#LyX 2.0 created this file. For more info see http://www.lyx.org/ \lyxformat 413 \begin_document \begin_header \textclass article \use_default_options true \maintain_unincluded_children false \language english \language_package default \inputencoding auto \fontencoding global \font_roman default \font_sans default \font_typewriter default \font_default_family default \use_non_tex_fonts false \font_sc false \font_osf false \font_sf_scale 100 \font_tt_scale 100 \graphics default \default_output_format default \output_sync 0 \bibtex_command default \index_command default \paperfontsize default \spacing single \use_hyperref false \papersize a4paper \use_geometry true \use_amsmath 1 \use_esint 1 \use_mhchem 1 \use_mathdots 1 \cite_engine basic \use_bibtopic false \use_indices false \paperorientation portrait \suppress_date false \use_refstyle 1 \index Index \shortcut idx \color #008000 \end_index \paperwidth 15cm \paperheight 24cm \leftmargin 2.5cm \topmargin 2.5cm \rightmargin 2.5cm \bottommargin 2.5cm \secnumdepth 3 \tocdepth 3 \paragraph_separation indent \paragraph_indentation default \quotes_language english \papercolumns 1 \papersides 1 \paperpagestyle default \tracking_changes false \output_changes false \html_math_output 0 \html_css_as_file 0 \html_be_strict false \end_header \begin_body \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \noindent \align center \family typewriter \size large Prof. Marek Weretka's \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \noindent \align center \series bold \size large Econ 301 Intermediate Microeconomics \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing double \noindent \align center \series bold \size huge Problem Set 11 \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \begin_inset Formula $\vphantom{}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Subsubsection* \paragraph_spacing onehalf Problem 1 (Oligopolistic Industry) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf Below you can find market shares of major beer producers in the USA in 2000. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \begin_inset Formula $\vphantom{}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \align center \begin_inset Tabular \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Bud Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 36.8% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Coors Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 19.1% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Miller Lite \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 18.5% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Natural Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 9.2% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Busch Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 6.1% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Michelob Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 3.3% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Keystone Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 2.6% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Millwaukee's Best Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 2.3% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Old Milwaukee Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 0.8% \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout Miller Genuine Draft Light \end_layout \end_inset \begin_inset Text \begin_layout Plain Layout 0.7% \end_layout \end_inset \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf The total light beer sales in 2000 amounted to 87 million barrels. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf a) Find the concentration ratio (a "big four" index) for the beer industry in the USA. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf b) Is this industry perfectly competitive or oligopolistic (concentrated)? Why? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf c) In your opinion how would Trade Commission react to a merger proposal by Bud Light and Coors Light? Why? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \begin_inset Formula $\vphantom{}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Subsubsection* \paragraph_spacing onehalf Problem 2 (Aircraft Industry) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf The jet aircraft industry is dominated by two major competitors: Airbus (A - based in Europe) and Boeing (B - based in the USA). Both companies have similar technology allowing each firm to produce a jet at a cost of $20 (in millions). Accordingly, their costs functions are given by: \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \align center \begin_inset Formula $TC(y_{A})=20y_{A}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \align center \begin_inset Formula $TC(y_{B})=20y_{B}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf In order to simplify our analysis, we assume there are no fixed costs. The inverse demand function for jets by major airlines is estimated to be \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \align center \begin_inset Formula $p(y)=200-y$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf a) Find analytically profit function \begin_inset Formula $π_{B}(y_{B})$ \end_inset for Boeing, given that the production of Airbus amounts to \begin_inset Formula $y_{A}=100$ \end_inset jets. In a graph with \begin_inset Formula $y_{B}$ \end_inset on the horizontal axis and \begin_inset Formula $π$ \end_inset on the vertical one, plot the profit function. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf b) Is the production \begin_inset Formula $y_{B}=100$ \end_inset jets Boeing's best response to \begin_inset Formula $y_{A}=100$ \end_inset ? Why or why not? Find the optimal level of production, given Airbus produces \begin_inset Formula $y_{A}=100,y_{A}=50,$ \end_inset and \begin_inset Formula $y_{A}=0$ \end_inset ? Mark the three points in space \begin_inset Formula $(y_{A},y_{B})$ \end_inset . \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf c) Find analytically the best response function for Boeing \begin_inset Formula $R_{B}(y_{A})$ \end_inset and plot it in the graph from point b) . \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf d) Find analytically the best response function for Airbus, \begin_inset Formula $R_{A}(y_{B})$ \end_inset and add it to your graph from point b) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf e) Find analytically the market price of an aircraft, the level of individual and aggregate production in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Also find the level of profit of each individual firm. Show the equilibrium in your graph from b. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf f) What is the deadweight loss ( \begin_inset Formula $DWL$ \end_inset ) associated with oligopolistic trading by the two firms? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf g) Suppose the two firms A and B form a cartel. What is the aggregate level of production, and profit per firm given collusion? Does collusion benefit the two producers? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf h) Find a deadweight loss ( \begin_inset Formula $DWL$ \end_inset ) given collusion, and compare it to the one from f) . Which loss is greater, why? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf i) Is the considered cartel sustainable if the interactions, as described above, are only in the short run? Why? How about if the market interactions are repeated? Why? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \begin_inset Formula $\vphantom{}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Subsubsection* \paragraph_spacing onehalf Problem 3 (Accounting & Audit services in the USA) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf There are \begin_inset Formula $N>2$ \end_inset auditing firms in the USA (N is a parameter). "Production" \begin_inset Formula $y^{i}$ \end_inset of a firm i is measured in auditors' hours and a cost function is given by \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \align center \begin_inset Formula $TC(y^{i})=10y^{i}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf You can think of $10 as an hourly wage paid to an auditor. Again we assume no fixed cost. The inverse demand for auditing in the USA is \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \align center \begin_inset Formula $p(y)=1000-y$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf where y is an aggregate supply. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf a) Find the level of aggregate production and market price in two extreme cases: monopoly ( \begin_inset Formula $N=1$ \end_inset ) and perfect competition (Hint: recall that in the case of perfect competition the secret of happiness is \begin_inset Formula $p=MC$ \end_inset .) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf b) Plot the inverse demand function and mark the two points located on it - one for competitive interactions and one for monopoly. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf c) Find analytically the level of production \begin_inset Formula $y^{i}$ \end_inset supplied by each auditing firm and aggregate \begin_inset Formula $y$ \end_inset number of hours, market price for one hour, \begin_inset Formula $p$ \end_inset , the level of profit and the deadweight loss in the industry, all in the Cournot - Nash equilibrium. Find all variables as functions of N. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf d) Find the values of aggregate production y and p for N=2, 5 and 10. Mark the corresponding values on the graph from b) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf e) In the graph with N on the horizontal axis and p on the vertical one, plot the equilibrium price. What can you say about the price limit, as N goes to infinity? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf f) In the graph with N on the horizontal axis and y on the vertical one plot the equilibrium aggregate production. What can you say about the limit of aggregate production, as N goes to infinity? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf g) In the graph with N on horizontal and \begin_inset Formula $DWL$ \end_inset on vertical one plot the equilibrium \begin_inset Formula $DWL$ \end_inset . What can you say about the limit of aggregate production, as N goes to infinity? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \begin_inset Formula $\vphantom{}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \begin_inset Formula $\vphantom{}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Subsubsection* \paragraph_spacing onehalf Problem 4 (Externality) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \begin_inset Formula $\vphantom{}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf a) Give four examples of market interactions with externalities: two positive and two negative ones. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf b) In each of your examples is the outcome Pareto efficient or not? Why or why not ? (you can answer this question assuming that market is not regulated) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf c) In each case explain how possibly we could change incentives of the agents so that they are closer to socially optimal outcome? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \begin_inset Formula $\vphantom{}$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Subsubsection* \paragraph_spacing onehalf Problem 5 (Positive externality) \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf In this problem we study market interactions with positive externalities. We consider a plant that manufactures dynamite \begin_inset Formula $d$ \end_inset and a nearby farm producing tomatoes \begin_inset Formula $t$ \end_inset . The dynamite's production cost is: \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \align center \begin_inset Formula $TC_{d}(d,x)=(1/2)d²+(x-2)²$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf where \begin_inset Formula $d$ \end_inset is the amount of dynamite produced and \begin_inset Formula $x$ \end_inset is the intensity of use of a nitrogen in the production process. The side product associated with use of the nitrogen is ammonia - a fertilizer that is released to the air. Such fertilizer promotes growth of tomatoes making the production on the farm cheaper. In particular the higher the intensity x the lower is the farmer's cost: \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf \align center \begin_inset Formula $TC_{t}(t,x)=(1/2)t²+2t-xt$ \end_inset \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf The prices of tomatoes and dynamite are: \begin_inset Formula $p_{d}=p_{t}=$ \end_inset $1 \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf a) Is the market interaction associated with a positive or negative externality? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf b) Find the level of production of dynamite \begin_inset Formula $d$ \end_inset and intensity \begin_inset Formula $x$ \end_inset that maximizes the profit of the dynamite manufacturer. What is the maximal level of profit? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf c) What is the marginal benefit (negative of marginal cost) from using \begin_inset Formula $x$ \end_inset in optimum. Give one number and show it on the graph with \begin_inset Formula $x$ \end_inset is on the horizontal axis. Explain why this is a reasonable number. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf d) Given the intensity \begin_inset Formula $x$ \end_inset from a) find the optimal level of production of tomatoes \begin_inset Formula $t$ \end_inset , and the profit of the farmer. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf e) Find the joint profit of the dynamite manufacturer and the farmer. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf f) Find the \shape italic pareto efficient \shape default level of production of \begin_inset Formula $d,t$ \end_inset and use of nitrogen \begin_inset Formula $x$ \end_inset . Compare these values to the ones obtained in points b and d. \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf g) Is the marginal benefit from using \begin_inset Formula $x$ \end_inset in f positive, zero, or negative? Why? \end_layout \begin_layout Standard \paragraph_spacing onehalf h) Economists say that the positive externality is associated with too little activity, compared to the efficient outcome. Are your findings in this problem confirming this statement? \end_layout \end_body \end_document