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THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROFESSIONALIZATION AND FORMALIZATION IN THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT*

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Resource mobilization theorists have argued that professionalized social movements emerge as more sources of funding become available for activists who make careers out of being movement leaders. This paper analyzes organizational case histories from the pro-choice (abortion rights) movement to explore the consequences of professional leadership and formal structure in social movements. Five general propositions are drawn from the case of the pro-choice movement: (1) professional movement activists do not initiate movements and create new tactics; the roles of movement "professional" and movement "entrepreneur" are distinct; (2) professional movement leaders tend to formalize the organizations they lead; (3) formalized social movement organizations (SMOs) help maintain social movements when environmental conditions make mobilization difficult; (4) professional leaders and formalized SMOs stimulate the use of institutionalized tactics; and (5) professionalization and formalization facilitate coalition work.

As a result of the conceptual work of McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977), the notion of the "professionalized" social movement is now firmly associated with the "resource mobilization" approach to collective action (cf. Jenkins 1983). They argue that professionalized movements are increasingly common as a result of increases in sources of funding for activists who make careers out of being movement leaders. In contrast to what they term "classical" movement organizations, which rely on the mass mobilization of "beneficiary" constituents as active participants, "professional" social movement organizations (SMOs) rely primarily on paid leaders and "conscience" constituents who contribute money and are paper members rather than active participants. Importantly, this analysis suggests that social movements can be launched with adequate funding. "Entrepreneurs" can mobilize sentiments into movement organizations without the benefit of precipitating events or "suddenly imposed major grievances" (Walsh 1981) and without established constituencies.

McCarthy and Zald's analysis of professional movement organizations recognizes that there are different types of movement participants and different types of SMOs, which require different levels and types of participation. Although few theorists have expanded on the McCarthy-Zald analysis of professional movement organizations (exceptions are Cable 1984; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Kleidman 1986; and Oliver 1983), such conceptual development is important because different types of organizational structures and participants have consequences for movement goals and activities. Examination of the effects of organizational leadership and structure is relevant to debates over movement outcomes, such as those generated by Piven and Cloward's (1977) thesis that large formal movement organizations diffuse protest.

This paper explores the consequences of professionalization in social movements by analyzing the impact of leadership and organizational structure in the pro-choice movement. My analysis is based on documentary and interview data gathered on the pro-choice movement (Staggenborg 1985) and focuses on a sample of 13 pro-choice movement organizations, including 6 national organizations and 7 state and local organizations from Illinois and Chicago (see Table 1). Documentary data cover the histories of the organizations from their beginnings to 1983.[1]

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[1] Manuscript collections used include the Women's Collection at Northwestern University,

Table 1. Sample of National and State/Local Pro-Choice SMOs

	Dates
National Organizations	
National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), formerly National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL) until 1973	1969–
Religion Coalition for Abortion Rights (RCAR)	1973–
Zero Population Growth (ZPG)	1968–
National Organization for Women (NOW)	1966–
National Women's Health Network (NWHN)	1975–
Reproductive Rights National Network (R2N2)	1978–1984
State/Local Organizations	
National Abortion Rights Action League of Illinois (NARAL of Illinois), formerly Illinois Citizens for the Medical Control of Abortion (ICMCA) until 1975 and Abortion Rights Association of Illinois (ARA) until 1978	1966–
Illinois Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights (IRCAR)	1975–
Chicago-area Zero Population Growth (Chicago-area ZPG)	1970–1977
Chicago Women's Liberation Union (CWLU)	1969–1977
Chicago National Organization for Women (Chicago NOW)	1969–
Chicago Women's Health Task Force (CWHTF)	1977–1979
Women Organized for Reproductive Choice (WORC)	1979–

Fifty individuals were interviewed, including leaders and rank-and-file activists, who were active in the organizations during different periods. I analyze the changes in leadership and internal structures of the SMOs and the impact of these changes on the movement. In particular, I focus on changes in three major periods of the abortion conflict: the years prior to legalization of abortion in 1973; 1973 to 1976, when Congress first passed the Hyde Amendment cutoff of federal funding of abortion; and 1977–1983 following the anti-abortion victory on the Hyde Amendment.

I begin by making some conceptual distinctions among three types of movement leaders and two major types of SMOs and then use these distinctions to classify the organizations by structure (see Table 2). Next, I examine the impact of leadership on the formation of movement organizations and the formalization of SMOs. Then I examine the impact of formalization on the maintenance of SMOs, their strategies and tactics, and coalition work. Tables 3 through 6 summarize data for each SMO on the pattern of leadership and structural influence. More detailed case material illuminates processes under certain circumstances that may be more generalizable. Finally, I argue that the professionalization of social movements and activists does not necessarily help expand the social movement sector by initiating activities and organizations, but that professionalization and formalization importantly affect the structure and maintenance of social movement organizations, their strategies and tactics, and their participation in coalition work.

CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS

Types of Leadership in SMOs

With the professionalization of social movements and the availability of funding for staff positions, several types of leaders are found in SMOs (cf. McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1227; Oliver 1983, pp. 163–64). *Professional managers* are paid staff who make careers out of movement work. Professional managers are likely to move from one SMO to another and from movement to movement over their careers (see McCarthy and Zald 1973, p. 15). Two types of *nonprofessional leaders* are *volunteer leaders* and *nonprofessional staff leaders*. Volunteer leaders are not paid.[2]

which contains newsletters and documents from NARAL, RCAR, ZPG, CWLU, ICMCA/ARA/NARAL of Illinois, and several coalitions; the papers of ICMA/ARA/NARAL and Chicago NOW at the University of Illinois, Chicago; the CWLU papers at the Chicago Historical Society; the Lawrence Lader papers at the New York Public Library; the public portions of the NARAL and NOW papers at the Schlesinger Library of Radcliffe College; and private papers provided by informants.

[2] Volunteers may be "professionals" in the sense that they spend many years, perhaps a lifetime, doing movement work. However, they differ from professional managers in that they do not earn a living through movement work.

Table 2. Organizational Structures of Sample SMOs over Time

SMO	Pre-1973	1973–76	1977–83
National			
NARAL	informal	transition to formalized	formalized
RCAR		formalized	formalized
ZPG	informal	informal	transition to formalized
NOW	informal	transition to formalized	formalized
NWHN		informal	transition to formalized
R2N2			informal
State/Local			
ICMCA/ARA/NARAL	informal	informal	formalized
IRCAR		informal	transition to formalized
Chicago-area ZPG	informal	(inactive)	(inactive)
Chicago NOW	informal	transition to formalized	formalized
CWLU	informal	informal	
CWHTF			informal
WORC			informal

Note: Details on organizational structures of sample SMOs are provided in Tables 3 and 4.

Nonprofessional staff leaders are compensated for some or all of their time, but are not career activists. Rather, they serve as SMO staff for a short term and do not regard movement work as a career. As I argue below, there may be significant differences in orientation of leaders within this category based on whether the nonprofessional staff leader is temporarily dependent on the movement income for a living. Those who are dependent on the income may behave like professional managers in some respects, whereas those with other sources of income (or those willing to live at subsistence level) may behave more like volunteers. All three types of leaders are, by definition, involved in organizational decision making. All three are also included in the category of *activists,* as are other nonleader members who are actively involved in the SMO as opposed to being paper members.

Paid leaders, then, may or may not be "professionals" in the sense of making careers out of movement work and, as Oliver (1983, p. 158) shows, may come from the "same pool" as volunteers. Of course, leaders who do not begin as movement professionals may become career activists. Both professional and nonprofessional leaders learn skills (e.g., public relations skills) that they can easily transfer from one organization to another and from one cause to another. Both professionals and nonprofessionals can serve as *entrepreneurs*—leaders who initiate movements, organizations, and tactics (cf. Kleidman 1986, pp. 191–92). However, as I argue below, nonprofessional leaders are more likely to initiate movements (as opposed to SMOs) and tactics than are professionals.

Types of Movement Organizations

Changes in the structures of SMOs have occurred along with the professionalization of social movement leadership. In contrast to "classical" SMOs, which have mass memberships of beneficiary constituents, McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) argue that movement organizations with professional leadership have nonexistent or "paper" memberships and rely heavily on resources from constituents outside of the group(s) that benefit from movement achievements. Professional movement activists are thought to act as entrepreneurs who form such organizations by appealing to conscience constituents. The difficulty with this characterization of the structural changes in SMOs led by professionals is, as Oliver (1983) notes, that many such SMOs have both active and paper memberships. Similarly, organizations may rely on a mix of conscience and beneficiary constituents for resources.

An alternative characterization of structural differences in SMOs is based on differences in operating procedures. *Formalized* SMOs[3] have established procedures or structures that enable them to perform certain tasks routinely and to continue to function with changes in leadership. Formalized SMOs have bureaucratic procedures for decision making, a developed division of labor with positions for

[3] The term *bureaucratic* might be substituted for "formalized" (cf. Gamson 1975). However, I have used the latter because SMOs are never as bureaucratic as more established organizations such as corporations and government agencies (cf. Zald and Ash 1966, p. 329).

Table 3. Organizational Characteristics of Sample SMOs: Informal SMOs

SMO	Decision-making Structure and Division of Labor	Membership Criteria/Records	Connections to Subunits	Leadership
Pre-1973 NARAL	informal control by small group of leaders on executive committee; board of directors representative of state organizations had no power; little division of labor	list of supporters rather than formal members, not formally maintained	loose connections to completely autonomous organizational members	volunteers and one nonprofessional staff director
Pre-1977 ZPG	control by self-appointed board of directors; no participation by rank-and-file membership in national decision making; division of labor between Washington lobbying office and California office	dues-paying membership, but sloppy record keeping, little follow-up on members	loose connections to completely autonomous chapters	volunteers
Pre-1973 NOW	elected board and officers; major decisions made by membership at annual conference; division of labor between administrative office, public information office, and legislative office	dues-paying membership, lack of reliable membership records	very poor communication with chapters, lack of national-local coordination	volunteers
Pre-1977 NWHN	decision making by informally recruited board of directors and five founders; informal division of labor	local organizations signed up by founders, no criteria for active involvement	loose connections to completely autonomous organizational members	volunteers
R2N2	decision making initially done by membership at two annual membership conferences; later, regionally elected steering committee and annual membership conference; informal division of labor	membership open to any organization sharing principles; no criteria for active involvement	difficulty integrating many organizational members into organization	volunteers and one staff coordinator
ICMCA/ARA	informal decision making by board and executive director; informal division of labor created by director as needed	list of supporters rather than formal members	informal connection to autonomous "chapters" in other parts of state	volunteers and nonprofessional staff director
Pre-1977 IRCAR	Policy Council of informally selected individuals active in member denominations; informal division of labor among small group of activists	religious organizations in agreement with principles; no criteria for active participation	difficulty in involving subunits in organization	volunteer leaders and coordinator
Chicago-area ZPG	informal decision making and division of labor among small number of activists and coordinator	no formal membership or records	loose connections to area chapters until they declined	volunteers
Pre-1973 Chicago NOW	informal decision making by board consisting of most active members; informal creation of committees by interested members	dues-paying membership	committees form and act independently	volunteers
CWLU	decision making by steering committee and in citywide meetings of membership; many experiments with structure, attempts to involve all members	list of supporters, dues initially voluntary, later required but not always collected; anyone active in workgroup or chapter was a "member"	loosely connected workgroups and chapters that were completely autonomous	volunteers and nonprofessional, part-time staff
CWHTF	informal decision making and division of labor by small group of activists	exclusive "membership" of small group of friends	no subunits	volunteers
WORC	changing structure consisting of steering committee and various issue and work committees; attempts to rotate tasks and include all members	list of supporters; members include anyone who participates	typically not large enough for subunits; committees form and dissolve as needed	volunteers and one part-time nonprofessional staff

Table 4. Organizational Characteristics of Sample SMOs: Formalized SMOs (including SMOs in transition to formalized structure)

SMO	Decision-making Structure and Division of Labor	Membership Criteria/Records	Connections to Subunits	Leadership
Post-1973 NARAL	decision making by elected board of directors, executive committee; division of labor by function with paid staff as lobbyists, media experts, fundraisers, etc.	dues-paying membership, professional direct-mail techniques	formalized connections to affiliates; training and funds provided	professional leaders along with volunteer board
RCAR	decision making by board of directors consisting of formal representatives of denominational members; division of labor by function using paid staff	denominations that agree with principles; expectation of active involvement	financial support to affiliates that report activities annually to national organization	professional leaders together with volunteer board members
Post-1977 ZPG	decision making by board of directors and staff; division of labor by function using paid staff	dues-paying membership, professional direct mail; list of active members who participate in letter writing	some financial aid for chapter projects; formal guidelines for chapters developed	professional staff along with volunteer board
Post-1973 NOW	decision making by elected board and officers and delegates at national convention; division of labor by function using paid staff	dues-paying individuals, professional direct mail; chapters	communication with chapters established as national organization expanded staff and increased finances; state and regional organizations created to further coordination	professional leaders
Post-1977 NWHN	decision making by formally elected board of directors; division of labor using paid staff	dues-paying membership, direct mail; attempts to actively involve organizational members	organization of first official chapters	professional staff together with volunteer board
NARAL of Illinois	decision making by board of directors elected on rotating basis; division of labor among committees using paid staff	dues-paying membership plus activists	committees created to perform needed tasks	professional director together with volunteer board
Post-1976 IRCAR	formally elected Policy Council consisting of representatives from member denominations; creation of area units of activists	denominations agreeing with principles; attempts to encourage more active participation	more formalized ties to members and creation of formal area units	paid part-time director and volunteers
Post-1973 Chicago NOW	elected officers and board of directors; committees based on priorities screened by board and voted by membership; division of labor increasingly based on function using paid staff	dues-paying members plus activists	committees tightly integrated into organization, no longer autonomous	professional staff and paid officers

various functions, explicit criteria for membership, and rules governing subunits (chapters or committees). For example, the formalized SMO may have a board of directors that meets a set number of times per year to make organizational policy; an executive committee of the board that meets more frequently to make administrative decisions; staff members who are responsible for contacts with the mass media, direct mail campaigns, and so forth; chapters that report to the national organization; and an individual rank-and-file membership. As I argue below, this type of SMO structure is associated with the professionalization of leadership. In contrast, *informal* SMOs[4] have few established procedures, loose membership requirements, and minimal division of labor. Decisions in informal organizations tend to be made in an ad hoc rather than routine manner (cf. Rothschild-Whitt 1979, p. 513). The organizational structure of an informal SMO is frequently adjusted; assignments among personnel and procedures are developed to meet immediate needs. Because informal SMOs lack established procedures, individual leaders can exert an important influence on the organization; major changes in SMO structure and activities are likely to occur with changes in leadership. Any subunits of informal SMOs, such as work groups or chapters, tend to be autonomous and loosely connected to one another. Informal organizations are dominated by nonprofessional, largely volunteer, leaders.

The SMOs in my sample are classified by structure in Table 2 based on the above criteria; details explaining the classifications are provided in Table 3.[5] The major categories of formalized and informal SMOs are, of course, ideal types. In reality, some SMOs share elements of each type, often because they are in the process of changing structures. When SMOs formalize, they typically do so very gradually. Some SMOs look formalized on paper, but are informal in practice. Important differences also appear among SMOs within each of the two major categories (e.g., some are centralized and others decentralized; cf. Gamson 1975). Nevertheless, the two major types of SMOs do differ from one another in important ways discussed below.

THE IMPACT OF PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

The Initiation of Social Movements

Because professional movement activists can easily transfer their skills from one movement to another, McCarthy and Zald suggest that professional activists are likely to become entrepreneurs who start new organizations in which to work. If this is the case, an increase in movement careers should help to expand the social movement sector. Grievances can be manufactured by professional activists and SMOs, making the formation of social movements at least partially independent of overt grievances and environmental conditions (cf. Oberschall 1973, p. 158).

The McCarthy-Zald argument has been challenged on grounds of lack of evidence that professional managers and their SMOs originate insurgent challenges, although they may play a role in representing unorganized groups in more established interest group politics (Jenkins and Eckert 1986, p. 812). In the case of the civil rights movement, researchers have shown that informal indigenous SMOs initiated and led the movement (Morris 1984; Jenkins and Eckert 1986). In the case of the pro-choice movement, all of the SMOs in my sample that were active in the early movement were informal SMOs (see Table 2). The leaders who initiated SMOs that formed in the period prior to legalization were all nonprofessional leaders, mostly volunteers (see Table 3).

[4] I have used the term *informal* to describe this type of SMO structure for want of a more positive label. The terminology of the existing literature on organizations and social movements is inadequate. The term *classical* used by McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) does not describe the structure of the SMO. The more descriptive term *grass roots* implies a mass membership base that may or may not be present in either "formalized" or "informal" SMOs. The term *collectivist* used by Rothschild-Whitt (1979) refers to a specific type of decision-making structure which is distinguished from "bureaucratic" organization; not all informal SMOs are collectivist. Freeman's (1979, p. 169) term *communal* for "small, local, and functionally undifferentiated" organizations is inappropriate because not all informal SMOs are local organizations.

[5] An appendix with further details on sample SMOs is available on request from the author.

Table 5. Consequences of SMOs: Informal Organizations

SMO	Maintenance/Expansion/Decline	Major Strategies and Tactics	Coalition Work
Pre-1973 NARAL	23 organizational members in states, 500–2,000 individual members, 1–2 staff, budgets of $30–70,000	demonstrations, support for abortion referral services, coordination of state lobbying campaigns, encouragement of litigation	minor participation in short-lived coalitions
Pre-1977 ZPG	high of 400 affiliates, 35,000 members in early 1970s; drop to about 60 affiliates, 8,500 members with budget of $350,000 in mid-70s	demonstrations, abortion referral work, state legislative lobbying, educational activities prior to 1973; Congressional lobbying, educational work after 1973	staff support for Congressional lobbying coalition after 1973
Pre-1973 NOW	initial membership of 1,200 individuals, 14 chapters; budget of $7,000 in 1967	participation in demonstrations on abortion	minor participation in short-lived coalitions
Pre-1977 NWHN	initial participation of about 50 activists	support for local demonstrations	no active participation
R2N2	50–90 affiliates, high budget of $50,000; dissolution in 1984 due to lack of resources	demonstrations; grassroots organizing; petition campaign against Hyde Amendment; educational work	experienced great difficulty in attempts to participate in lobbying coalition, lack of communication with other SMOs in coalition
ICMCA/ARA	active core of 30–35, part-time director, mailing list of about 700 contributors up until about 1976, when organization declined to about 60 paying members	demonstrations, state legislative lobbying, encouragement of litigation, educational activities prior to 1973; continued state legislative lobbying, Congressional letter-writing campaigns, educational work until decline in 1976	minor participation in largely unsuccessful pre-1973 coalition and short-lived 1977 coalition
Pre-1977 IRCAR	small core of activists; initial budget of $2,500, 8 denominational members, volunteer director through 1976	participation in demonstrations; lobbying in state legislature, letter-writing campaigns to Congress, educational activities	no major coalition work
Chicago-area ZPG	high of about 11 area chapters, low of 3 and small core of activists in early 1970s; largely inactive after 1973 with exception of failed attempt to revive the organization in 1977	participation in ICMCA demonstrations, lobbying activities prior to 1973; inactive after early 1970s	minor participation in largely unsuccessful pre-1973 coalition; endorsement of coalition activities in 1977 prior to dissolving
Pre-1973 Chicago NOW	about 20 active members, a few hundred paying members in early 1970s	participation in demonstrations, support for abortion referral work and support for ICMCA lobbying work by head of abortion committee	participation in short-lived coalitions
CWLU	200–300 active members, numerous chapters and work groups, mailing list of 900 by 1971; greatly reduced active membership and number of chapters and work groups by mid-70s; formally dissolved in 1977	demonstrations, illegal abortion service, educational work prior to 1973; community organizing project to improve access to abortion after legalization, pickets and meetings to pressure providers, formation of Health Evaluation and Referral Service to rate abortion clinics and influence standards of service delivery; decline in activity by 1975–76	participation in largely unsuccessful attempts at coalition work prior to 1973
CWHTF	never more than about 15 active members, dissolved in 1979	demonstrations, educational work to fight Medicaid funding cutoff in 1977	participation in short-lived coalition in 1977 characterized by a great deal of conflict
WORC	high of about 30 active members in late 1970s, decline to about 10 active members in early 1980s; 100–150 paying members	demonstrations, petition campaigns around Medicaid funding cutoffs and closing of public hospital abortion facility, educational work	experienced great difficulty in attempts to participate in Illinois Pro-Choice Alliance, eventually became inactive in coalition

Table 6. Consequences of SMO Structure: Formalized Organizations (including SMOs in transition to formalized structure)

SMO	Maintenance/Expansion/Decline	Major Strategies and Tactics	Coalition Work
Post-1973 NARAL	10,000 members, 4–8 staff, budget reaches $200,000 by 1976; 40 state affiliates, 140,000 members, 25 staff, budget reaches $3 million by 1983	Congressional lobbying, litigation from 1973 on; campaign work, PAC contributions, grassroots organizing beginning in late 1970s	began working in Congressional lobbying coalition in 1973; leadership role in lobbying coalition by mid- to late 1970s
RCAR	began with 24 organizational members, 13 affiliates, several staff, budget of $100,000; 31 organizational members and 28 affiliates, 8–10 staff and budget of $700,000 by 1983	educational work, Congressional lobbying since 1973; increased local organizing in late 1970s	began working in Congressional lobbying coalition in 1973; leadership role in lobbying coalition by mid- to late 1970s
Post-1977 ZPG	about 20 affiliates, 12,000 members, budget of $650,000	Congressional lobbying	cooperation in letter-writing campaigns in response to alerts from coalition leaders
Post-1973 NOW	40,000 members, 700 chapters by 1974; budget of $500,000 by 1976; membership reaches 250,000, budget reaches $6,500,000 by 1983	Congressional lobbying work, educational work after 1973; political campaign work and PAC contributions by late 1970s	participation in Congressional lobbying coalition
Post-1977 NWHN	membership of 300 organizations, 13,000 individuals, budget of $300,000 by 1983	educational work; Congressional testimony	participation in Congressional lobbying coalition
NARAL of Illinois	high of 200 active members, 4,000 paying members, budget of $80,000, full-time director and 3–4 part-time staff in early 1980s	legislative lobbying in late 1970s combined with political campaign work in early 1980s	participation in coalitions in late 1970s; leadership role in Illinois Pro-Choice Alliance
Post-1976 IRCAR	mailing list of 600–15,000, 13 denominational members, part-time paid director, budget high of $10,000	legislative lobbying, educational work; expansion of state organizing efforts in 1980s	participation in coalitions in late 1970s; increased role in 1980s
Post-1973 Chicago NOW	about 500 paying members, budget of $10,000 in mid-1970s; about 50 active members, 3,000 paying members, budget of $175,000 by 1984	legislative lobbying and political campaign work in late 1970s and 1980s	participation in lobbying coalition in late 1970s and 1980s

Professional managers may act as entrepreneurs in creating SMOs (as opposed to movements and collective action), but my data, together with cases from the literature, suggest that professionals are less likely than nonprofessionals to act as entrepreneurs. When professionals do initiate movement organizations, they are likely to be formalized rather than informal SMOs. Common Cause, for example, was initiated by a professional manager who created a formalized organization (see McFarland 1984). Many community organizations, which are often created by professional leaders, are also formally organized (see Delgado 1986). In my sample only the national Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights (RCAR) was initiated by individuals who might be called professional leaders; they included a staff member of the United Methodist Board of Church and Society. All of the other SMOs in my sample were initially organized by nonprofessional activists as informal SMOs (see Tables 2, 3, and 4). Significantly, RCAR is also distinctive in that it originated as a formalized organization to mobilize existing organizations for institutionalized tactics (e.g., lobbying Congress) in a period when the movement as a whole was becoming more established.[6]

Given the lack of evidence that movement professionals initiate movements and informal SMOs, it is necessary to reconsider the relationship between the roles of movement "professional" and movement "entrepreneur." McCarthy and Zald suggest that, in response to the availability of resources, movement professionals become movement entrepreneurs, initiating movement activities and organizations because they are career activists looking for preferences to mobilize. Although no systematic evidence on the entrepreneurial activities of professional and nonprofessional leaders has been collected, my data indicate that the roles of "entrepreneur" and "professional" are, in some cases, distinct (cf. Roche and Sachs 1965).

An example of a nonprofessional entrepreneur in the abortion movement is Lawrence Lader, a writer and family planning advocate who published a book (Lader 1966) reporting on the large number of abortions being performed by licensed physicians in the U.S. and advocating legal abortion. After his research was published, Lader was inundated with requests for the names of doctors from women seeking abortions. He began to make referrals to women and then announced his referral service publicly as a strategy intended "to stir as much controversy and debate as possible while bringing the facts to the public" (Lader 1973, p. xi). Lader played a role in getting others to employ this strategy, including the clergy who founded the Clergy Consultation Services on Abortion (see Carmen and Moody 1973). He later helped to found NARAL in 1969 and, more recently, founded another organization, the Abortion Rights Mobilization. Although remaining intensely interested in abortion and related family planning issues, Lader has not made a professional career out of his movement work; he continued to pursue his career as a writer while playing an entrepreneurial role in the movement.

Examples of nonentrepreneurial professionals in the pro-choice movement who have moved among established movement and political positions include Karen Mulhauser, an executive director of NARAL who became the executive director of Citizens Against Nuclear War after leaving NARAL in 1981. The NARAL director who succeeded her, Nanette Falkenberg, had previously been involved in union organizing work. In Illinois, the first professional leader of NARAL of Illinois was involved in community organizing work before taking the position of NARAL executive director and became a staff member of a political campaign after leaving NARAL.

These examples suggest that different factors may be responsible for the creation of two distinct roles. Movement entrepreneurs, the initiators of movement organizations and activities, may become paid activists who benefit from the existence of the same resources that support professional managers, but they typically do not make careers out of moving from one cause to another and they may never find paid positions that suit them. Rather, they found movement organizations and initiate tactics for the same reasons that other constituents join them. That is, they have personal experiences and ideological commitments which make them interested in

[6] The distinction between such formalized SMOs and interest groups or lobbies is not a sharp one (cf. Useem and Zald 1982). There is clearly a need for greater conceptual clarification of the differences between formalized SMOs and interest groups based on empirical research.

the particular issue(s) of the movement. They are also tied into the social networks and preexisting organizational structures that allow the movement to mobilize and are influenced by environmental developments (e.g., legalization of abortion in 1973) that make movement issues salient and provide opportunities for action (cf. Oliver 1983).

Professional managers, on the other hand, are not likely to be the initiators of social movements. They make careers out of service to SMOs and are often hired to come into SMOs that already have formal structures or are in the process of becoming formalized. Professional leaders are likely to care very much about the cause of the SMO—even if they aren't initially motivated out of particular concern for the issue(s) of the SMO. However, professionals' concerns with the particular causes of SMOs are part of their more general concern for a range of issues—the orientation toward social activism that made them choose a professional reform career.

Professionalization and the Formalization of SMOs

Not only are movement entrepreneur and professional distinct roles, but movement entrepreneurs and other nonprofessionals are likely to differ from professional managers in their organizational structure preferences. While McCarthy and Zald (1977) suggest that movement entrepreneurs create "professional" SMOs, my data support the argument that movement entrepreneurs prefer informal structures and may resist creation of formalized SMOs run by professional leaders. The professionalization of social movements (i.e., the rise of career leadership) is associated with the formalization of SMOs for two reasons: (1) professional managers tend to formalize the organizations that they lead; and (2) the SMOs that have the resources to hire professional managers are those with formalized structures.

Movement entrepreneurs prefer informal structures that enable them to maintain personal control. As the analogy to business entrepreneurs suggests, movement entrepreneurs are risk-takers (cf. Oliver 1983) who initiate movement organizations without certainty of success, just as capitalist entrepreneurs risk investment in new products. Like capitalist entrepreneurs, movement entrepreneurs are likely to be personally involved in the enterprise, desiring personal control over decision making because they have taken the risks to establish an organization or movement. In contrast to the professional manager who brings skills to an organization and expects to operate within an established structure, movement entrepreneurs may try to prevent the creation of an organizational structure in which decision making is routinized and, therefore, less subject to personal control.

The history of leadership in NARAL, which was founded in 1969 as the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws, reveals that conflict between entrepreneurial leadership and formalization occurs in some circumstances. NARAL founders were not professional movement organizers in the sense of being career movement activists; rather, they were persons who had become dedicated to the cause of legal abortion as a result of their prior experiences, primarily in the family planning and population movements that provided the most important organizational bases for the rise of the single-issue abortion movement (see Staggenborg 1985). Because the decision-making structure was informal (see Table 3), a movement entrepreneur who became chairman of the executive committee exerted a large amount of control over the organization; as he commented in a 1984 interview about his own style of leadership:

> Let's face it. . . . I don't believe in endless meetings, I like to make quick decisions. Maybe I acted unilaterally sometimes, although I was always careful to check with the executive committee. Some people objected to my calling [other members of the executive committee] and getting their approval on the phone. [But] we couldn't meet, we had to move fast, so I polled the exec committee around the country by phone. (Personal interview)

Although there were some disagreements among NARAL executive committee members in the pre-1973 years, the informal decision-making structure seems to have worked fairly well at a time when the movement was very young, abortion was illegal in most states, and it was necessary to act quickly to take advantage of opportunities for action and to meet crises (e.g., the arrests of leaders involved in abortion referral activities).

After legalization, however, conflict over the decision-making structure occurred as NARAL attempted to establish itself as a lobbying force in Washington and to expand by organizing state affiliates. At this point, there was a power struggle within the organization between long-time leaders and entrepreneurs of NARAL and newer activists who objected to "power being concentrated in the hands of a few men in New York City" and who supported having persons "who are doing the work of the field—the State Coordinators" on the board (documents in NARAL of Illinois papers; University of Illinois at Chicago). The latter faction won a critical election in 1974 resulting in a turnover of leadership on the NARAL executive committee. Although the executive committee remained the decision-making body of the organization, practices such as the use of proxy votes and phone calls to make important decisions were discontinued (personal interview with 1974 NARAL executive director), resulting in more formalized decision-making procedures that involved more activists at different levels. Another major change that occurred at this point was that for the first time the executive director and other paid staff became more important than the nonprofessional entrepreneurs as NARAL leaders. It was only with the defeat of movement entrepreneurs as organizational leaders that NARAL began to formalize and eventually grew into a large organization capable of acting in institutionalized arenas.[7]

If movement entrepreneurs interfere with the formalization of SMOs, as this case suggests, professional managers encourage formalization. While informal structures are associated with nonprofessional leadership, all of the organizations in my sample that have moved toward a more formal structure have done so under the leadership of professional managers (see Tables 3 and 4). Although further study of the leadership styles of professional managers compared to nonprofessional SMO leaders is necessary, my data suggest some reasons why professional managers tend to formalize the SMOs that they lead. Insofar as a bureaucratic or formalized structure is associated with organizational maintenance (Gamson 1975), professional leaders have a strong motivation to promote formalization: ongoing resources are needed to pay the salary of the professional manager. However, the motivation to promote financial stability is also shared by nonprofessional staff who are dependent on their income from the SMO position; moreover, it is possible to secure stable funding by means other than formalization. It is also important that professional managers are interested in using and developing organizing skills and expanding

[7] The conflict between entrepreneurial and professional roles also became apparent to me when I interviewed the anti-abortion leader Joseph Scheidler as part of another study. Scheidler helped to form several anti-abortion groups and was fired as executive director from two organizations for engaging in militant direct-action tactics without going through the proper organizational channels (see Roeser 1983). He finally founded his own organization in 1980, the Pro-Life Action League, in which he is unencumbered by bureaucratic decision-making procedures. As he told me in a 1981 interview:

> I don't like boards of directors—you always have to check with them when you want to do something—and I was always getting in trouble with the board. So I resigned, or they fired me, however you want to put it, because they didn't like my tactics. . . . The Pro-Life Action League is my organization. I'm the chairman of the board and the other two board members are my wife and my best friend. If I want to do something, I call up my wife and ask her if she thinks it's a good idea. Then I have two-thirds approval of the board! (Personal interview)

Additional examples of such conflict between the entrepreneurial and professional roles in the social movements literature can be cited. In the farm worker movement, there has been conflict over the leadership of Cesar Chavez, who attempted to maintain personal control over the United Farm Workers at a time when others wanted to create a more bureaucratic union structure (see Barr 1985; Jenkins 1985a, pp. 204–6). In the gay rights movement, the "brash" activist Randy Wicker left the New York Mattachine Society to found "the Homosexual League of New York, a one-man organization designed to give him a free hand to pursue his own plans" (D'Emilio 1983, pp. 158–59). In the environmental movement, Friends of the Earth founder David Brower was ousted from the organization after he failed in his attempts to maintain control over the SMO and prevent it from becoming formalized (Rauber 1986). And in Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), there has been conflict over the role of MADD's entrepreneur, Candy Lightner, who has attempted to maintain personal control over a bureaucratizing organization (Reinarman 1985).

the SMOs they lead because this is what they do for a career. A formalized structure, with its developed division of labor, enables the professional manager to achieve a degree of organizational development not possible in informal SMOs.

The case of the Abortion Rights Association of Illinois (formerly Illinois Citizens for the Medical Control of Abortion and later NARAL of Illinois) reveals the role of professional leadership in the creation of organizational stability and bureaucracy. From 1970 to 1976, ICMCA/ARA was led by a nonprofessional director who was paid a small salary, but who volunteered much of her time and was often not paid on time due to financial problems of the organization. She was extremely effective, but did not create a structure such that others could easily carry on her work. Rather, organizational activities were carried out by force of her personality.[8] Moreover, volunteer efforts were channeled into instrumental tactics like lobbying, and little emphasis was placed on organizational maintenance activities such as fundraising. When she resigned in early 1976, ARA entered a period of severe decline due to inept leadership and neglect of organizational maintenance.

A new director hired in 1978 was the first to develop a stable source of financial resources for the SMO. Although not a professional manager, the new director was highly motivated to secure funding because, unlike the previous directors, she was a graduate student who did not have a husband who made enough money to support her while she volunteered her time. She needed the money from the job and did not intend to work as a volunteer when there was not enough money to pay her salary (about $11,000 a year for part-time work) as had previous directors. Consequently, she set about trying to figure out how to bring a stable income to the organization. She eventually was able to do so by personally convincing the owners of a number of abortion clinics in the city to make monthly financial contributions to NARAL (personal interview with 1978–80 NARAL of Illinois director). Thus, it was important that the leader of Illinois NARAL was someone who, while not a career activist, did need to be paid and was therefore motivated to provide the organization with financial stability. However, the financial stability was based on the personal appeal of the organization's director; the contributions from clinics were received as a result of personal relationships with clinic owners established by the NARAL director. After she left NARAL and a new director replaced her in the fall of 1980, the organization lost these contributions and went through a period of budget tightening.

It was not until the first career professional took over leadership of NARAL of Illinois that the organization became more formalized and less dependent on the personal characteristics of its leaders. The director hired in 1980, who stayed with NARAL until 1983, was a young woman who had previously done community organizing work and who, unlike her predecessor, wanted a career in "organizing." She did not have any experience working on the abortion issue prior to being hired as the director of Illinois NARAL, but saw the job as a good experience for her, a way to develop her own skills and enhance her career objectives. Like other leaders, the professional manager was highly committed to the goals of the movement, both because of pro-choice views formed prior to directing NARAL and because of her experiences in working with NARAL. But the professional director's orientation to her job led her to make important changes in the structure of the organization.

Until Illinois NARAL's first professional manager took over, the board of directors was selected from the same pool of long-time activists, many of whom were highly involved in other organizations like Planned Parenthood and not very active in ARA/NARAL. Consequently, there was little division of labor in the organization and it was heavily reliant on the abilities of its executive director. When she was hired in 1980, the new director insisted that the board

[8] By all accounts this leader had an extraordinary ability to recruit volunteers for various tasks. As one of my informants explained, "She was really effective at getting people to do things. She would keep after you so that it was easier to do what she wanted rather than have her continue to bug you." Another activist concurred, "There was nothing like having her call you at 7AM and tell you what you were going to do that day!" The problem of reliance on the personal characteristics of this director was later recognized by a board member who commented that the problem with the long-time director was that she kept knowledge about the organization "in HER head" (document in private papers), making it difficult for her successor to assume control.

selection procedures be revised so that active new volunteer recruits could serve on the board and so that the terms of service on the board were systematically rotated. This procedure was implemented in 1980, resulting in a board composed of active volunteers along with some old board members who continued to serve on a rotating basis to provide experience to NARAL. The result was that a formal procedure for bringing new and active members into the decision-making structure of the organization was established for the first time. This change was important in making the organization less exclusively dependent on its executive director for leadership. It also made volunteers more available to the executive director for use in organizational maintenance activities, such as the NARAL "house meeting" program,[9] which provided an important source of funds to the SMO in the early 1980s. In Illinois NARAL and in other SMOs (see Table 4), formalization occurred as professional managers took over leadership. Once a formalized structure is in place, SMOs are better able to mobilize resources and continue to hire professional staff (see below).

THE CONSEQUENCES OF FORMALIZATION

The Maintenance of Social Movement Organizations

While informal movement organizations may be necessary to initiate movements, formalized SMOs do not necessarily defuse protest as Piven and Cloward (1977) argue; rather, they often perform important functions (e.g., lobbying) following victories won by informal SMOs (Jenkins and Eckert 1986, p. 827). And, while informal SMOs may be necessary to create the pressure for elite patronage, formalized SMOs are the usual beneficiaries of foundation funding and other elite contributions (Haines 1984; Jenkins 1985b; Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Consequently, formalized SMOs are able to maintain themselves—and the movement—over a longer period of time than are informal SMOs. This is particularly important in periods such as the one following legalization of abortion, when movement issues are less pressing and mobilization of constituents is more difficult.

Jenkins (1985b, p. 10) argues that one of the reasons that formalized SMOs are able to sustain themselves is that foundations prefer dealing with organizations that have professional leaders and "the fiscal and management devices that foundations have often expected of their clients." In the case of the civil rights movement, foundations "selected the new organizations that became permanent features of the political landscape" through their funding choices (Jenkins 1985b, p. 15). It is important to recognize, however, that this selection process is a two-way street. Formalized SMOs do not just passively receive support from foundations and other elite constituents; they actively solicit these resources. They are able to do so because they have organizational structures and professional staff that facilitate the mobilization of elite resources. Most importantly, professional staff are likely to have the know-how necessary to secure funding (e.g., grant-writing skills and familiarity with procedures for securing tax-exempt status).

The ability of formalized SMOs to obtain foundation funding is part of a broader capacity for organizational maintenance superior to that of informal SMOs. Paid staff and leaders are critical to the maintenance of formalized SMOs because they can be relied on to be present to carry out tasks such as ongoing contact with the press and fundraising in a routine manner. A formalized structure ensures that there will be continuity in the performance of maintenance tasks and that the SMO will be prepared to take advantage of elite preferences and environmental opportunities (cf. Gamson 1975). Of course, volunteers might well have the skills to perform such tasks, and some informal SMOs do maintain themselves for a number of years, even in adverse environmental conditions (cf. Rupp and Taylor 1987). However, it is much more difficult to command the necessary time from volunteer activists on an ongoing basis. When informal SMOs do survive for many years, they are likely to remain small and exclusive, as was the case for the National Women's Party studied by Rupp and Taylor (1987) and Women Organized for Reproductive Choice in my sample (see Table 5).

The superior ability of formalized SMOs to maintain themselves is documented by the

[9] The "house meeting" tactic, which involved holding meetings in the homes of NARAL members or other interested persons, was a recruitment tool developed as part of a national NARAL grassroots organizing program.

experiences of organizations in my sample (see Tables 5 and 6). On the national level, all of the surviving pro-choice organizations have at least moved in the direction of formalization (see Table 2). The one organization that did not do so, the Reproductive Rights National Network, was formed in a period of intense constituent interest in the abortion issue created by events such as passage of the Hyde Amendment cutoff of Medicaid funding of abortion in late 1976 and the election of anti-abortion president Ronald Reagan in 1980, but was unable to maintain itself after this period. On the local level, the movement industry declined in the period after legalization due to the lack of formalized SMOs (see Tables 2 and 5). The exception was Chicago NOW, which was moving toward formalization but which was concentrating its energies on the Equal Rights Amendment rather than on the abortion issue. In the period after the environmental stimulus of the Hyde Amendment, the local pro-choice SMOs that became stable were those that began to formalize. Among informal SMOs, only Women Organized for Reproductive Choice (WORC) has survived and it has remained a small organization. Thus, on both the national and local levels, formalized SMOs have been stable organizations that helped to sustain the movement during lulls in visible movement activity brought about by environmental developments.

Not only do formalized SMOs help keep a movement alive in periods when constituents become complacent, such as that following legalization of abortion, but they are prepared to take advantage of opportunities for mobilization when the environment changes. In the late 1970s, when the anti-abortion movement scored its first major victories, including the cutoff of Medicaid funding for abortions, adherents and constituents were alerted by visible threats to legal abortion, and the ability of the pro-choice movement to mobilize was greatly enhanced. However, it was important not only that the environment was conducive to mobilization but also that the pro-choice movement had formalized organizations that were stable and ready for combat (cf. Gamson 1975). In NARAL, professional leaders were available with the skills and know-how necessary to form a political action committee, launch a highly successful direct-mail drive, create an educational arm, obtain foundation grants, and organize state affiliates.

In contrast to the success of NARAL and other formalized SMOs in mobilizing resources (see Table 6), informal movement organizations were not as prepared to take advantage of constituent concerns in the late 1970s. The Reproductive Rights National Network (known as R2N2), an informal SMO formed in the late 1970s, received a donation of money to undertake a direct-mail campaign during this period, but the attempt to raise money and recruit activists in this manner was unsuccessful because activists in the organization's national office did not have the experience to carry out the program properly (personal interviews with 1980–83 R2N2 coordinator and steering committee member). There might have been local activists in the organization with direct-mail skills who could have directed this campaign, but in this instance, and in others, the informal structure of the organization made access to such skills difficult to obtain. As one steering committee member commented in an interview, R2N2 suffered from "the classic leadership problem"—the difficulty of trying to get people "to do what they are supposed to do" and the problem of "no one being around" to coordinate work—that has long affected the "younger branch" of the women's movement (see Freeman 1975) of which R2N2 was a descendent. Ultimately, this structural problem led to the demise of R2N2 after the period of heightened constituent interest in abortion ended.[10]

Formalized SMOs, then, are able tomaintain themselves during periods when it is difficult to mobilize support and are consequently ready to expand when the environ-

[10] The delay experienced by Women Organized for Reproductive Choice in obtaining the 501(c)3 tax status that allows a nonprofit organization to obtain tax-deductible contributions also reveals the difficulties that informal SMOs have with organizational maintenance. Although there were several local Chicago foundations willing to fund organizations such as WORC, the SMO was unable to take advantage of these opportunities for some time because it had not obtained the necessary tax status. When I asked WORC's sole part-time, nonprofessional staff leader why the tax status had not been obtained, she replied that the delay occurred because she was the only one who knew how to apply for the status, but that she simply had not had the time to do it yet.

ment becomes more conducive. An important reason for this is that they have paid leaders who create stability because they can be relied on to perform ongoing tasks necessary to organizational maintenance. However, stability is not simply a matter of having paid activists; it is also important that formalized SMOs have structures that ensure that tasks are performed despite a turnover in personnel. It is the combination of formalized structure and professional leadership that facilitates organizational maintenance in SMOs.

Strategies and Tactics

While Piven and Cloward (1977) appear to be mistaken in their claim that formalized SMOs necessarily hasten the end of mass movements, their argument that formalization leads to a decline in militant direct-action tactics remains important. Formalization does affect the strategic and tactical choices of SMOs. First, formalized SMOs tend to engage in institutionalized tactics and typically do not initiate disruptive direct-action tactics. Second, formalized SMOs are more likely than informal SMOs to engage in activities that help to achieve organizational maintenance and expansion as well as influence on external targets.

Formalization and institutionalized tactics. The association between formalization and institutionalization of strategies and tactics occurs for two reasons: (1) As environmental developments push a movement into institutionalized arenas, SMOs often begin to formalize so they can engage in tactics such as legislative lobbying (cf. Cable 1984). Formalization allows SMOs to maintain the routines necessary for such tactics (e.g., ongoing contacts with legislators) through paid staff and an established division of labor. (2) Once SMOs are formalized, institutionalized tactics are preferred because they are more compatible with a formalized structure and with the schedules of professional activists. For example, institutionalized activities can be approved in advance; the amount and type of resources expended for such efforts can be controlled; and activities can be planned for the normal hours of the professional's working day.

The history of the pro-choice movement clearly reveals that formalization accelerated as environmental events forced the movement into institutionalized arenas. Prior to 1973, the movement to legalize abortion was an outsider to established politics. Although institutionalized tactics were employed in this period, no SMO confined its activities to institutionalized arenas; demonstrations and quasi-legal or illegal abortion-referral activities were common tactics (see Table 5).[11] After legalization in 1973, the arena for the abortion conflict switched to Congress and SMOs like NARAL began to formalize in order to act in that arena. After the Hyde amendment was passed in 1976, the political arena became the primary battlefield for the abortion conflict, and formalization of SMOs within the movement accelerated. Although informal SMOs in my sample did engage in some institutionalized tactics, the organizations that sustained a heavy use of tactics such as legislative lobbying and political campaign work were most commonly formalized SMOs (see Tables 5 and 6). It is possible for informal SMOs to engage in such tactics, but only as long as the leaders of the organization have the necessary know-how and other organizational resources. Formalized organizations are able to maintain such activities, despite changes in leadership, due to their structural division of labor.

Environmental forces and events, including countermovement activities, do place strong constraints on the tactics of SMOs. When environmental events call for nonroutine direct-action tactics, informal movement organizations typically play a critical role in initiating these tactics (Jenkins and Eckert 1986). In the case of the civil rights movement, for example, Morris (1984) shows that the formalized NAACP preferred to focus on legal and educational tactics, while informal SMOs were engaging in direct-action tactics. However, even the NAACP engaged in some direct-action tactics through its youth divisions at a time when it was clear that progress could only be made through tactics such as the sit-ins initiated by informal SMOs.

When formalized SMOs do engage in direct-action tactics, however, they are likely to be nondisruptive, planned versions of the

[11] Abortion-referral activities were regarded by many activists as a militant means of challenging the system (see Lader 1973). In the case of women's movement projects such as the CWLU Abortion Counseling Service, there was an attempt to create an alternative type of organization as well as to serve the needs of women.

tactics. NARAL's use of the "speak-out" tactic in the period following 1983 provides some evidence on this point. This was a period when the pro-choice movement was beginning to take the offensive in the legislative and political arenas, particularly after anti-abortion forces failed in their attempt to pass a Human Life Bill through Congress in 1982 and the Supreme Court delivered a ruling in 1983 that struck down most of the restrictions on abortion that had been passed by state and local legislatures. The anti-abortion movement responded to these developments by forcing a switch away from the institutionalized arenas, in which pro-choice forces were beginning to gain the upper hand, to public relations tactics such as the film *The Silent Scream*.[12] As a result of media coverage that began to focus on the issue of fetal rights (cf. Kalter 1985), pro-choice organizations such as NARAL were forced to respond. NARAL chose to employ a version of the speak-out tactic originated by women's liberation groups in the late 1960s. Originally, the speak-out was a spontaneous type of public forum at which women spoke out about their experiences as women, relating their own stories about illegal abortions and so forth. NARAL's version of this tactic was a planned one; to focus media and public attention on women rather than on the fetus, NARAL asked women around the country to write letters about their experiences with abortion addressed to President Reagan and other elected officials and send the letters to NARAL and its affiliates. The letters were then read at public forums on a scheduled day. This case suggests that formalized organizations can switch from tactics in institutionalized arenas to other tactics when necessary, but the tactics they choose are likely to be orderly versions of direct-action tactics originated by informal SMOs.

Formalization and organizational maintenance tactics. Not only are the tactics of formalized SMOs typically institutionalized, but they are also frequently geared toward organizational maintenance and expansion, in addition to more instrumental goals. This was certainly the case for NARAL and its affiliates, which embarked on a "grassroots organizing" strategy known as "Impact '80," intended to expand NARAL, and its political influence, in the late 1970s (see, for example, *NARAL News,* November 1978). It was also the case for NOW, which engaged in a number of high-profile tactics around abortion that were used in membership appeals in the 1980s (see, for example, *National NOW Times,* September/October 1979). In Chicago NOW, there was explicit discussion of the membership-expanding potential of the abortion issue in the late 1970s and early 1980s (personal interview with Chicago NOW executive director).

The experiences of organizations in my sample suggest that professional leaders play an important role in influencing organizations to adopt tactics that aid organizational maintenance. In several organizations, professional staff were responsible for undertaking direct-mail campaigns that helped to expand the organization. In NARAL, an experienced director who took over in 1974 began a direct-mail campaign that was later expanded by other professional leaders (personal interviews with 1974–75 and 1975–81 NARAL executive directors). In the NWHN, an executive director succeeded in expanding organizational membership in the late 1970s through direct mail despite the concerns of nonprofessional leaders that direct mail would bring uncommitted members into the organization (personal interviews with NWHN board members). In ZPG, a professional manager was responsible for reversing the decline in individual membership in the organization through direct mail after he finally convinced the nonprofessional leaders on the ZPG board to undertake the campaign (personal interview with 1976–80 ZPG executive director).

The case of Illinois NARAL is particularly valuable in revealing the role of professional leaders in advancing strategies that aid organizational expansion. In the early 1980s, the NARAL affiliate made important changes in its strategies and tactics, switching from an emphasis on legislative lobbying to heavy involvement in political campaign work. This switch was part of the national NARAL Impact '80 program, which began to be implemented by Illinois NARAL in 1979. However, it was not until the early 1980s,

[12] *The Silent Scream* attempted to use sonography to make its case that the fetus suffers pain in an abortion. The film was distributed to members of Congress and received a great deal of media attention, helping to shift the debate on abortion to "scientific" issues.

after a professional manager took over, that Illinois NARAL really became committed to the new tactics, which included political campaign work and workshops to train volunteers, house meetings to recruit new members, and an "I'm Pro-Choice and I Vote" postcard campaign.

One reason why the switch in mobilization tactics occurred after 1980 was that the national NARAL organization had by this time become much better organized in implementing the grassroots organizing program through training and grants to local affiliates (see Table 4). As the national organization became more formalized, it was able to extend more aid through its bureaucratic structure to affiliates and to exert more influence over their tactics. In fact, NARAL affiliates signed formal contracts in exchange for national funds to carry out programs in the early 1980s. The other reason was that there were important differences in the state of the organization and in the orientations of the Illinois NARAL directors who served from 1978–1980 and from 1980–1983, which resulted in different strategies and tactics.

Because ARA was in a state of decline when she was hired in 1978 (see Table 5), the new director spent much of her time in administrative tasks; securing funding, renewing contacts with members, and organizing the office. Due to her organizational skills and attractive personal style, she was highly successful at reviving the organization. In doing so, she used the skills of constituents but did not create a formalized organization. NARAL's strategies and tactics were determined solely by the pragmatic and instrumental approach of the 1978–80 executive director. Rather than concentrating on bringing large numbers of activists into the organization, she recruited volunteers with particular skills, including her friends, for specific tasks. Tactics were aimed less at gaining exposure for NARAL than at accomplishing specific objectives. For example, when a Chicago alderman moved to introduce an ordinance in the city council restricting the availability of abortions, the NARAL director worked to have the measure killed through quiet, behind-the-scenes maneuvers. In this instance and in lobbying work in the state legislature, she made use of the skills and influence of seasoned activists.

Due to her success with such tactics and her lack of concern with organizational expansion, the 1978–80 director was not sold on the national NARAL "Impact '80" program, which was intended to expand NARAL and make the organization a visible political force. In accordance with the national organization's wishes, she tried to implement the program, conducting a limited number of house meetings. But she remained unconvinced of their effectiveness, preferring more efficient methods of fundraising and recruitment. She had similar objections to other parts of the national NARAL grassroots organizing program. When I asked her about the political skills workshops, she replied:

> I refused to do those political skills workshops. I didn't have time, I said [to national NARAL], I'm doing the house meetings program—that's enough. I really just didn't think they were necessary—there are enough organizations like the League of Women Voters which do political skills training. From an organizational point of view, I guess it's good to do your own skills training to show that the organization is really involved. (Personal interview)

Although she recognized the organizational value of such tactics, this director was not primarily concerned with organizational expansion, but with more specific goals, such as defeating particular pieces of anti-abortion legislation. She was accustomed to using individual skills for this work rather than mobilizing large numbers of activists. When asked about campaign work, she replied:

> I do think the "I'm Pro-Choice and I Vote" [postcard campaign] was important in getting the message across to legislators and candidates in a public way. I put a lot of emphasis on [abortion] clinics for post cards because there was a ready-made setting for getting people to sign them. . . . As far as the campaign work, it was clear to me at the time that Reagan was going to be elected. It was too late in 1980 to make a difference. And, on the local level, there are already liberal groups . . . that almost always support pro-choice candidates anyway. . . . I'm just not that much on duplicating efforts which I think NARAL is doing with the campaign work. (Personal interview)

As these comments indicate, the 1978–80 Illinois NARAL director preferred instrumental tactics rather than organizing tactics as a result of her background and experiences. She saw the house meetings as an inefficient way to raise money, and, while she recognized that political-skills workshops and campaign work were good for organizational visibility,

she was not convinced of their effectiveness for achieving movement goals—her primary concern. She used the "I'm Pro-Choice and I Vote" postcards as a signal to legislators rather than as an organizing tool. Due to her influence, most of Illinois NARAL's activities during her tenure were instrumentally targeted at state legislators.

It was not until an executive director with experience in community organizing work and with ambitions for a movement career was hired in 1980 that the Illinois NARAL affiliate enthusiastically implemented the national NARAL grassroots organizing program. In contrast to her predecessor, who had no interest in organizing *per se,* the new director was anxious to engage in "organizing" work to expand the local affiliate and eagerly began to develop the house meeting program that was part of the national NARAL organizing strategy. One of the reasons that she was successful in doing so was that, as described above, she created a more formalized organization. Whereas her predecessor had been reluctant to delegate certain tasks, including speaking at house meetings, the new director made heavy use of a division of labor that had not existed in the previously informal SMO. Aided by her past experience with community organizing, she was highly successful at training volunteers to conduct house meetings and, with funds raised from the meetings and some financial aid from national NARAL, was able to hire an organizer to run the house meeting program, thereby increasing the division of labor in the SMO.

The new director's strategic approach was clearly influenced by her professional interest in organizing tactics. She used the NARAL house meeting program to raise money, but also as a means of bringing new activists into the NARAL organization. And just as the house meetings were used as an organizing tool, so were the NARAL postcards. As the NARAL director explained:

> The best thing about the postcards was that they gave us new contacts. We would set up tables in different places and people would come up and sign and say things like "I'm really glad someone is doing something about this issue." And then we'd say, "Would you like to get more involved?" and we got a number of activists that way. We also got names for a mailing list. . . . So the postcards were good as a way of making contacts, a means of exposure for the organization. The actual effect of the postcards on legislators was, I think, minimal. I know some of the legislators never even opened the envelope; when we delivered an envelope-full to Springfield, they'd just throw them away. (Personal interview)

Thus, Illinois NARAL employed tactics oriented toward organizational goals after moving toward formalization. This local case history suggests that professional leaders may be more likely than nonprofessional staff and volunteers to influence SMOs to engage in tactics that have organizational maintenance functions rather than strictly instrumental goals because they have organizational skills that they want to use and develop.

Coalition Work

The formalization of social movement organizations also has implications for coalition work within movements. In my sample, formalized SMOs have played the dominant roles in lasting coalitions (see Tables 5 and 6). Coalitions among formalized SMOs are easier to maintain than are coalitions among informal SMOs or between formalized and informal SMOs because formalized SMOs typically have staff persons who are available to act as organizational representatives to the coalition and routinely coordinate the coalition work. Just as paid staff can be relied on to carry out maintenance tasks for SMOs, they can also be relied on to maintain contact with the representatives of other SMOs in a coalition. When all of the SMO representatives are paid staff, coordination is easiest. While volunteers can represent SMOs in coalitions, it is more difficult to keep volunteers in contact with one another and to coordinate their work, particularly in the absence of a formalized coalition organization with paid staff of its own. Thus, paid staff help to maintain coalitions, thereby lessening the organizational problems of coalition work (see Staggenborg 1986, p. 387).

The experiences of the Illinois Pro-Choice Alliance (IPCA), a Chicago-based coalition organization, reveal the impact of organizational structure on coalition work. Formalized movement organizations, including NARAL of Illinois and Chicago NOW, have played a major role in this coalition, while informal organizations, such as Women Organized for Reproductive Choice (WORC), have had a difficult time participating in the coalition. One past director of the Illinois Pro-Choice

Alliance recognized this problem, commenting in an interview:

> . . . there is a real difference between groups which have paid staff and the grassroots groups which are all volunteers. The groups with paid staff have a lot more opportunity to participate [in the coalition]—even trivial things like meeting times create problems. The groups with paid staff can meet in the Loop at lunch time—it makes it easier. Also . . . people from the grassroots groups tend to be intimidated by the paid staff, because as volunteers the grassroots people are less informed about the issue. Whereas for the staff, it's their job to be informed, and they have the resources behind them. . . . I think too that the grassroots people have higher expectations about what can be done. They're volunteers who may have worked all day, then they do this in the evenings; they're cause-oriented and they expect more out of people and projects. Paid staff are the opposite in that they work on the issue during the day and then want to go home to their families or whatever at night and leave it behind. They want to do projects with defined goals and time limits, projections as to the feasibility and all that. Not that paid staff are not committed people. I think it's good to have a balance between the grassroots and staffed groups. Without the grassroots people, I think things would be overstructured; with just the grassroots people, well, there's too much burnout among them. The staffers tend to last a lot longer. (Personal interview)

These perceptions are borne out by the difficulties of Women Organized for Reproductive Choice in trying to participate in the IPCA. WORC members interviewed also spoke of the problems they had attending IPCA meetings at lunchtime in downtown Chicago, a time and place convenient for the staff of formalized SMO members of the coalition but difficult for WORC members, who tended to be women with full-time jobs in various parts of the city. Another reason for the difficulty is that the coalition has focused on institutionalized lobbying activities, tactics for which WORC members have neither the skills nor the ideological inclination. Efforts by WORC to get the coalition to engage in a broader range of tactics, including direct-action tactics, have been unsuccessful. On the national level, the Reproductive Rights National Network had nearly identical problems participating in the Abortion Information Exchange coalition (see Staggenborg 1986). Formalized SMOs play an important role in maintaining coalitions, but they also influence coalitions toward narrower, institutionalized strategies and tactics and make the participation of informal SMOs difficult.

CONCLUSION

While professionalization of leadership and formalization of SMOs are not inevitable outcomes of social movements, they are important trends in many movements (cf. McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Gamson 1975, p. 91). There is little evidence, however, that professional leaders and formalized SMOs will replace informal SMOs and nonprofessionals as the initiators of social movements and collective action. While systematic research on the influence of different types of movement leaders is needed, my data show that the roles of entrepreneur and professional manager are in some cases distinct. This is because environmental opportunities and preexisting organizational bases are critical determinants of movement mobilization; movement entrepreneurs do not manufacture grievances at will, but are influenced by the same environmental and organizational forces that mobilize other constituents. Contrary to the arguments of McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977), nonprofessional leaders and informal SMOs remain important in initiating movements and tactics that are critical to the growth of insurgency (cf. McAdam 1983).

Professionalization of leadership has important implications for the maintenance and direction of social movement organizations. My data suggest that professional managers, as career activists, tend to formalize the organizations they lead in order to provide financial stability and the kind of division of labor that allows them to use and develop their organizational skills. Once formalized, SMOs continue to hire professional managers because they have the necessary resources. Contrary to the arguments of Piven and Cloward (1977), formalized SMOs do not diffuse protest but play an important role in maintaining themselves and the movement, particularly in unfavorable environmental conditions when it is difficult to mobilize constituents. Formalized SMOs are better able to maintain themselves than are informal ones, not only because they have paid staff who can be relied on to carry out organizational tasks, but also because a formalized structure ensures continuity despite changes in leadership and environmental conditions.

Thus, a movement entrepreneur who prevents formalization by maintaining personal control over an SMO may ultimately cause the organization's demise. A movement that consists solely of informal SMOs is likely to have a shorter lifetime than a movement that includes formalized SMOs. Similarly, a coalition of informal SMOs has less chance of survival than a coalition of formalized SMOs.

While formalization helps to maintain social movements, it is also associated with the institutionalization of collective action. Formalized SMOs engage in fewer disruptive tactics of the sort that pressure government authorities and other elites to make concessions or provide support than do informal SMOs. Formalized SMOs also tend to select strategies and tactics that enhance organizational maintenance. Given the prominent role of professional managers in formalized SMOs, these findings raise the Michels ([1915] 1962) question of whether formalized organizations with professional leaders inevitably become oligarchical and conservative, as Piven and Cloward (1977) argue. Based on my data, I dispute the conclusion that formalized SMOs necessarily become oligarchical. In fact, many seem more democratic than informal SMOs because they follow routinized procedures that make it more difficult for individual leaders to attain disproportionate power. As Freeman (1973) argues, "structureless" SMOs are most subject to domination by individuals.

The tendency of formalized SMOs to engage in more institutionalized strategies and tactics than informal SMOs might be interpreted as a conservative development, given findings that militant direct-action tactics force elite concessions (cf. Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Informal SMOs, with their more flexible structures, are more likely to innovate direct-action tactics. However, the institutionalization of movement tactics by formalized SMOs does not necessarily mean that movement goals become less radical; an alternative interpretation is that movement demands and representatives become incorporated into mainstream politics. For example, the National Organization for Women is now an important representative of women's interests in the political arena. While the long-term implications of this phenomenon for the social movement sector and the political system require further investigation, it is certainly possible for formalized SMOs to exert a progressive influence on the political system.

Finally, my research raises the question of whether movements inevitably become formalized or institutionalized, as suggested by classical theories of social movements, which argue that movements progress through stages toward institutionalization (see Lang and Lang 1961; Turner and Killian 1957 for discussions of such stage theories). In the case of the pro-choice movement, there has clearly been a trend toward formalization. As Gamson (1975, p. 91) notes, there does seem to be a kernel of truth to theories that posit an inevitable trend toward bureaucratization or formalization. However, as Gamson also notes, "the reality is considerably more complex" in that some SMOs begin with bureaucratic or formalized structures and others never develop formalized structures. Although neither Gamson nor I found cases of SMOs that developed informal structures after formalization,[13] such a change is conceivable under certain circumstances (e.g., if nonprofessional staff are hired to replace professional managers, a development most likely at the local level). Classical theories of the "natural history" of a movement focus on the institutionalization of a movement as a whole and ignore variations in the experiences of different SMOs within the movement. My research shows that SMOs vary in the ways in which they deal with internal organizational problems and changes in the environment. Formalization is one important means of solving organizational problems, particularly as SMOs grow larger; however, SMOs can also develop alternative structures. Important variations exist within the two broad categories of SMO structure that I have identified; further empirical research on leadership roles and SMO structures and their impact on organizational goals and activities is necessary.

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[13] Although it never developed a structure that could be called formalized, one SMO in my sample, Women Organized for Reproductive Choice, did become even more informal as it became smaller.

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