{"id":158,"date":"2014-07-28T15:48:15","date_gmt":"2014-07-28T20:48:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/users.ssc.wisc.edu\/~oliver\/wp\/?page_id=158"},"modified":"2022-09-29T09:36:14","modified_gmt":"2022-09-29T14:36:14","slug":"collective-action","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/users.ssc.wisc.edu\/~peoliver\/teaching\/sm_seminar\/topics\/collective-action\/","title":{"rendered":"Soc 924 – Collective Action Theory and Mobilization Processes"},"content":{"rendered":"

These readings are in the rational action tradition in the study of collective action and mobilization processes<\/p>\n

Collective Action Theory: Basic Arguments<\/a> (see below for more advanced readings)<\/p>\n

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  1. * Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (1965) Introduction and Chapter 1. Still very widely cited as true, despite extensive critical literature since its publication. You need to know what he said, as well as know why his argument is misleading (which we will discuss in class). \u00a0The PDF copy<\/a><\/li>\n
  2. *Pamela Oliver (1993). \u201cFormal Models of Collective Action.\u201d Annual Review of Sociology 19: 271-300. The first part (pp. 271-277) of this article gives my summary of Olson\u2019s problem and subsequent critics and is the only \u201crequired\u201d part, but you should also read the short \u201csubstantive conclusions\u201d section on pp. 292-3.\u00a0<\/strong>The rest reviews formal models of mobilization for collective action and of models of the interplay between movements and their opponents and is less central to this class, especially as it is now out of date, although it does provide my view of the literature through 1990. Stable URL<\/a><\/li>\n
  3. Pamela Oliver, algebraic proof<\/a>\u00a0that Olson\u2019s equations are independent of group size, contrary to his text and usual claims that he \u201cproved\u201d that collective action is harder for larger groups. Originally published in my 1980 AJS article with lines scrambled by the typesetter to render it unintelligible and republished in Marwell and Oliver\u2019s 1993 book.<\/li>\n
  4. Pamela Oliver, Gerald Marwell, and Ruy Teixeira. \u201cA Theory of the Critical Mass, I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Goods.\u201d American Journal of Sociology, Volume 91, Number 3, pages 522-556. (1985) The first in the series, which makes the major points about differences in forms of collective action. The technical arguments can be hard to follow (and you do not need to follow them in detail unless you are interested), but the main idea is that there are different kinds of collective action and that group heterogeneity is critical. Stable URL<\/a><\/li>\n
  5. Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell. \u201cThe Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action. A Theory of the Critical Mass. II.\u201d American Sociological Review, Volume 53, Number 1, pages 1-8. (1988) Most widely cited because it is the easiest to read. A direct critique of Olson\u2019s \u201csize\u201d argument. Stable URL<\/a><\/li>\n
  6. Pamela Oliver. “Rational Action.” This is a preprint of my chapter in Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements<\/em>. It argues that the impact of rational action theory was to emphasize the role of organization and networks in collective action, contra critics who associate rational action theory with isolated individualism. \u00a0Oliver_Rational Action_OxfordHandbook_1sp_preprint<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Empirical Work On Collective Action Models<\/a><\/p>\n

    There are quite a few empirical articles that assess the empirical predictors of collective action using a cost\/benefit framework. Interests (private and collective), selective incentives, individual and collective efficacy\/influence (probability of making a difference), and perceived costs are assessed.<\/p>\n