

POLITICAL FACTORS IN STATE INCARCERATION

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NOTE: Working paper last edited June 2011. Data on prison admissions are from the National Corrections Reporting Program.

INTRODUCTION

Residents of Wisconsin and other states that are traditionally relatively liberal are often surprised to learn that the Black/White disparity in incarceration is highest in northern liberal states. In previous work, we showed that the states and areas within states with higher Black population percentages typically have relatively low rates of Black incarceration and, thus, Black/White disparities. We suggested that Black political influence would be one of the mechanisms for this pattern. In this paper, we dig more deeply into the ways political and racial factors interact. Social control is an inherently political process that protects some interests against others. There is never a direct path from demographic or socioeconomic variables to incarceration, nor is there even a direct path from crime to incarceration. Political actors determine which laws are on the books and what the penalties can be, how much public money should be spent on what kinds of programs, how programs are evaluated and maintained. Even actors who themselves may be apolitical operate under political constraints and influences. Political influences are real. But this does not mean they are simplistic. We need to understand how they might work before looking for them in data.

Since 1968, Republican presidential candidates have pursued the "Southern strategy" of campaigning against crime, characterizing Democrats as "soft on crime" and relying on racially-coded references to welfare and crime. There are also strong racial patterns in presidential voting since 1968, with Blacks voting overwhelmingly Democratic and Whites typically giving an edge to Republicans. These patterns lead to general expectations among both the general public and sociologists that more punitive policies will be associated with times and places where Republicans are in power.¹ However, it was conservative White Southern Democrats pushing back against the Civil Rights Movement who first worked to create the political association between Black rights and crime, and by the 1980s, the Democrats were escalating their own politicized policies. The Democratic Congress's version of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was even more Draconian than President Reagan's proposal. The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act under Democratic president Clinton further escalated imprisonment. Instead of an

ideological difference between the parties, Murakawa (2008) found a post-1984 “mandatory minimum electoral staircase,” in which elections were preceded by rounds of punitive legislation.

Nevertheless, racial differences in the political base of each party would lead to expectations that the racial dynamics of these punitive bidding wars could differ depending on which party is in power. At the aggregate national level, the racial disparity in imprisonment rose steeply at the end of the 1980s during a Republican presidency and began to decline after 1995, during the Clinton presidency. It will take deeper analysis to determine whether these patterns are coincidental or tied somehow to partisan control.

The rise of mass incarceration and its racial patterns were deeply political, but these politics played out in complex ways. We begin this paper by discussing the ways in which political control over criminal justice outcomes is shaped by the nested political relations in the US. Next, we provide a brief overview of the national-level trends in political factors and how these have related to national-level trends in incarceration. Then we turn to the core of this paper, in which we explore the ways in which political factors correlated with state and local differences in the racial patterns of imprisonment and other criminal justice outcomes. We examine racial incarceration patterns by era and place, according to data availability. Within each section, we compare our results to prior research on comparable data.

Overall, we show that there are substantial differences in the racial patterns of criminal justice between places that are affected by their general political conservatism and their general patterns of partisan control, but relatively little difference that can be reliably attributed to changes in partisan control within place. Having found strong effects of a place’s general political climate, we investigate the correlates of these relatively this factor. In the conclusion, we pull together these threads.

NESTED RELATIONS

Imprisonment rates are a product of nested processes operating at the national, state and local level. A generic political goal of being “tough on crime” or, often more accurately, of *appearing* tough on crime, can be played out in many different ways, at many different points in the system, while being constrained by many other points in the system. Our analysis uses political data for states and criminal justice data for states and metro areas. The complexity of nested relations can make it difficult to locate the impact of political factors on imprisonment and other criminal justice outcomes.

At the base, local law enforcement, prosecutors and judges make the crucial decisions that lead people to be arrested, convicted, and sentenced to prison. These patterns of authority are complex and cross-cutting with dozens of points of entry for political considerations. Many of these local officials are themselves elected or are appointed by local elected officials. A typical metropolitan area includes several dozen law enforcement jurisdictions, each with somewhat different practices. Sheriffs are frequently elected and relatively autonomous, while police chiefs are appointed and accountable to elected municipal officials. The amount of funding available to law enforcement is largely controlled by elected local officials, and law enforcement agencies are subject to public opinion and political pressure—and often conflicting or cross-cutting pressures—regarding their enforcement priorities. The vast majority—typically 97% or more—of all criminal cases are resolved by plea bargains in which the prosecutor plays a central role. The lead prosecutor (e.g. District Attorney) is often an elected official with political accountability. Municipal governments are frequently officially non-partisan or dominated by only one party. In some states, the elected officials in major metropolitan areas are political opponents of the elected officials who dominate state government and these oppositions can shape policy and funding for criminal justice programs. Judges have independent discretion and are typically officially non-partisan, but are either appointed by partisan officials or are elected and are thus subject to political forces. Different judges in the same jurisdiction often have reputations for giving different sentences for the same crime, or for having different “biases” in their treatments of offenders of different races.

Partisanship, political ideology, and racial/ethnic intertwine differently in each local jurisdiction. Many suburban jurisdictions are virtually all-White and have low levels of partisanship. In contrast, ethnic/racial politics are explicit in many larger multi-ethnic cities. Some large cities are overwhelmingly Democratic, while others have highly competitive partisan politics.

Depending on state law, local jurisdictions may vary in the laws and penalties for lesser infractions. For example, in Wisconsin (and many other states), municipalities may enact local ordinances for marijuana possession or disorderly conduct that provide for lower penalties than those attached to the state laws for the same offenses. These jurisdictional differences can, themselves, generate disparities in criminal justice. The City of Milwaukee (where virtually all Milwaukee-area Blacks live) does not have a municipal ordinance for marijuana possession, while many suburban Milwaukee municipalities do; this appears to be one of the factors influencing the

substantial racial disparity in the ratio of prison sentences to arrests for drug possession in the county. A significant fraction of the racial disparity in juvenile detention in Milwaukee County arises because Milwaukee city police are more likely to take juveniles into secure custody than are suburban police (Pope, Lovell and Hsia 2002); I found a similar pattern in my own analysis of juvenile arrest patterns in Madison versus suburban Dane County. These examples are replicated with variations in every metropolitan area in the country and generate local discretion in criminal justice that produces a very high rate of "noise" in attempts to identify the correlates of criminal justice patterns.

At the next level, local discretion is constrained and influenced by state law and policy. State governments fund prison systems, enact laws that contribute to longer prison sentences or reductions in parole, and generally control the corrections officers that make revocation decisions. One of the essential elements for the rise in mass incarceration was a dramatic increase in the capacity of state correctional systems in terms of buildings, beds, and employees. Ruth Gilmore's (2007) detailed examination of the political economy in post-War California illustrates the politics involved in developing the capacity and public money needed to sustain a mass incarceration regime.

State laws or the enforcement of them regarding a wide variety of behaviors have changed over time. Laws against activities such as gambling pornography, sodomy, and adultery have been eliminated entirely, decriminalized, or subjected to less enforcement (Friedman 2002, pp. 228-234). On the other hand, new laws and penalties were enacted regarding illegal drugs, including "drug paraphernalia" laws (Friedman 2002, p. 233-4). Laws that regulate who can own what sort of guns are similarly in flux. State governments may also have revenue sharing schemes that providing funding to local law enforcement, develop sentencing guidelines for prosecutors and judges, and affect other parameters of the criminal justice system, such as the level of funding for prosecutors and public defenders.

State-level political actors often sought legislation to reduce judicial discretion and increase the use of imprisonment. Both conservative and liberal activists and legal scholarship during the 1970s criticized judicial discretion, and mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines were frequently adopted beginning in the 1980s to curtail it (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1996; Ditton and Wilson 1999). A wide variety of mandatory minimum laws expanded the range of offenses that would draw prison sentences, or increase the length of prison sentences. For example, California's legislature in the 1980s reclassified residential burglary and domestic assault as felonies

with mandatory prison terms (Gilmore 2007, p. 95). Many states enacted “habitual offender” and “three strikes” laws that provide for extremely long prison sentences for repeat offenders; Washington did so, for example, in a voter referendum in 1993 (Roth 2010).

States also control access to parole—early release from prison. Longer “time served” before release and increased rates of revocation from parole after release were the important sources of the growth in imprisonment in the 1990s.² Prior to the 1970s, parole could be used to ease prison crowding—if too many offenders were being sentenced to prison relative to capacity, parole boards could release offenders to compensate.³ As the political tide turned toward greater punitiveness and prison capacity was expanded, political actors could pressure parole boards to reduce the number of inmates released on parole. Another effort to reduce the discretionary release of inmates to parole was a wave of “truth in sentencing” laws effectively eliminating parole by mandating that offenders serve a high proportion of their nominal sentence (e.g. 85%) before release. Morris (1995, p. 217) argued that public opinion and academic reformers both agreed that “truth in sentencing” laws were a good idea—the former because of public perceptions of parole boards and judges as being sentimental and lenient in the context of the crime wave of the 1960s and 1970s, the latter because of increasing suspicion that parole boards were not good at identifying who was a good candidate for release based on behavior in prison.

In addition to controlling the release of inmates from prison, state government also controls entry into prison via revocation from either probation or the various categories of post-prison supervision (parole, extended supervision, etc.) People who are under supervision can be revoked to prison for violating the terms of supervision without a new sentence, typically at the discretion of the probation and parole officer. The administrative supervisors of the probation and parole officers can dictate standards to the officers. These administrative supervisors, in turn, can be influenced by outside political actors. For example, in California the Board of Prison Terms ordered its field parole officers to liberally revoke parole (Gilmore 2007, p. 96).

At the national level, the parties jockeyed for standing as “tough on crime,” but crime control in the U.S. is largely a state and local function, not a federal function, so federal politicians’ impact on criminal justice is largely indirect. Illegal drugs are one area of federal jurisdiction, which is the political reason why federal crime policy was focused on the “drug war.” In the 1980s, the President advocated and Congress passed legislation that provided federal support for punitive policies through incentives to prosecute the “drug war.” Holian (2004) argues that

President Clinton successfully "captured" crime control as an issue in the 1992 election. The 1994 federal Violent Crime Control and Law enforcement Act offered money to states to build prisons to relieve crowding. The string attached to accepting the money was a state's adoption of a truth in sentencing law requiring violent offenders to serve 85% of their sentences. A few states adopted a truth in sentencing law with a lower percentage, but most states now have such laws on the books (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1996; Ditton and Wilson 1999). The Justice Department operates a wide variety of shifting grants programs to local law enforcement agencies and state correctional systems with emphases that shift over time. Ditton and Wilson (1999, p. 2) explained how the federal government gave states an incentive to construct prisons by providing grants. These emphases might include such things as drug interdiction, gang disruption or prevention, victims' services, program assessment, and reductions in disproportionate minority confinement (See e.g. Marion 1994 for a history of federal crime control initiatives.).

The interplay of racial/ethnic conflict with partisan politics can play out at national, state or local levels. The original rise in "law and order" as a political issue grew out of the racial politics of the 1960s, and the escalation of Black drug sentences in the late 1980s flowed from the racial dynamics of national presidential politics. This national-level pattern did not mean that Black people opposed the drug war or other increases in punitiveness. Because of segregation patterns, Black people of each economic level are more likely to live in high-crime areas and to be victims of crime than White people of a comparable economic level.⁴ Black residents of big cities often supported punitive anti-crime and anti-drug policies, including the intensive round-ups of young Black men accused of drug dealing that filled the prisons.⁵ At the same time, Blacks are more likely to be aware of the problems caused by intensive social control and more likely to feel that racial disparities in arrest and imprisonment are unjust. This suggests that areas where Blacks have significant political influence will have different political dynamics from those where Blacks are a politically-insignificant minority.⁶ They may not be less punitive overall, but they may exhibit less sharp disparities in social control by race.

UNTANGLING THE POLITICAL

It is well established that the partisan political dynamics at the national level fueled the escalation of imprisonment in the 1980s and 1990s, but to understand how political dynamics play out at the state and local level, we need to dig more deeply into how political factors affect arrest and imprisonment rates and how these

factors intertwine with racial dynamics. One general pattern that transcends most prior research on political factors is the failure to recognize that global measures of average ideology or partisan control can obscure or be distorted by racial patterns. Another issue is attention to the importance of institutional inertia. Public opinion, political ideology and partisan dynamics are often important, but their impacts are conditioned by institutional logics that insulate large areas of policy from partisanship. There are also large areas of public policy that are essentially invisible to the general public and irrelevant to public opinion; major policy changes in these areas can be influenced by either private interest groups or activist organizations with little public notice (Burstein 2006).

INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND INERTIA

A distinction may be made between “government,” the officials and leaders who hold power and change in response to elections, and “the state,” the administrative bureaucracy that persists regardless of partisan control of government. The institutions of the state often have a significant autonomy and inertia. There are many areas of public policy that are relatively immune from ideological and partisan influences. An example of this can be seen in the divergent public policies regarding juvenile and adult offenders. At the same time as adult punishment moved in increasingly punitive directions and there was a move to treat more juvenile offenders—especially violent offenders—as adults in the criminal justice system, the overall thrust of federal policy toward juvenile offenders has been insuring that juveniles are kept strictly segregated from adult offenders and otherwise accorded protections that are often denied adults. The Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act was originally passed in 1974 and has been repeatedly reauthorized with bipartisan support. Additionally, federal policy since 1992 has mandated that juvenile systems address issues of racial disparity by tying federal funding to such efforts.⁷ There is no such mandate in federal policy toward the adult correctional system.

Political effects are constrained by complex issues of jurisdiction. As discussed elsewhere, national politicians’ efforts to be “tough on crime” were constrained by the lack of federal jurisdiction over most crime. State politicians are similarly constrained as decisions about arrest, prosecution and sentencing are controlled by actors that are relatively independent of governors and legislators.

States vary in the extent to which various elements of the criminal justice system are responsive to or relatively independent of partisan influence. Zimring and Johnson (2006) argue that public opinion is generally punitive toward criminals, but that structural governmental features determine whether state actors will be

punitive or moderate. Partisan efforts can be directed toward reducing or increasing the autonomy and discretion of administrative or judicial systems, or toward creating incentives for desired actions through funding systems. But these partisan efforts are always constrained, and different parts of the system differ in the extent of this constraint as many different state agencies impact incarceration.

For example, Minnesota and Wisconsin are adjacent states that often compare themselves to each other. Minnesota has a much lower incarceration rate than Wisconsin. One reason for this difference is institutional: in Minnesota, a local jurisdiction effectively pays the state for each offender sentenced to state prison, while in Wisconsin an offender sent to state prison is effectively transferred from a local budget to the state budget (Streit 2007). Wisconsin's juvenile system is funded more like Minnesota's, and Wisconsin's juvenile state incarceration rate is lower than Minnesota's and has remained low even as adult incarceration soared. Another example from Wisconsin of an impactful bureaucratic change occurred when the civil service rules were changed to permit prison guards to make lateral transfers into positions as probation and parole agents. Before this change, probation and parole agents were typically social workers with a rehabilitative orientation. After this change, a growing proportion of probation and parole agents had a less rehabilitative and more rule-enforcement orientation. Partisanship and ideology can still impact a non-partisan civil service agency, but indirectly. For example, the official mission statement for community corrections (probation and parole) in Wisconsin has changed several times over the years as the governor has changed in its relative emphasis on public safety and offender compliance versus rehabilitation and reintegration. Policies regarding parole in Wisconsin have varied as the politically-appointed head of the parole board changed.

Bureaucratic incentive structures and non-partisan movements can similarly motivate and change practices. These include the funding programs of large agencies like the National Institute of Justice, relatively bureaucratic movements for the adoption of uniform criminal codes across states, and "best practice" movements among various professions in the criminal justice system. NGOs and think tanks often play important roles in promoting these kinds of changes.

Finally, regardless of partisan control, institutional practices at all levels of government are affected by high-profile cases that attract substantial public attention through media coverage. This perhaps can be illustrated by the case of Lenard Wells, an African American retired Milwaukee police officer who was appointed head of

Wisconsin's parole board in 2003 by newly-elected Democratic governor Doyle. Wisconsin had enacted a "truth in sentencing" law that went into effect in 2000 and eliminated parole for new convictions, but there were still many inmates with long sentences. I was present when Mr. Wells met with a group of activists and told us that his goal was to get as many people out of prison as he could without compromising safety. His predecessor had put many inmates on 10-year cycles of review for parole; Mr. Wells argued that every inmate should be reviewed for parole every year. He said he was retired and had no political aspirations and his plan was to do what he could to get people out of prison until he let the wrong person out, then he'd be fired. This is exactly what happened three years later, when he approved parole for two men convicted of killing an off-duty police officer in 1975 (Garza 2006).⁸

As a consequence of these kinds of factors, it is well recognized that there is only a loose coupling between the laws on state books and empirical patterns. For example, although many states permit the use of the death penalty, only a few states account for the large share of all executions.⁹ Although most states enacted "truth in sentencing" laws under federal incentives, they varied greatly in the extent to which they implemented these laws in ways that increased the length of sentences.¹⁰ Sorensen and Stemen (2002) examined sentencing policies and incarceration in the 50 US states for 1977-1999, concluding that sentencing policies had very little effect on incarceration, with citizen ideology, crime rates, and Black population percentage being the factors that had more impact.

PUBLIC OPINION AND MORAL PANICS

Not surprisingly, most people are against crime and at one level it may seem obvious that politicians could seek to gain support from voters by claiming to be "tough on crime" because this is generally a popular point of view.¹¹ It is not easy to separate out the public's perceptions of crime, its beliefs about how hard or soft the criminal justice system is, and its relative valuation of incarceration as a means of addressing the problem. The General Social Survey, a periodic opinion survey of a cross-section of United States residents, has regularly asked participants since 1972 whether they think the courts in their area are "too harsh," "not harsh enough," or "about right" in their treatment of criminals. Figure 1¹² shows that the mean harshness rose quickly from the beginning of the series in 1972 and then stayed high and roughly the same from 1975 to 1995, then fell steeply through the end of the series. These results are consistent with Erskine's (1974-75) summary of polls from the mid-

1970s showing that public opinion had become more punitive. The trend characterizes the GSS's race groups, regions, and both sexes. It is true for those who report being fearful of walking in their neighborhood at night and those who do not.¹³ This opinion and others are not particularly correlated over time with objective crime rates. Figure 2 plots the violence victimization rate and the homicide rate against three attitudes over time: the courts are not harsh enough, fear walking alone at night in one's neighborhood, and "too little" is being spent on reducing crime. The attitude items are relatively constant despite marked changes in the crime rate.

This widespread agreement that criminals (vaguely specified) should be treated "more harshly" by courts does not necessarily translate directly into social policies. For example, in 2008, Californians voted in seemingly-contradictory ways on three initiatives. They rejected a measure that had strong bipartisan support from prominent politicians to increase the number of convicted criminals eligible for drug treatment programs, accepted a proposition that required offenders to pay restitution to victims and eliminated the possibility of state-created early release programs to deal with overcrowded prisons, but rejected a measure to increase spending on law enforcement that would also have raised penalties for some gang and drug offenses (Moore 2008).¹⁴

The racial patterns are more complex. Among Whites, racial attitudes and attitudes toward crime and punishment are often correlated. A substantial body of research indicates that many Whites implicitly or explicitly associate criminality with Blacks and that punitive attitudes toward criminals are associated with negative attitudes towards Blacks, at the same time that these attitudes are variable and contingent (e.g. Gaubatz 1995; Green, Staerkle and Sears 2006; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Krysan 2000; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Peffley, Shields and Williams 1996; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997; Quillian 1996; Soss, Langbein and Metelko 2003; Unnever 2008; White 2007; Wortley, Hagan and Macmillan 1997). This project is not analyzing or theorizing at the level of mechanisms for individual attitudes. What we draw from this literature is just an awareness that these associations exist and that they vary across different subgroups of White people.

Comparison of national trends by race on crime-relevant attitude items (Figure 3) shows some important racial difference in these attitudes. As the middle panel shows, White harshness was consistently higher than Black, but a strong majority of Blacks also thought criminals should be treated more harshly. The top panel shows that the percent of Blacks who feared walking alone at night was higher than for Whites, and nonwhites were more likely than Whites to say that "too little" was being spent to reduce crime (bottom panel). A separate analysis

(not shown) on the "harshness" item indicates that after 1995, Black harshness declined faster than White and the racial gap grew. Looking more deeply at gender differences, while White men and women have similar attitudes, there is a larger gender gap among Black men, who are most likely to say that the courts are "too harsh." Blacks of both genders, but especially Black men, showed a steep decline in "not harsh enough" and a corresponding rise in "too harsh" after 1995.¹⁵ Although we do not have crime victimization data separated by race of victim¹⁶, inspection of Figure 4 suggests that Black support for more spending on crime control was responsive to the rise in Black homicides at the height of the "drug war," while White support for more spending was not responsive to the rise in White homicides in the same era. These clues point to the fact that more Black people have more direct experience with both crime and the courts than Whites do and that their preferences regarding crime control may not show the same simple more-to-less continuum that seems to appear for Whites.

MORAL PANICS

A "moral panic" is a relatively rapid change in measured public opinion towards something that is out of proportion to objective measures of the problem. Tonry (2004, pp 85ff) gives a brief history of the term and offers several examples from the literature, suggesting the political science term "window of opportunity" as a more descriptive term. For Tonry, the key feature of a moral panic is that a troubling event generates a strong emotional response. He notes that moral panics invite collective decision-making that is based on anger and stereotypes, rather than critical reflection of the underlying problem. Some critics call this the "crime of the month" problem¹⁷ wherein some widely-publicized crime becomes the basis for new legislation. A moral panic effect might create a spike in the rate arrest or imprisonment for a particular kind of offense when the underlying rate of crime does not change.

Some have argued that the discursive conflation of street crime with urban riots in the 1960s was the first "moral panic" leading to escalated law enforcement. Chambliss (1995) concluded that "[a] review of the history of anticrime legislation from the 1960s suggests that it was a coalition of political, law enforcement, and mass media interests that, after thirty years of propaganda, created a moral panic about crime" (p. 245). Despite rising crime rates in the 1960s, the public did not express unusual public outrage about crime until a "nonstop propaganda campaign succeeded in raising crime as a major issue for the American people" (p. 247). Poll data on the "most important problem" reveals evidence for two relevant "moral panics," the first one in 1989 around drugs and the

second in early 1994 around crime see (see Figure 5). In both cases, the initiators of the "panic" were politicians seeking to mobilize public opinion around an issue. In both cases, there was a flurry of mass media stories about the issue.

The 1989 peak for "drugs" followed President Bush's statement that drugs were the most important problem facing the nation, this following an intense media campaign by the DEA beginning in October of 1985 that took off in 1986 after the deaths of Len Bias and Don Rogers, leading to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.¹⁸ Mainstream media organizations published highly exaggerated and manifestly incorrect claims that crack cocaine was instantly addictive and qualitatively different from other forms of cocaine (Terplan and Wright 2011). Major publications referred to crack cocaine as the number one problem in the country using images that were virtually all Black. Poor pregnant women were subjected to mandatory drug tests and arrested and imprisoned for child abuse when they tested positive for drugs because of alarms about permanently-damaged "crack babies"—a myth, as subsequent medical studies showed (e.g. Hartley and Miller 2010).

There are debates about how to interpret the racial patterns in the crack cocaine scare. Tonry (1995) argues that Republican policy makers chose to focus on crack cocaine because they knew the targets of the crackdown would be disproportionately poor Black Americans, while a crackdown on power cocaine or marijuana would have affected more Whites. But Black people were often active participants in the moral panic around crack cocaine. The crack epidemic was devastating to many Black communities and many Black residents and politicians supported the Draconian penalties against drug dealers. Kennedy (1997) critiqued the tendency to cast the debate on narrow race discrimination grounds. For example, he suggested that if white women had been disproportionately prosecuted for fetal endangerment through drug abuse, the race discrimination issue would have revolved around why black babies were being denied equal protection under the law (p. 363). He also complained that critics who have condemned the crack-powder sentence disparity as reflected in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 "failed to take into account the opinions of the members of Congress who concerned themselves most intently and consistently with elevating the fortunes of African-Americans, namely the black members of Congress. They have rendered the blacks in Congress invisible." (pp. 370-71) Nearly half of the Black members of Congress voted in favor of the 100-to-1 crack-powder differential. Important Black leaders spearheaded or supported anti-crack legislation. Kennedy quotes Anton Waldon, a U.S. House Representative from

New York, as saying on the floor that “For those of us who are black this self-inflicted pain is the worst oppression we have known since slavery. . . . Let us . . . pledge to crack down on crack.”¹⁹ Kennedy went on to discuss how media attention on the epidemic was could plausibly have been driven by a desire to draw attention to the devastating plight of the epidemic (pp. 379-80).

The moral panic around "crime" as the most important problem occurred late in 1993 and shows up in the January 1994 polls from several sources. Prior to 1994, no more than 5% of the population had ever said that crime was the most important problem. Putting the "drug" and "crime" charts into context in Figure 6²⁰ shows that one factor is the drop in the economy as most important as the country recovered from a recession.

It is difficult to explain the spike in concern about crime from external circumstances, as there was no crime spike in 1993, as Figure 5 shows. Violent crime victimization and fear walking alone at night were still rising slowly but had been rising since 1989. Writing early in 1994, Jeffrey Alderman, the poll director for ABC news, wrote a short piece about this unexpected rise, which began in November of 1993, attributing it to extensive news media coverage of crime as an issue (1994). Alderman cites data from the November ABC poll pointing to media influence: 79% said crime is a big national problem but only 14% said it was a big problem in their own neighborhoods, and 70% said it was a "small" problem in their own neighborhoods. Further, 65% said they learn about crime "mainly from the media" rather than their own experience. Beckett and Sasson attribute this media campaign to politicians:

"In August 1993, the Republicans in Congress—eager to reclaim the crime issue so effectively neutralized by Clinton in the 1992 presidential election—announced a major new package of anticrime legislation. Clinton and the Democrats responded with their own rival package, effectively setting the stage for a contest over which political party was tougher on crime. As both houses of Congress debated omnibus crime bills, local congressional races featured an unprecedented torrent of tough-on-crime posturing. In December 1993, the Senate passed a version of the crime bill providing for massive federal support to states for hiring police and building prisons. A few weeks later, 37% of Americans, an unprecedented proportion, named crime the most important problem facing the country. In the ensuing months, political and media attention to the issue of crime intensified still further. President Clinton announced his support for a federal 'three strikes and you're out' law in his State of the Union address,

the House of Representatives adopted its own version of the crime bill, and the national media covered the issue in a series of magazine cover stories and network news special reports. In addition, the national press provided saturation coverage of a number of sensational crimes and trials In August, the month President Clinton—amid maximum fanfare—signed the crime bill into law, public concern about crime reached its apex when 52% of those polled identified crime as the nation's most important problem." (2004, p. 110)

In short, the history of national politics strongly suggests that partisan politicking was at the root of both the major federal policy initiatives that affected imprisonment rates and crime control policy and the ebbs and flows in public concern about crime. These partisan panics played out against a backdrop of generalized popular support for harsh treatment of criminals and punitive policies. But it is less clear how they would affect punitive policies at the state and local level.

GENERAL POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

The punitive turn in correctional policy is generally seen conservative by definition (Garland 2001). Analyses of survey and experimental data regularly find that self-defined conservatives have more punitive attitudes towards criminal offenders (Hirschfield and Piquero 2010; Jacobs and Carmichael 2004; Timberlake, Rasinski and Lock 2001; Unnever and Cullen 2007). The General Social Survey asks people to classify themselves on a liberal-conservative continuum, and this self-classification is has a significant correlation with the opinion that the courts are "not harsh enough" (Arthur 1993).²¹ However, this statistically-significant correlation is extremely weak: it explains only about 1% of the variation for Whites, and zero for Blacks. Religious conservatives generally have more punitive attitudes than religious liberals or non-religious people, but even this pattern masks a divergence of views among religious conservatives depending on their specific theology (Unnever, Cullen and Applegate 2005). Among Whites, having anti-Black attitudes is sometimes taken as defining of conservatism, and Whites' racial attitudes are correlative with punitive attitudes towards criminals, especially if cues activate the salience of race for the issue or context (Johnson 2001; Valentino, Traugott and Hutchings 2002).

Both Whites and Blacks showed a very small increase over time in self-reported conservatism (about .15 for Whites and .28 for Blacks) on a 7-point scale and both races showed a somewhat larger increase of a little over .4 on a 7-point scale in party identification, moving in the Republican direction. However, the average party

identification was still well into the Democratic side for both races. Figure 7 shows these patterns. Political scientists find that many people's self-classifications as liberal or conservative seem to be highly error-laden or idiosyncratic and to bear only a loose relation to a consistent liberal-conservative ideology as it is understood in politics (e.g., Luttbeg and Gant 1985). In the GSS, the self-classification as on a seven-point liberal to conservative scale overall has only a moderate correlation (explaining about 10% of the variance) in predicting a seven-point scale of party self-identification as Democrat or Republican.²² However, for Whites, the strength of this correlation increased markedly over time, from explaining about 4% of the variance in the mid-1970s to 25% at the end of our data series in the mid-2000s and over 30% by 2010. For Blacks, the correlation remained low.²³

These weak and erratic patterns in general public opinion do not mean that ideology is irrelevant. Politics is dominated by people who do have more consistent ideological positions, and US states vary greatly in their political ideological climates in ways that are only moderately correlated with partisanship. Although states change over time, they have relatively stable political cultures that are grounded in the way they were originally settled and the ethnic origins of their citizenry (Elazar 1972; Koven and Mausolff 2002; Lieske 2010). Through the 1960s, the White South was both solidly Democratic and conservative; today there are still many conservative Democrats in the Southern part of the US. For their part, the Northeast and the upper Midwestern sections of the US have historically been more liberal and have strong traditions of relatively liberal or progressive Republicans. Since the 1960s, the US political spectrum has become relatively more conservative. The dominance of ideological conservatives has increased in the Republican Party, while the Democratic Party has been dominated by centrists.

PARTISAN POLITICS: CONTROL AND COMPETITION

Many sociological studies have approached the question of partisanship with the relatively naïve idea that there will be more punitive policies when Republicans are in control.²⁴ The Republican Party has successfully branded itself as the “tough on crime” party, and the Republican political base includes more ideological conservatives with “repressive and authoritarian” beliefs (Erskine 1974-75).

Around 1970, this view held some currency. For example, Da Costa Nunes (1980) analyzed Congressional voting on crime bills 1965-1973, contrasting “hard” anti-crime bills emphasizing stiffer penalties with “soft” bills supporting rehabilitation or crime studies. Table 1 summarizes Da Costa Nunes’s results. There was little party difference in the support for “soft” crime measures, but a large difference for the “hard” punitive bills. Republicans

overwhelmingly favored tougher measures. Also as expected, Southern Democrats were somewhat more likely to adopt the “tough” positions than Northern Democrats, but this difference was not large (data not shown). Da Costa Nunes also found that the racial composition of the district had a strong curvilinear effect on Democrats’ votes on the “hard” legislation category. Democrats’ support for punitive measures increased with the proportion of the district that was Black until Blacks were an actual majority in the district, when support for punitive measures plummeted. Note that no majority-Black districts had Republican representatives.

Despite these associations, Democrats have always been in the punitive game. Southern Democrats such as George Wallace started the ball rolling by equating the Civil Rights Movement with crime. Only after President Johnson, a Democrat, signed the Civil Rights Bill and the national Democratic Party became associated with Black rights did Republicans take possession of the race-coded crime issue. Even so, Democrats gave strong support to the escalation of police and paramilitary forces for domestic social control in the wake of the riots.

The period of the escalation of mass incarceration is better described as politically competitive at the national level than as dominated by either party. For our study period, the pattern of partisan control of the presidency, Senate and House was as follows:

1976-1980 All Democratic

1981-1986 President and Senate are Republican, House is Democratic

1987-1992 President is Republican, Senate and House are Democratic

1993-1994 All Democratic

1995-2000 President and Senate are Democratic, House is Republican.

2001-2002 President and House are Republican, Senate is Democratic

2003-2006 All Republican

2007-2008 President Republican, Senate and House are Democratic

From 1981 through 2002, the federal government generally lacked a unified government except for the first two years of the Clinton administration. Any time series analysis of the effect of partisan control on incarceration will give a different result depending on the starting and ending dates of the series.

In the 1980s, Reagan's administration emphasized the drug war because of its public popularity and, in the mid-1980s, sparked a media campaign to focus public attention on a crack epidemic that was clearly portrayed as Black. But, again, the Democrats were not to be out-manuevered, and eagerly supported the most Draconian elements of the 1986 laws. In the 1990s, President Clinton, a Democrat, captured the crime issue and supported a legislation that funded more prisons and mandated longer prison sentences. (Holian 2004) performed a quantitative content analysis of "elite attention to crime" between 1981-2000 and concluded that that President Clinton's rhetoric neutralized the Republican advantage on crime control and shifted discussion from a focus on punishment to a focus on prevention through gun control and more police on the streets. Similarly, Murakawa (2008) saw the period as mutual escalation due to competitive politics.

INTEREST GROUPS

Recent research on the role of interest group politics in the tough on crime era. Gottschalk (2006) located the political engine driving changes in incarceration in social movement history. Focusing on the Victim's Rights Movement and the women's movement of the 1970s, she argues that these movements were "remarkably in sync with the ascendant conservative forces and relatively immune from critical examination" (p. 114). They had a substantial impact on penal policy because there were so few alternatives for victims to get relief in the United States. Public sympathy for victims received an unlikely boost in the wake of responses to prison unrest in the 1960s and 1970s. Gottschalk argued that the state's reaction to the unrest exacerbated an association between race and unrest on the left hand and victims and justice on the right (pp. 190ff).

Miller (2008)²⁵ also drew attention to the role of interest groups in framing policy. The crux of her argument is that criminal justice policy has increasingly been relocated from local decision-making to state and national decision-making forums. Comparing Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, she showed that citizen groups with broad agendas (e.g., community reform groups, neighborhood associations, ex-offender groups, block watches) dominate local political decision-making. Crime is only one agenda item among many. However, these broad citizen groups have a difficult time competing for attention in the larger forums. In the state of Pennsylvania and in the U.S. Congress, however, she showed that broad citizen groups have substantially less clout relative to criminal justice agencies (such as organizations of prosecuting attorneys) and single-issue groups such as the National Rifle

Association and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. The result is a less nuanced balancing of interests at the federal (especially), and even state-level.

In many communities, there are well-organized interest groups of African-Americans or other ethnic minorities that have significant political influence. The magnitude of this influence is heavily but not solely affected by the size of the ethnic group's population. As we consider the racial-political dynamics of incarceration, it is important to keep this factor in mind. Unfortunately, we do not have any good direct indicators of Black interest group organization, but we may indirectly assess its effects by examining the interplay of Black population representation and Black poverty with political factors.

MEASURING POLITICAL FACTORS

MEASURING PARTISAN CONTROL AND COMPETITION

Political scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of measuring partisan control of state government (Berry et al. 1998; Klarner 2003). Most states have a governor and two legislative chambers. Partisan dominance is straightforward if the governor and substantial majorities of both chambers are of the same party. But if they are not, decisions need to be made about how to weight the governor relative to the legislative chambers, and whether to treat legislative control simply dichotomous or varying with the size of the majority. As to weighting the legislature and the governor, most scholars end up weighting the governor 50% and the legislature 50%, then weighting each chamber of the legislature at 50% of the legislature (i.e. 25% of the total). This weighting scheme is arbitrary even as it is usual. States differ widely in the relative power of the governor and the legislature. For example, Wisconsin's governor is unusually powerful because the State Supreme Court ruled in 1988 that the governor's partial veto power extends to letters and symbols: the governor can veto the word "not", parts of words, digits and decimal places in numbers, and anything else as long as what remains is "complete and workable law" (Proctor 2007).

Defining partisan control for the governor is mostly straightforward, except for a few cases of governors who change party mid-term and two who declared themselves to be independents despite being generally viewed as aligned with Republicans. We count the few cases of mid-year changes and independent governors as "split" control. Legislative control is much more complex, as all states but Nebraska have two chambers, and Nebraska's

unicameral legislature is officially nonpartisan. There are a variety of ways of calculating legislative dominance in the literature. At the simplest level, it is just a matter of which party has a majority. But the size of the majority can matter, too. If control of a chamber of the legislature is not dichotomous, what should the function be? Having a majority greater than 60% or 2/3 in each chamber can often permit the legislature to override a hostile governor. A majority barely about 50% is very weak as it is threatened by even one defection. The not-infrequent situation in which neither party has a majority due to tied representation, vacancies, or the presence of independent or third-party representatives also poses difficulties. Berry and his colleagues (Berry et al. 1998), for example, treat power as zero below 40% representation, as 1.0 at 60% representation, and as adding .04 to power for each 1% increment between 40% and 60%, with a .2 bonus for being above 50%.

Klarner (2003) does not stop with election information but tracks down subsequent balances as vacancies occur and includes information about committee chairs to refine the measure of control, showing that it improves accuracy because it tells who is really in control when neither side has an absolute majority or the majority is in flux because of vacancies. His compilations are often accepted as a kind of "gold standard" among many political scientists for which party is in control of a state house and the governorship, although other political scientists and sociologists just use measures derived from elections.²⁶ We use Klarner's data for 1959-2007.²⁷ There were 57 state-years or 4% of the 1470 in our study period 1978-2007 in which one or both chambers had split party control for all or part of the year, in which case the control is coded .5 if split for the year or another fraction to capture the partial-year split.²⁸ Instead of seeking to tweak the best measure of partisan control, we will focus on showing the general patterns in partisan control.

Changes in party control of state governments tend to be correlated in time. This can be seen in the graph of partisan control shown in Figure 8.²⁹ Most changes happened in a few key years: there was a short-lived upswing for the Democrats between 1983 and 1985 and then a huge increase for the Republicans in 1995 that lasts through 2006 (the end of our data series). Before 1995, very few states had unified Republican control. Between 1996 and 2006, few states had unified Democratic control. The means or coefficients assessing the effect of unified partisan control are based on very small numbers of states for Republicans before 1995 and Democrats between 1996 and 2006 and are thus particularly volatile.

Another issue in studying partisan control is that there is relatively low within-state variation. Figure 9³⁰ shows the counts of numbers of years in 30 that each state had each of the five types of partisan control. The states are sorted by an overall dominance score. Although no state had unified partisan control by the same party across all thirty years of the study period, South Dakota and Maryland came close. Only 18 states (36%) experienced both unified Democratic and unified Republican control of state government during these thirty years. Even by the looser criterion of controlling the governorship and at least one chamber of the legislature, 17 states (34%) varied only between split control and one party's dominance, thirteen Democratic and four Republican. Many states exhibit a high level of partisan competition in this series. Thirty states (60%) had some form of mixed control for over half of the years, and three states always had mixed control: New York, Delaware, and Nebraska.³¹ Thus, any attempt to assess the possible effects of within-state changes in party control must take account of the large between-state differences in the range of political variation.

COMPETITIVENESS

Given that the national pattern was a competitive escalation of incarceration as the parties sought to out-do each other in punitiveness, we might expect that competitiveness rather than solid partisan control may be an important factor in predicting imprisonment outcomes. Competitiveness can be measured in a variety of ways. One conceptualization is just the opposite of dominance, i.e. any pattern of mixed control. The number of years of split government ranged from 1 to 26 and was fairly evenly spread across the range. A second approach is to take the standard deviation of the partisan control measure. This captures the magnitude of the political swings in a state. A third considers how often party control shifted over time. Using the five-category scheme from Figure 9, the number of changes in partisan control varied from 3 to 12, i.e. from very few to almost as often as possible, given that legislative elections are held every two years in most states. Although there is a built-in curvilinear relation, and a few states with extreme dominance patterns rarely changed control, the number of changes was otherwise not particularly correlated with dominance or split control: some states were quite stably split, some states changed often between one-party and split control. A fourth approach to measurement instead considers the proportion of all legislative seats that are won by relatively small margins. Using 52% as the criterion for a close margin of victory, the proportion of seats won by such a small margin varied from .002 to .31 across state-years. States' averages across all years for the proportion of close elections varied from .01 to .08.³² These different

measures of competitiveness have low inter-correlations. The R^2 for the standard deviation and the number of changes is .2, for the number of changes and number of years of split governance .1, and for the proportion of close elections and split governance .1; all other pairwise correlations among measures of competitiveness are essentially zero.

IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

Political scientists have long argued that different states in the US have radically different political cultures. Building on the work of previous scholars, Berry et al. (1998) developed widely-used measures of political ideology using interest group ratings of Congressional representatives by Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education. Berry et al. provide extensive information on the reliability and construct validity of these measures, and demonstrate that they correlate with a wide variety of social policy outcomes. The measure we are using is from their revised 1960-2006 citizen and government ideology series. Two different measures are calculated with different weighting schemes.³³

The measure called "citizen ideology" weights each Congressional representative's rating by the votes received. Candidates with no Congressional experience are assigned the average rating of the Congressional delegation from that state of the same party. This measure varies greatly between states but is relatively consistent within states. Brace et al. (2004) concluded that, when general period effects are accounted for, the bulk of variation in state political ideology is due to differences across states, though there is some variation in citizen ideology over time.³⁴ Because it is weighted by votes for candidates, the measure varies somewhat over time when there are large shifts in the partisan outcomes of Congressional elections. Because the content of the bills in the COPE and ADA rating scales changes over the years, these ratings can stay the same even if the absolute level of liberalism/conservatism in Congressional bills has varied over the years. As Figure 10 indicates, citizen ideology measured this way had a zero correlation with partisan control of state government early in the series, when many conservative states had Democratic governments. The correlation became stronger over time, but even after 1995, the correlation was still quite low. Thus citizen liberalism index and partisan control are quite separate measures of a state's political context.

Scholars who have tried to assess the effect of political factors have found complex interactions between political ideology and partisan control. For example, (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001) conducted a pooled time series

analysis of the total imprisonment rate in the 50 states in 1970, 1980 and 1990 using the Census as data, finding that ideologically conservative states had higher imprisonment rates, while the effect of Republican strength in state government was not significant overall but was found to have a significant effect in 1980 and 1990, with the 1990 effect being stronger than the 1980 effect. Religious fundamentalism and the violent crime rate were also positive predictors. Below we will show that unpacking the effects of ideology and partisan control in such data requires careful attention to the problem of the co-trending of imprisonment and partisan control.³⁵

Figure 11³⁶ shows the high level of stability in states' relative citizen liberalism between the four years at the beginning of our data series and the four years at the end, as well as permitting identification of states at different points on the scale. Anchoring the high liberal end is Massachusetts, along with Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Vermont, New Jersey, Hawaii, New York and Maryland are also consistently high. At the low end are Mississippi, Utah, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Louisiana and Georgia. By the end of the series, the most conservative state was Idaho, followed by Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. States above the line became increased in their relative liberalism; states below the line became relatively more conservative. States within the reference lines changed less than .5 on their standard score in twenty years. Only six states changed by more than one standard score: Alaska and Idaho became much more conservative, while Nevada, New Mexico, Vermont and Virginia became much more liberal.

It must be stressed that this ideology variable is very different from an ideology question asked directly of a random sample of people. The ideology assessment itself is of votes in Congress as evaluated by two ideological organizations, and the weights are calculated based on people who voted and thus exclude those who are politically disaffected and do not vote. This Ideology measure tends to be more liberal in states where both Blacks and Whites have higher incomes and higher education—especially college graduation—and where a higher percentage of the population of both races is urban. The proportion Hispanic is not related to liberalism; the proportion Black is NEGATIVELY related to liberalism. The correlates of Democratic control are quite different: there is a strong negative time trend, while the ideology measure (even before standardization) shows little trend. Democratic control has a strong racial component, with percent White having a negative correlation and percent Black a positive correlation. The education effects are the opposite for Democratic control and liberalism: Democratic control is higher where a higher percentage of both races have less than high school diplomas.

The Berry et al. measure variously called “institutional ideology” or “government ideology” merges ideology as measured by ratings of Congressional delegations with partisan dominance of state government. This measure starts with the ratings of Congressional delegations (described below), but instead of attributing these opinions to the citizenry through votes, one average rating is calculated for the Democratic and Republican Congressional delegations from that state. These ideology scores are weighted by partisan control of state government, using Klarner's (2003) data on partisan control. Within each house, a party in the minority is assumed to have zero power below 40% and to gain .04 in power for each 1% gain in representation up to a maximum of .4. The party in the majority has power of .6 at 50% representation and gains .04 in power for each 1% increase in the majority up to a maximum power of 1.0 at 60%. Majorities larger than this add nothing to power. The ideology within each house is each party's power weight times the party ideology score; the overall ideology score weight's each chamber of the legislature .25 and the governor .5. Thus this is fundamentally a measure of partisan control that is weighted by the ideological tendencies of the state's Congressional delegation. The “government” measure is (by construction) highly correlated with partisan control. Figure 10 shows that the correlation between Democratic control and state government liberalism rose sharply over time from low to high as the conservative states that had been Democratic shifted in a Republican direction. This “institutional ideology” measure is collinear with the combination of the separate partisan control and citizen ideology measures, so we do not use it in this study.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON RACIAL IMPRISONMENT RATES

We know that partisan political jockeying was central to the national policies that impacted imprisonment rates. But how did these factors affect the racial patterns of imprisonment in different states? In this section, we consider the impact of political factors on Black and White imprisonment rates calculated from the Correctional Populations of the United States (CPUS) and prison admissions of various types calculated from the National Corrections Reporting Program. Our strategy is to work carefully to understand the impact of each political factor one at a time before assessing their combining them into multivariate models. In this process, it is especially important to distinguish between-place effects from within-place effects. When studying within-place effects, it is important to control for the co-trending of imprisonment rates and the conservative shift in partisan dominance.

To forecast the results, we will see that there is a consistent between-place effect that the Black/White disparity is higher in more Republican states and that drug sentence and revocation disparities and overall imprisonment are higher in liberal states. Except for revocations, all measures of White imprisonment are higher in more conservative states and white prison sentences (but not revocations or the overall imprisonment rate) are higher in more Democratic states. There is no consistent between-state effect of either ideology or partisan control on Black imprisonment after the percent Black is controlled, but states with more close elections had substantially higher rates of sentencing Blacks for non-drug offenses. The effects of changes in political factors within states after controls for the overall mean, time trends and autocorrelation are generally weak or non-existent. The only consistent significant result is that both White and Black prison sentences are higher in eras when the state is relatively more conservative.

We begin by gaining an understanding of the bivariate patterns and then turn to a multivariate model.

PARTISAN CONTROL AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SECULAR TREND

Figure 12 shows the scatterplot for Democratic control and Black imprisonment. The Southern states were more likely to be Democratic and to have lower Black imprisonment due to their higher Black population percentages. This suggests that a study of partisan control and the racial patterns of imprisonment needs to take account of the racial composition of a state.

Assessing the impact of partisan also control requires careful handling of changes over time. Recall that most of the variation in state incarceration rates is between-states, and the next portion is trends across time that affected all states (especially through the mid-1990s). Further, political control trended over time as many states shifted from being Democrat-dominated to politically competitive, or from competitive to Republican-controlled. These shifts in political control were highly clustered in time. Without very careful controls we will simply find that incarceration increased as Democratic dominance decreased because they changed together over time.

The basic trend over time can be seen in Figure 13 which shows the mean Black and White imprisonment by partisan control. There is little difference in the White imprisonment rate by partisan control until after 2002, when the rate rises in Republican-controlled states. The Black imprisonment rate is consistently lowest in Democratic-controlled states 1986-2002. The Black/White disparity (not shown) is consistently lowest in Democratic-controlled states. There is a great deal of consistency across time in both a state's imprisonment rate

and its partisan control. Apparent shifts in the relationship over time are largely due to states changing partisan control in key election, particularly the 1994 election.

When we dig into prison admission rates, we need to assess whether the subset of states in the NCRP are different from other states. Figure 14 suggests that there are some differences, most notably for the White rates in Republican-dominated states. A handful of Republican-dominated states are in the NCRP so those rates are quite volatile. The Black trends are more similar between the two samples.

Inspection of plots of imprisonment rates for individual states (not shown) seems to indicate that most of the time a shift in party control does not lead to a sharp change in imprisonment rates. This is not entirely surprising, due to the institutional inertia factors. Places differ in their propensity to elect Republicans versus Democrats but perhaps who takes office matters less than what kind of place it is.

We can directly assess the importance of within-state variations in party control in Table 2, which provides a test of statistical significance of within-state effects comparing periods in which the Republican had unified control, the Democrats had unified control, or control was divided. The entries in the body of the table are the proportion of states in the base for which the average rate or disparity was higher when there was a more conservative government (where split is intermediate between Democrat and Conservative). The last row in each section of the table gives the number of states in each column for which the relevant within-state comparison could be made. For example, in the top panel, only 18 states experienced both unified Democratic and unified Republican control of state government (both houses of the legislature and the governor) and the .72 in the table indicates that 72% or 13 of these states had a higher mean total imprisonment rate when Republicans were in office than when Democrats were in office. The top panel indicates that, in general, imprisonment rates for all races were significantly higher when Republicans were in control. But Republican control and imprisonment rates are co-trending. To get a fairer test of the within-state effect, the second panel standardizes the imprisonment rate for each state-year to the national rate for that year by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. In this panel, most of the proportions are quite close to 50%: which party was in power in a given year made little difference in the imprisonment rate after the national trend is controlled.³⁷ The only exception is for the Hispanic rate, which was significantly higher when Republicans rather than Democrats controlled state government. The third panel compares proportional rates of change. In this panel, the proportions are again close

to half, although in this case they are more often below half, i.e. states were more likely to have lower rates of growth under Republicans than under Democrats. In some cases, this is "significant" in the opposite direction. This is also probably due to co-trending, as the rate of change was highest in the late 1980s when more states were dominated by Democrats. The bottom panel shows how the disparity ratio compares. Again there is little difference. In a table of 20 coefficients, 1 would be expected to be "significant" at the .05 level and the single * or ^ is marking the much less stringent .1 level of significance, which would be expected to occur randomly 10% of the time. In short, there is little warrant for seeing much within-state variation in the imprisonment rate due to party control after the time trend is controlled.³⁸

Prison admissions are much more volatile than the rates of being in prison and are potentially more subject to partisan influence. We conducted the same test of the standardized Black and White rates on the 25 states that participated in the NCRP 1985-2002. We divide prison admissions into three types: new drug sentences, new non-drug sentences, and revocations with no new sentence.³⁹ The results are shown in Table 3. There does appear to be a weak pattern of periods of Republican control being associated with higher Black and lower White year-standardized rates of new sentences and higher racial disparities. But the pattern is not strong or always consistent and the number of states in each comparison group is too small to assure significance.

IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN CONTROL

Although it is common casually to treat Liberal and Democrat as synonyms, along with Conservative and Republican, ideology and partisanship are not well correlated. It is thus not surprising that they have different relations to racial imprisonment patterns. Figure 15 shows a graph of the signed squared correlation coefficients for the bivariate relation between the CPUS imprisonment rate and the NCRP prison admissions rate for the Klarner Democratic dominance scale and the two Berry et al. ideology measures. Citizen liberalism has a consistent negative relation to both White imprisonment rates and a consistent positive relation to the Black/White disparity; the positive relation to the disparity arises because the relation between liberalism and the Black rate is close to zero. Democratic control, by contrast, tends to have no relation to White imprisonment rates but is negatively associated with the Black rate and more negatively associated with the disparity.

Figure 16 shows the scatterplot for the relation between citizen ideology and Black, White and disparity CPUS. The liberal states of the Northeast have very low White imprisonment rates, which contribute to the high

disparity ratio. Comparison of the two figures (Figure 16 and Figure 12) makes it clear that many of the liberal states of the Northeast often elected Republicans.

The pattern is quite clear: conservative ideology is associated with higher White imprisonment rates and prison admission rates; Democratic control is associated with higher White imprisonment rates towards the end of the series. But ideology is uncorrelated with Black imprisonment, while Democratic Party control is negatively related to Black imprisonment, especially between 1988 and 1998. Combining these patterns leads to the strong disparity patterns: liberal states have higher Black/White disparities, while Democratic states have lower Black/White disparities. Although Democrats are thought of as liberal and Republicans as conservative, the correlations between partisan control and ideology are low enough to make this an entirely possible outcome. Although they are not shown, the Hispanic patterns look similar to the Black patterns.

POLITICAL COMPETITION

Preliminary tests revealed that the strongest effect of political competition is with the close elections measure on Black prison admissions, especially new sentences. Figure 17 shows the correlation over time between % close elections and prison admissions.⁴⁰ This figure shows that the correlation changed markedly after the 1995 electoral shift. Figure 18 shows the scatterplot of the relation between Black prison admissions and % close for the whole series and for before and after 1995. The number of years a state had split control is also positively related to Black but not White prison admissions. There is also evidence of a weak time-varying relation between the standard deviation of the partisan control measure and prison admissions, especially for nondrug offenses (Figure 19). The other measures have much weaker bivariate relations that show up for some of the imprisonment measures.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS

To be sure that we can tell the difference between between-place and within-place events, we calculate the between- and within- versions of each variable directly. Because we do not have strong-enough theory or data to disentangle relations of mutual causality, we smooth change scores for variables that change abruptly across 5-year periods centered on the target year.

- Citizen liberalism. Because the actual content of this measure varies across years, a state's score for each year is centered on that year's mean. The between-state measure is the mean of this centered score for a state across all years. The within-state measure is the centered score minus that state's mean centered score.
- Democratic control. The between measure is the mean of Klarner's Democratic control scale. The within measure is the 5-year smoothed average of the difference between the current Democratic control and the state's average.
- Instability in Democratic control. There are two between measures of instability: the standard deviation of the Democratic control measure and the number of times a state changed in the 5-category control scheme.
- Political competition. The proportion of elections won by a margin of 52% or less is calculated and smoothed across a five-year period. To reduce skew, this proportion is logged. The between measure is the mean of the logged proportion. The within measure is calculated by subtracting the state's mean from the logged smoothed proportion.
- Population. Between measures are the average proportion Black and non-Hispanic White in the state, and the average change in that proportion.⁴¹ The within measures of racial population change are calculated by subtracting the mean change from the year's change.

The dependent variables are all centered on the yearly national mean for that variable, so national-level trends are excluded from this analysis. A square root transformation brings the imprisonment and prison admission rates into acceptable ranges of skew and kurtosis. Disparities are calculated as the log of the ratio of the Black to the White rate and then centered on the national log disparity for that year. Imprisonment measures include the CPUS imprisonment rate 1978-2003⁴²; total admissions from the NCRP for 25 states 1985-2002. We run regressions on the CPUS imprisonment rate for the NCRP subsample to help assess the impact of sampling issues. Prison admissions are divided into new sentences (further divided into drug and nondrug) and all other admissions which, in practice, are primarily revocations. Two states (Maryland and Tennessee) do not distinguish

between new sentences and revocations for all or most of the data years and so are excluded from the analysis of revocations.

Because there is extremely high between-year autocorrelation for both the independent and dependent variables, the regressions are run using the xtregar package in Stata which corrects the standard errors for both the autocorrelation and the clustering within states. Variables are excluded from the reduced model if absolute value of the ratio of their coefficients to the standard error is less than 1.28 (i.e. $p > .1$).

The CPUS imprisonment rate captures the stock of being in prison in a given year and is the accumulation of prior prison sentences as well as prior sentence lengths, rates of release due to parole, and revocations back into prison after release to community supervision. The CPUS rate has a great deal of inertia and cannot generally change rapidly from year to year. Prison admissions are potentially more volatile. Admissions for new sentences occur after a crime and an adjudication process. Admissions for revocations are a product of the pool of people available for revocation due to being on supervision and the propensity of the supervising agents to revoke. Revocation admissions as measured via the NCRP are also highly subject to data errors as different states count and classify these non-sentence admissions differently. We count people who have both a new sentence and a revocation as a new sentence in this analysis.

RESULTS

Table 4 summarizes the results for regressing the various prison admission records on the various political and demographic factors; the tables with full information are in the appendix to this paper. The summary table has an entry only if the regression coefficient meets the conventional significance level $p < .05$ in a reduced model that eliminates non-significant independent variables.⁴³ For Whites, prison admissions are higher in conservative states (negative coefficient on liberalism) for all measures except revocations; in addition, there is a within-state variability for prison sentences, such that states had higher White imprisonment rates when that state was more conservative relative to its own mean across time. White sentences (but not revocations or total imprisonment) were also higher where the average partisan control was more Democratic. Drug sentences only were also higher in states that varied more across time in the valence of their partisan control (standard deviation). For Blacks, the main effect of liberalism is not significant, although non-drug sentences are higher when a state is more conservative relative to its own mean. Partisan control also has only two significant coefficients: imprisonment and

total admissions 1988-2001 are higher in more Republican states. The strong predictive factor for Black imprisonment is political competition, both the percentage of elections that are close (for most factors except revocations and CPUS imprisonment 1988/2001) and the standard deviation of partisan control, for new sentences. Black nondrug sentences also are positively related to the number of years of split government in a state. Finally, these two sets of results merge in the disparity results, where we see that the racial disparity is highest in liberal states, Republican-dominated states, and states with a relatively high percentage of close elections.

What this all seems to add up to is that White imprisonment is largely a function of ideological conservatism or the factors associated with it, while Black imprisonment is primarily driven by political competition. The signs on the partisan control measures are opposite for Whites and Blacks, but significant only for Whites. This seems logical, as Blacks are a significant part of the electoral base for Democrats but not for Republicans; conversely, Whites disproportionately vote Republican.

It is reasonable to wonder whether these results replicate for areas within states and whether they are affected by the extent of urbanization in a state. One might speculate that rural areas are more conservative, and we know from earlier work that White imprisonment rates are higher in rural areas than metropolitan areas, especially towards the end of the data series. Table 5 summarizes the results for metropolitan areas and Table 6 summarizes the results for the non-metropolitan balance of states; the tables with numbers and standard errors are in the appendix to this paper.⁴⁴ These separate analyses are not inconsistent with the state-level analysis but add some specificity. If we look at the regression coefficients in the tables, the effect sizes are generally roughly comparable for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.⁴⁵ There are as many degrees of freedom in the nonmetropolitan regressions as in the state regressions, and comparison of Table 4 and Table 6 makes it clear that the effect of liberal/conservative ideology is weaker in non-metropolitan areas than in the state as a whole, the effect of partisan control is consistent between the whole state and the non-metropolitan areas, and the effect of political competition is stronger in non-metropolitan areas than in the state as a whole. The weaker ideology coefficient for nonmetropolitan areas arises because the relationship between liberalism and low White imprisonment rates in rural areas changed over time.

Another way to consider the data is by examining the standardized regression coefficients which express the impact of a one standard deviation change in the independent variable on the dependent variable. Standardized regression coefficients cannot be directly compared between models, only within models, but the graphical display of these coefficients for the full models including all independent variables provides a rough sense of the magnitudes of the effects of the variables. Graphs of these relations for new prison sentences are shown in Figure 20 for Whites, Figure 21 for Blacks and Figure 22 for the Black/White disparity. As Figure 20 indicates, the negative effect of liberalism is strong for states but considerably moderated within states, especially for rural areas, suggesting that much of the state effect is due to the rural/urban mix in different places. The strongest factors for White rates in rural areas are the percent White and Black; the fact that they are both strongly negative says that the highest White rates occur in rural areas where there are a significant fraction of other minorities, especially Hispanics. The impact of Democratic control largely replicates within states and the strong positive effect of the standard deviation in partisan control (which primarily captures the large-scale changes in partisan control) both point to a significant role for politics in White imprisonment. For Blacks (Figure 21), the strongest measures are clearly those for political competition: both close elections and the standard deviation of partisan control have strong effects. When these political competition factors are controlled, the effect of demographic factors weakens considerably. There is a large negative effect for years of split control that shows up only for rural areas. The surprising positive effect of liberalism on the disparity ratio (Figure 22) weakens when we separate rural and urban areas, as do the effects of Democratic control and close elections. In the mirror image of the White effect, the disparity is highest in rural areas that are higher in both Black and White population proportions (i.e. lowest in other minorities).

Overall, political competition had a positive effect on imprisonment of both races but the effect was stronger for Blacks than Whites. Both political conservatism and Democratic control (both of which tend to be stronger in the South) also had strong effects on White imprisonment but weak and oppositely-signed effects on Black imprisonment, so that the disparity was highest in liberal states that elected more Republicans.

COMPARISONS TO LITERATURE

Carefully unpacking the effects of political factors by race and parts of states helps to clarify some of the mixed and unstable results of previous research. Much of this research has failed to disaggregate by race.⁴⁶

Stucky, Heimer and Lang (2005) studied total prison admissions and found Republican control of the legislature to be a strong factor only where there is more political competition and after 1996, the Governor had no effect after Texas was removed, and found strong state-year interactions that mean that each state had a different time profile. Their study of correction expenditures as proportion of state total for 1980-1998 (Stucky, Heimer and Lang 2007) found a positive effect of Republican control of the state legislature, but in contrast to the previous study, found that lower electoral competition strengthens the party effect.

Helms and Jacobs (2002) conducted a Tobit analysis of individual sentence lengths by race in 337 counties in 7 states (MN, MO, NE, NJ, NY PA and VA) in 1990. The percentage in the county who voted Republican in the 1988 presidential election is the measure of political context. No difference was found in conventional analysis, including state dummies. But interaction terms suggest that men and African Americans received longer sentences in counties with a higher Republican vote percentage.

Yates and Fording (2005) is the first major piece to consider that Black & White incarceration may have different political relationships. They use a pooled cross-sectional time-series design with Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates to examine changes in race-specific imprisonment rates and levels of racial disparity for 45 states in the CPUS 1977-1995.⁴⁷ Excluded states are Alaska, Hawaii, Vermont, Illinois, Nebraska. The first three are trivial for racial politics and Nebraska has a non-partisan legislature, but the exclusion of Illinois (due to its lack of arrest and crime data) is unfortunate for this analysis. Independent variables are the changes in the percentage of seats held by Republicans in the legislature, Republican governor, a measure of judicial conservatism of the state Supreme Court, Black elected officials, female legislators, and Berry et al.'s ideology measure. They find that changes in both the Black and White imprisonment rates are positively affected by a change to a Republican governor, while an increase in the Republican legislative share (or a decrease in the Democratic share) and an increase in judicial conservatism are both positively associated with the Black imprisonment rate and the Black/White disparity but not with the White rate. The Berry et al citizen ideology measure has no effect, but both Black elected officials and female legislators have significant negative effects on Black imprisonment. Summarizing

their results, Yates and Fording stress that arrests or crime, poverty, determinate sentencing laws and a Republican governor affect both races, but Black rates are even more affected than White rates by other political variables, including Republican legislature, judicial ideology, and Black and female elected officials. The disparity results give a similar conclusion: the growth in Black rates is much more affected by political factors than the growth in White rates. They then go one step farther and look at the relationship between political context and the percentage of the population that is Black. This analysis finds that the Black population percentage reduces the impact of Republican political strength and judicial conservatism on the Black imprisonment rate and the disparity ratio. It is also interesting that they find a positive effect of the change in poverty on the change in imprisonment for both races with other factors controlled.

THE 1970S: A BRIEF REPORT AND A COMPARISON

We started this project with the idea that the mass incarceration of African Americans had its origins in the responses to the 1960s riots. There are some data from the 1970s compiled by Langan (1991). These data are sparse; different states reported in different years, so conclusions must be tentative. Examination of data from this period reveals that the ideology pattern anticipates the later results: more conservative states have higher White prison admissions and more liberal states have a higher Black-White disparity. There is little evidence for any effect of partisan control on Black or White imprisonment at the beginning of the 1970s, but by the end of the 1970s, the highest White imprisonment rates are in the Southern Democratic states where there is a high percent Black, along with Nevada (also Conservative and Democratic, but low percent Black) Few Republican-controlled states even reported prison admissions between 1975 and 1980: their rates were in the middle of the distribution. States with mixed partisan control all had below-average White imprisonment rates.⁴⁸ This pattern does not hold for Blacks. Democratic-controlled states do **not** stand out as having high Black imprisonment rates, nor is there any clear pattern in the bottom panel for the Black/White disparity, except that the Black/White disparity is lowest for the states with the highest White imprisonment rates. These data are very sparse, but such as they are they either show no partisan effect or a tendency for Democratic-controlled states to incarcerate Whites, similar to the trends identified in the later data.

Examining race-specific incarceration rates changes conclusions that do not take account of race. An illustration is Barker (2006), whose qualitative historical comparison of Washington, California, and New York in the 1960s and 1970s is the basis for an institutional account for why these states had low, medium and high incarceration rates, respectively. We may compare her discussion with the data in Figure 23. Per Barker, Washington made very little use of imprisonment and conducted politics with open forums that encouraged deliberation rather than conflict that generated low imprisonment rates. But Washington actually had the *highest* race-specific prison admission rate of the three states for both Blacks and Whites 1974-1977. It continued to have by far the highest Black imprisonment rate through 1980, while its White rate slipped below California's in 1978-1980. Washington's Black/White disparity was comparable to New York's through 1977, but it stayed high when New York's fell after 1977. That is, Washington looked non-punitive because of the racial mix of its citizenry, but looks much more punitive if race-specific rates are considered.

For California, Barker argues that its populist context and decentralized policy-making through initiatives generated an alienated and hostile citizenry who supported highly punitive measures. California began the 1970s with the lowest Black rate and the middle White rate of the three states. By the end of the decade the Black rate had moved to the middle of the pack and the White rate had become the highest among the three. This is consistent with Barker's analysis. However, during the 1970s California consistently had the lowest Black/White imprisonment ratio of the three states. Its conflictual climate which escalated White imprisonment led it to be less focused on Blacks for social control.

New York, Barker argues, had a political climate of elite pragmatism. Focusing specifically on the Rockefeller drug laws, she argues that Black activists advocated for stronger anti-drug policies in the 1960s and supported the anti-drug law of 1973. She argues that, unlike California, Blacks in New York in the 1960s were incorporated into the polity. But New York had the lowest *White* imprisonment rate of the three states. Although its White rate stayed relatively low, by the end of the 1970s the Black rate had fallen. Its Black/White disparity ratio, though falling during the 1970s, was still higher than California's, Blacks' political inclusion notwithstanding.⁴⁹

In short, the race-specific rates point to a different and more complex story about politics and punishment in each state.

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List of Tables

TABLE 1. PERCENT OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTES FOR CRIME MEASURES BY PARTY AND RACIAL COMPOSITION OF DISTRICT 1965-1973

Percent of Congressional Votes for Crime Measures by Party and Racial Composition of District 1965-1973 (table constructed from information in the text and graphs of DaCosta Nunes 1980.)

District composition	"Hard" Bills		"Soft" Bills	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
>51% Black	24%	X	40%	
20-50% Black	59%	82%	48%	48%
10-20% Black	47%	79%	51%	44%
<10% Black	37%	79%	51%	47%

TABLE 2. TEST FOR WHETHER REPUBLICAN PARTY CONTROL AFFECTS CPUS IMPRISONMENT RATES WITHIN STATES

Test for whether Republican Party control affects CPUS imprisonment rates within states																		
Table entries are proportions of states that meet criterion across time; significance test is based on the binomial																		
Race	Combined Control						Legislature						Governor					
Variable	R>D		R>S		M>S		R>D		R>S		S>D		R>D		R>S		S>D	
Rate																		
All	0.72	**	0.79	**	0.76	**	0.81	**	0.67	*	0.81	**	0.68	**	0.56		0.67	
Black	0.78	**	0.79	**	0.73	**	0.81	**	0.52		0.84	**	0.68	**	0.56		0.78	*
Hispanic	0.78	**	0.82	**	0.62	*	0.81	**	0.7	**	0.81	**	0.62	*	0.44		0.78	*
White	0.72	**	0.79	**	0.73	**	0.81	**	0.74	**	0.78	**	0.66	**	0.67		0.67	
N	18		28		37		21		27		32		50		9		9	
Rate standardized within year																		
All	0.56		0.5		0.54		0.38		0.52		0.63		0.56		0.78	*	0.44	
Black	0.56		0.54		0.46		0.43		0.63		0.5		0.46		0.89	**	0.33	
Hispanic	0.72	**	0.54		0.49		0.57		0.52		0.56		0.54		0.44		0.44	
White	0.56		0.61		0.54		0.48		0.41		0.59		0.6		0.44		0.44	
N	18		28		37		21		27		32		50		9		9	
Proportional change in rate																		
All	0.39		0.32	^^	0.43		0.38		0.46		0.5		0.39	^	0.22	^	0.33	
Black	0.44		0.32	^^	0.41		0.33	^	0.38		0.34	^	0.43		0.44		0.22	^
Hispanic	0.5		0.43		0.49		0.43		0.42		0.28	^^	0.43		0.44		0.22	^
White	0.61		0.43		0.54		0.48		0.62		0.56		0.43		0.44		0.33	
N	18		28		37		21		26		32		49		9		9	
Log disparity in rate																		
Black	0.5		0.39		0.46		0.38		0.37		0.41		0.52		0.11	^^	0.78	*
Hispanic	0.56		0.54		0.46		0.76	**	0.48		0.66	*	0.46		0.22	^	0.67	
N	18		28		37		21		27		32		50		9		9	
as predicted * p<.1, ** p<.05 ; opposite to prediction ^p<.1, ^^ p<.05																		
R=Republican control, D=Democratic control, S=Split control																		

TABLE 3. TEST FOR WITHIN-STATE EFFECTS OF PARTY CONTROL ON YEAR-STANDARDIZED PRISON ADMISSION RATES

Test for whether party control affects year-standardized prison admission rates within states										
Restricted to 25 states with complete data 1985-2002										
Race	Type	Combined Control			Legislature			Governor		
Race	Type	R>D	R>S	M>S	R>D	R>S	S>D	R>D	R>S	S>D
Black	revoc	0.50	0.43	0.35	0.38	0.40	0.62	0.47	0.50	1.00
	drug	0.75	0.86 *	0.59	0.88 **	0.60	0.46	0.58	0.00	0.50
	nondrug	1.00 *	0.57	0.71 *	0.88 **	0.60	0.77 **	0.63	0.00	0.50
White	revoc	0.50	0.29	0.24 ^^	0.13 ^^	0.20 ^	0.38	0.37	0.00	0.50
	drug	0.50	0.14 ^	0.59	0.38	0.40	0.69	0.58	0.50	0.50
	nondrug	0.25	0.29	0.47	0.38	0.50	0.54	0.53	1.00	0.50
	N	4	7	17	8	10	13	19	2	2
				Disparity						
B/W Dispa	revoc	0.75	0.86 *	0.65	0.75	0.50	0.62	0.63	0.50	0.50
	drug	1.00 *	0.86 *	0.53	1.00 **	0.70	0.46	0.58	0.50	1.00
	nondrug	0.50	0.43	0.53	0.38	0.50	0.31	0.53	0.50	0.50
N		4	7	17	8	10	13	19	2	2
as predicted * p<.1, ** p<.05 ; opposite to prediction ^p<.1, ^^ p<.05										
R=Republican control, D=Democratic control, S=Split control										

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF REGRESSIONS OF STATE IMPRISONMENT RATES ON POLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Summary of regression of state imprisonment rates on political factors (p<.05 only)

	Liberalism		Dem control		% Close Elections		Partisan Control			Demographics	
	Average	Change	Average	Change	Average	Change	Std Dev	# changes	years split	%Black	%White
White											
CPUS (50, 1978/2004)	—										—
CPUS (29, 1988/2001)	—										—
NCRP(29 1988/2001)											
All admissions	—									—	—
Revocations											
New Sentences (all)	—	—	+							—	—
Nondrug sentences	—	—	+								
Drug sentences	—	—	+				+			—	—
Black											
CPUS (50, 1978/2004)					+						
CPUS (29, 1988/2001)			—							—	
NCRP(29 1988/2001)											
All admissions			—		+					—	—
Revocations										—	
New Sentences (all)		—			+		+				
Nondrug sentences		—			+		+		+		
Drug sentences					+		+				—
Disparity											
CPUS (50, 1978/2004)	+		—		+						
CPUS (29, 1988/2001)	+		—		+						
NCRP(29 1988/2001)											
All admissions	+		—		+						
Revocations	+		—		+						
New Sentences (all)	+		—		+						
Nondrug sentences	+		—		+						
Drug sentences	+		—								

TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF REGRESSIONS OF METRO AREA IMPRISONMENT RATES ON POLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Summary of regression of metro area imprisonment rates on political factors (p<.05 only)

	Liberalism		Dem control		% Close Elections		Partisan Control			Demographics		
	Average	Change	Average	Change	Average	Change	Std Dev	# changes	years split	%Black	%White	Black pop
White												
All admissions	—	+	+		+					—		
Revocations		+		+			—			—		
New Sentences	—		+	—	+	+	+					
Drug	—		+			+				—	—	
Violence		+	+	—	+		+				—	—
Robbery/Burglary	—		+	—	+	+	+	—	+			
Theft	—	—	+			+	+		+	+		
Other	—		+	—	+		+	—				
Black												
All admissions		—	—	—	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—
Revocations	+						—		+	—	—	—
New Sentences		—	—	—	+	+	+	—	+		+	—
Drug	+			—	+	+	+	—				—
Violence					+		+		+			—
Robbery/Burglary		—		+	+	+	+	—	+			—
Theft	—	—		+	+	+	+		+			—
Other		—	—	—	+		+	—			+	—
Disparity												
All admissions	+	—	—	—						—	+	
Revocations	+	—		—	+		+					—
New Sentences	+		—	—	+						+	
Drug	+	+	—	—		+				+	+	—
Violence	+		—		+							—
Robbery/Burglary	+		—		+							—
Theft	+		—	+	+	—					+	—
Other	+		—	—	+						+	—

TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF REGRESSIONS OF NON-METRO AREA IMPRISONMENT RATES ON POLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Summary of regression of non-metro area imprisonment rates on political factors (p<.05 only)

	Liberalism		Dem control		% Close Elections		Partisan Control			Demographics		
	Average	Change	Average	Change	Average	Change	Std Dev	# changes	years split	%Black	%White	Black pop
White												
All admissions										—	—	
Revocations										—	—	
New Sentences			+				+			—	—	
Drug	—		+							—	—	
Violence			+	—	+		+			—	—	
Robbery/Burglary					+		+					+
Theft	—											
Other				—			+			—	—	
All admissions			—		+		+	—				
Revocations			—					—				
New Sentences					+		+	—				
Drug					+		+	—				
Violence				—	+		+					
Robbery/Burglary					+		+					
Theft	—		—									
Other					+		+		+			
Disparity												
All admissions			—	—							+	
Revocations		—	—	—							+	
New Sentences			—	—						+	+	
Drug	+		—				+	—		+	+	
Violence			—	—	+					+	+	
Robbery/Burglary			—		+					+	+	
Theft			—								+	
Other			—		+					+	+	

List of Figures




FIGURE 1. MEAN HARSHNESS IN THE GSS BY RACE, SEX AND YEAR




FIGURE 2. CRIME RATES AND OPINIONS ABOUT CRIME




FIGURE 3. RACIAL PATTERNS IN CRIME-RELEVANT OPINIONS




FIGURE 4. HOMICIDE RATES AND CRIME-RELEVANT OPINIONS, BY RACE




FIGURE 5. CRIME AS MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM AND CRIME RATES




FIGURE 6. TOP MENTIONS AS "MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM"





FIGURE 7. IDEOLOGY AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION, GSS, BY RACE




FIGURE 8. TRENDS IN PARTISAN CONTROL OF STATES




FIGURE 9. NUMBER OF YEARS 1978-2007 WITH EACH TYPE OF PARTISAN CONTROL




FIGURE 10. SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AND LIBERAL IDEOLOGY MEASURES ACROSS TIME




FIGURE 11. STATE IDEOLOGY IN 1978-82 AND 2003-6, STANDARDIZED WITHIN ERA




FIGURE 12. SCATTER PLOT FOR RELATION BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AND IMPRISONMENT RATES, ALL YEARS




FIGURE 13. MEAN BLACK AND WHITE IMPRISONMENT RATE (CPUS) BY PARTISAN CONTROL (COMBINED)







FIGURE 14. BLACK AND WHITE IMPRISONMENT RATES (CPUS) FOR ALL STATES AND NCRP STATES




FIGURE 15. SIGNED SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN IMPRISONMENT AND POLITICAL VARIABLES, BY YEAR






FIGURE 16. LIBERAL IDEOLOGY BY IMPRISONMENT RATE, ALL YEARS




FIGURE 17. SIGNED SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN PERCENT CLOSE ELECTIONS AND PRISON ADMISSION RATES AND DISPARITY






FIGURE 18. SCATTERPLOTS OF RELATION BETWEEN BLACK PRISON ADMISSIONS BY % CLOSE ELECTIONS





FIGURE 19. SIGNED SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN SENTENCE RATES AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PARTISON CONTROL (K)




FIGURE 20. STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS ON WHITE NEW SENTENCE RATE




FIGURE 21. STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS ON BLACK NEW SENTENCE RATE




FIGURE 22. STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS ON LOG BLACK/WHITE DISPARITY IN NEW SENTENCE RATE




FIGURE 23. COMPARISON OF PRISON ADMISSION RATES IN WASHINGTON, CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK IN THE 1970S

Notes

¹ Add refs.

² Cite BJS analysis

³ This is the old Blumstein "constant size" argument.

⁴ ref?

⁵ refs

⁶ This implies that percent Black may mediate political effects or be mediated by them. Check this. Is there a literature on this?

⁷ Documented in timeline available on the web page of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention <http://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/chronology.html> accessed 6/24/11.

⁸ I received email permission from Lenard Wells to use his name in describing this incident. Worth analyzing the DOC records to identify the impact of his tenure? This would have to restrict analysis to people sentenced before 12/31/99 and get parole release as a % of inmates not released that year as mandatory release.

⁹ Get the citation

¹⁰ pick up the reference

¹¹ For discussions of the influence of public opinion on policy, see Burstein Burstein, Paul. 2003. "The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda." *Political Research Quarterly* 56(1):29, —. 2006. "Why Estimates of the Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy are Too High: Empirical and Theoretical Implications." *Social Forces* 84(4):2273-89. NOTE: The 2006 article says estimates of the impact of public opinion are too high because they are based on a biased sample of issues about which the public has opinions. This is contra his earlier reviews that stress the significance of public opinion.

¹² [Harshness_race_year_GSS.jpg] better to re-do this as % not harsh enough.

¹³ This paragraph describes a "raw" GSS table. JEY has produced tables based on models using GSS sample weights. Because the GSS is a sample of households, changes in household composition over the years can create misleading picture of changes of individuals' attitudes. Expected values by year and region were calculated accounting for several such composition variables, though doing so compensates for the composition at the price of assuming that such variables' effects themselves are constant throughout time.

¹⁴ See http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf for the secretary of state's statement of the vote and http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2008/Prop_9_9_23_08.pdf for a summary of the provisions of the victim's rights bill.

¹⁵ There is much more instability in "other" race rates, but after 1995, they seem to be more similar to the Black trend rather than the White trend. There is evidence of regional variation in punitiveness that varies by racial group and is stronger after the mid-1990s when overall punitiveness was declining. As the GSS does not identify states and non-White samples are too small for stable estimates of regional differences, we will not pursue the question of regional variation in attitudes. JEY on regions: First, there is some regional variation in this measure of punitiveness (regions are the smallest identifiable geographic units in the survey). New England states (ME, VT, NH, MA, CT, RI) express the most punitive attitude, while West South Central states (AR, OK, LA, TX) express the least punitive attitudes [table or footnote]. Still, upwards of 70% of the population say "not harsh enough" in any region.

¹⁶ This probably exists but I don't have it.

¹⁷ Walter Dickey, University of Wisconsin law professor and former head of Wisconsin's Department of Corrections uses this phrase often in his public presentations on criminal justice issues.

¹⁸ This is frequently rehearsed in other sources.

¹⁹ (Kennedy is quoting 132 Cong. Rec. H 5939, August 11, 1986).

²⁰ [[figure CrimImportant2.jpg]]

²¹ [[reference + cite my own analysis]]

²² This statement is based on my own correlation within the GSS sample. I should probably give a more careful methodological report on this in a footnote.

²³ I can turn this into a signed correlation graph or some such. Need to do weights etc.

²⁴ Add citations

²⁵ Lisa L. Miller (2008). *The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control*. New York: Oxford University Press.

²⁶ In comparing data on party control of the governorship with data from another source we had previously been using, we found many errors in the other source and in 100% of the cases of a discrepancy between Klarner's data and the other source, external sources supported Klarner.

²⁷ These data were downloaded 6/23/11 from http://academic.udayton.edu/SPPQ-TPR/other_datasets.html and are documented in Klarner, Carl. 2007. "Codebook for StatePartisanBalance1959to2007_ForUse." Which is available on that web site.

²⁸ Klarner offers two schemes for the degree of partial control of upper houses weighted by months of control, but as there are only three state-years in which the alternate coding partial control is different from .5, we will ignore this distinction and use the scheme that assigns .5 for all such cases.

²⁹ (PartyControl5.jpg) Other graphs are [Graphs PartyControlIndex.jpg, PartyControl3.jpg and PartyControl5.jpg are from PartisanControl spreadsheet.] The "lean" category includes cases in which the governor and one chamber of the legislature are of the same party; the "split" cases are those in which a governor of one party faces two legislative chambers of the other party. In the few cases of an independent governor, the state is split if the legislature is split and leans if the two chambers of the legislature are of the same party.

³⁰ PartyControl5_statse_mono.jpg

³¹ [[fn: The three states that never had unified political control were New York (whose legislative houses were never under the control of a single party), Delaware (whose houses were generally divided and had a Republican governor for the two years the legislature was controlled by Democrats), and Nebraska (whose non-partisan unicameral legislature is coded as mixed control).] NOTE: Should add the years to the title. Also I think I can make the mono graph work if I put white borders around the bars so the gap between lean Dem and lean Rep will show up for NE and NY.

³² We also calculated the proportion of "safe" seats won by at least 65%, but this factor did not prove to have predictive value.

³³ There are many complex allocation rules for missing information which are explained in the original publication and its on-line supplements. ADD WEB SITE

³⁴ Paul Brace, Kevin Arceneaux, Martin Johnson, and Stacy G. Ulbig (2004). Does State Political Ideology Change over Time? *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (December 2004): pp. 529-540. Of course, to the extent there is variation across time, it is difficult to know exactly why it has occurred. For example, Brace (p. 530) mentions residential mobility across and within states.

³⁵ For example, time series analyses for 1950-1990 on national-level imprisonment rates Jacobs, David, and Ronald E. Helms. 1996. "Toward a Political Model of Incarceration: A Time-Series Examination of Multiple Explanations for Prison Admission Rates." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(2):323-57. and expenditures Jacobs, David, and Ronald Helms. 1999. "Collective Outbursts, Politics, and Punitive Resources: Toward a Political Sociology of Spending on Social Control." *Social Forces* 77(4):1497-523. find positive effects of Republican dominance because the series ends in 1990 during a Republican presidency.

³⁶ Liberalism_1978_2006.wmf The scores have been standardized within era to facilitate comparisons of level of change across eras.

³⁷ we ran the tests on the CPUS imprisonment rate shown in Table 2 for the NCRP subset and got essentially the same results.

³⁸ Drop Hispanics and proportional change entirely?

³⁹ The "revocation" category is anything other than a new sentence, but most of these are revocations. Revocations are very low or zero for some states because they are often not reported to the NCRP.

⁴⁰ I also have a 3-panel figure showing admissions, cpus and new sentences.

⁴¹ Because the annual changes in the proportions are very small, they are multiplied by 100 to bring their regression coefficients into scale

⁴² The political competition data end in 2003.

⁴³ The regressions use the Stata xtregar program which takes account of autocorrelation in time series data. Models were run with all variables and then a reduced form model was calculated using only the factors that for which $p < .1$.

⁴⁴ I have some concern that the models for metropolitan areas have not been sufficiently controlled for the nesting of metro areas within states and they inherently weight states with more metropolitan areas more heavily than states with fewer metropolitan areas. The political factors are state-level factors that do not vary within states; only the demographic factors are particular to metro areas within states.

⁴⁵ I need to get this out the door now, but I have an idea for how to convey effect sizes graphically by calculating each effect as the change from something like 25th to 75th percentile of that variable, and then comparing the effects across variables and samples.

⁴⁶ MAKE SPECIAL DAVEY GRAPHS? THIS WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL REVISION IF IT STAYS: Davey, Joseph Dillon. 1998. *The politics of prison expansion : winning elections by waging war on crime*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. selected states that had periods of especially steep increases in imprisonment and compared each with an adjacent state that did not exhibit a similar increase in the same time period, finding that there were “law and order” governors in office in the states and years that exhibited these steep increases but not in the comparison state-years. Davey’s cases with law and order governors are New Hampshire 1989-93, Missouri 1989-1993, South Carolina 1986-1990, Delaware 1985-1989, Kentucky 1987-1991, Arizona 1987, and Louisiana 1988-1991. All of these cases are in the early drug war era when incarceration rates were rising in almost all states. When we calculate race-specific year-standardized rates and compare a state with all states, not just an adjacent state, the impact of the “law and order” governor is generally muted, although in most cases there is some evidence of an increase. 1) New Hampshire (1989-1993) actually had lower White incarceration rates than either Vermont or Maine; its high growth rate was due to having a low base and was focused almost entirely on Hispanics, not Whites or Blacks. 2) Missouri (1989-1993) was compared with Kansas, which had an earlier rise from which it was declining, but Missouri’s race-specific rates showed no exceptional trends relative to other states, and it had lower Black and Hispanic incarceration rates than Kansas. 3) South Carolina (1986-1990) had relatively high rates coming into 1986-1990 but did not grow more than other states did, although its White rate was consistently higher than North Carolina’s and the gap in the Black rates was higher in this period than others. 4) Delaware (1985-1989) consistently had high incarceration rates for all races in the 1980s, and did exhibit a rise for Blacks and Hispanics in 1985. 5) Kentucky 1987-1991 shows a steep rise in White rates during the era in question, while Black and Hispanic rates held fairly constant. 6) Arizona’s rates (1987) were already high and rising before 1987 and kept rising through 1991; White rates are exceptionally high. Louisiana (1988-1991) rates are high and do exhibit a rise in the relative rates in 1988-1991.

⁴⁷ [[FN. NEED TO CLARIFY THE YEAR OF REFERENCE VS THE YEAR ON THE STUDY. I think it is mid-year and that the series is 1978-1995.]]

⁴⁸ Two states with low White imprisonment rates switched to Republican control in 1982 (New Hampshire, from mixed, and Pennsylvania, from Democratic), bringing down the Republican average in the last year of this data series.

⁴⁹ [[fn: It may be wondered whether other races or unreported races are influencing these comparisons. The answer is no. The state with unusually high “other race” reports is New York, where the large number of “other race” in 1974 and 1976 appears to be artificially reducing the White imprisonment rate and thus artificially increasing the Black/White disparity in those years. Log file from 3/18/09.]]

Appendix to Political Factors in Incarceration
Pamela E. Oliver September 2011
Working Paper

Detailed regression tables

States

White

1. Imprisonment rates, CPUS and NCRP
2. Prison admission rates, NCRP

Black

3. Imprisonment rates, CPUS and NCRP
4. Prison admission rates, NCRP

Disparity

5. Imprisonment rates, CPUS and NCRP
6. Prison admission rates, NCRP

Metro Areas

White

7. Prison admission rates by type
8. Prison sentence rates by offense

Black

9. Prison admission rates by type
10. Prison sentence rates by offense

Disparity

11. Prison admission rates by type
12. Prison sentence rates by offense

Non-metro Areas

White

13. Prison admission rates by type
14. Prison sentence rates by offense

Black

15. Prison admission rates by type
16. Prison sentence rates by offense

Disparity

17. Prison admission rates by type
18. Prison sentence rates by offense

Regression of White imprisonment rates by type on political factors, states

	In prison CPUS 1978-2004 (50 states)		In prison CPUS 1988-2001 (29 states)		All prison admissions NCRP 1988-2001 (29 states)	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.509*** [0.130]	-0.462*** [0.116]	-0.738*** [0.177]	-0.602*** [0.186]	-0.632*** [0.170]	-0.623*** [0.164]
Liberalism change	0.00115 [0.0503]		0.0173 [0.0942]		-0.233* [0.131]	-0.235* [0.131]
av. Dem. Control	0.143 [0.163]		0.320 [0.229]		0.335 [0.220]	0.340* [0.178]
Dem. control change	0.0136 [0.0177]		-0.0279 [0.0286]		-0.0665* [0.0397]	-0.0681* [0.0395]
av. % Close elect log	0.265 [0.395]		-0.471 [0.657]		-0.0519 [0.631]	
% Close elect change	-0.00711 [0.0340]		0.0246 [0.0611]		0.0962 [0.0855]	
Stdev Dem control	-0.277 [0.507]		-0.528 [0.750]		-0.0269 [0.720]	
# changes Dem control	0.0596 [0.0553]		0.124 [0.0773]		0.0168 [0.0741]	
# years split control	0.00642 [0.0169]		-0.00355 [0.0238]		-0.00192 [0.0229]	
av. % Black	-0.794 [1.740]		-4.230 [2.792]		-6.536** [2.679]	-6.392*** [2.043]
av. % White	-2.231** [0.930]	-1.935** [0.811]	-4.230** [1.736]	-2.405* [1.358]	-5.262*** [1.666]	-5.230*** [1.592]
Constant	2.338 [1.764]	1.655** [0.667]	1.295 [2.634]	1.834* [1.097]	3.686 [2.527]	3.855*** [1.464]
Observations	1,300	1,300	406	406	405	405
Number of state	50	50	29	29	29	29
R2_Overall	0.294	0.253	0.443	0.314	0.410	0.405
R2_Between	0.342	0.294	0.480	0.341	0.475	0.471
R2_Within	0.000224	0	0.00845	0	0.0620	0.0499
Rho_pov	0.934	0.940	0.929	0.944	0.845	0.845

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of White prison admission rates by type on political factors 1988-2001, 29 states in NCRP

	Revocations		New Sentences		Non-drug sentences		Drug Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.316		-0.708***	-0.728***	-0.675***	-0.647***	-0.653***	-0.653***
	[0.205]		[0.149]	[0.150]	[0.165]	[0.168]	[0.101]	[0.103]
Liberalism change	-0.0344		-0.402***	-0.402***	-0.335***	-0.340***	-0.526***	-0.517***
	[0.141]		[0.131]	[0.130]	[0.124]	[0.124]	[0.175]	[0.175]
av. Dem. control	-0.0474		0.613***	0.542***	0.595***	0.441**	0.574***	0.561***
	[0.265]		[0.192]	[0.164]	[0.214]	[0.176]	[0.131]	[0.121]
Dem. control change	-0.0705*	-0.0704*	0.00224		0.0246		-0.0249	
	[0.0425]	[0.0421]	[0.0389]		[0.0366]		[0.0529]	
av. % Close elect log	-0.711		0.518		0.494		0.537	
	[0.762]		[0.553]		[0.614]		[0.375]	
% Close elect change	0.0655		0.120		0.125		0.0950	
	[0.0919]		[0.0859]		[0.0816]		[0.116]	
Stdev Dem control	-0.849		0.784		0.727		0.985**	0.793**
	[0.869]		[0.631]		[0.701]		[0.428]	[0.338]
# changes Dem control	-0.00793		0.0588	0.0984*	0.0636	0.113*	0.0247	
	[0.0895]		[0.0650]	[0.0552]	[0.0722]	[0.0623]	[0.0441]	
# years split control	-0.00340		0.00850		0.00960		0.00710	
	[0.0276]		[0.0200]		[0.0222]		[0.0136]	
av. % Black	-6.374**	-4.079*	-3.045	-3.932**	-1.954		-5.206***	-6.874***
	[3.234]	[2.420]	[2.346]	[1.868]	[2.605]		[1.591]	[1.318]
av. % White	-4.097**	-3.549*	-3.951***	-4.398***	-3.112*	-2.134*	-5.545***	-5.704***
	[2.011]	[2.042]	[1.459]	[1.445]	[1.620]	[1.252]	[0.989]	[1.013]
Constant	2.456	2.972	2.203	1.887	1.413	-0.188	3.781**	2.840***
	[3.050]	[1.840]	[2.214]	[1.396]	[2.458]	[1.236]	[1.500]	[1.082]
Observations	406	406	406	406	406	406	406	406
States	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
R2_Overall	0.202	0.101	0.536	0.512	0.472	0.418	0.590	0.565
R2_Between	0.238	0.119	0.612	0.585	0.532	0.473	0.777	0.747
R2_Within	0.0192	0.0118	0.0679	0.0573	0.0553	0.0394	0.0784	0.0682
Rho_pov	0.874	0.890	0.768	0.782	0.810	0.829	0.288	0.349

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black imprisonment rates on political variables, states

	In prison CPUS 1978-2004 (50 states)		In prison CPUS 1988-2001 (29 states)		All prison admissions NCRP 1988-2001 (29 states)	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.105 [0.124]		-0.279** [0.130]	-0.295** [0.132]	-0.114 [0.140]	
Liberalism change	-0.0257 [0.0737]		-0.0327 [0.0930]		-0.196 [0.146]	
av. Dem. control	-0.259* [0.156]	-0.227* [0.124]	-0.376** [0.168]	-0.291** [0.144]	-0.317* [0.181]	-0.322** [0.153]
Dem. control change	0.0123 [0.0259]		-0.0239 [0.0285]		-0.0122 [0.0443]	
av. % Close elect log	0.794** [0.377]	0.790** [0.329]	0.500 [0.484]		1.131** [0.520]	1.086** [0.475]
% Close elect change	0.00373 [0.0505]		0.0617 [0.0599]		0.147 [0.0954]	
Stdev Dem control	-0.259 [0.485]		-0.230 [0.552]		0.212 [0.594]	
# changes Dem control	0.0649 [0.0528]		0.101* [0.0568]	0.0892* [0.0484]	-0.0338 [0.0611]	
# years split control	0.0273* [0.0161]	0.0293* [0.0160]	-0.00458 [0.0175]		-0.00163 [0.0189]	
av. % Black	0.413 [1.662]		-4.236** [2.054]	-5.773*** [1.637]	-5.964*** [2.209]	-5.426** [2.148]
av. % White	-0.940 [0.888]		-2.549** [1.277]	-2.409* [1.266]	-4.112*** [1.374]	-4.106*** [1.345]
Constant	3.479** [1.684]	2.762** [1.237]	4.919** [1.937]	2.856** [1.223]	8.523*** [2.084]	8.325*** [1.931]
Observations	1,300	1,300	406	406	405	405
Number of state	50	50	29	29	29	29
R2_Overall	0.233	0.202	0.508	0.486	0.520	0.493
R2_Between	0.301	0.262	0.593	0.569	0.635	0.610
R2_Within	0.00791	0	0.00726	0	0.0388	0
Rho_pov	0.836	0.847	0.860	0.872	0.714	0.724

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black prison admission rates by type on political factors 1988-2001, 29 states in NCRP

	Revocations		New Sentences		Non-drug sentences		Drug Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.0443 [0.189]		-0.139 [0.124]		-0.281** [0.124]	-0.292** [0.123]	0.0775 [0.124]	
Liberalism change	-0.0233 [0.130]		-0.417** [0.187]	-0.387** [0.186]	-0.373** [0.171]	-0.366** [0.170]	-0.354 [0.217]	-0.366* [0.215]
av. Dem. control	-0.426* [0.244]		0.0457 [0.160]		-0.0198 [0.161]		0.122 [0.161]	
Dem. control change	-0.0414 [0.0393]		0.105* [0.0563]	0.101* [0.0558]	0.0920* [0.0511]	0.0877* [0.0506]	0.118* [0.0654]	0.115* [0.0648]
av. % Close elect log	-0.158 [0.700]		2.250*** [0.460]	2.163*** [0.346]	2.388*** [0.462]	2.168*** [0.334]	1.450*** [0.462]	1.710*** [0.364]
% Close elect change	0.0587 [0.0847]		0.240* [0.124]	0.225* [0.122]	0.168 [0.113]		0.250* [0.144]	0.250* [0.142]
Stdev Dem control	-0.836 [0.799]		1.776*** [0.526]	1.718*** [0.431]	1.344** [0.528]	1.336*** [0.409]	1.918*** [0.528]	1.772*** [0.410]
# changes Dem control	-0.0214 [0.0823]		-0.00478 [0.0541]		0.00614 [0.0544]		-0.0248 [0.0543]	
# years split control	-0.00829 [0.0254]		0.0208 [0.0167]		0.0307* [0.0168]	0.0288** [0.0132]	0.000448 [0.0168]	
av. % Black	-6.392** [2.974]	-7.187*** [2.247]	-0.646 [1.954]		0.755 [1.962]		-2.406 [1.961]	
av. % White	-3.656** [1.849]	-3.292* [1.897]	-1.735 [1.215]		-0.521 [1.220]		-3.261*** [1.219]	-2.590** [1.016]
Constant	5.257* [2.805]	3.343* [1.709]	6.495*** [1.843]	5.248*** [1.031]	6.332*** [1.850]	5.310*** [1.092]	5.170*** [1.850]	5.523*** [1.670]
Observations	406	406	406	406	406	406	406	406
Number of state	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
R2_Overall	0.332	0.244	0.475	0.428	0.534	0.515	0.326	0.299
R2_Between	0.385	0.284	0.642	0.576	0.679	0.656	0.504	0.458
R2_Within	0.00684	0	0.0631	0.0630	0.0498	0.0479	0.0539	0.0543
Rho_pov	0.875	0.893	0.439	0.522	0.518	0.544	0.282	0.331

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of log Black/White disparity in imprisonment rates on political variables, states

	In prison CPUS 1978-2004 (50 states)		In prison CPUS 1988-2001 (29 states)		All prison admissions NCRP 1988-2001 (29 states)	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	0.178*** [0.0639]	0.171*** [0.0583]	0.225*** [0.0649]	0.222*** [0.0644]	0.276*** [0.0662]	0.270*** [0.0641]
Liberalism change	0.0169 [0.0351]		0.00347 [0.0356]		-0.0128 [0.0463]	
av. Dem. control	-0.164** [0.0805]	-0.186*** [0.0640]	-0.262*** [0.0839]	-0.312*** [0.0662]	-0.292*** [0.0856]	-0.331*** [0.0659]
Dem. control change	-0.0003 [0.0122]		0.0021 [0.0107]		0.00403 [0.0140]	
av. % Close elect log	0.300 [0.195]	0.297* [0.163]	0.535** [0.241]	0.464*** [0.158]	0.623** [0.246]	0.541*** [0.157]
% Close elect change	0.0276 [0.0248]		0.0417* [0.0232]	0.0407* [0.0230]	0.0311 [0.0303]	
Stdev Dem control	0.0889 [0.250]		0.335 [0.275]		0.300 [0.281]	
# changes Dem control	-0.00111 [0.0272]		-0.0176 [0.0283]		-0.0303 [0.0289]	
# years split control	0.0105 [0.00832]		0.00424 [0.00874]		0.00521 [0.00892]	
av. % Black	0.750 [0.857]		0.372 [1.024]		0.161 [1.044]	
av. % White	0.510 [0.458]		0.853 [0.637]		0.485 [0.649]	
Constant	0.637 [0.869]	1.420*** [0.551]	1.470 [0.966]	2.414*** [0.525]	2.159** [0.985]	2.616*** [0.522]
Observations	1,300	1,300	406	406	405	405
Number of state	50	50	29	29	29	29
R2_Overall	0.254	0.207	0.617	0.580	0.643	0.624
R2_Between	0.312	0.254	0.648	0.609	0.688	0.669
R2_Within	0.00312	0	0.0376	0.0362	0.0118	0
Rho_pov	0.829	0.840	0.914	0.924	0.867	0.875

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black/White disparity in prison admission rates by type on political factors 1988-2001, 29 states in NCRP

	Revocations		New Sentences		Non-drug sentences		Drug Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	0.307*** [0.0697]	0.312*** [0.0676]	0.263*** [0.0697]	0.250*** [0.0682]	0.189*** [0.0690]	0.182*** [0.0676]	0.431*** [0.0821]	0.401*** [0.0821]
Liberalism change	-0.0423 [0.0693]		-0.00164 [0.0521]		0.00569 [0.0400]		0.0158 [0.119]	
av. Dem. control	-0.250*** [0.0901]	-0.302*** [0.0739]	-0.280*** [0.0901]	-0.308*** [0.0701]	-0.296*** [0.0893]	-0.320*** [0.0695]	-0.304*** [0.106]	-0.292*** [0.0838]
Dem. control change	0.0108 [0.0206]		0.0107 [0.0156]		-0.00498 [0.0118]		0.0642* [0.0361]	0.0589* [0.0358]
av. % Close elect log	0.815*** [0.259]	0.826*** [0.191]	0.625** [0.259]	0.476*** [0.167]	0.682*** [0.257]	0.601*** [0.166]	0.427 [0.305]	
% Close elect change	0.0122 [0.0455]		0.0367 [0.0341]		0.00660 [0.0263]		0.0631 [0.0778]	
Stdev Dem control	0.701** [0.296]	0.484** [0.242]	0.318 [0.295]		0.178 [0.293]		0.365 [0.348]	
# changes Dem control	-0.0339 [0.0304]		-0.0257 [0.0304]		-0.0188 [0.0302]		-0.0232 [0.0358]	
# years split control	0.00784 [0.00940]		0.00423 [0.00938]		0.00636 [0.00930]		-0.00527 [0.0111]	
av. % Black	-0.176 [1.099]		0.729 [1.099]		0.871 [1.089]		1.191 [1.295]	
av. % White	0.420 [0.683]		0.797 [0.683]		0.907 [0.677]		0.887 [0.805]	
Constant	2.314** [1.036]	2.953*** [0.550]	1.783* [1.037]	2.342*** [0.555]	1.985* [1.027]	2.780*** [0.551]	1.155 [1.221]	0.733*** [0.212]
Observations	405	405	406	406	406	406	406	406
Number of state	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
R2_Overall	0.648	0.629	0.570	0.541	0.612	0.589	0.383	0.339
R2_Between	0.726	0.707	0.624	0.594	0.647	0.623	0.541	0.482
R2_Within	0.0114	0	0.0127	0	0.00155	0	0.0440	0.0278
Rho_pov	0.721	0.738	0.839	0.852	0.878	0.888	0.412	0.493

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of White prison admission rates on political factors, metro areas

	All admissions		Revocations		New Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.700**	-0.685**	0.0679		-0.934***	-0.941***
	[0.353]	[0.326]	[0.366]		[0.235]	[0.227]
Liberalism change	0.515**	0.543**	1.035***	1.028***	-0.111	
	[0.233]	[0.233]	[0.201]	[0.200]	[0.189]	
av. Dem. control	1.524***	1.003***	0.728		1.175***	1.153***
	[0.465]	[0.368]	[0.482]		[0.309]	[0.310]
Dem. control change	-0.0503		0.149***	0.155***	-0.212***	-0.208***
	[0.0563]		[0.0485]	[0.0481]	[0.0452]	[0.0450]
av. % Close elect log	1.871**	1.358*	-0.719		1.737***	1.913***
	[0.825]	[0.776]	[0.856]		[0.548]	[0.492]
% Close elect change	0.394**	0.365**	0.171		0.415***	0.415***
	[0.181]	[0.180]	[0.158]		[0.151]	[0.150]
Stdev Dem control	2.083*		-2.494*	-3.925***	3.462***	3.155***
	[1.247]		[1.294]	[0.857]	[0.830]	[0.790]
# changes Dem control	-0.247**	-0.176*	-0.220*	-0.197*	-0.0984	
	[0.110]	[0.106]	[0.115]	[0.110]	[0.0735]	
# years split control	0.0970*		0.0923*		0.0620*	0.0610*
	[0.0504]		[0.0523]		[0.0335]	[0.0325]
log Black pop.	-0.488		-0.663*	-0.608*	-0.153	
	[0.335]		[0.347]	[0.337]	[0.223]	
av. % Black	-7.431**	-10.91***	-9.415***	-9.227***	-1.762	
	[3.352]	[2.814]	[3.477]	[2.990]	[2.229]	
av. % White	-9.090***	-9.352***	-11.41***	-12.00***	-2.745**	-2.203*
	[1.852]	[1.795]	[1.921]	[1.840]	[1.231]	[1.148]
Constant	20.82***	22.48***	17.52***	24.97***	9.819***	8.922***
	[4.284]	[3.461]	[4.444]	[2.417]	[2.848]	[2.649]
Observations	3,080	3,080	3,053	3,053	3,080	3,080
Number of metgroup	220	220	220	220	220	220
R2_Overall	0.213	0.196	0.250	0.236	0.198	0.187
R2_Between	0.258	0.238	0.282	0.265	0.260	0.244
R2_Within	0.0148	0.0147	0.0337	0.0324	0.0169	0.0176
Rho_pov	0.830	0.835	0.871	0.874	0.711	0.716

Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of White prison admission rates on political and demographic factors, Metro areas only

	Drug		Violence		Rob/burg		Theft		Other	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.513*** [0.134]	-0.487*** [0.124]	-0.0960 [0.0985]		-0.266** [0.112]	-0.263** [0.108]	-0.735*** [0.127]	-0.790*** [0.121]	-0.446*** [0.124]	-0.457*** [0.113]
Liberalism change	-0.00628 [0.140]		0.449*** [0.0834]	0.446*** [0.0830]	-0.169* [0.0935]	-0.171* [0.0935]	-0.698*** [0.0976]	-0.690*** [0.0974]	-0.0588 [0.114]	
av. Dem. control	0.779*** [0.176]	0.618*** [0.131]	0.412*** [0.130]	0.303*** [0.0991]	0.565*** [0.148]	0.555*** [0.147]	0.456*** [0.167]	0.492*** [0.163]	0.364** [0.164]	0.283** [0.123]
Dem. control change	-0.0432 [0.0336]		-0.149*** [0.0198]	-0.144*** [0.0196]	-0.0609*** [0.0222]	-0.0605*** [0.0222]	0.0378 [0.0232]	0.0387* [0.0232]	-0.222*** [0.0272]	-0.215*** [0.0268]
av. % Close elect log	0.517* [0.313]		0.998*** [0.230]	1.018*** [0.210]	0.702*** [0.263]	0.787*** [0.239]	0.564* [0.296]	0.495* [0.294]	0.943*** [0.290]	0.891*** [0.257]
% Close elect change	0.254** [0.112]	0.225** [0.110]	0.101 [0.0685]		0.248*** [0.0766]	0.247*** [0.0765]	0.322*** [0.0792]	0.321*** [0.0791]	0.118 [0.0920]	
Stdev Dem control	0.869* [0.474]		1.741*** [0.348]	1.454*** [0.247]	2.820*** [0.398]	2.822*** [0.394]	1.048** [0.449]	0.868** [0.419]	1.389*** [0.439]	0.832*** [0.317]
# changes Dem control	0.000130 [0.0420]		-0.0217 [0.0309]		-0.0770** [0.0352]	-0.0737** [0.0349]	-0.0523 [0.0397]		-0.0817** [0.0389]	
# years split control	0.0169 [0.0192]		0.0167 [0.0141]		0.0326** [0.0161]	0.0348** [0.0158]	0.0542*** [0.0181]	0.0511*** [0.0175]	0.0212 [0.0178]	
log Black pop.	0.127 [0.127]		-0.151 [0.0934]	-0.217*** [0.0786]	-0.0345 [0.107]		-0.137 [0.120]		-0.155 [0.118]	
av. % Black	-5.411*** [1.272]	-5.249*** [0.960]	-1.165 [0.935]		-0.553 [1.068]		2.489** [1.205]	1.999** [0.966]	-0.313 [1.180]	
av. % White	-3.829*** [0.703]	-4.177*** [0.683]	-1.293** [0.517]	-1.380*** [0.492]	-1.115* [0.590]	-0.926* [0.550]	-0.415 [0.666]		-0.506 [0.652]	
Constant	5.042*** [1.625]	5.822*** [0.683]	5.841*** [1.195]	6.882*** [0.957]	2.514* [1.364]	2.411* [1.272]	3.002* [1.540]	1.734 [1.198]	5.542*** [1.507]	4.943*** [0.899]
Observations	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080
Number of metgroup	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220
R2_Overall	0.223	0.210	0.181	0.169	0.241	0.238	0.203	0.196	0.122	0.0964
R2_Between	0.339	0.318	0.239	0.221	0.330	0.327	0.254	0.244	0.160	0.120
R2_Within	0.00204	0.00284	0.0674	0.0672	0.00876	0.00875	0.0552	0.0552	0.0526	0.0533
Rho_pov	0.565	0.577	0.588	0.600	0.612	0.614	0.687	0.690	0.611	0.626

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black prison admission rates on political factors, metro areas

	All admissions		Revocations		New Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	1.520 [1.002]		2.835** [1.125]	2.711** [1.125]	0.113 [0.633]	
Liberalism change	-1.609** [0.788]	-1.599** [0.787]	0.396 [0.747]		-2.929*** [0.646]	-2.949*** [0.645]
av. Dem. control	1.399 [1.319]		-0.480 [1.481]		1.433* [0.835]	1.393* [0.830]
Dem. control change	-0.392** [0.189]	-0.391** [0.189]	0.322* [0.179]	0.333* [0.177]	-0.459*** [0.154]	-0.458*** [0.154]
av. % Close elect log	9.539*** [2.341]	9.599*** [2.358]	0.449 [2.628]		8.398*** [1.479]	8.822*** [1.357]
% Close elect change	1.483** [0.623]	1.488** [0.623]	0.418 [0.595]		1.463*** [0.518]	1.462*** [0.518]
Stdev Dem control	11.27*** [3.541]	8.881*** [2.998]	-6.457 [3.974]	-7.509*** [2.829]	15.87*** [2.240]	16.06*** [2.223]
# changes Dem control	-0.988*** [0.314]	-0.974*** [0.315]	-0.473 [0.352]		-0.520*** [0.198]	-0.520*** [0.198]
# years split control	0.466*** [0.143]	0.421*** [0.114]	0.300* [0.161]	0.280** [0.121]	0.327*** [0.0905]	0.346*** [0.0854]
log Black pop.	-2.181** [0.950]	-1.833** [0.926]	-5.716*** [1.067]	-5.509*** [1.062]	-1.508** [0.602]	-1.686*** [0.504]
av. % Black	-24.00** [9.515]	-26.60*** [9.261]	-26.87** [10.68]	-27.12*** [9.859]	-3.856 [6.012]	
av. % White	-11.71** [5.256]	-11.06** [5.015]	-39.37*** [5.908]	-39.57*** [5.770]	7.457** [3.335]	8.161*** [3.137]
Constant	68.24*** [12.16]	73.40*** [9.269]	87.59*** [13.65]	82.68*** [8.284]	30.18*** [7.691]	30.94*** [7.389]
Observations	3,080	3,080	2,997	2,997	3,024	3,024
Number of metgroup	220	220	220	220	220	220
R2_Overall	0.246	0.238	0.339	0.335	0.238	0.237
R2_Between	0.314	0.304	0.412	0.408	0.337	0.335
R2_Within	0.00987	0.00987	0.00215	0.00109	0.0233	0.0233
Rho_pov	0.737	0.741	0.790	0.793	0.558	0.559

Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black prison admission rates on political and demographic factors, Metro areas only

	Drug		Violence		Rob/burg		Theft		Other	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	0.932*	1.212**	0.580**		0.0417		-1.294***	-1.199***	-0.0259	
	[0.530]	[0.495]	[0.293]		[0.371]		[0.327]	[0.318]	[0.288]	
Liberalism change	-1.001*	-0.989*	-0.0228		-2.038***	-2.046***	-2.152***	-2.151***	-1.728***	-1.693***
	[0.584]	[0.582]	[0.283]		[0.344]	[0.343]	[0.350]	[0.348]	[0.338]	[0.336]
av. Dem. control	1.055		-0.461		-0.336		0.0322		-0.690*	-0.923***
	[0.699]		[0.386]		[0.489]		[0.432]		[0.381]	[0.299]
Dem. control change	-0.486***	-0.475***	-0.0664		0.293***	0.291***	0.393***	0.394***	-0.339***	-0.334***
	[0.140]	[0.140]	[0.0669]		[0.0818]	[0.0817]	[0.0831]	[0.0829]	[0.0801]	[0.0792]
av. % Close elect log	3.804***	4.267***	5.379***	5.244***	4.413***	4.385***	2.686***	2.657***	3.729***	3.097***
	[1.239]	[1.155]	[0.684]	[0.624]	[0.866]	[0.793]	[0.764]	[0.758]	[0.674]	[0.619]
% Close elect change	1.817***	1.798***	0.141		0.629**	0.630**	0.761***	0.745***	0.163	
	[0.465]	[0.464]	[0.233]		[0.279]	[0.279]	[0.286]	[0.286]	[0.277]	
Stdev Dem control	11.68***	10.46***	4.827***	5.129***	7.363***	7.817***	2.714**	2.588***	3.087***	1.971***
	[1.877]	[1.556]	[1.036]	[0.795]	[1.312]	[1.077]	[1.158]	[0.899]	[1.022]	[0.739]
# changes Dem control	-0.486***	-0.495***	-0.0582		-0.324***	-0.319***	-0.00786		-0.252***	-0.224**
	[0.166]	[0.167]	[0.0918]		[0.116]	[0.116]	[0.103]		[0.0906]	[0.0896]
# years split control	0.151**	0.100*	0.105**	0.140***	0.130**	0.150***	0.187***	0.182***	0.0667	
	[0.0759]	[0.0594]	[0.0419]	[0.0293]	[0.0530]	[0.0388]	[0.0468]	[0.0365]	[0.0413]	
log Black pop.	-2.065***	-2.450***	-2.163***	-1.923***	-2.266***	-2.231***	-1.345***	-1.418***	-1.428***	-1.202***
	[0.504]	[0.403]	[0.279]	[0.221]	[0.352]	[0.295]	[0.311]	[0.304]	[0.275]	[0.234]
av. % Black	-5.703		2.623		0.703		6.211**	5.483*	4.742*	
	[5.035]		[2.781]		[3.521]		[3.107]	[3.047]	[2.740]	
av. % White	2.069		-1.321		-3.688*	-3.415*	2.075		3.794**	2.893**
	[2.793]		[1.546]		[1.953]	[1.780]	[1.727]		[1.526]	[1.452]
Constant	19.55***	28.65***	33.14***	28.45***	31.50***	29.42***	15.31***	17.53***	22.55***	23.50***
	[6.442]	[3.868]	[3.559]	[2.064]	[4.504]	[3.348]	[3.976]	[2.500]	[3.509]	[2.969]
Observations	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024
Number of metgroup	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220
R2_Overall	0.184	0.173	0.353	0.343	0.236	0.236	0.155	0.152	0.219	0.209
R2_Between	0.293	0.279	0.511	0.496	0.348	0.346	0.234	0.230	0.365	0.351
R2_Within	0.0147	0.0148	0.000349	0	0.0491	0.0491	0.0569	0.0570	0.0196	0.0197
Rho_pov	0.534	0.540	0.478	0.491	0.574	0.574	0.463	0.467	0.390	0.401

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of log Black/White disparity in prison admission rates on political factors, metro areas

	All admissions		Revocations		New Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	0.234*** [0.0504]	0.232*** [0.0464]	0.328*** [0.0605]	0.353*** [0.0566]	0.225*** [0.0497]	0.227*** [0.0448]
Liberalism change	-0.112*** [0.0421]	-0.109*** [0.0419]	-0.125** [0.0635]	-0.130** [0.0630]	-0.0677 [0.0442]	
av. Dem. control	-0.199*** [0.0663]	-0.254*** [0.0489]	-0.0885 [0.0798]	-0.108* [0.0620]	-0.185*** [0.0655]	-0.275*** [0.0478]
Dem. control change	-0.0612*** [0.0100]	-0.0597*** [0.00995]	-0.0586*** [0.0151]	-0.0620*** [0.0150]	-0.0488*** [0.0105]	-0.0461*** [0.0104]
av. % Close elect log	0.222* [0.118]		0.613*** [0.141]	0.719*** [0.129]	0.250** [0.116]	0.207** [0.0978]
% Close elect change	0.0314 [0.0340]		-0.0719 [0.0518]		0.0177 [0.0358]	
Stdev Dem control	0.385** [0.178]		0.612*** [0.214]	0.743*** [0.156]	0.396** [0.176]	
# changes Dem control	-0.0182 [0.0158]		0.0277 [0.0190]		-0.0127 [0.0156]	
# years split control	0.0103 [0.00719]		-0.00420 [0.00866]		0.0104 [0.00711]	
log Black pop.	-0.0146 [0.0477]		-0.152*** [0.0575]	-0.204*** [0.0487]	-0.0444 [0.0472]	
av. % Black	-0.560 [0.478]	-0.862** [0.359]	-0.763 [0.574]		-0.143 [0.472]	
av. % White	0.844*** [0.264]	0.748*** [0.255]	0.420 [0.319]	0.526* [0.314]	1.297*** [0.262]	1.313*** [0.240]
Constant	0.301 [0.611]	0.241 [0.255]	2.189*** [0.735]	2.607*** [0.587]	0.00153 [0.604]	0.422 [0.453]
Observations	3,080	3,080	2,997	2,997	3,024	3,024
Number of metgroup	220	220	220	220	220	220
R2_Overall	0.345	0.333	0.316	0.311	0.363	0.356
R2_Between	0.441	0.425	0.454	0.443	0.475	0.464
R2_Within	0.0386	0.0371	0.0178	0.0184	0.0204	0.0168
Rho_pov	0.660	0.666	0.487	0.498	0.607	0.614

Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black/White disparity in prison admission rates on political and demographic factors, Metro areas only

	Drug		Violence		Rob/burg		Theft		Other	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	0.422*** [0.0762]	0.437*** [0.0744]	0.176*** [0.0537]	0.205*** [0.0464]	0.127** [0.0626]	0.137** [0.0560]	0.136** [0.0582]	0.133** [0.0564]	0.227*** [0.0607]	0.247*** [0.0571]
Liberalism change	0.162* [0.0841]	0.166** [0.0840]	-0.0457 [0.0505]		-0.0323 [0.0501]		-0.0107 [0.0590]		-0.129* [0.0682]	-0.127* [0.0677]
av. Dem. control	-0.339*** [0.101]	-0.381*** [0.0808]	-0.347*** [0.0709]	-0.363*** [0.0509]	-0.409*** [0.0825]	-0.418*** [0.0623]	-0.252*** [0.0768]	-0.238*** [0.0632]	-0.291*** [0.0801]	-0.336*** [0.0605]
Dem. control change	-0.129*** [0.0200]	-0.129*** [0.0200]	-0.00551 [0.0119]		-0.00813 [0.0118]		0.0527*** [0.0139]	0.0528*** [0.0138]	-0.0495*** [0.0161]	-0.0486*** [0.0159]
av. % Close elect log	0.272 [0.178]		0.458*** [0.126]	0.441*** [0.109]	0.405*** [0.146]	0.387*** [0.132]	0.288** [0.136]	0.290** [0.118]	0.394*** [0.142]	0.364*** [0.132]
% Close elect change	0.165** [0.0682]	0.161** [0.0681]	0.00969 [0.0417]		0.00870 [0.0415]		-0.0958** [0.0489]	-0.0945* [0.0487]	0.0244 [0.0563]	
Stdev Dem control	0.958*** [0.270]	0.700*** [0.192]	-0.0166 [0.190]		-0.254 [0.221]	-0.306* [0.160]	-0.0558 [0.206]		0.112 [0.215]	
# changes Dem control	-0.0567** [0.0239]	-0.0480** [0.0234]	-0.00758 [0.0169]		-0.0111 [0.0196]		0.0489*** [0.0183]	0.0476*** [0.0173]	-0.00550 [0.0191]	
# years split control	0.0110 [0.0109]		0.00591 [0.00769]		0.000988 [0.00895]		0.00881 [0.00833]	0.0101* [0.00609]	0.00981 [0.00869]	
log Black pop.	-0.345*** [0.0725]	-0.339*** [0.0728]	-0.184*** [0.0512]	-0.187*** [0.0400]	-0.261*** [0.0595]	-0.265*** [0.0471]	-0.168*** [0.0555]	-0.163*** [0.0469]	-0.144** [0.0579]	-0.144** [0.0570]
av. % Black	1.963*** [0.724]	1.509** [0.671]	0.458 [0.510]		0.167 [0.594]		0.127 [0.553]		1.209** [0.577]	1.102* [0.569]
av. % White	2.348*** [0.402]	2.276*** [0.396]	0.462 [0.284]		0.351 [0.330]		0.970*** [0.308]	0.973*** [0.300]	1.509*** [0.322]	1.438*** [0.315]
Constant	0.408 [0.927]	0.105 [0.613]	2.911*** [0.653]	3.349*** [0.379]	3.651*** [0.760]	3.931*** [0.447]	1.272* [0.708]	1.151* [0.632]	1.204 [0.739]	1.539** [0.621]
Observations	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024	3,024
Number of metgroup	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220	220
R2_Overall	0.334	0.330	0.279	0.269	0.277	0.274	0.257	0.257	0.244	0.242
R2_Between	0.494	0.488	0.438	0.427	0.412	0.409	0.441	0.441	0.426	0.423
R2_Within	0.0404	0.0403	0.000926	0	0.000743	0	0.00841	0.00838	0.00500	0.00482
Rho_pov	0.479	0.482	0.458	0.466	0.541	0.547	0.387	0.387	0.359	0.361

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of White prison admission rates on political factors, non-metro areas

	All admissions		Revocations		New Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.439		-0.462		-0.307	
	[0.649]		[0.869]		[0.403]	
Liberalism change	0.289		0.735	0.791	-0.284	
	[0.461]		[0.490]	[0.485]	[0.370]	
av. Dem. control	0.875		0.160		0.946**	0.829**
	[0.737]		[0.987]		[0.459]	[0.379]
Dem. control change	-0.0362		0.0848		-0.189*	-0.180
	[0.143]		[0.150]		[0.112]	[0.111]
av. % Close elect log	-1.457		-5.059		1.177	
	[2.915]		[3.902]		[1.812]	
% Close elect change	0.260		0.419		0.177	
	[0.369]		[0.393]		[0.296]	
Stdev Dem control	3.804		0.667		3.434**	2.707**
	[2.704]		[3.622]		[1.686]	[1.164]
# changes Dem control	-0.292		-0.389		-0.0649	
	[0.238]		[0.319]		[0.149]	
# years split control	-0.0263		-0.0290		0.0184	
	[0.0756]		[0.101]		[0.0469]	
log Black pop.	-1.558		-2.933		0.113	
	[1.891]		[2.532]		[1.178]	
av. % Black	-21.55**	-18.57**	-17.40	-16.53*	-12.73**	-14.37***
	[8.694]	[7.426]	[11.64]	[10.02]	[5.404]	[4.690]
av. % White	-25.44***	-25.29***	-22.04**	-18.76*	-14.56***	-16.44***
	[7.560]	[7.247]	[10.12]	[9.776]	[4.696]	[4.340]
Constant	32.20***	33.84***	24.06**	23.04**	19.42***	18.82***
	[9.014]	[6.756]	[12.07]	[9.114]	[5.600]	[4.431]
Observations	378	378	376	376	378	378
Number of metgroup	27	27	27	27	27	27
R2_Overall	0.313	0.244	0.209	0.101	0.378	0.350
R2_Between	0.388	0.303	0.236	0.116	0.488	0.453
R2_Within	0.00396	0	0.0268	0.0149	0.0321	0.0248
Rho_pov	0.811	0.840	0.868	0.888	0.631	0.651

Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of White prison admission rates on political and demographic factors, non-metro areas only

	Drug		Violence		Rob/burg		Theft		Other	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.647*** [0.218]	-0.660*** [0.207]	0.323* [0.170]	0.302* [0.166]	0.0788 [0.184]		-0.326 [0.232]	-0.464** [0.207]	-0.223 [0.279]	
Liberalism change	-0.226 [0.286]		0.114 [0.154]		-0.248* [0.144]	-0.239* [0.144]	-0.0347 [0.188]		-0.226 [0.263]	
av. Dem. control	0.588** [0.249]	0.543*** [0.197]	0.406** [0.194]	0.441*** [0.162]	0.296 [0.210]		-0.0164 [0.265]		0.704** [0.318]	0.453* [0.264]
Dem. control change	-0.0357 [0.0875]		-0.128*** [0.0461]	-0.123*** [0.0455]	-0.0250 [0.0431]		-0.00607 [0.0567]		-0.179** [0.0800]	-0.175** [0.0792]
av. % Close elect log	0.462 [0.981]		1.076 [0.766]	0.933** [0.458]	1.178 [0.829]	1.536** [0.711]	1.030 [1.045]		-0.515 [1.255]	
% Close elect change	-0.0797 [0.230]		0.106 [0.123]		0.149 [0.115]		0.210 [0.150]		0.0708 [0.211]	
Stdev Dem control	0.501 [0.915]		2.001*** [0.712]	1.922*** [0.532]	2.089*** [0.771]	1.396** [0.594]	0.273 [0.971]		2.527** [1.167]	1.578* [0.810]
# changes Dem control	0.0122 [0.0805]		-0.0277 [0.0628]		-0.0431 [0.0680]		-0.0174 [0.0856]		-0.0793 [0.103]	
# years split control	0.00830 [0.0254]		-0.00329 [0.0198]		0.0202 [0.0215]		0.0170 [0.0271]		0.00928 [0.0325]	
log Black pop.	0.245 [0.639]		0.0635 [0.498]		0.634 [0.539]	0.973*** [0.306]	0.695 [0.679]	0.379* [0.210]	-0.759 [0.816]	
av. % Black	-9.058*** [2.924]	-8.920*** [2.441]	-6.120*** [2.282]	-5.787*** [2.190]	-2.341 [2.473]		-1.664 [3.116]		-8.873** [3.741]	-10.39*** [3.262]
av. % White	-7.780*** [2.541]	-8.222*** [2.394]	-6.529*** [1.983]	-6.533*** [1.873]	-3.474 [2.149]		-3.254 [2.709]		-9.616*** [3.252]	-9.832*** [3.018]
Constant	9.147*** [3.029]	9.963*** [2.291]	10.55*** [2.365]	10.11*** [2.170]	4.897* [2.563]	2.929** [1.409]	6.107* [3.230]	1.594* [0.937]	10.44*** [3.877]	10.40*** [3.082]
Observations	378	378	378	378	378	378	378	378	378	378
Number of metgroup	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
R2_Overall	0.355	0.341	0.443	0.433	0.459	0.384	0.302	0.225	0.287	0.251
R2_Between	0.536	0.522	0.563	0.551	0.561	0.472	0.386	0.290	0.374	0.327
R2_Within	0.0133	0	0.0628	0.0604	0.0248	0.0124	0.0114	0	0.0636	0.0607
Rho_pov	0.401	0.414	0.583	0.590	0.649	0.694	0.692	0.736	0.638	0.662

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black prison admission rates on political factors, non-metro areas

	All admissions		Revocations		New Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	-0.157		-1.196		0.212	
	[1.376]		[1.907]		[1.011]	
Liberalism change	-1.151		-0.826		-1.408	
	[1.599]		[1.459]		[1.250]	
av. Dem. control	-2.811*	-3.631***	-3.763*	-5.020***	-0.432	
	[1.569]	[1.185]	[2.169]	[1.705]	[1.154]	
Dem. control change	-0.468		-0.0595		-0.566	
	[0.488]		[0.442]		[0.376]	
av. % Close elect log	3.763	10.56***	-10.58		11.06**	9.068***
	[6.194]	[3.357]	[8.563]		[4.549]	[2.505]
% Close elect change	0.912		0.813		0.476	
	[1.283]		[1.172]		[1.000]	
Stdev Dem control	14.50**	12.09***	-0.249		14.99***	13.78***
	[5.767]	[4.618]	[7.961]		[4.247]	[3.429]
# changes Dem control	-1.730***	-1.594***	-1.415**	-1.327**	-0.994***	-0.772**
	[0.508]	[0.434]	[0.702]	[0.591]	[0.374]	[0.331]
# years split control	-0.135		-0.235		0.133	
	[0.160]		[0.222]		[0.118]	
log Black pop.	-4.257		-7.246		1.250	
	[4.031]		[5.566]		[2.968]	
av. % Black	-8.689		-32.30		9.690	
	[18.46]		[25.54]		[13.55]	
av. % White	-8.171		-34.81		14.56	
	[16.04]		[22.19]		[11.77]	
Constant	70.55***	67.91***	67.46**	36.03***	27.90**	41.36***
	[19.13]	[10.21]	[26.46]	[6.250]	[14.04]	[7.668]
Observations	378	378	374	374	376	376
Number of metgroup	27	27	27	27	27	27
R2_Overall	0.416	0.384	0.367	0.262	0.306	0.246
R2_Between	0.582	0.542	0.443	0.317	0.485	0.400
R2_Within	0.00998	0	0.00756	0	0.0193	0
Rho_pov	0.505	0.531	0.729	0.776	0.408	0.455

Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black prison admission rates on political and demographic factors, non-metro areas only

	Drug		Violence		Rob/burg		Theft		Other	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	0.799	1.047*	0.442		0.238		-1.055**	-1.007**	-0.260	
	[0.706]	[0.611]	[0.465]		[0.420]		[0.473]	[0.420]	[0.522]	
Liberalism change	-1.265		-0.812		-0.882*	-0.907*	-0.435		0.129	
	[1.050]		[0.617]		[0.503]	[0.495]	[0.629]		[0.764]	
av. Dem. control	0.00978		0.139		-0.433		-1.451***	-1.092***	0.353	
	[0.808]		[0.533]		[0.481]		[0.542]	[0.421]	[0.599]	
Dem. control change	-0.434		-0.482***	-0.448**	0.0736		0.216		-0.178	
	[0.317]		[0.183]	[0.181]	[0.149]		[0.187]		[0.228]	
av. % Close elect log	4.534	3.620**	4.946**	5.085***	5.191***	2.938***	5.284**	1.819*	5.322**	5.398***
	[3.180]	[1.677]	[2.094]	[1.178]	[1.893]	[1.023]	[2.130]	[1.010]	[2.354]	[1.215]
% Close elect change	0.840		0.340		0.299		0.504		-0.519	
	[0.843]		[0.490]		[0.399]		[0.501]		[0.610]	
Stdev Dem control	12.11***	11.76***	6.992***	4.361***	5.693***	6.233***	-0.157		5.252**	4.840***
	[2.976]	[2.405]	[1.962]	[1.479]	[1.770]	[1.401]	[1.995]		[2.209]	[1.735]
# changes Dem control	-1.049***	-0.968***	-0.288*		-0.208	-0.228*	-0.0989		-0.347*	-0.334*
	[0.262]	[0.228]	[0.173]		[0.156]	[0.135]	[0.176]		[0.194]	[0.178]
# years split control	0.0652		0.0436		0.0438		0.0478		0.118*	0.106**
	[0.0822]		[0.0541]		[0.0490]		[0.0551]		[0.0608]	[0.0479]
log Black pop.	0.862		-1.441		1.231		2.261		-0.227	
	[2.080]		[1.370]		[1.236]		[1.393]		[1.542]	
av. % Black	-0.792		11.82*		4.376		2.510		4.094	
	[9.470]		[6.237]		[5.640]		[6.345]		[7.010]	
av. % White	3.983		8.548	5.464*	2.351		8.295		4.879	
	[8.224]		[5.414]	[3.315]	[4.897]		[5.508]		[6.084]	
Constant	12.11	17.37***	17.34***	17.05***	13.90**	13.49***	11.43*	16.54***	15.75**	20.98***
	[9.805]	[5.108]	[6.457]	[5.417]	[5.840]	[3.132]	[6.569]	[3.345]	[7.256]	[3.818]
Observations	376	376	376	376	376	376	376	376	376	376
Number of metgroup	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
R2_Overall	0.316	0.291	0.352	0.303	0.262	0.228	0.263	0.205	0.243	0.237
R2_Between	0.542	0.514	0.618	0.535	0.488	0.425	0.488	0.387	0.475	0.473
R2_Within	0.0237	0	0.0319	0.0225	0.0155	0.0129	0.0133	0	0.0124	0
Rho_pov	0.289	0.301	0.250	0.301	0.298	0.330	0.271	0.333	0.241	0.247

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of log Black/White disparity in prison admission rates on political factors, non-metro areas

	All admissions		Revocations		New Sentences	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
av. Liberalism	0.111		0.174		0.101	
	[0.111]		[0.110]		[0.111]	
Liberalism change	-0.0300		-0.336**	-0.332**	-0.0228	
	[0.0865]		[0.145]	[0.143]	[0.0924]	
av. Dem. control	-0.258**	-0.257**	-0.310**	-0.221**	-0.239*	-0.243**
	[0.127]	[0.105]	[0.126]	[0.106]	[0.127]	[0.104]
Dem. control change	-0.088***	-0.084***	-0.0788*	-0.0794*	-0.0824***	-0.0780***
	[0.0260]	[0.0257]	[0.0433]	[0.0425]	[0.0276]	[0.0272]
av. % Close elect log	0.530		0.742		0.591	
	[0.500]		[0.493]		[0.500]	
% Close elect change	0.0606		-0.113		0.0561	
	[0.0691]		[0.117]		[0.0736]	
Stdev Dem control	0.657		0.522		0.613	
	[0.465]		[0.463]		[0.465]	
# changes Dem control	-0.0769*		-0.0533		-0.0696*	
	[0.0410]		[0.0407]		[0.0410]	
# years split control	0.00277		-0.00963		0.00676	
	[0.0130]		[0.0128]		[0.0130]	
log Black pop.	-0.0575		0.117		0.0122	
	[0.325]		[0.323]		[0.325]	
av. % Black	3.117**	2.290*	0.763		3.579**	2.775**
	[1.491]	[1.348]	[1.469]		[1.491]	[1.331]
av. % White	3.877***	3.949***	2.043	1.969**	4.376***	4.309***
	[1.296]	[1.276]	[1.275]	[0.786]	[1.296]	[1.259]
Constant	-1.451	-3.183***	0.735	-1.233	-2.173	-3.600***
	[1.545]	[1.207]	[1.520]	[0.803]	[1.545]	[1.191]
Observations	378	378	374	374	376	376
Number of metgroup	27	27	27	27	27	27
R2_Overall	0.476	0.388	0.313	0.222	0.437	0.365
R2_Between	0.568	0.461	0.534	0.372	0.548	0.457
R2_Within	0.0748	0.0677	0.0451	0.0449	0.0477	0.0441
Rho_pov	0.694	0.741	0.276	0.366	0.606	0.653

Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.

Regression of Black/White disparity in prison admission rates on political and demographic factors, non-metro areas only

	Drug		Violence		Rob/burg		Theft		Other	
	Full	Rest.	Full	Rest.	Full	Rest.	Full	Rest.	Full	Rest.
av. Liberalism	0.486***	0.457***	-0.0301		0.0118		0.0195		0.0681	
	[0.137]	[0.134]	[0.110]		[0.0820]		[0.116]		[0.123]	
Liberalism change	0.0290		-0.221**	-0.203*	-0.0479		-0.000775		0.193	
	[0.206]		[0.109]	[0.108]	[0.0992]		[0.142]		[0.142]	
av. Dem. control	-0.291*	-0.348***	-0.196	-0.290***	-0.242***	-0.257***	-0.297**	-0.242**	-0.224	-0.262**
	[0.157]	[0.133]	[0.125]	[0.0974]	[0.0939]	[0.0723]	[0.133]	[0.104]	[0.141]	[0.112]
Dem. control change	-0.108*	-0.101	-0.0958***	-0.0882***	-0.0507*	-0.0474*	-0.0138		-0.0675	
	[0.0623]	[0.0617]	[0.0324]	[0.0320]	[0.0293]	[0.0288]	[0.0419]		[0.0421]	
av. % Close elect log	0.226		0.340	0.671**	0.369	0.552***	0.653		1.513***	0.990***
	[0.619]		[0.493]	[0.267]	[0.369]	[0.198]	[0.522]		[0.554]	[0.308]
% Close elect change	0.308*	0.290*	0.114		0.0254		-0.0261		-0.0194	
	[0.166]	[0.164]	[0.0867]		[0.0786]		[0.112]		[0.113]	
Stdev Dem control	1.563***	1.127***	0.453		0.163		-0.179		0.207	
	[0.580]	[0.422]	[0.460]		[0.345]		[0.488]		[0.518]	
# changes Dem control	-0.160***	-0.131***	-0.0439		-0.0275		-0.00380		-0.0299	
	[0.0510]	[0.0434]	[0.0405]		[0.0304]		[0.0430]		[0.0456]	
# years split control	0.00776		0.00310		-0.00431		0.00453		0.0247*	
	[0.0160]		[0.0128]		[0.00954]		[0.0135]		[0.0143]	
log Black pop.	-0.142		-0.336		-0.176		0.0834		0.279	
	[0.405]		[0.321]		[0.241]		[0.341]		[0.361]	
av. % Black	4.617**	3.577**	4.583***	4.229***	2.446**	2.389**	1.940		4.754***	4.533***
	[1.844]	[1.633]	[1.470]	[1.410]	[1.099]	[1.045]	[1.554]		[1.650]	[1.627]
av. % White	4.521***	4.438***	4.188***	4.354***	2.327**	2.590***	3.626***	2.931***	5.024***	4.657***
	[1.601]	[1.530]	[1.277]	[1.181]	[0.955]	[0.876]	[1.349]	[0.774]	[1.432]	[1.364]
Constant	-3.216*	-3.879**	-1.293	-1.300	0.106	-0.328	-0.714	-2.036***	-1.045	-0.652
	[1.909]	[1.576]	[1.523]	[1.322]	[1.138]	[0.980]	[1.609]	[0.790]	[1.708]	[1.527]
Observations	376	376	376	376	376	376	376	376	376	376
Number of metgroup	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
R2_Overall	0.406	0.399	0.384	0.361	0.328	0.316	0.338	0.293	0.339	0.301
R2_Between	0.632	0.621	0.569	0.535	0.591	0.570	0.582	0.503	0.577	0.524
R2_Within	0.0426	0.0424	0.0509	0.0448	0.0120	0.0113	0.000727	0	0.0196	0
Rho_pov	0.278	0.297	0.396	0.411	0.269	0.280	0.289	0.338	0.302	0.329

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Generated by Stata xtregar. Rho_pov= prop. of variance in autocorrelation.