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THE MOBILIZATION OF PAID AND VOLUNTEER ACTIVISTS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD MOVEMENT

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ABSTRACT

This paper compares the mobilization of paid social movement activists with the mobilization of volunteers, a topic mentioned but not treated systematically in previous work. Classic treatments of paid movement activists assume that they are the most dedicated and ideologically committed members of movement organizations, while collective action theory underlying the resource mobilization perspective suggests they may be less committed, that material incentives can compensate for lower ideological commitment. McCarthy and Zald's work documenting the rise in outside sources of support for movement activists furthers the idea that paid activists may be less committed to particular movements than volunteers. Their historical analysis of changes in resources in the 1960s raises the possibility of political generations affected by those changes; generations can also be analyzed in

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either resource or commitment terms. Data collected at the 1979 convention of the National Association of Neighborhoods from paid and volunteer activists allows a comparison of alternate models of the mobilization of activists. There is definitely a commitment effect independent of resources: paid activists are just as politically and socially integrated as volunteers, but have significantly more leftist political orientations and longer histories of activism. There is a strong cohort effect, with the 60's generation being more likely to be paid activists than those older or younger. It is concluded that all activists are mobilized through commitment processes that are constrained but not determined by resources, and that the most committed will become paid activists if resources are available.

I. INTRODUCTION

There have been paid activists in social movements for at least two hundred years¹ and probably longer. At the turn of the century, there was extensive debate in socialist circles about whether working-class movements should pay their leaders (Lenin, 1973:137-176; Michels, 1962:129-152). Nevertheless, collective behavior theorists writing about social movements generally devote a great deal of attention to the traits and activities of movement leaders without discussing whether they are provided livelihoods for their activism (Turner and Killian, 1972:388-405; Smelser, 1962:296-298, Lang and Lang, 1961:517-524; Killian, 1964:440-443). A few writers mention paid activists in passing, suggesting for example that they are more strongly committed to a movement because their livelihood depends upon it (Lang and Lang, 1961:526).

Collective behavior theorists are doubtless well aware that some activists are paid, but have not considered the matter to be worthy of specific analytic attention, possibly because they assume that paid activists are supported by contributions from movement participants.

McCarthy and Zald (1973) changed the thinking of social movement theorists when they challenged this collective wisdom. They argued that the trend of the 1960s (which seemed to be continuing into the 1970s) was for more and more activists to be paid for their activism and for the source of that support to come from institutions or conscience contributors outside any membership base of potential beneficiaries; they argued that this trend has important consequences for social movements. McCarthy and Zald went on to argue that a new kind of social movement has emerged, a "professional social movement," characterized by a paid leadership cadre and the absence of any genuine participating membership. Interestingly, three other works published that same year commented on this phenomenon (Oberschall, 1973:161; John Wilson, 1973:182; James Q. Wilson, 1972:203); clearly an important historical trend was being noticed by many of the major theorists in the field.

In this paper I propose to address systematically one of the questions raised by McCarthy and Zald's work, but not pursued by them or subsequent writers: the

mobilization of paid activists as compared to the mobilization of volunteer activists. I shall do this by laying out the two alternative theories of mobilization common in the social movement literature and showing the relation of these models to McCarthy and Zald's work as well as to other works which have addressed the problem. These models suggest empirical predictions about the differences or similarities between paid and volunteer activists; these predictions are developed in some detail, drawing on the relevant literature.

A partial test of these propositions is provided by data collected from a sample of paid and volunteer activists who attended the 1979 convention of the National Association of Neighborhoods. Despite some serious limitations in the sample (which are described in detail below), these data are important—perhaps unique—because there are sufficient numbers of similarly-situated paid and volunteer activists to permit statistical comparisons. Even though the data permit only cautious empirical generalizations, they provide strong support for a theoretical model that integrates resources and commitment in the process of mobilization.

II. PAID ACTIVISTS AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD MOVEMENT

The neighborhood movement of the 1970s provides an excellent instance for testing theories of the mobilization of paid activists because it contains significant numbers of both paid and volunteer activists.

Although some writers used the term "neighborhood movement" in the 1960s, the movement's present configuration is very much a product of the 1970s.² As with all social movements, its boundaries are ill-defined (Gerlach and Hine, 1970:33-78). Speaking generally, this movement may be said to include the following elements: (1) A general ideology stressing local community control over local land use and services. (2) A proliferation of tens of thousands of block clubs and neighborhood associations in most urban areas of the country. These groups have arisen in both white and minority neighborhoods and span the economic spectrum from poor to middle class. Most are in central cities, although some are in suburbs or rural areas. The major growth period for these organizations was 1972-1979. (3) The creation in many urban areas of inter-neighborhood coalitions or coordinating bodies. (4) The creation of nearly a dozen national organizations, coalitions, and networks addressing "neighborhood issues" (Perlman, 1979). (5) Local strategies most commonly directed toward the physical and economic renovation of older urban areas as places of residence, or towards resisting the introduction of some noxious element into a neighborhood. (6) The use of a broad diversity of tactics, ranging from campaigning and block voting in elections through lobbying and petitioning, self-help projects, and participation in government-initiated programs to disruptive direct action projects.

The neighborhood movement is particularly appropriate as an arena for studying paid activists because it includes both paid and volunteer activists in leadership positions. The national organizations, coalitions, networks, lobbying groups, and organizers' schools are all staffed by paid professionals and may be thought of as "professional social movement" organizations in McCarthy and Zald's sense, except that some of them have real members who pay dues and attend conventions. With or without participating membership, all these organizations are dominated by their professional leaders. But the picture is more varied at the local level. Most movement organizations at the local level have at least some genuine voluntary participation in the leadership cadre, and some have only volunteers. Most block clubs or neighborhood associations have at least some active members, although these groups vary widely in the extent to which control is centralized in a few leaders, paid or unpaid. In city-wide coalitions, paid and volunteer leaders stand formally as peers, as representatives of their respective neighborhood organizations, although paid activists are more likely to be active in such coalitions than volunteers are.

The neighborhood movement has been heavily funded by what I call "external sponsors" (see the appendix): federal and local government agencies, private foundations, churches, and corporations. Progressive elites have long believed in and funded "community organization" in poor neighborhoods (Dillick, 1953). The modern burst of neighborhood organizing seems to have originated in the late 1950s and early 1960s: the Ford Foundation began funding a series of experimental projects to improve social life in American cities through community organization; the Kennedy/Johnson administration's "poverty program" drew heavily from Ford Foundation ideas (Moynihan, 1969). Throughout the 1960s, large numbers of people were paid to "organize" poor urban neighborhoods in the belief that this would contribute to an amelioration of urban poverty and urban violence. Almost all neighborhood organizing in the 1960s was directed toward urban minorities or Appalachian whites.

Many of these programs (or their successors) continued into the 1970s. But the 1970s saw a new development: increasing formation of neighborhood organizations by middle-class and working-class whites. I have research in progress trying to understand this development, and its causes are not central here. I can say that the evidence seems to be that it was due to a combination of a shift to block grant funding (which meant that neighborhoods could compete at the municipal level for federal monies) and various ideological and political tendencies, including "white backlash," the "revolt of the white ethnics" (both prominent topics of discussion in the early 1970s), and black separatism, which led white radicals to shift their attention towards organizing whites.

By the late 1970s, the neighborhood movement was variegated and multi-textured. In some cities there was bitter competition or racial antagonism between neighborhoods or organizations. In others a spirit of bi-racial or

multi-racial cooperation prevailed. Some neighborhood organizations are made up of low-income people, some of middle-class people, and some are mixed; cities differ in the class composition of their neighborhood organizations. The neighborhood movement has to be seen in dialectic terms. On the one hand, an ideology of self-help has caught the imagination of many people and has evoked millions of hours of labor from dedicated volunteers; on the other, much of the movement is dominated by paid professionals subsidized by elite agencies. To focus on either aspect without considering the other is to distort the truth. It turns out that this dualism parallels what I have found in evaluating theories of the mobilization of activists.

III. TWO THEORETICAL APPROACHES

This paper focuses on the mobilization of activists. By "activists" I mean those persons who commit a relatively large amount of time and effort to movement activities; they are generally part of the leadership cadre of movement organizations. The distinction between inner hard-working circles and outer circles of less involved participants is common in the literature (Lenin, 1973:137-176; John Wilson, 1973:306; Killian, 1964:443).

Activists may be paid or volunteer. McCarthy and Zald's concept of a "professional social movement" combines the presence of paid activists with the absence of a genuine membership base. These characteristics are, in fact, separable: Some movement organizations have both paid activists and genuine participating memberships, and some have neither (that is, may have only an all-volunteer cadre). Distinctions among kinds of paid activists are developed in the appendix.

By "mobilization of activists" I refer to the processes whereby people come to devote significant amounts of time and energy to a movement, that is, to the processes whereby they become activists rather than passive supporters or occasional participants.

Although the distinction between mobilizing activists and mobilizing less involved supporters has often been blurred, two traditions may be identified in explaining the mobilization of activists. These may be labeled commitment models and collective action models. These two traditions are not necessarily incompatible, although they have developed somewhat distinctly. Some theorists from each tradition have incorporated elements of the other into their theories. To foreshadow the conclusions of this paper, I believe the evidence indicates that a correct understanding of the mobilization of paid activists requires an integration of these two traditions.

Although not necessarily older in the history of ideas (see Oberschall, 1973:1-29), the commitment tradition is older in the sociological study of social movements. There are two key ideas in this tradition. The first is that people

become involved in social movements because of changes in beliefs, values, and norms and that these involve emotional responses to events. The second is that commitment is a progressive process, with earlier experiences drawing the person into greater and greater involvement in and identification with the movement. Comprehensive treatments of commitment processes identify rituals and customs that tend to increase the recruit's dependence on the movement and to decrease his or her involvement outside of the movement (Turner and Killian, 1972:335-360; John Wilson, 1973:300-328; Gerlach and Hine, 1970:99-158; Kornhauser, 1962; Becker, 1960).

If they are mentioned by commitment theorists, paid activists are viewed as the most committed members of all, for they have cast their lot with the movement and they depend upon it for their very survival (John Wilson, 1973:306; Lang and Lang, 1961:526). It is nearly always either explicitly stated or implicitly assumed that paid activists rise through progressive commitment from the ranks of volunteers. Lenin explicitly argued that the professional revolutionary cadre should be chosen from the talented members of the mass base (1973:137-176), and most commitment theorists retain this image (e.g., John Wilson, 1973:306).

In contrast with the commitment tradition, the collective action tradition is based on the idea that people decide whether to participate in a social movement according to their expectations of benefits and costs. Most theoretical work is informed by Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), which argues that pursuit of a group interest invokes the public goods problem from economics in which every actor prefers to share in the collective benefit without having to incur the costs of cooperating in the collective action; this implies that collective action requires private or selective incentives to reward those who cooperate with collective action or to punish those who do not. A subsequent critical literature has shown that Olson overstates the generality of his claims (Oliver, 1980; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1970; Frohlich et al., 1975; Chamberlin, 1974; Schofield, 1975; Bonacich et al., 1976; Smith, 1976), but the work remains important for calling attention to the problematic nature of mobilization. The resource mobilization perspective on social movements is based on collective action models of mobilization.

Paid activists are central to collective action theory, for a salary is an important private incentive for collective action. People who are paid for their actions in pursuit of a collective good do not experience the dilemma of the free rider problem. Completion of the logic of paid activism requires specifying who will pay the activist and under what conditions (Oliver, 1980). Entrepreneurial theorists argue that the activist absorbs the cost of creating a payment system in the expectation of making a profit by doing so (Frohlich et al., 1971; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1978:66-89). Alternately, persons or institutions who attach high value to the collective good and who have more money than time may prefer to hire an activist rather than be one themselves.

In its pure form, the collective action theory borrowed from economists assumes that activists are motivated by material gain, either from the collective good or their salaries as paid activists, or both. The assumption that people are motivated only by their own personal material gain is obviously incorrect, and a number of theorists within the collective action tradition modify the concepts of benefit and cost to take account of other motivations. James Q. Wilson argues that there are three basic kinds of incentives: *material incentives*, which are tangible rewards readily priced in monetary terms; *solidary incentives*, which are intangible rewards arising from the association with others; and *purposive incentives*, which are intangible rewards deriving from the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause (1973:30-34). Fireman and Gamson (1979) construct an argument in a different way that arrives essentially at the same conclusion. Collective action models should include not only material self-interest but group solidarity that leads an actor to value group benefits and consciousness that leads an actor to want to contribute to a collective good. Much of Fireman and Gamson's article discusses the ways in which organizers and entrepreneurs (that is, paid activists) can induce others (that is, volunteers) to participate in collective action.

Both of these modifications to collective action models contain terms that interface with the commitment models, although the dynamic elements of commitment processes are only partially captured in Fireman and Gamson's work and hardly mentioned in James Q. Wilson's. Conversely, the classic discussions of commitment cited above interface with collective action models. They discuss such topics as turning resources over to the movement, bridge-burning rituals cutting off alternate actions, and shifts from extra-movement to intra-movement social ties, all of which can be recast as costs and benefits in collective action models.

A. Mobilizing Paid Activists

The issue can now be posed simply. Are paid and volunteer activists mobilized through the same basic process, or are they mobilized in different ways? Are paid activists just activists who happened to be paid, or are they fundamentally different from volunteers? Do the factors which distinguish paid from volunteer activists arise in the larger society or within the internal processes of the movement?

The commitment tradition strongly suggests that paid and volunteer activists mobilize through the same processes, the paid only more so. Conversely, the collective action tradition implies that paid activists are mobilized, in ways different from volunteers, by the possibility of drawing a salary.

Even though the issue is not exactly isomorphic with the two theoretical traditions on mobilization, they are strongly related. Commitment theorists (if they mention paid activists explicitly at all) state that paid activists are the most committed activists and rise from the ranks of volunteers, implying that paid and volunteer activists are mobilized in the same general process.

On the other hand, collective action theory implies that paid and volunteer activists are often mobilized differently. Since paid activists are compensated by salaries, they require less interest in the public good and/or less concern with purposive incentives than do volunteers. McCarthy and Zald's articles imply that paid activists respond to different constraints in mobilizing than do volunteers (1973:18-25). James Q. Wilson speaks of an organization hiring staff in a way that implies that they would not necessarily come from the ranks of volunteers (1973:225-228). Oberschall analyzes the risks and rewards of mobilizing and argues that paid activists incur lower risks than other activists (1973:161), again implying that the two groups are affected by different factors in mobilizing.

Although commitment theories suggest similarities and collective action theories differences in the mobilization of paid and volunteer activists, there are ambiguities and contradictions in each stream of work. Commitment theories are strangely silent about the mobilization of leaders, particularly the kind that collective action theorists call entrepreneurs. A great deal of attention has been devoted to the motivations of the followers of charismatic and other leaders, and to the attributes of leaders that make people follow them (Turner and Killian, 1972:388-405; Lang and Lang, 1961:517-524; Killian, 1964:440-443, John Wilson, 1973:194-225; Heberle, 1951:286-290), but I know of none devoted to the question of what makes a leader want to be a leader. Such leaders are often supported by their followings—making them paid activists in the terms of this paper—and some treatments hint at financial exploitation of the following, but the suggestion of material gain as a motivation has not been pursued in this tradition.

For their part, collective action theorists are contradictory in their treatment of the obvious empirical phenomenon of intense ideological commitment among paid activists. Salaries are material incentives, and the main thrust of collective action theorists is to emphasize the importance of salaries in attracting activists. But James Q. Wilson (1973:227) and others suggest a salary might be a sacrifice if it is less than a person could earn in a non-movement job. McCarthy and Zald, especially in their 1973 article, talk about the dedication of young activists, the tone implying that committed activists look for ways to be paid for their activism rather than being attracted by the prospect of a paying job. A willingness to make a sacrifice or an active seeking support for activism sounds more like a result of a commitment process than a materially-oriented response to resource levels, but none of these authors sorts out these contradictions into a coherent model of the mobilization of paid activists.

IV. PREDICTIONS FROM THE THEORIES

The data I have available do not contain direct information about activist careers or mobilization processes, but it is possible to derive a number of competing cross-sectional hypotheses from the theoretical traditions summarized above.

A. Social Characteristics

A number of theorists provide predictions for the economic positions or backgrounds that are most likely to produce movement activists. Obviously, if paid and volunteer activists are mobilized by the same factors and processes, then they should appear to come from the same general population; if they are mobilized in different ways, they should come from different populations.

Pure commitment models make no particular predictions about the social characteristics of activists. Different ideologies will have appeal for different people depending upon their situation and experience, but no particular occupational group is treated as logically more predisposed to activism than any other.

By contrast, resource mobilization theorists make specific predictions about the occupations of volunteer activists. McCarthy and Zald put greatest emphasis on the convenience of action and predict that volunteer activists come from occupations with discretionary time (such as students and professionals), particularly when tactics require transitory teams (1973:9-11; 1977:1236).

Oberschall emphasizes the ratio of possible rewards to the risk of retaliation and argues that volunteer activists are persons for whom the risk of retaliation from the opposition is relatively low, either because they are in relatively secure occupations (such as free professionals or small business owners whose clientele are of the aggrieved population) or because their upward mobility is blocked and they have nothing to gain from refraining from movement activity (1973:159-171). Thus, Oberschall predicts that activists will be from the higher, secure strata, from groups whose income is independent of the opposition, and from the very lowest strata who have nothing to lose.

No theorist makes specific predictions about comparing paid and volunteer activists. McCarthy and Zald's notion of discretionary time as an explanation for the occupations of activists simply explains why paid activists are important, since they can devote all their time to the movement. But Oberschall's discussion of risks and rewards implies that the persons attracted to paid activism will be those for whom it is a relatively lucrative or secure position, that is, those whose occupational opportunities in the society in general are lower. These would be people who have blocked channels of access due to discriminatory social barriers, or those whose education or skills fit them poorly for high-paying jobs.

B. Networks

There is strong evidence that persons mobilized for a social movement tend to be well integrated into social and organizational networks. Oberschall (1973:103-113) cites a great deal of evidence to support this position and to refute Kornhauser's mass society hypothesis; he also argues that those mobilized first are especially likely to be well-integrated (:135). Gerlach and Hine (1979:79-98) stress the importance of personal networks in recruiting and mobilizing converts to the Pentecostal and Black Power movements as does John

Wilson's review of the literature (1973:131-133). Snow and his colleagues (1980) review a number of different studies of movement recruitment and conclude that people are mobilized through personal influence networks.³

This evidence about networks applies to the mobilization of volunteer activists. Now if, as the commitment models predict, paid activists work their way up through the ranks of the volunteers, they should be just as integrated—if not more integrated—into the social and organizational networks of their communities as the volunteers. By the same logic, paid activists would exhibit the same density of social connections to the movements' constituencies as volunteers would.

On the other hand, if paid activists are mobilized for the movement by the material incentive of a salary, they would not necessarily exhibit the same patterns of social integration as volunteers. Although I have found no author who makes an explicit prediction about social ties to the larger community, McCarthy and Zald argue that paid activists are more likely than volunteers to be divorced from their constituencies (1973:17-18), and that the true membership base of social movement organizations with paid leadership is smaller than the true membership base of organizations with volunteer leadership (1973:20-23). This difference between paid and volunteer would be predicted to hold true especially for those activists whose salaries are paid from sources external to the movement's membership base (which is true of virtually all paid neighborhood activists).

C. Ideological Commitment and Involvement

Commitment models of paid activism imply the clear predictions that paid activists will, on the average, exhibit greater ideological connection to the movement and will have had longer histories of activism in that movement than volunteers. This follows necessarily from the assumption that paid activists work their way through the ranks of volunteers. As indicated above, commitment theorists generally assume that paid activists are leaders supported from sources internal to the movement; it is not clear if they would change these predictions for activists supported from external sources.

Pure collective action models ignore ideology and simply examine the balance of collective benefits and individual incentives versus costs; these pure models would predict no particular ideological differences between activists and nonactivists, or between paid and volunteer activists. However, the modified collective action models that admit intangibles such as purposive incentives do yield specific predictions about ideology and paid activists. Since tangible and intangible incentives are proposed to be additive, paid activists should be *less* ideologically motivated than volunteers at comparable levels of involvement. This is because volunteers would presumably be motivated solely by purposive incentives, while paid activists would have both. McCarthy and Zald's suggestion that paid activists are more responsive to ebbs and flows in resources than are volunteers is consistent with this analysis: They view all social movement organizations as

responsive to resource levels (1977:1224-5), but imply that sensitivity to resource flows is especially characteristic of movements controlled by professional activists (1973:18-25; 1977:12-4-5). Oberschall explicitly argues that being paid reduces the cost of activism (1973:161), which would seem to suggest that lower ideological motivation would be necessary. James Q. Wilson's discussion of organizations hiring staff implies that staff do not necessarily have the attachment to the movement of the volunteers who hire them (1973:225-230). His discussion of movement entrepreneurs argues that they are generally motivated by purposive incentives and willing to forego material gain (:196-197). Entrepreneurs foregoing material gain would show up as volunteers in a cross-sectional analysis, although persons who had foregone gain in the past and who were now being supported by the movement they created could be expected to show high ideological commitment as paid activists.

The suggestion proposed by Wilson (1973:226) that movement staff may view their paid activism as a sacrifice would make the generation of testable propositions difficult. However, if paid activism is a sacrifice, it should be greater the better the activist's alternative occupations. Thus, paid activists with higher education or skill levels should be more ideologically motivated than those with lower education or skill levels. For similar reasons, better paid professional activists should be less ideologically motivated (on the average) than less paid movement activists.

Commitment theories imply that paid activists will have longer average histories of movement activism than volunteers. Collective action theories do not yield clear predictions about the relative lengths of activist histories. The mobilization of paid activists may precede or follow the mobilization of volunteers, depending in part on whether their source of support is internal or external to the movement.

D. History and Generations

McCarthy and Zald offer historical evidence that external support for social movements increased during the 1960s (1973:12-16). If this historical argument is correct (and I have seen nothing to dispute it), it must affect any empirical study of paid and volunteer activists in the recent period. For McCarthy and Zald, working in the collective action tradition, the important thing about the 1960s is the amount of resources available to support movement activists. But the commitment tradition calls our attention to the 1960s as a period in which many people, especially those who were of college age, became extremely involved in and committed to the civil rights and anti-war movements. Both theories require that attention be paid to the impact of the 1960s trends on people who came of age during the decade.

Building on the writings of Mentre, Mannheim, and Hellpach, Heberle defines a *political generation* as "those individuals of approximately the same age who have shared, at the same age, certain politically relevant experiences" (1951:119-120). He suggests that people are most affected by decisive experi-

ences as young adults, that different sub-groups within an age cohort might have different decisive experiences and form different political generations, that traditions based on decisive experiences may or may not be transmitted across generations, and that political generations have been important in movements such as Nazism, whose leaders were all young adults when the Versailles treaty was signed (:118–127).

It is widely believed that the turmoil of the civil rights and anti-war movements in the 1960s created a political generation. Numerous articles and books written during the period and immediately after it focused on the question of generations and adduced various kinds of data to support the claim that the youth of this period were qualitatively different from their elders, although there is debate about whether these differences were disjunctive.⁴ Comparisons of activist students with nonactivist students found that they were more likely to be politically radical; more likely to be liberal arts majors and especially social science majors; less likely to espouse “extrinsic reward values” such as money, prestige, and security; and more likely to plan to enter knowledge or social service careers (Braungart and Braungart, 1974; Demerath et al., 1971; Flacks, 1967, 1971; Kornberg and Brehm, 1971; Lipset, 1971; McFalls and Gallagher, 1975; Matthews and Prothro, 1966; Van Eschen et al., 1971).

The small accumulating literature on subsequent careers of movement activists suggests that they remain different from persons who were not student activists during their college days. The largest sample is Fendrich's, of male students who were in Tallahassee during the civil rights activities of 1960–1964; 95 white former Florida State University students were surveyed in late 1971, and 110 black Florida A & M students were surveyed in 1973. Men who had been arrested at civil rights demonstrations and student government leaders were disproportionately sampled. White civil rights activists were far more likely than nonactivists (including student government leaders) to have chosen academic professions or social service and creative occupations (a category that included paid activists), to claim to be politically radical, and to maintain a high level of political involvement as adults. Black activists were more likely to continue adult political activism, but student activism was not correlated with political radicalism or occupational choice among blacks.⁵

Other studies have found similar patterns for white 1960s activists: Isla Vista “Bank Burners” (Whalen & Flacks, 1980), student protesters at Berkeley (Maidenberg and Meyer, 1970; Green, 1970) and Kent State (Adamek and Lewis, 1973), civil rights workers (Demerath et al., 1971), youth movement activists (Weiner and Stillman, 1979), radical leaders (Braungart and Braungart, 1980), and OEO Legal Service lawyers (Erlanger, 1977) tend to be more radical, less likely to pursue financially lucrative careers, and more likely to pursue social service occupations than nonactivists. I know of no comparable follow-up studies of black activists.

These historical effects are relevant to both commitment and decision models

of the mobilization of paid activists. If 1960s activists remain politically active in the 1970s, this supports the idea that the process of being committed to a social movement leads to permanent changes in one's ideological beliefs and actions. It is clear that part of the ideology of the time led to a rejection of “establishment” (that is, business) jobs and a preference for employment in academic or social service occupations, which would serve ideologically acceptable goals. In this context, paid movement activism would be viewed as the most extreme instance of this ideological tendency, as a willingness to dedicate one's life to “the movement.”

But the historical features of the 1960s are also relevant to collective action models of paid activism, for this decade witnessed not only intense ideologies and political conversion experiences, but a tremendous expansion in the money available to pay people to be social movement activists (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Career decisions are typically made when people are in their late teens and early twenties. The 60s generation is the first that could (in large numbers) rationally choose a career in movement activism. Thus the ideological and economic impacts of the decade are intertwined and cannot be separated; we will only be able to assemble indirect suggestive evidence as to the relative weights of these two kinds of effects.

V. SOURCE OF DATA

Some of the observations I am able to make about the mobilization of paid and volunteer activists arise from my familiarity with published and verbal accounts of the neighborhood movement nationally and from my two and one-half years as a participant observer in the neighborhood movement in Louisville, Kentucky. Data uniquely relevant to the matter were obtained in a survey of the participants at the 1979 convention of the National Association of Neighborhoods (NAN). NAN was founded in 1976 by Milton Kotler, whose book *Neighborhood Government* (1970) articulates an ideology of extreme decentralization and local control. It is one of several national coalitions, including ACORN and National People's Action, each of which has a distinctive constituency and strategy, although they have significant overlaps and generally amicable inter-organizational relations. NAN puts more priority on providing services and obtaining governmental funding, while ACORN emphasizes confrontations with powerful persons and institutions (Rathke et al., 1979; Kotler, 1979). NAN is generally controlled by its paid staff, although it has a participating membership of individuals and organizations.

Many neighborhood activists who were not NAN members attended the 1979 convention. At the 1978 convention, NAN voted to launch a drive to promote neighborhood platform conventions in 50 cities; the goal was to broaden participation in NAN as well as to develop what was believed to be a useful political tool. NAN hired organizers to aid in promoting these local conventions. In

Louisville, the Louisville Inter-Neighborhood Coalition simply convened the convention through its pre-existing channels, although the publicity uncovered some new block clubs and mobilized some new activists to city-wide activity. But in some cities these conventions were the first major inter-neighborhood meetings, and they often pulled in local activists previously unconnected to national networks or organizations. Each local convention sent elected delegates who met along with regular delegates from NAN-affiliated organizations and individual NAN members at the national convention. This broader participation makes the sample less restrictive than it otherwise would have been, but it is still the case that people who attend a national meeting and take the time to fill out a questionnaire can represent only themselves, since they are in no sense a sample of any larger population. There were 179 questionnaires turned in, representing about 30% of the people who signed in at the registration desk. The respondents came from 52 cities in 26 states and represented something over 110 distinct organizations.

I have provided details about this sample to allow the reader to assess the limits that should be placed on empirical generalizations from the data. Compared with the quality of samples available in other fields of inquiry, this sample is quite limited. However, it is quite comparable to all other published samples of social movement participants, all of which couple relatively small sample sizes with limited populations such as students at a particular university, members of a particular group or attendees at a particular event (Snow et al., 1980; Fendrich, 1974, 1976, 1977; Fendrich and Tarleau, 1973, Fendrich and Krauss, 1978; McPhail, 1973; Haan, 1975; Demerath et al., 1971; Lofland, 1977; Lin, 1974-5). Although *attitudes* may be assessed in general population surveys, activist *behavior* generally cannot because the trait is too rare. Thus we are forced to piece together information from less than ideal specialized surveys.

Despite the limits on empirical generality, these data are uniquely suited to provide theoretical illumination on the mobilization of paid and volunteer activists, for they are the only data I am aware of that contain significant numbers of paid and volunteer activists in roughly comparable positions in a social movement. Many of the problems of self-selection in the sample affect paid and volunteer activists equally, so that comparisons of the two kinds of activists within the sample are subject to fewer distortions than arise when comparisons are made between activist samples and control groups of nonactivists.

VI. RESULTS

A. Characteristics of the Activists

Occupations. Information about the neighborhood activists' occupations was obtained in a standard open-ended occupation item on a page titled "background information"; the results are shown in Table 1. McCarthy and Zald's

Table 1. Occupations of Neighborhood Activists

	<i>n</i>	<i>Percent</i>
<i>All Activists</i>		
No Paid Job	32	19
Paid Movement Activist	75	43
Non-Movement Paid Job	<u>66</u>	<u>38</u>
	173	100
No Answer	6	
<i>Paid Activists</i>		
Paid by neighborhood movement organization	57	76
Paid by government agency	<u>18</u>	<u>24</u>
	75	100
"Organizing" as part or all of job	27	36
Advocate, liaison, community education	12	16
Administrator, coordinator, director	28	37
Association officer (local leader)	2	3
Technical specialists	2	3
Consultant	1	1
City council member	1	1
Clerical workers	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
	75	100
<i>Non-Movement Paid Jobs</i>		
1. Professor	7	11
2. Minister, priest	6	9
3. Other independent professionals	4	6
4. Teacher	4	6
5. Other professionals in organizations	10	15
6. Independent creative occupations	2	3
7. Small business owner	4	6
8. Administrator, inspector	3	4
9. Real estate sales	5	7
10. Clerical and kindred workers	7	11
11. Teachers' and nurses' aides	7	11
12. Other blue collar workers	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>
	66	100
Professional, technical, kindred (#s 1-6)	33	50
Managers, proprietors (#s 7, 8)	7	11
Sales, clerical (#s 9, 10)	12	18
Blue collar (#s 11, 12)	<u>14</u>	<u>21</u>
	66	100
Occupations with high independence and discretionary time (#s 1, 2, 3, 6, 9)	24	36
Occupations with some independence but also some constraints on discretionary time (#s 4, 5, 7, 8)	21	32
Occupations with little independence or discretionary time	<u>21</u>	<u>32</u>
	66	100

arguments about the importance of discretionary time receive strong support in this sample of activists: 43% are paid activists, and a total of 76% are in occupational situations with high discretionary time; only 12% are in occupations with little discretionary time. However, occupations with high discretionary time also tend to require high education, and education is known to be a strong correlate of all forms of political and organizational participation⁶, so it is difficult to disentangle the two effects. Oberschall's claim that movement activists will come from independent occupations receives little support. Except for activists paid by movement organizations, the vast majority are employed by large, elite-controlled public or private organizations. There are only handfuls of independent professionals or small business owners among the activists.

Three-quarters of the paid movement activists are employed by independent neighborhood movement organizations. However, nearly all of these organizations are funded by some combination of government and foundation grants or contracts, so the boundary between movement-paid and government-paid activists is blurry. Many neighborhood organizations that are formally independent and private (such as neighborhood development corporations, community action agencies, and the more diversified groups of more recent origin) have achieved routinized, quasi-governmental status.

Nearly all of the paid activists have staff titles: only two are elected officers of associations. "Organizing" was mentioned as a part or all of their job description by 36%; another 16% described their job in terms related to the concept of organizing, terms such as advocacy or education. A large group, 37%, described their job as administrative or coordinative.

Age. Table 2 shows the distribution of activists' ages in five-year ranges defined by the year the activist became 18. Activists span the entire range of adult ages, but most come from the years of peak adult responsibility, 23 to 47. Comparing the sample to the resident adult population of the United States using standard census categories indicates that the 35-44 age group is by far the most overrepresented in the sample, and that representation in the sample has a bell-shaped distribution with those 18-21 and those over 65 most underrepresented (data not shown). Contrary to expectations established during the 1960s, this social movement is staffed not by the young, but by adults. Of course, many of these participants were young in the 1960s.

Table 2 also shows the percentage of paid activists within each age group because preliminary analysis revealed a significant deviation from linearity. Inspection of these percentages indicates that it is precisely those persons who reached maturity in the 1960s, and especially those who came of age in the latter half of the decade, who are most likely to become paid neighborhood activists. For this reason, subsequent analysis of the effect of age employs a dummy variable for membership in the 1960s cohort; those younger and those older are grouped together in the reference category.

Table 2. Age Distribution of Activists, and Age by Proportion Paid Activists

Age in 1979	Year Became 18	n	Percent	Percent Paid
19-22	1975-1978	9	5	33
23-27	1970-1974	19	11	42
28-32	1965-1969	29	17	69
33-37	1960-1964	26	16	58
38-42	1955-1959	22	13	36
43-47	1950-1954	20	12	25
48-52	1945-1949	9	5	44
53-57	1940-1944	8	5	25
58-62	1935-1939	10	6	30
63-67	1930-1934	7	4	0
68+	before 1930	7	4	43
TOTAL		166	98*	

Note: *rounding error

Neighborhood Integration. The means, standard deviations, and coding conventions for the extent to which the activists have significant social ties to the neighborhoods in which they reside are shown in the first section of Table 3.⁷ It is difficult to interpret means of the neighborhood integration variables without a comparison group of nonactivists, but they seem to be at least as high as one would expect of comparable nonactivists.

Political Integration. Two indicators assess the activist's involvement with political activities besides the neighborhood movement and are shown in the second section of Table 3. The levels of activity reported on these variables appear higher than those obtained in general population samples (e.g., Verba and Nie, 1972), indicating that these activists are quite involved in community political affairs. This is consistent with Oberschall's predictions.

Movement Experience. Four indicators tap the activist's past involvement in social movements and are shown in the third section of Table 3. Again, the means of these variables indicate rather higher levels of movement experience than would be obtained in the general population.

Movement Ideology. Three indicators assess the activists' adherence to movement-relevant ideologies and are shown in the fourth section of Table 3. The first assesses the person's general political orientation; the other two deal with issues directly relevant to the neighborhood movement. One question asked whether neighborhood organizations should concentrate on meeting local neighborhood needs even if they conflict with others, should concentrate on developing city-wide cooperation among neighborhood organizations, or should concentrate on linking up with a larger struggle for social justice. The first two choices were contrasted with the last. The other item derives from coding of

Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations and Coding Conventions for Independent Variables

<i>Variables and Coding Conventions</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>s.d.</i>
<i>Neighborhood Integration</i>		
<i>Kin</i> : Have kin in other households in neighborhood (1=yes, 0=no)	.33	.47
<i>Known</i> : Proportion of neighbors known personally (1=none, 2=handful, 3=less than half, 4=more than half, 5=nearly all)	3.84	1.06
<i>Years Lived</i> : Proportion of life lived in neighborhood (Years in neigh./Age)	.28	.26
<i>Church</i> : Attends church (1=yes, 0=no)	.46	.50
<i>Political Integration</i>		
<i>Elections</i> : How often works in elections (1=never, 2=occasionally, 3=fairly often, 4=regularly)	2.57	1.11
<i>Political Orgs.</i> : Membership in a political or special issue group other than neighborhood movement group (1=yes, 0=no)	.51	.50
<i>Movement Experience</i>		
<i>Civil Rights</i> : Was active in the civil rights movement (1=yes, 0=no)	.40	.49
<i>Anti-War</i> : Was active in the anti-war movement (1=yes, 0=no)	.28	.45
<i>Feminist</i> : Was active in the feminist or related movements (1=yes, 0=no)	.20	.40
<i>Years Active</i> : Proportion of adult life as neighborhood activist (Years Active/(Age-18))	.42	.27
<i>Movement Ideology</i>		
<i>General Politics</i> : General political orientation; coded responses to an open-ended question. (4=radical, socialist, etc.; 3=liberal, progressive, etc.; 2=mixed, moderate, independent, other; 1=conservative.)	2.75	.94
<i>Local Orientation</i> : Neighborhood movement should encourage local neighborhood needs and/or city-wide cooperation among neighborhood groups (=1) rather than treat neighborhood movement as part of larger struggle for social justice (=0).	.59	.49
<i>Issue Orientation</i> : Named one or more specific problems or issues such as housing, crime, displacement, or services as being important for movement activity (=1) rather than only abstractions such as justice or inequality (=0).	.59	.49
<i>Demographic Variables</i>		
<i>Sex</i> : (1=male, 0=female)	.44	.50
<i>Race</i> : (1=minority, 0=white)	.36	.48
<i>College Grad</i> : (1=college graduate, 0=not)	.61	.49
<i>60s Cohort</i> : (1=age 28-37 in 1979, 0=other)	.33	.47

open-ended responses to a question asking what issues the neighborhood movement should give first priority to. Those activists who listed any specific neighborhood-related problem were coded as having an issue orientation and contrasted with those who responded only in general abstract terms. These two items capture the extent to which the activist is concerned about the specific issues of the neighborhood movement as opposed to a diffuse interest in social change.⁸ The activists' general political orientations are significantly more liber-

al-to-radical than the general population. The other two items are not meaningful for nonactivists.

Demographic Variables. The last section of Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for sex, race, years of education, and whether the person is a college graduate. The sample has only slightly more women than men, is over a third minority, and is very highly educated.

B. Multivariate Analysis

Data to address theoretical predictions were obtained from ordinary least squares multiple regressions. The table of bivariate correlations is given in Table 4. Two strategies of analysis are reported. The first involves assessing the strength of sets of variables as predictors of paid activism; the second involves estimating the coefficients of a model predicting paid activism from movement-related attitudes and experiences.

Tables 5 and 6 provide data for assessing the strength of sets of variables as predictors of paid activism. Table 5 shows the R^2 and significance for each set of variables as predictors of paid activism. Table 6 shows the regression of paid activism on all of the independent variables. The patterns shown in these tables hold up under all other modes of analysis. The Neighborhood Integration and Political Integration variables, individually and collectively, are simply not significant predictors of paid activism. Within this sample of neighborhood activists, there is no difference between paid and volunteer activists in their levels of integration with local neighborhoods and politics. Paid and volunteer activists do not differ in their orientations to issues specifically relevant to the neighborhood movement. These non-relations hold up when other variables are controlled: the few small non-zero bivariate correlations are eliminated without creating any new ones.

Since all preliminary multivariate analyses indicate that the above variables play no direct or indirect role in predicting paid activism, the causal sequence that leads to paid activism appears to involve only movement-specific experiences. The multiple regression analysis is presented as a path model to portray the process whereby volunteer activists become paid activists. Exogenous variables are dummy variables for minority race, male, college graduate, and 60's cohort. Causal order among social movement experiences can be assumed because of the chronological order in which those movements occurred in the 1960s. Years of activism is assumed to be a consequence of past political experiences, since its magnitude today depends upon whether the person was politically involved in the past. Political attitudes are assumed to be a result of past political experiences. Being a paid activist is assumed to be a consequence of the preceding factors. Table 7 shows the coefficients of the full model with all possible paths, and the restricted model recalculated through backwards elimination to include only those coefficients for which $p < .1$. The restricted model is shown graphically in Figure 1.

Table 4. Table of Bivariate Correlations. Correlation in Upper Triangle, Number of Cases in Lower Triangle

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) Paid Activist		.05	-.13*	-.08	-.09	.02	-.01	.09
(2) Kin	166		.25*	.33*	.18*	.22*	-.07	.04
(3) Known	165	168		.27*	.30*	.11	-.04	-.04
(4) Years Lived	157	155	154		.08	.36*	-.10	.05
(5) Church	168	166	165	155		.04	-.08	-.05
(6) Elections	166	165	164	152	165		.22*	.35*
(7) Political Orgs.	171	168	167	157	171	168		.24*
(8) Civil Rights	171	168	167	157	171	168	174	
(9) Anti-War	171	168	167	157	171	168	174	174
(10) Feminist	171	168	167	157	171	168	174	174
(11) Years Active	154	151	150	151	152	149	154	154
(12) Politics (Left)	150	148	147	137	149	147	152	152
(13) Local Orient.	165	162	161	151	164	162	167	167
(14) Issue Orient.	162	160	159	148	161	159	164	164
(15) Sex (Male)	173	167	166	157	169	167	172	172
(16) Race (Minority)	172	167	166	157	168	166	171	171
(17) College Grad	173	167	166	157	169	167	172	172
(18) 60s Cohort	166	160	159	157	169	167	172	172

Table 5. Variance Accounted for and Significance of Clusters of Independent Variables as Predictors of Paid Activism

Independent Variables	R ²	p
Political Attitudes (Leftist Politics, Local Orientation, Issue Orientation)	.052	.031
Leftist Politics Only	.048	.010
Movement Experiences (Years of Activism, Civil Rights, Anti-War, and Feminist Movements)	.071	.043
Years of Activism, Anti-War Only	.070	.008
Years of Activism Only	.055	.006
Neighborhood Integration (Kin, Know Neighbors, Years Lived, Church)	.035	.320
Political Integration (Elections, Political Organizations)	.025	.959
Demographic Variables (Race, Sex, College Graduate, 60's Cohort)	.122	.002
Race, College Grad, 60's Cohort	.121	.001
College Grad, 60's Cohort	.109	.000

Table 4. (continued)

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
(1)	.17*	.02	.23*	.22*	.01	-.06	.08	.05	.20*	.30*
(2)	-.19*	-.14*	.10	-.08	.26*	.15*	.02	.34*	-.23*	-.05
(3)	-.24*	-.14*	.03	-.26*	.14*	.18*	-.06	.27*	-.29*	-.24*
(4)	-.21*	-.15*	.30*	-.03	.25*	.28*	.03	.25*	-.18*	-.10
(5)	-.17*	-.20*	-.05	-.27*	-.10	.17*	.02	.19*	-.12	-.26*
(6)	.09	.08	.24*	.03	-.07	.12	.09	.23*	.00	-.00
(7)	.17*	.32*	.21*	.10	-.27*	.00	.05	-.04	.29*	-.03
(8)	.33*	.09	.25*	.24*	-.17*	.04	.17*	.21*	.13*	.12
(9)		.20*	.20*	.46*	-.27*	-.12	.15*	-.26*	.32*	.22*
(10)	174		.12	.14*	-.11	-.06	-.30*	-.11	.20*	.12
(11)	154	154		.17*	-.07	.01	.15*	.07	.14*	.16*
(12)	152	152	137		-.17*	-.05	.20*	-.12	.24*	.10
(13)	167	167	149	152		-.07	-.09	.00	-.10	-.03
(14)	164	164	146	150	164		.03	.21*	-.09	-.06
(15)	172	172	154	151	166	163		-.06	.23*	.04
(16)	171	171	154	150	165	162	173		-.34*	-.02
(17)	172	172	154	151	166	163	174	173		.21*
(18)	164	164	154	145	159	156	166	165	166	

Note: * p < .05

Table 6. Regression of Paid Activism on All Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized	
		B	s.e.
60's Cohort	.20	.213*	.095
Sex, Male	-.03	-.032	.094
College Graduate	.17	.172	.101
Minority Race	.13	.131	.102
Kin in Neighborhood	.09	.095	.097
Know Neighbors	-.03	-.012	.044
Years Lived in Neighborhood	-.17	-.313	.192
Attend Church	-.01	-.008	.091
Work in Elections	.02	.009	.044
Political Organizations	-.10	-.096	.093
Leftist Politics	.16	.086	.052
Years Activist	.22	.405*	.173
Feminist Movement	-.07	-.083	.120
Anti-War Movement	.01	.008	.117
Civil Rights Movement	-.05	-.052	.099

Note:

*Coefficient twice its standard error

Table 7. Path Coefficients (Standardized Regression Coefficients), Significance Levels, and Coefficients of Determination for Full and Restricted Models Predicting Paid Activism

Dependent and Independent Variables	Full		Restricted	
	Beta	p	Beta	p
<i>Dependent: Paid Activist</i>				
Leftist Politics	.17	.09	.17	.04
Years of Activism	.22	.02	.16	.05
Feminist Movement	-.07	.49		
Anti-War Movement	.02	.88		
Civil Rights Movement	-.05	.61		
Minority Race	.13	.18		
College Graduate	.16	.11		
Male	-.03	.77		
60's Cohort	.20	.03	.25	.002
Coefficient of Determination (R ²)	.21		.15	
<i>Dependent: Leftist Politics</i>				
Years of Activism	.05	.56		
Feminist Movement	.09	.33		
Anti-War Movement	.38	.000	.44	.000
Civil Rights Movement	.06	.49		
Minority Race	.00	.99		
College Graduate	.06	.53		
Male	.14	.11	.13	.08
60's Cohort	-.03	.74		
Coefficient of Determination (R ²)	.25		.23	
<i>Dependent: Years Active</i>				
Feminist Movement	.12	.21	.15	.09
Anti-War Movement	.09	.36		
Civil Rights Movement	.15	.12	.21	.01
Minority Race	.10	.29		
College Graduate	.05	.58		
Male	.13	.16	.15	.08
60's Cohort	.10	.26		
Coefficient of Determination (R ²)	.12		.09	
<i>Dependent: Feminist Movement</i>				
Anti-War Movement	.15	.10	.19	.02
Civil Rights Movement	.08	.40		
Minority Race	-.04	.67		
College Graduate	.21	.02	.21	.01
Male	-.39	.000	-.38	.000
60's Cohort	.04	.60		
Coefficient of Determination (R ²)	.21		.20	


(continued)

Table 7. (continued)

Dependent and Independent Variables	Full		Restricted	
	Beta	p	Beta	p
<i>Dependent: Anti-War Movement</i>				
Civil Rights Movement	.35	.000	.36	.000
Minority Race	-.28	.001	-.29	.001
College Graduate	.14	.10	.15	.08
Male	.04	.60		
60's Cohort	.13	.10	.14	.06
Coefficient of Determination (R ²)	.28		.27	
<i>Dependent: Civil Rights Movement</i>				
Minority Race	.28	.002	.28	.001
College Graduate	.18	.05	.23	.01
Male	.14	.10		
60's Cohort	.08	.32		
Coefficient of Determination (R ²)	.11		.11	

Note: Correlations among exogenous variables are shown in Table 4.

Figure 1. Standardized path coefficients for model predicting paid activism. (Only those paths for which p < .10 are shown.) * p < .05 ** p < .01 ***p < .001



This analysis indicates that there are two routes to paid activism for this sample of activists. One comes from experience in past social movements and is mediated by acquisition of leftist political beliefs or, to a lesser extent, the proportion of adult life spent as an activist. The second source is membership in the 60's cohort, which net of political experience makes a person more likely to be a paid neighborhood activist. Although the sample is too small to allow separate analyses by race to be statistically stable, such analyses were performed on an exploratory basis and indicated that there are some differences between the races in the factors drawing them into past social movements, but only minor differences in the coefficients on the predictors of paid activism. The cohort effect net of political experience seems to be more important for whites, and the political experience effect net of cohort seems to be more important for minorities.

VII. RESULTS OF TESTS OF PREDICTIONS

Consistent with the assumptions of the collective action/resource mobilization tradition, the majority of the activists whose occupations are detailed in Table 1 seem to have an occupational interest in the goals of the neighborhood movement. Even considering only the volunteers, these activists are certainly not a representative sample of the kinds of people who live in urban neighborhoods. Contrary to Oberschall's discussions, there is little suggestion that these activists come from occupations independent of elite control; most are employed by elite-controlled or elite-funded organizations. However, Oberschall's logic would seem to apply only to a movement facing elite opposition (which he seems to assume faces all movements). His predictions would not seem to hold for a movement with elite sponsorship. (See Marx, 1979, for more about elite sponsorship of and opposition to movements.) Another proposition implied by Oberschall, that paid activists will come disproportionately from those with blocked channels of access due to discriminatory social barriers or from those whose education or skills fit them poorly for higher-paying jobs, also has not been confirmed: paid activists have higher average levels of education than volunteers and are not significantly more likely to be members of minority groups (Table 4).

The second set of predictions involved social and organizational networks. Consistent with past research on social movement activists, the neighborhood activists in this sample appear to have rather high levels of social and political integration. However, there is no difference between paid and volunteer activists in this regard. This lack of a difference is consistent with the theory that paid activists come to their positions by way of volunteer activism, that is, they are mobilized into the movement by the same general processes and factors as volunteers are. Contrary to the implications of McCarthy and Zald's work, paid activists do not appear to be more likely than volunteers to be divorced from their

constituencies, nor do they appear to have been recruited to paid activism by the lure of a job independent of ideological considerations.

The next set of predictions involved ideology and experience. Commitment models of paid activism imply that paid activists will exhibit greater ideological connection to the movement and have longer histories of movement activism than volunteers, predictions that follow necessarily from the assumption that paid activists work their ways up through the ranks of the volunteers. Even though the 1970s neighborhood movement violated the commitment theorists' assumption that paid activists are supported from internal movement sources, they nevertheless support such theorists' predictions about ideology and experience. Paid activists are more likely to have leftist political orientations and to report that they have spent greater proportions of their adult lives as "neighborhood activists" than volunteers. However, they are no different from volunteers on the indicators of specific neighborhood-movement ideology, when general political ideology is controlled. This, plus the strong correlation of leftist ideology with participation in the anti-war movement, strongly suggests that the motivation for paid neighborhood activism lies not in the neighborhood movement, but in previous social movements. The evidence is that a commitment process is involved, but not a commitment to the neighborhood movement itself. Rather, there appears to be a commitment to some larger movement or vision of a movement.

Contrary to the commitment models, the general logic of the collective action models implies that volunteers would be more motivated by purposive incentives or personal gain from the collective good than would paid activists. While many of the volunteers' occupations are consistent with the view that they are especially likely to experience personal gain from the goals of the neighborhood movement, there is little support for the view that volunteers are more ideologically or purposively motivated. It appears much more likely that it is the paid activists who are more ideologically motivated.

Concerning the possibility that paid activism is an economic sacrifice, it was argued that this would imply ideological differences among paid activists according to educational levels. As Table 8 shows, persons with college degrees have more leftist political orientations than persons who do not, but this difference is statistically significant for paid activists and is not for volunteers. These data are consistent with the prediction from collective action theory, but not strongly confirming.

It is very clear that the 60's cohort, persons who came of age during the 1960's, are much more likely to be paid activists than others. This finding is quite consistent with what would be predicted from the values expressed by student activists in the 1960s, and with the literature on the subsequent political involvement and occupational careers of 1960s activists. Examination of the occupations of the volunteer activists will reveal that they are also likely to have chosen careers consistent with these predictions. These data strongly indicate

Table 8. Mean Leftist Politics, by Paid Activism and College Graduate

	Mean Leftist Politics	T-Test		
		t	df	P*
<i>Volunteer Activists</i>				
Not College Graduate	2.38	1.42	81	.08
College Graduate	2.67			
<i>Paid Activists</i>				
Not College Graduate	2.53	2.36	65	.01
College Graduate	3.12			

Note: *One-tailed test of significance.

that many of the 1970s neighborhood activists are heirs of the social movements and values of the 1960s. These patterns lend support to the view that activists in the 1960s experienced commitment processes that led to permanent changes in their political and occupational behavior.

However, money to pay social movement activists also became more readily available in the 1960s. The fact that, especially for whites, there is a cohort effect net of political experience from this decade suggests that the economic factor is also significant. In assessing the economic factor, however, it is important to remember that this is a sample of activists whose political experience is substantially more extensive and whose political attitudes are substantially more leftist than the general population. There is little evidence that the net cohort effect is due to political inexperience or ideological neutrality among paid activists; rather, persons not from this cohort who are just as politically experienced and politically leftist are far less likely to be paid activists. Since occupations are usually chosen in young adulthood, it is most likely that the cohort effect is due to the availability of such occupations at the time the person is making an occupational choice.

Since both cohort and political ideology and experience have effects on paid activism net of each other, it is clear that neither a pure commitment model nor a pure collective action model adequately explains the observed data. Both processes are obviously important in creating paid activists.

VIII. DISCUSSION

The evidence of these data is that paid neighborhood activists come from essentially the same pool as volunteers, except that they are more likely to have leftist political orientations as a result of their greater involvement in the social move-

ments of the 1960s, have spent a somewhat greater proportion of their adult lives as neighborhood activists, and are more likely to have come of age in the 1960s. What does this mean for theories of the mobilization of activists, especially paid activists?

First, there is strong evidence that the decision to become a paid activist arises from social movement experience and commitment. The evidence strongly suggests that the values and activities of the social movements of the 1960s affected participants in ways that led them to continue lives of political activism, and led many of them to choose careers as paid activists. There is no evidence that paid activists are less socially or politically integrated than volunteer activists. The image of paid activists as being the especially committed, experienced, and ideologically motivated participants in a social movement seems justified. There is no evidence to support the idea that a salary may be an alternative or supplementary motivation for social movement activism.

Secondly, there is clear evidence that economic factors impose constraints on the limits of activist involvement. It seems fairly clear that ideological commitment alone is not sufficient to make a paid activist; there must also be the possibility of earning a livelihood in this way. In the 1960s, a generation just at the age of deciding their life's work not only encountered new values and experiences but perceived the possibility of making a career of activism in the rapidly increasing funding available for such work throughout the decade. Older generations of activists may have been just as committed (and many were also active in the 1960s social movements), but they had already chosen other careers. The 1970s generation came of age in a period of reduced activism and retrenchment in support for social movements; Table 9 shows that they are somewhat more likely to have chosen non-movement occupations than the 1960s generation did.

The responses of these activists forces us to see resources as a constraint on activism, not as a motivation for it. Neighborhood activists—regardless of their

Table 9. Percentage of Employed Activists in Movement and Non-movement Jobs by Age

Age in 1979	Percentage of Employed		Total Number	
	Movement	Non-Movement	Employed	Not Employed
19-22	60	40	5	4
23-27	53	47	15	4
28-37 (60s cohort)	70	30	50	5
38-47	32	68	41	1
48-57	40	60	15	2
58-67	43	57	7	10
68+	100	0	3	4

backgrounds—speak for constituencies they are members of. But even for activists promoting causes of no immediate benefit to themselves, it seems unlikely that we will be able to say that they are activists *because* they can be paid to be activists. Rather, their desire to be social movement activists derives from fundamental beliefs and values acquired in the intense experiences of past social movements. Their beliefs and values lead them to seek ways of being able to devote full time to activism by being able to make a living doing it. They not only passively receive the benefits of increases in resources, they actively campaign for and promote resources for activism. (This is the implication of McCarthy and Zald's 1973 piece, an implication they contradicted in their 1977 work.)

To argue that paid activists are mobilized more by commitment experiences than by job opportunities is not to discount the significance of changes in job opportunities stressed by McCarthy and Zald. Job opportunities for paid activists allow activists to spend more time on activism, since they do not also have to earn a living. Job opportunities controlled by elite sponsors (as were the majority of those available in the 1960s and 1970s) raise important implications for social movements. Even though they have strong social and political ties to their communities, paid activists dependent on outsiders rather than their constituencies for their paychecks may well choose their specific actions and programs more in line with their sponsors' goals than their constituencies'. But in exploring these important issues, and other related ones, it is important to recognize that whatever the *consequences* of paid activists may be for social movement organizations in goal displacement or elite control, the *causes* of activist careers arise from commitment and ideology.

In sum, people became paid neighborhood activists through progressive social and ideological commitment constrained by the resources available to support their activism. A movement will have many paid activists when there is a conjunction of commitment experiences leading participants to dedicate themselves to the movement and resources to pay full-time activists arising at a point in activists' life cycles when they are making occupational choices.

Although this paper has compared in detail paid and volunteer activists in the neighborhood movement, its findings are significant for our more general understanding of social movement mobilization. It seems clear from the papers and discussions among participants at recent meetings that most theorists are abandoning polar contrasts between the collective behavior and resource mobilization traditions. The constructive task of building theory on the foundations of the best from both traditions seems well under way. In this context, the findings of this research call attention to several important issues.

First, the character of social movement participation is clearly affected by the presence or absence of resources. Different types of activism and activities require different amounts of resources. The occupations of the volunteers in this sample highlight the importance of discretionary time as a critical "resource." Paid activism clearly depends upon monetary resources. Material conditions clearly constrain collective action.

Secondly, mobilization for one social movement will generally be affected by past mobilizations. The history of social movements in America is replete with examples of activists from one movement becoming involved in another cause. Neither of the two main theoretical traditions in the sociological study of social movements has dealt well with continuity and historical context, or provided an adequate theoretical accounting of these phenomena. An older paper by Weiss (1963) using stimulus-response concepts may be a starting point for comparative studies of activists' shifts from movement to movement.

Thirdly, mobilization of people to activism clearly should be viewed as a process of progressive commitment, not as isolated decisions or sporadic outbursts. It is quite possible that the mobilization of activists is very different from the mobilization of occasional participants, although the implications of this possibility have rarely been explored. There is a good theoretical grounding for the study of activist mobilization since, as I discussed above, each of the two main theoretical traditions has links to the other; the combination seems likely to yield a good portrait of this process.

Finally, the work already underway to link theories of interests and decisions with theories of emotions and ideologies is clearly taking us in the proper direction toward our goal of understanding the mobilization of social movement participants.

IX. APPENDIX

Although various writers discuss various types of paid activists or external sources of support for paid activists, no one has comprehensively treated these topics. An overview of each is provided here because these distinctions are referred to in the text, even though they are not the central topic of this paper.

A. Sources of Support

The sources of money to pay movement activists may be grouped into three categories according to where control over the money lies: *internal*, *external sponsor*, and *external market*. McCarthy and Zald stressed the importance of external versus internal sources of support (1973) and discussed extensively the consequences of support from external markets (1977), but did not note important differences between external sponsors and external markets.

Internal. Classic political and sociological treatments of paid activists assume they are supported by contributions of money or tangible goods from a participating membership base, and this is still an important source of support for paid activists in labor unions, religious movements, and some social reform organizations. Donations may be made directly or through symbolic rituals, as when members donate goods to rummage sales whose customers are all members of the movement (John Wilson, 1973:176–182). Support is also internal when members donate labor (and sometimes materials) to produce goods or services

that are sold to non-members: the money comes from outside the movement, but the profits arise from members' donations. Such sales by extremely committed movement participants can raise a great deal of money (Lofland, 1979:161). Fund-raising events such as fairs involve lower member commitment (that is, a few days a year) and are popular among community and religious organizations; the skill to put on such events is often carried by experienced volunteers from such groups into social movement organizations.

External Sponsor. Although a few social movements have been sponsored by wealthy individuals (Gamson, 1975:183-4), many social movement organizations have institutional sponsors such as governments, foundations, churches, and corporations. McCarthy and Zald (1973:12-16) document increases in contributions from such institutions throughout the 1960s and argue that such support has become a dominant trend. Institutional sponsors may give money to an organization or isolated activist requesting it, or may take the initiative in employing activists to organize new movement organizations. Institutions also indirectly support social movements by paying employees who, in fact, spend their work time working for the social movement. Even when such activities are nominally "ripping off" the system, they are encouraged only in sympathetic institutions and not tolerated in others.

External Market. While support from sponsors arises from decisions by small numbers of powerful persons, support from large numbers of small contributions by isolated individuals who are not active participants in the movement organization depends upon market processes. These contributions may be direct, in response to solicitations in public places, door-to-door, or through direct mail or mass media advertising; or they may be indirect, through the purchase of goods or services sold at a profit, where the labor involved has been paid a fair wage. Direct contributions are more common than the sale of goods or services because attempts by small movement organizations to make a profit fail just as do most small businesses. McCarthy and Zald (1977) devote a great deal of attention to the implications of a movement's dependence upon isolated monetary contributions (the major kind of external market), arguing that organizations with such dependence exhibit instabilities of resource flows (:1228), large advertising expenditures (:1230), dependence upon economic cycles affecting discretionary income (:1230), and recruitment of beneficiary members for strategic purposes rather than as workers (:1235).

Each of the three types of support presents different controls on paid activists. Internal support makes paid activists ultimately depend upon their membership. This, in turn, may be expected to make the activist more responsive to the desires of the membership (unless larger legal institutions make membership in the organization mandatory). Support from external sponsors makes paid activists dependent on the fairly self-conscious policy decisions of a relatively small member of elite individuals and on the allocation decisions of institutional em-

ployees. Maintenance of support from external sponsors requires the ability to impress employees who make allocation decisions and depends in good measure on shifting cultural, political, and economic trends that affect policy decisions. Support from external markets makes paid activists dependent on aggregate market forces including economic cycles, competition from other movement organizations, and shifts in public opinion, but leaves the activists free from control by specific other persons.

B. Roles of Paid Activists

Although no single author has discussed the full range of paid movement activists, the following five roles seem to be the major types: leader, entrepreneur, staff, organizer, and institutional activist. The roles overlap somewhat, as described below, but each is an important pure type with different implications for mobilization theory.

Leaders arise indigenously from a movement or because of popular support from the movement's membership; they set policy and are symbolic representatives of the movement and its goals (Turner and Killian, 1972:388-405; Lang and Lang, 1961:517-524; Killian, 1964:440-443; John Wilson, 1973:194-225, 276-282; Heberle, 1951:286-290). Following Weber, many of the authors distinguish types of leaders, especially charismatic versus administrative. Leaders can, of course, be either volunteer or paid. The key distinction between a leader and the other kinds of paid activists is that a leader, by definition, has followers. That is, there are genuine participants who believe in the leader and are willing to be led by him or by her.

Entrepreneurs take risks to start movements. If they succeed in creating followers they turn into leaders, but some never succeed in creating followers and others never try, preferring to pursue movement goals in other ways. There is a split in the literature concerning the motivations of movement entrepreneurs. Some authors see movement entrepreneurs as seeking to make a financial profit through providing the public good to persons who are willing to pay money to have someone else incur the costs of collective action (Frohlich, et al., 1971; Schwartz and McCarthy, 1978; and, by implication McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977). Others, particularly James Q. Wilson (1973:196-197), believe that movement entrepreneurs are motivated by purposive incentives and are willing to forego material gain to achieve their goals, implying that many entrepreneurs are volunteer activists who gain their livelihoods in some other way than through their activism. Moe (1980) argues that some entrepreneurs are motivated by material gain and others by purposive incentives, and that they will behave differently depending on their motives.

Staff are hired by movement leaders or entrepreneurs (either paid or volunteer) to perform tasks oriented toward accomplishing the movement's goals. In principle, staff carry out policy set by others. Staff may include clerks, administrators, or specialists such as architects, builders, nurses, planners, social workers, and

fund-raisers. The staff-leader distinction often blurs in practice as many organizations are dominated by their paid staff (James Q. Wilson, 1973:225-228). An additional confusion is that many movement entrepreneurs define the positions they create for themselves as staff; this is especially true of organizers (discussed below). True staff are likely to be hired to perform less desirable or more time-consuming tasks whenever the organization has sufficient money to do so.

Organizers are staff or entrepreneurs who seek specifically to increase participation in and support for a movement organization among some population of people. The large prescriptive literature on community organizing stresses that organizers should not be leaders, that is, they should play the staff role of getting things organized rather than the leader role of setting policy (e.g. Kahn, 1970; Grosser, 1968; Alinsky, 1971; and the articles in Kramer and Specht, 1974 and Ecklein and Lauffer, 1972). Even these texts stray into discussing leadership functions such as setting goals and, prescriptions notwithstanding, many organizers dominate their organizations. The classic organizer comes from outside the movement's constituency and moves on after a year or so. Labor and community organizers have long been paid, although community organizing experienced a boom in the 1960s.

Institutional Activists are employees of non-movement institutions whose work includes the pursuit of movement goals. The most important group of these are government-employed activists. This group has rarely been conceptualized as a kind of paid movement activist, but the political realities of this century require just such a concept. Obviously not all employees of governments are social movement activists. But some are. Some have been elected or appointed to their positions because of the movement's activities. Some work in agencies created in response to movement agitation. Some have self-consciously sought their jobs to pursue the movement's goals by "boring from within." An institutional employee should be seen as a type of paid movement activist when major portions of his or her job further movement goals, and when he or she identifies with the movement, has social and political connections with movement members, and participates in movement activities in ways that go beyond the institutional job description. Obviously, institutional activists are supported by external institutional sponsors.

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NOTES

1. Thirty-three or 63% of the 53 "challenging groups" in the U.S. between 1800 and 1945 that were studied by Gamson had one or more paid staff members (1975:190). Calculating from the data presented in his appendix, the following percentages in each time period had paid staff: before 1860, 25%; 1860-1879, 67%; 1880-1899, 56%; 1900-1913, 67%; 1914-1928, 71%; 1929-1945, 55%. The proportion of groups having paid staff varies with the type of group: 80% for occupational groups, 47% for reform groups, 30% for socialist groups, and 33% for right-wing groups. Other examples of paid activists in a wide variety of social movement organizations may be found in John Wilson (1973:176-191) and James Q. Wilson (1973:215-232).

2. The question of whether there really is a "neighborhood movement" raises definitional and political questions beyond the scope of this paper. There are two key empirical problems. First, the extensive resources provided to the movement from institutional sponsors (government agencies and corporate and religious foundations), along with policies and regulations that encourage or even mandate the formation of neighborhood organizations, raise serious questions about whether this mobilization is in any sense "illegitimate" in the eyes of those in power. The second problem is whether disparate and disconnected local mobilizations over diverse issues really add up to a unified social movement. Despite the importance of these issues for interpreting the neighborhood movement, they are not germane to this paper, which focuses on the processes leading some people to become activists.

3. Certain kinds of political and religious sects are a partial exception, in that they tend to recruit social isolates who are attracted by the close ties they can obtain within the sect to substitute for the ones they lack in the outside world (Snow et al., 1980). The movements that are the basis for this paper typically draw from a broad-based constituency and exhibit the patterns of social connections described by Oberschall.

4. For more detailed reviews of theoretical tendencies and distinctions and of the empirical literature, see the articles by Fendrich cited in note #5, Bengston et al. (1974), Buss (1974), and Kasschau et al. (1974).

5. This brief summary is a synthesis compiled from Fendrich (1974, 1976, 1977), Fendrich and Tarleau (1973), and Fendrich and Krauss (1978).

6. The correlation between SES and participation in the leadership of voluntary associations is so well established in the literature that it is rarely subjected to direct test. For a major empirical report on political participation, see Verba and Nie (1972). For reviews of organizational participation, see Smith and Freedman (1972) and Smith (1975).

7. For *known* and all other polychotomous ordinal variables listed below, analyses were performed using several different numerical coding schemes and checked with cross-tabulations; all coding schemes yielded essentially the same results so only the simplest are reported.

8. A reviewer has critiqued this measure of localistic orientation on the grounds that leftist organizers believe that participation in activities oriented toward local issues tends over time to increase a person's vision of the need for a larger social struggle; the reviewer predicted that volunteers with longer histories of movement involvement would be more likely to believe in "larger struggle." I was aware of leftists' beliefs on this matter when I formulated the question and worded it to acknowledge that all were important, but to ask the respondent to identify priorities and say which was *most* important. I checked the reviewer's prediction, and the results will be disappointing to leftist organizers. Among volunteers, there is *no correlation* between raw years as a neighborhood activist and commitment to a "larger struggle." Raw years as an activist is highly correlated with age, and older people are more conservative, but controlling for age only further reduces this already miniscule correlation. Using the standardized variable proportion of adult life as a neighborhood activist, there is a first-order bivariate correlation for volunteers between history of activism and commitment to a larger struggle, but this correlation is entirely explained away when controls for

prior social movement experience are introduced. It is experience in the anti-war movement in particular and, to a lesser extent, experience in the civil rights movement that leads to a priority on linking the neighborhood movement to larger struggles. Being a "neighborhood activist" for a long time without being in the anti-war or civil rights movement has an extremely weak and non-significant *negative* effect on support for the "larger struggle."

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ON THE ROLE OF THE VANGUARD
PARTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
A CASE STUDY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
COMMUNIST PARTY AT
WAI AHOLE-WAIKANE

James A. Geschwender

With the Assistance of Steven Smith

I. INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen a revival of interest in the concept of the vanguard party and its possible relevance to the social change process in the United States and other advanced capitalist societies. The vanguard party virtually disappeared from the American political scene in the decade following World War II. Then in the mid- to late-1970's the vanguard structure experienced a rebirth through

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