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Kurt Schock. Social Problems.  August 1999 v46 i3 p355.

Author's Abstract: 
This study assesses the relevance of the political opportunity framework for social movements in non-democratic contexts by applying it to two people power movements that occurred in the Philippines and Burma during the 1980s. The movement in the Philippines culminated in the toppling of the Marcos dictatorship and a democratic transition. The movement in Burma was violently suppressed, and although multiparty elections were subsequently held as a result of the protest movement, the military regime refused to honor them and remained in power. The core dimensions of political opportunity are used to account for the mobilization of the two movements and their divergent outcomes. As expected by the political opportunity framework, influential allies and elite divisions influenced the mobilization and outcomes of the movements. The application of the political opportunity framework to non-democracies uncovers some limitations with the framework as well: the under-theorized role of the international context and the importance of press freedoms and information flows. A comparative approach uncovers limitations with the additive enumeration of political opportunities for single movements. Violent and indiscriminate repression was found to have a differential effect on mobilization depending on whether other opportunities were present or absent. More generally, a configuration approach to political opportunities is proposed that incorporates a multiple and conjunctural conception of causation. This approach assumes that political opportunities may not be independent of each other and that political opportunities may have differential effects on dissent depending on the larger configuration of opportunities in which they occur.

Full Text: COPYRIGHT 1999 University of California Press 

In the 1980s both the Philippines and Burma(1) experienced widespread people power movements where millions of peaceful demonstrators called for the end of dictatorship and a transition to democracy. Citizens in both cases put their lives on the line by demonstrating against authoritarian regimes which had the capacity and propensity for violent repression. The movement in the Philippines culminated in the People Power "revolution" of February 1986 in which Ferdinand Marcos's dictatorship was toppled by a broad-based democratic opposition led by Corazon Aquino. Protest in Burma erupted in the spring of 1988 at the universities in Rangoon. By the summer the protests escalated into a broad-based pro-democracy movement that continued until September 1988, when the regime reorganized itself and brutally suppressed the movement. What facilitated the mobilization of people power movements in the Philippines and Burma in the 1980s? Why did the movement in the Philippines culminate in a regime change, while the movement in Burma did not? The purpose of this article is to assess the relevance of political opportunities in accounting for the mobilization and the outcomes of social movements in non-democratic contexts and to uncover limitations of previous research on political opportunities. 
Political process theory, which emerged in reaction to the internal emphasis of resource mobilization theories of social movements, attempts to specify factors external to social movements, usually referred to as political opportunities, that influence their mobilization, form, or outcome (Jenkins 1985; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). The political process theory, which includes mobilizing structures and cultural framing processes in addition to political opportunities, has become the dominant perspective on social movements (see McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). Despite the privileged position of the political opportunity framework, there are a number of criticisms.(2) First, the approach is biased towards social movements in developed democracies. While the utility of the political opportunity framework for non-democratic contexts has been proposed (Boudreau 1996; Jenkins and Schock 1992) we lack systematic applications of political opportunities to challenges outside of democracies.(3) Second, since works incorporating political opportunities into their explanations tend to be case studies of single, successful social movements, selection bias may be a problem. Cross-national comparisons are more common in studies of European social movements (e.g., Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995), but these studies are limited to movements in Western democracies. Third, the dimensions of political opportunities incorporated into explanations of social movements have included just about everything external to movements. The core dimensions of political opportunities need to be identified and consistently applied in order to make useful comparisons over time, across countries, and for different types of movements (Gamson and Meyer 1996). Fourth, as some have noted, there is a tendency to be ambiguous about what political opportunities are actually explaining (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1996). That is, researchers need to be explicit in what they are trying to explain with political opportunities: mobilization, form, or outcomes of social movements. Political opportunities influencing the mobilization of a challenge may not influence, or may operate differently on the form of dissent or the outcome of the movement. Fifth, until recently the international context of political opportunities has been ignored. McAdam (1996, 1998), for example, suggests that a major component missing from his earlier political process model was the international context of political opportunities.(4) 
These five criticisms of political opportunities will be addressed by examining the people power movements in the Philippines and Burma. First, both movements occurred in less-developed, non-democratic, and non-Western contexts. Second, a comparison will be made between two similar movements (see the description of people power movements below) with two different outcomes, permitting a paired-comparison design. As will be shown in the analysis, the independent variables (political opportunities) and integration into the world system vary across the two cases as well as the movement outcomes. Third, in order to avoid conceptual stretching of political opportunities, I will begin the analysis with what some scholars regard as its core dimensions: increasing political access, influential allies, divided elites, and declining state repression (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998).(5) Fourth, I will make explicit and keep analytically distinct the two dependent variables: movement mobilization and outcome. By mobilization, I mean sustained collective action targeted against the government by at least tens of thousands of participants drawn from many segments of society. By outcome, I simply mean whether there is a regime change characterized by democratization. A movement is successful if there is such a regime change and unsuccessful if there is not. Fifth, the international context will be explicitly considered. Before the core dimensions of political opportunity are applied to the social movements in the Philippines and in Burma, I will describe what is meant by people power movements and provide brief descriptions of the states and the movements in the two countries. 
People power movements are challenges to the policies or structures of authoritarian regimes that primarily incorporate methods of nonviolent action, such as protest demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, and interventions (e.g., nonviolent blockades, creation of parallel institutions [see Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Sharp 1973]). While nonviolent action has been used throughout history, its modern practice was formulated by Gandhi in opposition to the racist laws in South Africa and British colonial rule in India (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Burrowes 1996; Sharp 1973). Since the 1950s, aspects of nonviolent action have been commonly incorporated into protest movements in the West, including the civil rights, student, women's, environmental, and peace movements. Methods of nonviolent action were also used to oppose communist rule in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Poland during the 1980s, and throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by the late 1980s. In recent years, challenges to authoritarian regimes in the Third World have been characterized by a shift in strategy from violent guerrilla insurgencies to unarmed insurrections that primarily incorporate methods of nonviolent action (Zunes 1994). By the late twentieth century nonviolent action had become global and modular (Tarrow 1998). 
States and Movements 
The Philippines 
The declaration of martial law by Marcos in 1972 marked the end of democratic politics and the beginning of a dictatorship characterized as neo-patrimonial or personalistic. Marcos claimed that martial law was necessary to counter threats of communist insurgency and to implement land reform. Most likely his motives were to undermine competing centers of power and to centralize the formerly decentralized patrimonial polity. Marcos extended his financial reach throughout society with patron-client ties. Through state monopolies, he subcontracted to his relatives and friends important areas of the economy for plundering. By controlling the economy, foreign aid from the United States, and foreign loans from international banks, Marcos and his cronies amassed great wealth (Aquino 1987; Hutchcroft 1991; Overholt 1986; Wurfel 1988). According to Wurfel (1988:138), "[t]he patrimonial style of governance increasingly recognized no boundary between the public purse and that of the First Family." 
While the ultimate basis of Marcos's power was the military, he relied on legalistic arguments, and incorporated referenda and plebiscites as mechanisms for building regime legitimacy. These techniques were characterized by intimidation and fraud, and they ultimately failed to provide the regime with legitimacy (Wurfel 1988). The most salient issues of Marcos's rule, which led to widespread grievances and eventually protest, were the "politics of plunder" and indiscriminate repression; this alienated much of Philippine society (Aquino 1987). 
The people power movement in the Philippines can ostensibly be traced back to the assassination of Benigno Aquino. Aquino, a long-time political opponent of Marcos, returned to the Philippines from exile in the United States in August, 1983, and was assassinated upon his arrival at Manila International Airport. More than two million people gathered for Aquino's funeral procession, which was transformed into an anti-Marcos demonstration. After the Aquino assassination much of the public shifted from passive acceptance of the Marcos regime to active political opposition. By 1985 it was apparent that Marcos had lost legitimacy. In response to the rising protests, Marcos called for snap elections to be held on February 7, 1986. Confident in his ability to hold fraudulent elections and intimidate the seemingly unorganized opposition, Marcos fully expected to remain in power. He was opposed by Corazon Aquino, who headed a loose coalition of pro-democracy groups that had little in common besides the desire to oust Marcos (Thompson 1995). 
Shortly after the snap elections, thirty-five government election workers responsible for the computerized tabulation of votes walked off their jobs in protest of the election fraud being committed. On February 16, Corazon Aquino, responding to the obviously fraudulent declaration of an electoral victory for Marcos by the Batasang Pambansa (national assembly), led a rally of over two million people, proclaiming victory for herself and "the people," condemning Marcos, and launching the Tagumpay ng Bayan (triumph of the people) campaign of civil disobedience. On February 22, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile led two battalions of soldiers in a mutiny, barricading two major military camps in Quezon City. He was joined by General Fidel Ramos, and they announced their withdrawal of support from Marcos and their support for Aquino. Shortly thereafter, Manila Archbishop Jamie Cardinal Sin condemned the election as fraudulent, declared that the regime had lost its moral authority to govern, and urged people to nonviolently resist the Marcos dictatorship. He made an appeal over the radio for people to show their support for the mutiny. In response, hundreds of thousands of pro-democracy sympathizers assembled at the military camps. Marcos ordered two battalions to the military camps to put down the rebellion, but as the tanks approached the military camps civilians formed a human barrier between the tanks and the rebels in the camp. The troops sent by Marcos retreated in the face of a mass of unarmed civilians led by priests and nuns. These dramatic events sparked a nationwide defection of soldiers and officers. On February 26, Corazon Aquino was sworn in as president and Marcos was escorted to Honolulu by the U.S. military. The people power movement succeeded. It prevented a violent clash between the divided segments of the armed forces and it forced Marcos from office (Elwood 1997). 
Burma 
In contrast to the Philippines, the military played a central role in governing Burma. The regime has been commonly referred to as bureaucratic-authoritarian or military-socialist. General Ne Win assumed dictatorial power in March 1962, staging a coup against the democratic regime of U Nu and organizing and chairing a 24-member Revolutionary Council. The raison d'etre for the military's assertion of control over the state included a perceived turning away from the state's founding socialist principles and U Nu's policy of establishing Buddhism as the state religion. Also of note was U Nu's negotiations with leaders of two of the non-Burman states in the union for greater autonomy, with the possibility that they would attempt to exercise their constitutional right to secede. Upon the declaration of martial law Ne Win expanded the role of the military in politics, bureaucratic administration, and the economy. The Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) was formed in 1962 as a means of mass mobilization and political indoctrination, and all other political parties were banned. Within the BSPP, the Peasants' Asiayon, Workers' Asiayon, and the Lansin Youth Organization were the primary bodies for mobilization. All institutional rivals of the Revolutionary Council were eliminated by law and new institutions were created with direct ties to the state (Taylor 1987). 
The regime's economic policies concentrated economic control and management in the hands of the state, limiting the development of private centers of wealth with the potential for producing political power independent of the state. After 1962, firms that were not nationalized were placed under strict state supervision. Burma subsequently pursued an autarkic economic policy and attempted to disengage from involvement in the world economy (Taylor 1987). The result of the military-run economy was gross inefficiency, rampant corruption, and economic decline (Maung 1991, 1992; Silverstein 1977; Steinberg 1990). Economic decline, along with indiscriminate repression, led to widespread grievances and eventually protest. 
Overt protest against the regime during the 1980s was minimal until 1988. In March 1988, students at the Rangoon Institute of Technology protested against the killing of university students by the Lon Htein, or riot police. They were soon joined by students from Rangoon University in daily protests, which took an explicitly anti-government and pro-democracy stance. The Lon Htein was called in to breakup the demonstrations with force; they killed scores of students and arrested more than 1,000 students. On March 18, hundreds of students marched from the university campuses to downtown Rangoon, gathering supporters along the way. The anti-regime protest grew into the thousands by the time it reached downtown. The demonstrators were again met with violence from the Lon Htein and by army troops as well. Scores of protesters and bystanders were killed and thousands were arrested. The government shut down the universities and the movement temporarily collapsed (Lintner 1990; Yitri 1989). 
When the universities re-opened on May 30, 1988, students began to organize a mass movement. By mid-June, large demonstrations within the confines of the university campuses were taking place. On June 21st, the students once again took to the streets, joined by Buddhist monks and workers from nearby factories (Lintner 1990). Protesters were also drawn from a pool of disaffected and unemployed urban residents (Taylor 1991). Once again they were met by violence from the Lon Htein and an estimated 80 to 100 dissidents were killed. A new curfew was imposed and the universities were closed again. Significantly, anti-regime protests erupted outside of Rangoon as well, with protests reported in Pegu, Prome, and Mulmein (Lintner 1990; Yitri 1989). 
In response to the spreading protests, the government announced that the BSPP would hold an extraordinary congress in late July. At the extraordinary party congress, Ne Win announced that he would step down from his position of president and chairman of the BSPP. He also suggested that a referendum take place to gauge the public's support for a multiparty system. The proposal for the referendum, however, was rejected by the BSPP congress. The rejection of the proposal and the appointment of Sein Lwin, the universally despised commander of the Lon Htein, to the posts of president and BSPP chairman led to a new and intensified round of anti-regime protests (Lintner 1990; Yitri 1989). 
Protests once again erupted and a nationwide general strike was planned for August 8th, 1988 (8-8-88). The demonstrations in Rangoon leading up to the general strike attracted tens of thousands of people, composed of students, monks, civil servants, workers, and the unemployed. On August 8th, the general strike began. Downtown Rangoon was filled with tens of thousands of peaceful pro-democracy protesters from all segments of society and from all ethnic groups. Huge demonstrations erupted in cities and towns throughout the country. The festive atmosphere in Rangoon was broken that night when the military opened fire with machine guns. The massacre left an estimated one to three thousand dead in Rangoon. The demonstrations outside of Rangoon were brutally suppressed as well. Smaller demonstrations in Rangoon and throughout the country, which were also violently suppressed, continued sporadically for a few more days. Finally, on August 12th it was announced that Sein Lwin had resigned. Despite the carnage, the people power movement forced Sein Lwin from office. On August 19th, the government announced that his successor, Dr. Maung Maung, who was the highest ranking civilian in the party and a "moderate" in the military regime. The next day demonstrations resumed as tens of thousands of people rejected Dr. Maung Maung's nomination and demanded an end to one-party rule and the formation of a new interim government. On August 22nd, a nationwide general strike was once again proclaimed. Strike centers were established in towns and cities across the country and daily anti-regime, pro-democracy demonstrations took place (Lintner 1990; Yitri 1989). 
Martial law was unexpectedly lifted and the military withdrew from the cities. On August 23rd and 24th an estimated one million people participated in the protest demonstrations in Rangoon alone while other cities drew crowds in the hundred thousands (Burma Watcher 1989). On August 26th, a crowd estimated to be at least 500,000 people gathered to hear Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of one of Burma's independence heroes, General Aung San, give her first public speech. She emerged as the leading voice of the pro-democracy opposition. The general strike was crippling the regime and for a while it seemed as if the prodemocracy movement would succeed. 
However, by early September the festive, Philippine-style people power movement turned lugubrious. Agent provocateurs from the military, along with criminals who had been released from prison, engaged in arson, looting, violence, and other destabilizing activities apparently in an effort to legitimize the military's restoration of order and return to power. As the anti-regime demonstrations and the general strike continued the country was on the verge on anarchy. Then, on September 18th, a group of generals organized by Ne Win and led by General Saw Maung staged a "sui coup,"(6) and announced the formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Committee (SLORC). Once again martial law was imposed and the army returned to the cities and brutally repressed all opposition. By September 20th, the demonstrations had ended and once again several thousand unarmed civilians were killed. Arrests and summary executions of alleged dissident organizers continued into October and the universities remained closed. SLORC ordered all people to return to work and threatened those who did not return to work with dismissal and arrest. In need of food and money, the workers returned and almost eight-weeks of general strikes collapsed (Lintner 1990; Yitri 1989). The movement failed as sustained collective action ceased and the regime reorganized and remained in power. 
Similar to Marcos's tactics in the Philippines, SLORC scheduled elections in an effort to increase international legitimacy and foreign aid. Elections for the Pyitha Hluttaw (national assembly) were subsequently held on May 20, 1990. The regime fully expected to win the elections, having imposed severe restrictions on organizing and having arrested opposition party leaders in the months leading up to the elections. The descendent of the BSPP, the National Unity Party (NUP), received 21.2 percent of the votes (2.1% of the seats). The most outspoken opposition to the military regime, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won 59.9 percent of the votes (80.8% of the seats [Guyot 1991]). The goal of the NLD, whose General Secretary was Aung San Suu Kyi, was to form a federalist democratic system with full respect for human rights. Stunned by the results, SLORC refused to honor the elections and remained in power. Thus, after more than two years (March 1988 to May 1990), the people power movement, though successful in ousting Sein Lwin from power and forcing the government to hold multiparty elections, was ultimately unsuccessful in toppling the military regime. 
Political Opportunities in Comparative Perspective 
As discussed above, the political opportunity framework was originally developed to explain social movements in democratic contexts. So what is the rationale for applying political opportunities to the explanation of social movements in non-democratic regimes? It is based on the assumption that political contention is facilitated or constrained by aspects of the political environment, regardless of the type of regime in which it occurs. In other words, the underlying assumption that social movements are shaped by the broader context of political opportunities and constraints should hold in non-democratic, as well as democratic regimes. Moreover, political opportunities may be even more important for political contention in non-democratic regimes. Since these political systems are characterized by a lack of institutional access, a lack of regular and effective political competition, and often a lack of institutionalized procedures for political succession, any sign of increasing political opportunities is likely to generate political contention. However there are some major differences between democratic and non-democratic political contexts that have consequences for the relevance of certain dimensions and consequences for how political opportunities influence movement mobilization and outcomes. 
In democracies, there are numerous points at which institutionalized political access may increase for challengers, providing them with openings to power-wielding policy-makers such as legislatures, judiciaries, executives, and bureaucracies. These points may be accessed at a number of different levels as well, depending upon the degree to which the polity is decentralized. If access at one point closes, challengers may attempt to influence policy-makers at other points of access. By contrast, non-democratic regimes are highly centralized with the legislatures, judiciaries, and bureaucracies typically wielding no real power independent from the state executive. Moreover, increasing access is unlikely to occur since it would undermine the power and legitimacy of the regime. Increasing access through the opening of legal or electoral routes, for example, would involve the creation of new avenues of influence resulting in a change in the form of rule itself, undermining the regime's legitimacy and sources of power. Given the incapacity of states to meet the demands of the populace in most less-developed societies, non-democratic regimes usually rely on mass mobilizing parties to shape and channel political demands. When these fail to meet demands or provide legitimacy, the state must rely on a combination of repression and promises of future political reforms in order to deflect demands. 
The relationship between repression and dissent is complex,(7) but generally speaking the political opportunity literature suggests that declining repression should promote movement mobilization and success while increasing repression should deter mobilization and inhibit success. Repression of social movements in democracies can assume a variety of forms from subtle to blatant intervention by state authorities (e.g., Churchill and Vander Wall 1990; Gelbspan 1991). In democracies violent repression is typically targeted only at "extremist" challengers who themselves employ violence. In non-democratic regimes violent repression is more widespread and often used in an indiscriminate manner against entire populations. 
Influential allies facilitate the mobilization and success of social movements by providing organizational expertise, economic assistance, and leadership, and by lowering the power discrepancies between challengers and the state. Challengers are usually too vulnerable to risk engaging in overt oppositional activities without influential allies. In democracies, political parties, professional associations, and labor unions have played crucial roles as influential allies to social movements. In non-democratic regimes, by contrast, political parties, professional associations, and labor unions, it they exist, tend to be controlled by the state, thus precluding their role as an influential ally to challengers. Therefore, influential allies in nondemocratic regimes must come from areas outside the control of the state, such as religious institutions, transnational social movements or foreign governments. 
Elite divisions in democracies tend to be over economic or social policies rather than the form of political rule. Moreover, a virtue of democratic systems is that elections provide regular and institutionalized mechanisms for elite realignment, and elites, to an extent, must mobilize a certain degree of mass support. In non-democratic contexts, elite divisions may have more far-reaching consequences for social change as they occur not only over economic and social policies, but over the type of political system as well. The lack of regular and institutionalized methods of elite competition and succession increases the likelihood that any sign of elite divisions or realignments will produce political contention. 
Press freedoms and information flows have not been considered a dimension of political opportunity in democracies, since by definition the press is relatively free and there is a relatively free flow of information. However, in non-democratic contexts there may be significant variation in the extent to which the state controls both the press and the flow of information. This may vary both within non-democratic regimes over time, and across non-democratic regimes. Given that political opportunities are aspects of the external political environment that facilitate or constrain collective action and influence movement outcomes, press freedoms and information flows can be considered a relevant political opportunity. 
Political Opportunities in the Philippines 
Repression 
Marcos repressed political opponents throughout the duration of his regime. In order to silence opponents, Marcos used the police and the military to enforce prohibitions against organized political opposition, and to imprison, torture and assassinate real and perceived opponents. Peaceful demonstrations were often met by crude military force. There was not a decline in repression which would have promoted mobilization, as expected by the political opportunity framework. In fact repression by the regime seemed to promote mobilization instead. According to Wurfel (1988:127), ". . . [a] growing portion of the citizenry was appalled at the brutality and the haphazard selection of victims. Detention and torture may have deterred some organized expression of dissent, but many Filipinos found in it a course for disaffection from the regime. The opposition, both revolutionary and reformist, grew." Only during the regime's last hour did repression decline, when troops which had been loyal to Marcos refused to use force against the unarmed citizens and military rebels. Thus, while Marcos's use of arbitrary and indiscriminate repression promoted mobilization, in the end his incapacity to repress the people power movement was crucial to his downfall. 
Influential Allies 
Upon the imposition of martial law in 1972, the traditional political parties fell apart as political opponents transferred their allegiance en masse to Marcos in order to benefit from his patronage system. All remaining political organizations that opposed Marcos's rule were repressed. However, the personalistic nature of Marcos's authoritarian rule did not effect the existence of autonomous institutions that did not directly threaten his interests. The mobilization of the people power movement was greatly facilitated by two areas outside of Marcos's control, the Catholic Church and segments of the business class. As stated by Thompson (1995:6) the challenger's ". . . limited resources forced them to turn to civil society, in particular the Catholic Church and business groups, for mass protests against the regime." 
While originally supportive of Marcos, the Catholic Church eventually provided support and resources fundamental to the mobilization of the people power movement. Elements of the Catholic Church openly opposed the Marcos dictatorship from the start, but the Catholic Church's general policy toward the Marcos regime was one of "critical collaboration," which before 1983 was more collaborative than critical (Thompson 1995:118). However, after the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983, the mainstream elements of the Catholic Church overtly opposed Marcos and provided institutional assistance to the pro-democracy challenge. While political cleavages existed within the Catholic Church, by 1983 the moderates led by Manila Archbishop Jaime Sin, came to the forefront of the Church in opposition to the Marcos regime. Moreover, the Catholic Church, as well as human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), were tied into transnational social movements, which facilitated the movement. 
By the early 1980s, elements of the business class were also providing organizational support and resources for the mobilization of the people power movement. While support for the democratic opposition on the part of the Catholic Church was based on moral issues, such as human rights, members of the business community supported the pro-democracy movement for more material reasons. Initially, the business community benefited from the imposition of martial law. Political order, docile labor unions, an influx of foreign funds, and rapid economic growth were all acceptable reasons for backing the Marcos regime. By the early 1980s, however, segments of the business class reassessed their position as corruption was rampant, more and more sectors of the economy were being controlled by crony corporations, and the economy was in a state of decline. Businesses in Makati, the central business district of Metro Manila, began holding weekly anti-Marcos rallies. According to Thompson (1995:120), "[t]he large crowds that anti-Marcos executives could mobilize and the substantial financial assistance that they could provide made them crucial to the success of the traditional opposition." Without the support of the church or capitalists, the regime depended on the military and the backing of the U.S. to remain in power. However, as elaborated on below, these bases of support were beginning to unravel as well. 
The Aquino assassination marked a turning point with regard to the role the U.S. was to play in the Philippines' internal politics, as it had the effect of dividing the support of the U.S. for Marcos. One faction within the U.S. government, composed of the State Department and members of Congress, wanted to avoid an anti-U.S. revolution as had recently occurred in Nicaragua and Iran. The growing communist insurgency and Marcos's indiscriminate repression of the democratic opposition forced them to break with the Reagan administration, which continued to support Marcos believing that support was justified given Marcos's anti-Communist rhetoric (Bonner 1987; Thompson 1995). In an effort to stem the growth of the communist New People's Army and to build up the democratic opposition, the anti-Marcos faction in the U.S. provided key support to both the people power movement and the reform movement within the military.(8) Once Reagan sided with the anti-Marcos faction and withdrew support from the Marcos regime, in addition to the earlier withdrawal of support from the Catholic Church and segments of the business class, Marcos could no longer rule. As discussed below, the United States was also crucial in exacerbating elite disunity within the military by supporting the reformist faction against the faction loyal to Marcos. 
Elite Divisions 
By the early 1980s a number of elite divisions within the Marcos regime were manifested (Wurfel 1988). The most important of these with regard to the people power movement were the divisions among the economic elite between the "cronies" and the non-crony segments of the business class, and divisions in the military command between officers whose positions were based primarily on their loyalty to Marcos and officers with a more professional orientation. 
The so-called "cronies" were the new economic elite promoted by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. They were relatives and close friends of the Marcoses who prospered through access to government credit and contracts, and an inside track in landing joint ventures with foreign investors. Large sums of money were funneled from the state treasury and government banks to the crony corporations. Their rise increased the hostility of the old economic elite as well as indigenous entrepreneurs and lead to mobilization against the regime. In 1981, the Makati Business Club was formed to articulate the business interests of the non-crony segments of the business class, marking a shift from covert to overt opposition to the regime (Wurfel 1988). 
Elite divisions within the military emerged in the late 1970s in response to Marcos's personalization of the military and corruption within the armed forces. By the 1980s the most significant rivalry within the armed forces was between General Fidel Ramos and General Ponce Enrile on the one hand, and General Fabian Ver on the other. Ramos was regarded as the epitome of professionalism and attracted respect from junior officers with high professional standards. His major competitor was Ver, whose rise to power was the result of personal loyalty to Marcos. By 1984 General Enrile was spearheading the Reformed Armed Forces Movement (RAM), a reform movement within the armed forces, in response to the personalization of the military and the growing communist insurgency. The U.S. State Department and military, also in response to Marcos's military policies, became actively involved in promoting the reformist sector of the military, led by Enrile, against the sector led by Ver (Wurfel 1988). By 1986, the U.S. had knowledge of and supported a proposed coup against Marcos. The support RAM and Ramos received from segments of the U.S. government was a crucial factor contributing to the fall of Marcos and the success of the people power movement. 
Press Freedoms/Information Flows 
Upon the imposition of martial law in 1972, Marcos closed down all media outlets and arrested outspoken journalists. The initial censorship was lifted in 1973, but by this time the major media outlets were controlled by Marcos or his cronies (Rosenberg 1979). However, by the early 1980s, a substantial alternative press was developing and the Aquino assassination in 1983 fueled its growth. After the assassination, the alternative press was the only credible source of political information in the Philippines (Doronila 1985). Moreover, the Catholic Church promoted the mobilization of the pro-democracy movement by openly criticizing the regime in its weekly newspaper and over the church-run radio station. As noted by Wurfel (1988:215), "[t]he Catholic Church was the only institution in the Philippines with both a nationwide network of communications and the legitimacy to use that network for political purposes." Thus, the rise of an alternative press and the Catholic Church's communications networks were able to provide the public with accurate information and facilitate the mobilization of the pro-democracy movement. 
Political Opportunities in Burma 
Repression 
Repression has been consistently and indiscriminately applied to protests against the military regime. In July 1962, four months after the coup, the army occupied Rangoon University and blew up the student union, killing up to 100 students who were protesting against the Revolutionary Council's closing of independent student political organizations. Riots in Rangoon in 1967 due to food shortages, and student unrest at the universities during the Southeast Asian games in 1969, were violently repressed. In 1974, workers and students in Rangoon protested against inflation and food shortages after the implementation of economic policies which favored the rural sector. The protests began with strikes in state-owned factories. They ended with the use of force in which at least 22 people were killed and with the closing of the universities. Later that year in December, students and Buddhist monks protested at the state's funeral arrangements for the former UN Secretary-General U Thant. Over 100 people were killed (Taylor 1987). According to Taylor (1987:336), the military has consistently responded to protests with ". . . minimal manpower and maximum firepower to demonstrate, as rapidly as possible, its determination to keep the unrest from spreading and to serve as a deterrent." 
From the beginning of the protests in March, 1988 the government once again met demonstrations with excessive and indiscriminate repression. However, the state's "disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force had kindled a deep and massive response within the populace" (Yitri 1989:556). "Instead of becoming afraid, more and more people joined the movement" (Lintner 1990:9). At the beginning of the people power movement indiscriminate repression had the effect of mobilizing the movement. Yet when SLORC assumed power and the military returned to the cities on September 18th repression was again applied indiscriminately. According to Yitri (1989:554), the army was a ". . . brutal, blunt weapon incapable of discrimination." "Parts of Rangoon were turned into a free-fire zone, with troops shooting people in tea shops, at bus stops, and even in their homes" (1989:549). Thus, the apparent effect of the violent and indiscriminate repression was to promote mobilization of the movement from March to August 1988, but then by September 1988, the violent and indiscriminate repression had the effect of demobilizing and suppressing the movement. The paradoxical relationship between repression and dissent will be discussed below. 
Influential Allies 
The people power movement in Burma was not characterized by the degree of influential allies as was the movement in the Philippines. There was not a business class in Burma independent of the state that could have supported the dissidents. Nationalization of businesses and property during the 1960s resulted in the departure of much of the Indian and Chinese entrepreneurial class and destroyed the emerging Burmese middle class (Taylor 1987, 1998). Moreover, no elite divisions within the military command manifested themselves before or during the people power movement. There was significant support for the people power movement in Burma by individual members of the Buddhist sangha (monkhood).(9) However as elaborated on below, the relationship between the sangha and the state and the propensity of the regime to repress the sangha in Burma was significantly different from the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state, the state's propensity to repress the Catholic Church in the Philippines. 
In the 1960s the sangha successfully resisted the government's efforts to register monks as a method of attaining control over the Buddhist monkhood (Silverstein 1977). Subsequent attempts by the Ne Win regime to exert control over the sangha had been relatively ineffective until May, 1980, when the relationship between the state and the sangha was fundamentally altered. The state sponsored the First Congregation of the Sangha of All Orders for the Purification, Perpetuation, and Propagation of the Sasana, which established rules for the registration of all monks and for the removal of monks who engaged in political activities. This meeting, along with a second congregational meeting in 1985, led to a much greater control over the Buddhist monkhood by its older and conservative leadership and by the state (Matthews 1993; Taylor 1987; Than 1988). 
Moreover, the allegiance of the leadership towards the regime varied across the two cases. In the Philippines the Archbishop of Manila, Cardinal Sin, was an outspoken critic of the regime since the mid-1970s. By the 1980s, he had completely withdrawn his support for the regime, urging people to vote for Aquino and to participate in civil disobedience against the regime in 1986. In contrast, the conservative leadership of the sangha did not overtly criticize the military regime and consistently disapproved of monks participating in anti-regime demonstrations (Kurzman 1998). 
The Catholic Church in the Philippines was by no means immune from repression, but for the most part repression occurred at the outset of martial law except for the more radical and politically oriented sects of the church, such as the Christian Social Movement, which were repressed throughout the duration of martial law. Yet compared to the sangha in Burma, the Catholic Church as an institution was much less prone to control by the regime and there were apparent limits on the extent to which repression could be used. When Cardinal Sin refused to support Marcos during the 1986 election and encouraged active opposition to the regime, Marcos could not resort to using force against Cardinal Sin given the Archbishop's position in Filipino society. In contrast, dissident political activity by monks in Burma was consistently repressed. When the military cracked down on the people power movement in September, 1988, troops carried out orders to shoot Buddhist monks who participated in the demonstrations. On the second anniversary of the 8-8-88 general strike, thousands of monks participated in anti-regime demonstrations. Once again, several monks were shot and numerous others beaten and arrested. The military crushed the opposition of individual monks within the sangha by attacking all 133 monasteries, disrobing, beating and imprisoning hundreds of monks in Mandalay, the center of sangha activism against the regime (Lintner 1990; Matthews 1993; Maung 1992). Thus, while a significant segment of the sangha supported and participated in the people power movement, the state's control over the sangha, the leadership's refusal to oppose the regime and disapprobation of dissident monks, and the state's willingness to repress the dissident monks suggests that the sangha was not an influential ally to the people power movement in Burma as was the Catholic Church in the Philippines. 
The people power movement in Burma also differed from the movement in the Philippines with regard to the role of international influential allies. Burma has historically been more isolated than the rest of Southeast Asia and suspicion of foreigners and capitalism has been prevalent in the ideologies among Burma's intellectuals since the early 1900s. Following the 1962 coup, Burma severed most of its international ties and pursued a non-aligned, isolationist policy that remained insulated from direct political influence by foreign powers. When the pro-democracy dissidents provided a serious challenge to the regime, there were no foreign powers in the position to influence the outcome of the social movement through withdrawal of their support from the regime. The Western powers denounced the regime's brutality, but there was little they could do, or were willing to do, besides impose trade sanctions and restrict government aid (Guyot and Badgley 1990). Meanwhile, the Thai government arrested and deported dissidents who sought refuge across its border, China, Pakistan and Singapore sold military arms to SLORC, and Japan, while temporarily suspending aid, refused to join the West in an economic boycott due to its substantial economic interests in Burma. Moreover, there were no transnational social movements in the position to provide direct support for the movement, as none operated inside Burma. 
Elite Divisions 
Since the coup in 1962, Ne Win ruled Burma using the military as a vehicle for exerting control over the state and economy and for advancing officers loyal to him. All senior military officers owed their promotions to him. Officers within the military who presented challenges to Ne Win's rule, either through the development of their own cliques or through attempts at professionalization, were successfully purged. 
Prior to the people power movement, the only serious challenges to Ne Win's rule were from elites within the military and at the apex of the BSPP (which overlapped to a great degree). Following the worker and student protests of 1974-75, General Tin U was forced to resign. It was rumored that a split within the armed forces emerged between a pro-Tin U faction of field commanders who faced the brunt of the fighting against the ethnic insurgents, and the officers who had taken a leading part in the development of the state in Rangoon. In July, 1976, seven military officers were arrested and tried for allegedly plotting to assassinate Ne Win. General Tin U, who some viewed as a likely successor to Ne Win, was charged with having knowledge of the assassination plot and was imprisoned. Less than a year later, another plot to assassinate Ne Win was alleged. Two former officials of the BSPP were arrested and tried. Subsequently, there was a major purge within the state apparatus as well as within the armed forces to root out potential bases of support for Tin U and to consolidate Ne Win's grip on power (Lintner 1990; Maung 1990; Silverstein 1977). No coup or assassination plots were reported in the 1980s. 
Thus, in sharp contrast to the Philippines, the military command in Burma remained cohesive prior to and during the people power movement. The only documented defections from the military during the 1988 protests were by lower level personnel, primarily from the peripheral services (Guyot 1989). There was not a withdrawal of support from military officers and most of the rank-and-file troops faithfully carried out their orders to attack the unarmed demonstrators. 
Press Freedoms/Information Flows 
After the 1962 coup in Burma, the state assumed control over all publishing and communications and there was a general suppression of non-state publications (Taylor 1987). However during the "Rangoon Spring" of June to September, 1988 a spate of newspapers critical of the regime emerged. By August, 1988, Rangoon alone had nearly forty independent newspapers and magazines devoted to political criticism and mobilization of the opposition (Lintner 1990). The emergence of an alternative print media was crucial in transforming the student-centered protests into a mass-mobilized movement. The state-run newspapers were taken over by the workers who published news of the demonstrations and pressed for movement demands (Guyot 1989). However when SLORC assumed power in September, 1988 it immediately retook control of the media, permitting only highly constrained forms of information flow. All newspapers except for the government-run Working People's Daily were shut down (Lintner 1990). With no alternative information available to the public, the movement collapsed. 
Discussion 
The above examination suggests that the political opportunity framework is relevant for explaining social movement mobilization and outcomes in non-democratic contexts. It also uncovers some of the framework's limitations. 
Repression 
In both the Philippines and Burma, violent and indiscriminate repression facilitated mobilization and collective action by decreasing the legitimacy of the regime. Yet in Burma, indiscriminate repression also suppressed the movement as well. How can we account for the apparently paradoxical relationship between repression and dissent? The relationship between repression and dissent must be examined in relation to the presence or absence of other dimensions of opportunity. That is, configurations of political opportunities must be examined in order to account for the repression-dissent paradox.(10) 
At an earlier stage of the people power movement in Burma during the summer of 1988, violent and often indiscriminate repression had the effect of mobilizing more people into the movement. Mobilization in response to repression was facilitated by an apparent division within the regime over holding a referendum on a multiparty democracy, and by the rise of alternative print media and the workers' control of the state newspaper. At a later point in time, however, by mid-September 1988, repression had the effect of demobilizing the movement. By mid-September, the regime had reorganized and re-unified, and there were not any divisions within the repressive military apparatus. Moreover, the capacity to sustain challenging movements in the face of repression depends significantly on the presence of influential allies and the ability to produce and receive accurate information. Since there were no influential allies and the state reasserted control over the press and information flows, the movement was demobilized. 
Thus, for both the Philippines and Burma, violent and indiscriminate repression facilitated mobilization when it was combined with elite divisions and the free flow of alternative information. However, as illustrated in the Burmese case, when violent and indiscriminate repression occurred in combination with a closure of elite divisions, a lack of divisions among the military, a lack of influential allies, and a lack information flows, its effect was to demobilize the movement. This suggests that the effect of repression on dissent may be a function of the configuration of opportunities in which it occurs. 
Influential Allies 
As discussed above, two areas within non-democratic regimes from which influential allies may potentially come are the religious and business sectors of society. Over the past few decades the Catholic Church has played an important role mobilizing people power movements in a number of authoritarian contexts including, in addition to the Philippines, Poland (e.g., Osa 1997) and in Latin America (e.g., Smith 1991). Islam has served as an influential ally to state challengers as well (e.g., Arjomand 1988). The likelihood that the business class acts as an influential ally to challengers depends upon the extent to which it is autonomous from state control, independent from the state, and internally cohesive. The business class is also more likely to support challenges to authoritarianism when the challenge is not a threat to its own class interests (Parsa 1995). 
Another area from which influential allies to challenging movements may come, which obviously is outside the control of non-democratic regimes, is from foreign governments. States that are more dependent on external support are more susceptible to foreign influence in their domestic politics. The Philippines was highly susceptible to U.S. influence as a result of U.S. aid, investment, and military support (Hutchcroft 1991; Shalom 1981; Wurfel 1988). While Marcos was by no means a puppet of the United States, he ultimately depended upon its support, or at the very least, its non-intervention into Filipino politics. In contrast, Burma pursued an autarkic policy of development since 1962 and followed a strict policy of neutrality, even to the extent of withdrawing from the non-aligned movement in 1979 when it was perceived that the movement was aligned with the Soviet Union. The military regime repeatedly made proclamations about the ultimate sovereignty of states and the illegality of foreign intervention in domestic affairs (Taylor 1987). Since Burma lacked dependence relations with a foreign power, no external country was in the position of applying effective pressures for change on the military regime or providing crucial support for the people power movement. 
In addition to foreign states, non-governmental organizations, transnational social movements, and the transnational advocacy networks in which they are embedded may play an important role in the mobilization and the outcomes of social movements in non-democracies. Transnational social movements promote mobilization and influence the outcome of social movements by providing organizational templates for protest, material resources, solidarity, and channels for the diffusion of repertoires of contention and the flow of information. They may also influence the outcomes of movements indirectly by lobbying more powerful states in the international system to pressure regimes for political and social change (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; Tarrow 1998; Willetts 1982). 
Transnational social movements played a vital role in the challenge to authoritarianism in the Philippines. As of January 1986, there were an estimated 27,100 non-governmental organizations operating in the Philippines (Clarke 1995), of which a significant subset promoted human rights and democracy, and received substantial support from a wide variety of international organizations from North America, Europe, Australia, and Japan (Silliman 1998; Wurfel 1988). The people power movement in Burma, by contrast, had little, if any support from transnational social movements due to Burma's isolated position in the international system. Upon imposition of military rule in 1962 the state cut the few ties that existed with international non-governmental organizations. Burma remained cut off from transnational social movements except for a brief period during the "Rangoon Spring" in 1988. For example, Amnesty International, a social movement organization within the transnational human rights movement, briefly set up an office in Rangoon during the summer of 1988, but it was closed down in September when the military re-asserted control. Non-governmental organizations promoting the pro-democracy movement in Burma subsequently emerged, but they were located outside of Burma, mostly in Thailand, the United States, or Europe, and their links to the movement within Burma were weak.(11) Thus, to the extent that a country is more integrated into the international system and its populace is more integrated into international networks, the more likely that foreign states and transnational social movements will be in a position to promote the mobilization, and facilitate the success of social movements.(12) 
Elite Divisions 
Based on the two cases examined here, elite divisions promote mobilization and facilitate the success of a challenging movement. Especially crucial in non-democratic contexts is whether there are divisions within the military command. In a comparative analysis of the role of military coherence in fifteen violent rebellions in authoritarian regimes between 1910 and 1959, Russell (1974) found that divisions within the military were a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful rebellion. The findings are relevant for nonviolent insurrections as well, as the success of a movement is greatly facilitated if there are divisions within the military. In the Philippines, the alignment of the reform segment of the military with the people power movement was crucial in toppling of the Marcos regime, while in Burma a lack of divisions within the military ensured that the people power movement would be suppressed. 
Press Freedoms/Information Flows 
While the role of the mass media on social movement dynamics has been examined in democratic contexts (e.g., Gitlin 1980), the impact of variations in the openness of the media on social movements has not, due to its slight variation. In contrast, press freedoms and information flows may vary considerably across non-democratic regimes and within non-democratic regimes over time, and therefore should be considered a relevant political opportunity. The degree and form of state control can vary from censorship to post-censorship. Censorship involves the stifling of all viewpoints critical of the regime through closing down alternative publications, restricting access to communication technologies, and centralizing the news media services under the control of the state. Post-censorship may occur through the imposition of economic sanctions, the revocation of publishing licenses, and the harassment, imprisonment, torture, or assassination of journalists (O'Neil 1998). 
Broadcast media, such as radio and television, are more easily controlled by authoritarian states, since there are technical and economic barriers in addition to political ones. The print media is less easily controlled by governments, and it has the power to undermine authoritarian regimes by quickly expanding in short periods of time. Similar to the role of samizdat publications in the Soviet Union, the growth of alternative print media in both the Philippines and in Burma facilitated the mobilization of people power movements. Thus, to the extent the print media opens up, the more likely it is that challenges can be mobilized, while their closure by the state will constrain mobilization.(13) 
As mass communication becomes more global and as technological advances blur the distinction between personal and mass communication, non-democratic states will find it more difficult to control the flow of information. However there are still places in the world where the state tightly controls the media and information flows, having significant consequences for social movement mobilization and outcomes. 
Conclusions 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, it provides support for the relevance of the political opportunity framework in accounting for the mobilization and outcomes of social movements in non-democratic contexts. Elite divisions and influential allies affected mobilization and outcomes as expected by the political opportunity framework. Moreover, the extension of the political opportunity approach to social movements in nondemocracies highlights a dimension that has been missed due to its lack of variation in democracies: press freedoms and information flows. This study suggests the important role that they may have for social movement mobilization and outcomes. A freely operating press and the free flow of information are important mechanisms by which grievances become translated into collective action. Variations in these, like variations in the core dimensions of opportunity, should be related to the mobilization and outcomes of movements. The development of a substantial alternative press, the taking over of the state-run press, or the opening up of information flows, should lower power discrepancies between challengers and the state and facilitate challenging movements. As noted below, press freedoms and information flows may have an influence on how other dimensions of opportunity affect political contention as well. 
Second, this analysis illustrates the importance of the international context. Given the closed nature of non-democratic regimes, influential allies to challenging movements are more likely to be transnational actors or foreign states. The political opportunity literature has ignored or under-theorized the international context of political opportunities. However, given the recent recognition of the processes of globalization by scholars studying social movements, and the application of the political opportunity framework to challenging movements in less-developed parts of the world where states have historically been more susceptible to international forces, the international context of political opportunities, for democratic as well as non-democratic countries, is beginning to be recognized. 
Third, this analysis suggests that configurations of opportunities must be examined, since dimensions of opportunity may not have consistent or additive effects on social movement mobilization and outcomes. The political opportunity literature is characterized by the additive enumeration of political opportunities for a single social movement. A lack of comparative research has prevented scholars from identifying variations in configurations of opportunities that may shed light on inconsistent relationships between opportunities and political contention. Moreover, criticisms of the political opportunity framework based on inconsistent additive relations between political opportunities and dissent may be misleading. It is the additive and linear conception of causation that is problematic rather than a fundamental flaw in the political opportunity framework. By examining configurations of opportunities, unexpected, inconsistent, or paradoxical relationships between opportunities and dissent may be accounted for. Researchers need to view causation as being multiple and conjunctural,(14) rather than linear and additive (Ragin 1987; Schock 1996). 
In this study, for example, repression was found to have a differential effect on mobilization, depending on the configuration of political opportunities in which it was present. Further research is needed to determine whether the relationships between other dimensions and dissent vary depending upon the configuration of political opportunities in which they occur. A multiple conjunctural view of causation would also show that dimensions of opportunity are not necessarily independent of each other. This study suggests, for example, that the ability to repress social movements is influenced by elite divisions within the military and alternative information flows. And, elite divisions and information flows are influenced by international forces. 
Finally, the long-term payoff in applying the political opportunity framework to social movements in non-democratic contexts will come only when there is a critical mass of comparative studies which will enable the examination of how variations in the configurations of political opportunities influence diverse movements across the range of non-democratic regimes. A critical mass of comparative studies will also help bridge the gap between theoretical approaches to social movements that are too general, and non-generalizable studies of social movements by country or movement specialists. 
* I would like to thank the participants in the Workshop on Power, Politics, and Protest, Department of Sociology, New York University, who were subjected to a first draft of this paper. I am especially grateful to Vince Boudreau, Ira Cohen, Carmenza Gallo, Jeff Goodwin, Craig Jenkins, David Meyer, Vibha Pingle, Csaba Toth, Gay Young, the editors of Social Problems, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and criticisms. Parts of this paper were completed while I was a visiting scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and a fellow of the Albert Einstein Institution. The views expressed in the paper are not necessarily those of the Albert Einstein Institution. Direct correspondence to Kurt Schock, Rutgers University, 605 Hill Hall, 360 Martin Luther King Boulevard, Newark, New Jersey 07102. E-mail: kschock@andromeda.rutgers.edu 
1. The official name of Burma was changed by the military regime in July 1989 to "Myanmar," the Burmese name for Burma. Since this paper focuses primarily on events prior to July 1989, I will use the name "Burma." 
2. One criticism sometimes raised, but not explicitly addressed in this study, is that political opportunity models should be dynamic rather than static or cross-national. However, I believe that this is a matter of research design rather than an inherent superiority of one approach over another. Moreover, dynamic and cross-national approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive (see Boudreau 1996). 
3. There is an emerging literature that applies political opportunities to social movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s. See, for example, Oberschall (1996) and Zdravomyslova (1996). There are very few applications of political opportunities to political contention in the Third World. For exceptions, see Brockett (1991, 1995), Gurr (1993), and Schock (1996). 
4. See Goodwin and Jasper (1999) and Piven and Cloward (1991) for additional criticisms of the political opportunity framework and the political process theory. 
5. Tarrow (1998:76-77), drawing on Gamson and Meyer (1996), defines political opportunities as ". . . consistent - but not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people's expectations for success or failure." He identifies five core dimensions of political opportunities. I will collapse the shifting alignments and divided elites dimensions into one dimension, called elite divisions, which reflects McAdam's (1996) dimension of instability of elite alignments. 
6. Guyot (1989:121) refers to the events as a "sui coup," in which a government run by the military is replaced by the military. 
7. Some works that attempt to address the complexity of the repression-dissent relationship include Brockett (1991, 1995), Mason and Krame (1989) and Opp and Roehl (1990). 
8. The mobilization of the people power movement, as well as the mobilization of the communist movement, raised the cost of supporting Marcos. 
9. During the August 8, 1988 general strike, columns of hundreds of Buddhist monks carried their alms bowls upside down, a symbol that the entire nation was on strike (Lintner 1990). According to Matthews (1993) and Steinberg (1990), approximately 80 percent of the 120,000 Buddhist monks supported the people power movement. See Kurzman (1998) as well. 
10. Brockett (1995) suggests that the repression-dissent paradox can be resolved by locating its position within the cycle of protest. He maintains that indiscriminate repression during an ascending cycle of protest facilitates mobilization, while indiscriminate repression during a descending cycle of protest constrains mobilization. However, there are criticisms of the cycle of protest concept including: (1) the inability to make a clear distinction between levels of mobilization and cycles of protest; and (2) the fact that actors do not necessarily know what phase of the cycle they are in. A virtue of the configurations approach specified here is that it avoids the problems with the cycle of protest concept, and it may be useful in accounting for other paradoxical relationships between dimensions of opportunity and dissent. 
11. An indication of Burma's isolation and lack of transnational ties compared to the Philippines is the number of social movement organizations listed in the Human Rights Index (Human Rights Internet 1994) for each country. The index listed 28 human rights social movement organizations for Burma, however all of them were located outside of Burma and thus were isolated from the movement within the country. The index listed 209 human rights social movement organizations for the Philippines, of which only 24 were located outside of the country. While these data are for 1994, they are nevertheless suggestive of the tremendous variation in the transnational ties that existed between the people power movements in Burma and the Philippines in the 1980s. 
12. Exports of goods and services as percentage of GDP and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP are rough indicators of the extent to which a country is integrated into the world economy. For the Philippines the scores for 1985 were 24.0 for exports/GDP, and 21.9 for imports/GDP; and for Burma the scores for 1985 were 4.6 for exports/GDP, and 8.6 for imports/GDP (World Bank 1997), suggesting that Burma was much more isolated from the international system than the Philippines. Of course, these figures do not reflect the substantial black-market trade between Burma and its neighbors. 
13. Two measures which give a rough indication of the extent to which the state controls the mass media are the freedom of expression and media pluralism scales (Coppedge and Reinicke 1990). Both are measured on a four-point scale with 1 being open and 4 being closed. For 1985, the Philippines' scores were 2 for freedom of expression and 2 for media pluralism. By contrast, the score for Burma in 1985 on the freedom of expression scale was 3 and the score for the media pluralism scale was 4. These suggest that the media were more open in the Philippines and therefore more able to facilitate the mobilization of the opposition. Of course, indicators such as these cannot capture short-term fluctuations in media openness, as occurred in Burma during 1988. 
14. According to Ragin (1987:27), ". . . social causation is often both multiple and conjunctural, involving different combinations of causal conditions." That is, any given outcome (i.e., dependent variable) may be related to different combinations of conditions (i.e., independent variables), and single conditions may have inconsistent relations with an outcome, depending on the configuration of conditions in which it occurs. 
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