Reading article tables

Klandermans, Wood & Hughes, McAdam “High Risk” model

Klandermans & Oegema 1987



Fig. 1. Mobilization Potential, Recruitment Networks, Motivations to Participate, and Actual Participation ($N = 114$)

Klandermans & Oegema: Network Effects

Table 4. Links between the Local Peace Movement Networks and Intention to Participate, Education, Voting Behavior, and Gender

	Intention to Participate[a]	Education[b]	Voting Behavior[b]	Gender[b]
No links ($N = 17$)	—	3.82	−.73	1.29
Formal links only ($N = 15$)	1	4.27	−.45	1.40
Informal links only ($N = 17$)	4	5.88	−.14	1.59
Formal and informal links ($N = 32$)	6	6.38	−.03	1.72

Note: ANOVA for education: $p < .01$; voting behavior, gender: $p < .05$; $N = 81$.

[a] In absolute numbers.

[b] Means (see Table 2).

Links	None	Formal	Informal	Both
% Participate	0%	7%	24%	19%

Table suggests that informal links are most important!!
Tilt of movement to educated, leftist, men came through networks, NOT opinions for/against movement

Klandermans & Oegema: Deciding to Go

Table 6. Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Willingness to Participate in the Demonstration (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Equation (1)	Equation (2)	Equation (3)	Equation (4)	Equation (5)	Equation (6)	Equation (7)
Demographics							
Age	.04 (.03)	.05 (.06)	.03 (.03)	.04 (.03)			
Gender	−.32 (.88)	.92 (1.40)	−.17 (.88)	−.54 (.92)			
Education	.37 (.21)*	.84 (.48)*	.33 (.22)*	.39 (.21)*			
Voting behavior	2.33 (.90)**	3.07 (1.67)*	2.06 (.91)**	2.22 (.90)**			
Collective Incentives							
Attitude toward goal of demonstration		1.23 (1.15)			1.58 (.83)*		
Does the Dutch government have the potential to influence the arms race?		15.47 (3.97)***			8.46 (1.67)***		
Selective Incentives							
Social							
How many acquaintances/friends will go to the demonstration?			.89 (.71)			1.37 (.64)**	
Nonsocial							
Sacrificing free time				−.78 (.72)			−.79 (.63)
Fear of disturbances				−.77 (1.61)			−.42 (1.16)
Constant	−7.53 (2.92)	12.33	−5.60 (3.27)	10.41 (4.49)	10.04 (2.96)	.62 (.97)	−4.43 (2.79)
Log likelihood	−22.63	−11.55	−21.78	−21.79	−18.77	−26.13	−27.82

Note: $N = 64$.
* $p < .05$.
** $p < .01$.
*** $p < .001$.

1. Left parties, educated are key. Overlap with expect friends to go
2. Additional effect of believing Dutch government has effect
3. Majority who said they would go did not (6/10): cited specific "reasons"

Reading regression tables

- Look for symbols about "significance", usually *'s. (Check footnotes, occasionally non-significant results are *'d.) Significant = effect too large to be due to change. MORE SIGNIFICANT IS SMALLER P, $p<.05$ is significant, $p<.001$ is more significant.
- Look at sign of coefficient: + or -, and meaning of variables. [In a few cases, the coefficients are odds ratios instead, which are above 1.0 if effect is positive and below 1.0 if effect is negative.]
- Unstandardized "b" or "B" coefficients can be compared across equations for the same variables
- Standardized β (beta) coefficients tell you how "strong" each variable is compared to others in the same equation.

Interpreting Klandermans & Oegema regression: DV=intend to go

	Equation (1)	
Demographics		
Age	.04	(.03)
Gender	−.32	(.88)
Education	.37	(.21)*
Voting behavior	2.33	(.90)**
Collective Incentives		
Attitude toward goal of demonstration		
Does the Dutch government have the potential to influence the arms race?		
Selective Incentives		
Social		
How many acquaintances/friends will go to the demonstration?		
Nonsocial		
Sacrificing free time		
Fear of disturbances		
Constant	−7.53	(2.92)
Log likelihood	−22.63	

Note: $N = 64$.
* $p<.05$.
** $p<.01$.
*** $p<.001$.

Equivalent to saying:
LogOdds(Intend) = .04Age - .32Gender + .37Educ + 2.33Voting –7.53
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Coefficients are significant when they are substantially larger than their standard error.
Here, only education and voting for left parties are significant.
Table SHOULD have labeled direction for gender, voting

Klandermans & Oegema: Deciding to Go

Table 6. Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Willingness to Participate in the Demonstration (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Equation (1)	Equation (2)	Equation (3)	Equation (4)	Equation (5)	Equation (6)	Equation (7)
Demographics							
Age	.04 (.03)	.05 (.06)	.03 (.03)	.04 (.03)			
Gender	−.32 (.88)	.92 (1.40)	−.17 (.88)	−.54 (.92)			
Education	.37 (.21)*	.84 (.48)*	.33 (.22)*	.39 (.21)*			
Voting behavior	2.33 (.90)**	3.07 (1.67)*	2.06 (.91)**	2.22 (.90)**			
Collective Incentives							
Attitude toward goal of demonstration		1.23 (1.15)			1.58 (.83)*		
Does the Dutch government have the potential to influence the arms race?		15.47 (3.97)***			8.46 (1.67)***		
Selective Incentives							
Social							
How many acquaintances/friends will go to the demonstration?			.89 (.71)			1.37 (.64)**	
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Fear of disturbances				−.77 (1.61)			−.42 (1.16)
Constant	−7.53 (2.92)	12.33	−5.60 (3.27)	10.41 (4.49)	10.04 (2.96)	.62 (.97)	−4.43 (2.79)
Log likelihood	−22.63	−11.55	−21.78	−21.79	−18.77	−26.13	−27.82

Note: $N = 64$.
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1. Left parties, educated are key. Overlap with expect friends to go
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Reading Wood & Hughes Table

	(1)		
	B	β	t
Culture and Socialization Variables:			
Age of Respondent	.021	.301	24.303†
Sex (Male)	−.326	−.139	−11.746†
Education	−.042	−.113	−9.082†
Conservative Protestant Religion	.157	.066	5.258†
Rural Residence	.136	.054	4.258†
Rural Residence at Age 16	.111	.046	3.558†
Southern Region	.065	.026	2.094*
Status Discontent Variables:			
Occupation:			
Manual			
Lower White Collar			
Self-Employed Business Person			
Self-Employed Professional			
Rural Self-Employed			
Rural Self-Employed Professional			
Geographic Mobility			
Geographic Mobility × Conservative Religion			
Upward Mobile Catholic			
Upward Mobile Black			
Over-Rewarded Education			
Over-Rewarded Prestige			
Control Variables:			
Income (Family)			
Income of Family at 16			
Occupational Prestige			
Black			
Catholic			
Constant	1.011		12.182†
R^2	.177		
F	188.320		
n = 6117			

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. † $p < .001$.

B is undstandardized regression coefficient; gives equation for attitude toward pornography.

The beta (β)column gives standardized coefficients. You can use it to find which independent variables are strongest. Here, age, the send, then education.

The t column is for a t-test, ratio of B to its standard error (not shown). The symbols show that all independent variables are significant.

Wood & Hughes Table

Significant predictors are older, female (-male), -education, rural now & rural at 16, Southern manual or lower white collar occupation, came from low income family, not Black, Catholic & Conservative Protestant.

Table 2. Regression Analyses Presenting the Effects of: (1) Culture and Socialization Variables; (2) Culture and Socialization Variables, Status Discontent Variables, and Control Variables; (3) Culture and Socialization Variables, Status Discontent Variables, Control Variables and Selected Interaction Terms; and (4) All Significant Predictors, on Anti-Pornography Scale

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	B	β	t	B	β	t	B	β	t	B	β	t
Culture and Socialization Variables:												
Age of Respondent	.021	.301	24.303†	.021	.298	23.484†	.021	.298	23.450†	.021	.299	24.002†
Sex (Male)	−.326	−.139	−11.746†	−.297	−.127	−10.265†	−.297	−.127	−10.247†	−.290	−.124	−10.152†
Education	−.042	−.113	−9.082†	−.034	−.092	−5.590†	−.034	−.092	−5.601†	−.032	−.085	−5.692†
Conservative Protestant Religion	.157	.066	5.258†	.483	.202	11.549†	.488	.204	10.331†	.483	.202	11.560†
Rural Residence	.136	.054	4.258†	.095	.038	1.296	.091	.036	1.225	.102	.041	3.223*
Rural Residence at Age 16	.111	.046	3.558†	.108	.044	1.454	.109	.045	1.467	.100	.041	3.243*
Southern Region	.065	.026	2.094*	.111	.044	3.602†	.110	.044	3.592†	.110	.044	3.600†
Status Discontent Variables:												
Occupation:												
Manual				.134	.057	2.465*	.133	.057	2.456*	.102	.043	2.465*
Lower White Collar				.172	.063	3.595†	.172	.063	3.589†	.161	.059	3.785†
Self-Employed Business Person				.095	.022	1.495	.099	.022	1.287	.082	.019	1.368
Self-Employed Professional				−.173	−.016	−1.391	−.206	−.019	−1.457	−.179	−.017	−1.440
Rural Self-Employed							−.009	−.001	−.087			
Rural Self-Employed Professional							.140	.006	.491			
Geographic Mobility				−.009	−.004	−.115	−.002	−.001	−.028			
Geographic Mobility × Conservative Religion							−.015	−.006	−.258			
Upward Mobile Catholic				.116	.018	1.375	.115	.017	1.361			
Upward Mobile Black				.175	.020	1.531	.174	.020	1.53			
Over-Rewarded Education				.020	.004	.318	.020	.004	.319			
Over-Rewarded Prestige				−.088	−.020	−1.475	−.088	−.020	−1.476			
Control Variables:												
Income (Family)				.004	.011	.764	.004	.011	.767			
Income of Family at 16				−.036	−.025	−1.970*	−.036	−.025	−1.972*	−.047	−.033	−2.702*
Occupational Prestige				.001	.007	.370	.001	.007	.365			
Black				−.426	−.108	−8.015†	−.426	−.108	−8.011†	−.401	−.101	−8.366†
Catholic				.432	.161	9.320†	.432	.161	9.305†	.446	.167	9.866†
Constant	1.011		12.182†	.575		4.184†	.576		4.180†	.641		5.334†
R^2	.177			.205			.205			.204		
F	188.320			74.879			65.503			111.747		
n = 6117												

* p < .05. ** p < .01. † p < .001.

McAdam High Risk Activism



FIG. 1.—Model of recruitment to high-risk/cost activism