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Survey
- Equilibrium Theory of Financial Markets: Recent Developments
(with J. H. Yoon), revise and resubmit, Journal of Economic Literature. PDF
Decentralized-Market
Design
- Decentralized Exchange (with S. Malamud), American
Economic Review 107, 11 (2017). PDF
- Exchange Design and Efficiency (with J. H. Yoon), Econometrica 89, 6 (2021). PDF
- Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Synthetic Products vs.
Trading Technology (with J. H. Yoon), AEJ:
Microeconomics, forthcoming. PDF
- Financial Product Design in Decentralized Markets (with J. H.
Yoon), revise and resubmit, Journal of Political
Economy. PDF
- Improving Access to
Information Through Market Design (with X. Wu). PDF
- Design of Market-Clearing Technology (with C. Lyu and J. H. Yoon).
Equilibrium and
Stability/Interactions among Groups/Games in Contracts
- Matching with Strategic Consistency (with N. Yoder). PDF
- Matching with Complementary Contracts (with N.
Yoder), Econometrica 88, 5 (2020, lead article). PDF
- Complementarity in Matching Markets and Exchange Economies
(with N. Yoder), revise and resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior. PDF
- Games in Contracts: Formal and Informal Institutions (with R.
Dix and J. H. Yoon).
Theory and Design
of Imperfectly Competitive Centralized Markets/Divisible Good Markets
- Price Inference in Small Markets (with M. Weretka), Econometrica 80, 2 (2012). PDF
- Demand Reduction and
Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (with with L. Ausubel, P. Cramton, M. Pycia,
and M. Weretka), Review
of Economic Studies 81,
4 (2014). PDF
- Dynamic Thin Markets (with M. Weretka), Review
of Financial Studies, 28, 10
(2015). PDF
- Information and Strategic Behavior (with M. Weretka), Journal of Economic
Theory 158 (2015). PDF
- Privacy in Markets (with M. Ollar
and J. H. Yoon). PDF
- Futures Contracts and Imperfect Competition (with C. Lyu and J. H. Yoon). PDF
- Dynamic Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Non-Recursive
Approach (with J. H. Yoon). PDF
- Supply Function Games with General Gaussian Information
Structures (with J. H. Yoon), available by e-mail.
- Reallocative Auctions and Core Selection (with N.
Yoder). PDF
Optimization and
Games in Spans: Applications to Financial Innovation, Information Disclosure,
and Bundling
Many economic problems involve sellers choosing collections of ''bundles'' in
order to maximize the bundles' market value. Instances of optimization over
bundles include issuance of asset-backed securities by real asset holders,
choosing a portfolio of risky assets to offer by central banks and Treasury
Departments, and selection of product variety by multiproduct sellers with a
bundle interpreted as a product with multiple continuous characteristics or
attributes. To study these economic problems, the following introduce and
analyze a class of single-agent problems and games in which strategies are
spans.
- Competition in Financial
Innovation (with A. Carvajal and M. Weretka), Econometrica 80, 5 (2012). PDF
- Information Design and Capital Formation (with A.
Carvajal and G. Sublet), Journal
of Economic Theory 176 (2018). PDF
Qualitative
Decision Making
- Quantile Maximization in
Decision Theory, Review of
Economic Studies 77 (2010). PDF
Misc
- Price Discrimination and Resale (with A. Basuchoudhary,
C. Metcalf, K. Pommerenke, D. H. Reiley, C. Rojas, and J. Stodder), Journal
of Economic Education (2008), 39 (3).
- Thin Markets (with M. Weretka), The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online (2008), Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Eds. Palgrave
Macmillan.
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