POLITICAL CLAIMS ANALYSIS: INTEGRATING PROTEST EVENT AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE APPROACHES

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Starting from a critique of protest event and political discourse analysis, we propose an extended methodological approach that has the quantitative rigor of event analysis but also retrieves the qualitative discursive elements of claims. Our political claims approach extends the sample of contentious actions beyond protest event analysis by coding institutional and civil society actors, and conventional and discursive action forms, in addition to protests by movement actors. This redefines the research object to acts of political claims making in a multi-organizational field. We use examples from a research project on mobilization about migration and ethnic relations in Britain and Germany to demonstrate the analytic gains that are possible with our approach. By situating protest and social movements, not just theoretically but also methodologically, in a wider context of political claims making, we are in a better position to follow the recent calls for more integrated approaches, which place protest within multi-organizational fields, link it to political opportunities and outcomes, and are sensitive to discursive messages.

In the field of social movements, protest, and collective action, there has recently been convergence between the competing paradigms. The desirability of combining political opportunities (contextual factors), mobilizing structures (organizational resources), and framing processes (discursive resources) has become an accepted tenet (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Given this emergent consensus, it is surprising that there have been relatively few attempts to re-address questions of method, and in particular, techniques of news analysis. Over the last two decades, newspaper reports have become a primary data source in social movement research. News reporting assigns meaning to issues by providing a continuous record of public events and visibility to the claims of actors. The public sphere is an important field where social problems are constructed and political alternatives defined. It is hardly surprising then that the news has become an important data source for researchers interested in studying political challenges in the public domain. In this article, our focus will be self-consciously directed to methods. Specifically, we will propose how recent methodological developments that often rely on collecting data from news sources might be profitably extended.

Regarding the current "state of the art," two different approaches may be identified. The first methodological school is *protest event analysis*,[1] a perspective that produces data on levels of civic unrest, contention, and "protest cycles" (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1989). Many recent applications of protest event analysis have been in conjunction with theories of political opportunities (e.g., Kriesi et. al. 1995).

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[1] For a "state of the art" volume on protest event analysis, see Rucht, Koopmans and Neidhardt eds. (1998).

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A second school of methods that uses news data and other written document sources is *political discourse analysis*. This is associated with the constructivist framing perspective and is perhaps best represented by the work of Gamson and his collaborators (Gamson 1988, 1992; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; see also Gitlin 1980; Donati 1992). This approach looks at how movement actors attempt to challenge dominant definitions of political reality by mobilizing new interpretations—schemata or frames—of contested social relationships, and making them visible in the public sphere. The two approaches focus on different dimensions of collective challenges to political power: the first relating an action type variable—protests—to institutional political opportunities; and the second relating an interpretative scheme variable—frames—to the dominant sets of cultural and political norms.

Although these approaches have emerged as competing paradigms within the social movement field, it should be pointed out that they share a common focus by taking a dimension of collective mobilization in the public domain as a key variable for explaining political change. In this article, we argue for a more self-conscious integration of the political discourse approach with the undoubted gains that have been achieved by protest event analysis. We argue that an extended methodological focus will better relate collective mobilization variables to both discursive and institutional contextual variables, and thus better ground the analysis in primary data.

Proceeding from a critique of protest event analysis and a discussion of experiences with this method over the last decade, we present some of the benefits that we argue can be gained from extending the approach. The examples in the second part of this article are drawn from a current project on Mobilization on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigration (MERCI).[2] In designing this internationally comparative project, we explicitly set out to move beyond a protest event design, firstly, by systematically coding discursive dimensions, so that the focus shifted from "protest" to "political claims making," and secondly, by coding all actions by all actors which are relevant to our political issue field, so that the focus shifted from "movement" to "multi-organizational field" (Curtis and Zurcher 1973). Substantive topical research from this project has been published elsewhere, on both comparative and national aspects.[3] Here, the substance of our topic will be referred to only where it is necessary for demonstrative purposes.

ARGUMENTS FOR EXTENDING BEYOND PROTEST EVENT ANALYSIS

Protest event analysis quantifies the level of collective mobilization longitudinally over time, or comparatively between different country or regional contexts. It has emerged as a rigorous methodological endeavor that provides macrolevel data on the phenomenon of protest. Significant steps have been taken to determine the extent to which the sample of protest recorded in the news is representative of the total volume of protest, for example, by comparing police records, different newspapers, or taking into account the impact of news production factors such as "news values" and editorial bias (e.g., McCarthy et. al. 1998; Hocke 1998). This enables protest variables to be used as an indicator for the level of civil

[2] The MERCI project group has been initiated by the authors at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB). In addition to the German and British cases, undertaken, respectively, by Koopmans and Statham, the project includes Swiss and French (Marco Giugni and Florence Passy at the University of Geneva) and Dutch cases (Thom Duyvene de Wit at the University of Amsterdam). The British data presented in this paper were collected with the assistance of a grant award from the British Economic and Social Research Council (R000236558) in co-operation with the Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, the German project has been financed internally by the WZB.

[3] See Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Koopmans 1996, 1997; Statham 1999.

unrest and social disruption. Another advantage of the type of data relative to others such as attitudinal data, is that—unlike opinions given in response to survey questions—it is grounded in the strategic dimension of collective action, which is the object of research. Nonetheless, we argue that the explanatory potential of these protest data remains limited on several counts.

One problem with conventional protest analysis is that, as a method for measuring political contention, it is too "protest-centric." If we are to take seriously the argument that protest has become a routine and conventional action form in contemporary societies, it is no longer self-evident that data which are limited strictly to protest events are good indicators for the level of contention. Because protest has become more sophisticated and universal, it is necessary to move beyond the image of protestors physically standing at the gates of institutions with their objections.[4] To take a familiar example, the environmental movement has become an established collective actor and achieves routine access to the mass media agenda. Its protest forms have subsequently taken on a more discursive form, whereby environmental organizations are more likely to make press releases and gain direct access and visibility for their claims on the public agenda than mobilize mass public protest demonstrations. As part of an overall action repertoire the two strategies are not mutually exclusive. From a methodological perspective, protest event analysis will pick up mainly "physical protest" and only to a limited extent "discursive protest." This underlines one of the main criticisms from the political discourse camp (e.g., Gamson), namely that protest event analysis has a deficient appreciation of public discourse as a medium of social conflict and symbolic struggles.

Another fundamental problem with protest event analysis is that the data on protest events is not systematically related to co-variates in the process of data retrieval, and so explanations of what certain levels of protest indicate, and whether they are high or low—the classic interpretative problem of whether the glass is half full or half empty!—tend to fall back on a secondary level of explanation, and are not based on the original data. When this requires the use of secondary data sources, it is often problematic to relate these to protest data. For a start, it is difficult to find suitable and compatible secondary co-variates that can be systematically and reliably related to protest, though some researchers (e.g., Olzak 1992; Soule et al. in this volume) have taken this direction and linked protest data to external quantitative co-variates, usually existing statistical data. The use of this type of statistical co-variates can be problematic, not least because they are usually strong for social indicators, such as unemployment, but often poor or unavailable for variables which are important to social movement theory, such as the availability of political opportunities. In addition, secondary data has usually been gathered to answer different questions than those posed by social movement researchers, and it may be incomplete, difficult to check for consistency and reliability, or not cover the required time span. Such problems of collecting secondary co-variates become magnified when conducting cross-national comparative research, because different national institutions tend to use different definitions and different methods for collecting data.

Clearly, it is always better to collect primary data for co-variates. For instance, one may code parliamentary debates or party programs in an attempt to gauge political causes and impacts of protest. Since such data will be drawn from differently structured sources than the

[4] Protest event analyses usually include only those forms of collective action, such as demonstrations or violence, which imply some form of mobilization into the streets. Sometimes more conventional forms of claims making are included as well, but only for a limited range of actors who can be explicitly identified as social movement or non-institutional organizations and spokespersons (Rucht, Hocke and Ohlemacher 1992: 4-5, 60-61; Kriesi et al. 1995: 264). Sometimes "unconventional" forms of protest are excluded if they are organized by national or local government actors (Rucht, Hocke and Ohlemacher 1992: 6-7).

daily coverage of newspapers that is used for retrieval of protest data problems may occur regarding how to relate the data sets to each other. Moreover, such research strategies are highly labor-intensive and expensive, and are perhaps best undertaken as projects within their own right. In the absence of adequate primary sources of data on independent as well as dependent variables, there is a clear danger that the process of sociological investigation is likely to fall back on post hoc descriptions, clichés, and descriptive narratives of events rather than empirically grounded explanation.

In our project, we took the step of coding important co-variates relating to contextual actors, actions, and claims within the actual process of primary data collection from the news. This was relatively straightforward: we simply extended the range of actors and action forms included in the scope of inquiry. More specifically, we included both institutional and non-institutional actors, and all forms of claims making by these actors in the public domain, whether routine or non-routine, conventional or unconventional. When one takes the step of including institutional actors, it becomes more accurate to refer to the unit of analysis as public acts of claims making: the strategic demands made by collective actors within a specific contested issue field. This re-definition also shifts the focus of inquiry toward the coalitions, networks, and conflict lines that connect and relate different types of collective actors in a multi-organizational field. By focusing solely on protest forms, protest event analysis has an in-built myopia to important parts of the broader picture, whereby movements build networks and alliances with other public and institutional actors.

By taking all acts instead of just protest events, we are able to include events which occur outside of the context of the reported protest, but which are important for understanding the conflict because they either helped to trigger the protest or were affected by it in some way afterwards. It therefore becomes possible to trace the shifting alliances and oppositions between actors that evolve in the dynamic process of a political conflict.[5] On the contrary, conventional protest event analysis stops recording challenges which take on institutional forms, i.e., when they are likely to be more important and powerful in a substantive sense. For example, it is impossible to determine from protest event data whether the level of protest is falling because of co-optation, where demands are taken up by other actors, or from marginalization, where the movement has difficulty in mobilizing sufficient resources to make a challenge. In a similar vein, if one takes the notion of protest cycles seriously, namely that protest in an early stage has an effect on the whole organizational field and transforms the protest context, it is necessary to use data which can show such dynamic and interactive relationships.

If protest event studies were really only interested in non-routine protest mobilization—however defined—then all these shortcomings would be relatively unproblematic. However, the present state of theory emphasizes that the causes and impacts of protest can be gauged only in relation to its institutional and discursive contexts. But what does protest event analysis do? It measures only protest, nothing else. How can protest event analysis capture the importance of social movements' embeddedness in multi-organizational fields if it a priori excludes many of the relevant contextual acts and actors from the analysis? How can protest event analysis follow the suggestion of political opportunity theories, which emphasize the importance of events in institutional politics for the mobilization chances of social movements, if it excludes anything that happens in institutional politics from its data? Finally, how can protest event analysis contribute to our understanding of the role of discourse and framing in mobilization, if discursive forms of protest are systematically disregarded?

[5] Here, we share Franzosi's insistence on the importance of mapping the relationships between actors; see his contribution to this issue.

In the remainder, we discuss several examples drawn from the MERCI project which illustrate these criticisms of protest event analysis. In addition, we attempt to show how our method for political claims analysis can be used for analyzing (1) the embeddedness of movement groups in multi-organizational fields; (2) the relations between opportunities and mobilization, and (3) the discursive content of claims making. First, we give some details on our MERCI data.

MERCI DATA COLLECTION AND VARIABLES

For cross-national comparison, the core data have been retrieved from one national newspaper for each country. The selected newspapers, *The Guardian* for Britain and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* for Germany, have a similar political affiliation (center-left), and are broad-sheet newspapers with a reputation for a consistent and detailed coverage of the field of migration and ethnic relations. At present the sample for Britain and Germany covers the six years from 1990-1995, but we intend to code the whole of the 1990s. Reports relating to the topic were collected from the sections of the newspaper reporting national events, omitting editorial and commentary sections, for three editions (Monday, Wednesday, and Friday) of the six which appear each week. As is increasingly common among social movement researchers, we also applied this method to other newspapers in order to control for biases in the primary newspaper source, which in fact vindicated our original choice (results available on request). As is usual in protest event analysis—but unlike many other forms of media content analysis—we code only the factual coverage of statements and events that appear in the newspapers, leaving out the comments and evaluations that are made by editors or reporters.

Similarly taking a cue from social movements perspectives rather than media studies, our units of analysis are instances of claims making, not articles. All acts included in the data involved demands, criticisms, or proposals related to the regulation or evaluation of immigration, minority integration, or xenophobia. Instances of claims making were included irrespective of their form, and range from violent attacks on other groups, public demonstrations and legal action, to public statements and other speech acts. Actors making claims in the field were coded regardless of their type, which means that our sample includes civil society groups, such as antiracist and human rights organizations or labor unions, and also political parties and state actors, including the police, courts, legislatures, local and national governments and supranational institutions. Because of our special interest in minority and xenophobic claims making, we also included acts by ethnic minorities and xenophobic actors, even if they were not related to issues of migration and ethnic relations, provided, of course, that they involved a political claim.

Important variables refer to the identity of the actors making the claim, including full organizational names, action forms, and (where present) the size, target, and intensity of protest. Regarding the semantic contents of the claims, for each act we coded up to three aims or demands, up to two (causal or symbolic) frames,[6] and the actors on whom demands are made (addressee) or who are objects of criticism. Actors, aims, and frames were not coded with reference to pre-defined, "closed" categories, but on the basis of "open' code lists that could be extended by the coders when a new actor, aim or frame, appeared. We chose this strategy to retain as much as possible of the original content of claims. For Germany, we have almost 700 actors, appearing as claims makers and/or as objects of claims, and more than 500

[6] An example of a causal frame is the statement that immigration is good for the economy; an example of a symbolic frame the depiction of immigration as "flooding" or "swamping" the country.

individual aims, and for Britain, 350 actors and 500 aims, respectively. These raw codes for actors and claims, have been re-coded and grouped as summary codes at a later stage.

Although defining common aggregate summary variables at a later stage is time consuming, and to some extent constitutes a second coding of the coding, we think that it is necessary to proceed in this way.[7] First, it is difficult to pre-define category systems at a high level of aggregation when this requires exactly the kind of detailed knowledge about the subject matter that one is trying to learn in the first place. Second, if one codes straight away at a high level of aggregation, possibilities for alternative ways of categorization are lost forever. This restricts the use of the data set to those research questions that were already explicit at the start of the project, but makes it difficult to shift attention to other questions in the course of the same study. Third, in cross-national comparative studies it is sometimes difficult to identify functionally equivalent demands in the first instance of coding because they are expressed in different types of national language and symbols—for example, in Britain demands against discrimination are often made in a language referring to racism and minorities whereas in Germany they refer to tolerance, solidarity, and hostility in relation to foreigners. Fourth, the use of aggregated category systems places important theoretical decisions on the proper classification of claims in the hands of coders, instead of the researcher (Shapiro and Markoff 1998: 73ff.).

The resulting data set has considerable advantages. In particular, it provides an easily accessible hierarchy of aggregated data that enables researchers to answer questions at different levels. Similar findings at the macrolevel of international comparison can be traced back to the most detailed level of specific claims by individual actors in relation to particular events. It therefore becomes possible to focus on specific areas of interest that are themselves generated by comparative findings. As we shall demonstrate, the data is suitable for macrolevel comparative analyses of broad issue-fields, but at the same time can zoom in on particular actors and claims.[8]

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CLAIMS MAKING, AND INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: THE LIMITS OF PROTEST EVENT ANALYSIS

Social movements have been defined in alternative ways: as a collective actor with a shared identity (e.g., Melucci 1989; Turner and Killian 1987); as a disruptive, unconventional, non-routine type of action repertoire (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1979; Tilly 1984); or as a set of demands, opinions, beliefs and interests for change (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977). Without entering into such debates, it is clear that protest event analysis reduces collective action to a specific range of disruptive, non-routine action forms and a specific set of non-institutional actors. This empirical conceptualization of protest derives from a tendency within the political process approach for a black-and-white dichotomy between "members" and "challengers" of the polity (Gamson 1968; Tilly 1978). However, far from a neat separation between "members" and "challengers," democratic polities are characterized by cross-cutting alliances between polity members and challengers, and a mutual interpenetration of institutional and non-institutional politics.

[7] For an elaborate discussion of similar considerations, see Shapiro and Markoff 1998

[8] Even our detailed codes imply some loss of detail and reduction of complexity compared to the original texts. Since we kept copies of the original texts it is always possible to go back to the original sources if additional information is needed. This is of course also possible in many protest event studies. Our detailed codes, however, provide us with a precise index on the source material, by which we can quickly trace relatively well-delimited classes of cases for qualitative analysis or for additional coding.

Table 1. Antiracist Organizations, Protests and Claims Making: Empirical Implications of Different Conceptualizations of the German Antiracist Movement, 1990-1995

Definition of Antiracist Movement	N	Carried by antiracist and prominority organizations	Carried by other non-institutional actors	Carried by Civil Society Institutions	Carried by State and Party Actors	Uncon-ventional Protest
As claims making by antiracist and prominoirty organizations	65	-	-	-	-	44.6%
As unconventional protests against racism and the extreme right	522	5.6%	77.0%	8.5%	7.9%	-
As claims making against racism and the extreme right	1924	3.4%	31.4%	15.0%	49.4%	27.3%

These points can be illustrated with our MERCI data. Table 1 shows the empirical implications of different conceptualizations of the "antiracist movement" in Germany. If we define the antiracist movement as the set of groups and organizations that explicitly identify themselves as an "antiracist movement" (e.g., SOS Racism; Antiracist Alliance, Antifascist Action, etc.), we find a total of 65 acts. However, less than half (45%) of these acts are protest events that would be captured by conventional protest event analysis. The other 55% consist of discursive forms of claims making that were reported as statements.

The omission of the conventional forms of claims making by movement organizations from protest event data, not only obscures an important part of the action repertoire of social movement groups, but may also lead us to inaccurate conclusions regarding the comparative strength and importance of different social movements. For instance, if we compare "unconventional" protest events by antiracist groups in Germany and Britain, we find 36 and 12 events, respectively. This implies a much stronger and more important antiracist movement in Germany. However, if we include discursive claims making (speech acts), we arrive at a total of 65 acts in Germany and 80 in Britain, suggesting the opposite conclusion. Thus, British antiracist groups have a much more institutionalized action repertoire than their German counterparts, a conclusion that we would not have been able to draw on the basis of conventional protest event data.

An alternative conceptualization of the "antiracist movement"—implicit in most studies using protest event data—is simply to take all unconventional protests against racism, regardless of the identity of the actor. This substantially increases the number of events found in Germany to 522. As the table shows, explicit antiracist groups and organizations are responsible for only a small part (5.6%) of protest mobilization against racism. It is true that in line with the idea of social movements as challengers, the majority of protests (82.6%) are carried by non-institutional actors.[9] However, the number of protest events sponsored by civil society institutions (8.5%), or by state and party actors (7.9%) is sizeable, and larger than the number of protests by explicit antiracist organizations!

[9] This includes events with no named actor (32%) assuming that institutional actors will usually be mentioned in the newspaper report. Although this may be a realistic assumption in many cases, part of these events will have involved unmentioned institutional actors, implying that the percentages given in the table for institutional actors probably underestimate their actual involvement in antiracist protests.

This finding becomes even clearer if we expand our conceptualization of the antiracist movement to include all forms of claims making (protest and discursive) against racism, regardless of the identity of the actor. Again, this significantly increases the number of relevant acts to 1,924. Almost half of these claims (49.4%) were made by state and party actors, including a sizeable number of claims made by core members of the polity. An additional 15% of antiracist claims were made by representatives of civil society institutions, while only about 35% could be attributed to non-institutional actors. This shows that antiracist claims making constitutes a "multi-organizational field" in which antiracist and other non-institutional groups are joined by a variety of actors from state and civil society institutions. Moreover, only in a minority of cases (27.3%) does such claims making take the form of public protest demonstrations.

In the following sections we present three examples, each related to a central topic in recent theorizing on social movements. First, we focus on the composition of the multi-organizational field in the migration and ethnic relations field, and on the relative positioning of actors. The second example focuses on the relation between political opportunities and extra-institutional mobilization. The third focuses on discursive aspects of claims making.

MAPPING THE FIELD OF MOBILIZATION

If we consider forms of extra-institutional mobilization within the field of migration and ethnic relations, at least three main constituencies can be discerned. First, there is the mobilization by racist and xenophobic groups against the presence of minorities and the influx of migrants. Second, we have the mobilization by ethnic minorities and migrants themselves, mobilizing against racism and discrimination, and for an extension of their rights. And third, antiracist, pro-minority and human rights groups based on a constituency within the majority population may mobilize against racist and extreme right tendencies and on behalf of minority and migrant rights.

However, these challenging groups do not mobilize in a vacuum, but are part of a wider field of political claims making on migration and ethnic relations that includes a wide variety of institutional and non-institutional actors, using disruptive and routine forms, both against and in defense of minority rights and interests. Table 2 shows for the German and British cases the distribution of claims across main actor categories. The results demonstrate that political contention over migration and ethnic relations extends far beyond the three constituencies we mentioned. In both countries, more than fifty percent of claims were by state and party actors; and an additional ten percent or more by civil society institutions, including churches, and the media.

Without going into detail on each of the actor categories, we will highlight some important findings thta give insight into the two countries'. mobilization contexts. First, there are important differences between the two countries in the relative contribution of the three types of mobilization. While the weight of antiracist and pro-minority groups from within the majority population is—with eight percent of overall claims making—about equally important in the two countries, the results are highly divergent regarding the role played by ethnic minority organizations and groups, and xenophobic and extreme right groups. While ethnic minority actors play a marginal role in the German political discourse (seven percent of claims), they are responsible for one-fifth of the claims made in Britain, making them the single most important category. In contrast, extreme right and xenophobic groups are relatively marginal in Britain (three percent) compared to Germany (twelve percent). Conventional protest event analysis would have allowed us—at least in as far as non-routine forms of claims making are concerned—to put the three forms of mobilization in relation to

Table 2. Actors in the Politics of Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigration, Percentage Shares in Claims Making, Germany and Britain, 1990-1995 (Percent)

	Britain	Germany
State and party actors	**52.0**	55.5
United Nations	0.2	0.5
European Union	0.6	0.1
Foreign governments	0.3	0.7
National government	14.0	8.5
Regional and local governments	1.3	14.7
National legislative	12.7	6.9
Regional and local legislatives	3.1	3.1
Judiciary	7.3	4.4
State executive agencies dealing with migration and minorities	4.1	2.0
Police and security agencies	4.8	2.0
Other state executive bodies	2.0	0.8
National political parties	1.3	7.8
Regional and local political parties	0.3	4.3
Civil society actors	**48.0**	44.5
Unions and professional organizations	2.7	3.3
Employers' and business organizations	1.5	0.7
Churches	1.3	3.3
Media	2.3	0.7
Scientific and cultural institutions and representatives	3.7	2.1
General welfare organizations	1.4	0.7
Human rights organizations	1.6	1.3
New social movement organizations (peace, ecology, etc.)	-	0.6
Radical left groups	-	2.5
Specific welfare organizations for minorities and migrants	3.9	0.7
Organizations for minority rights	1.5	1.8
Antiracist groups and organizations	2.6	5.8
Ethnic minority organizations and groups	20.1	6.9
Xenophobic and extreme right organizations and groups	2.6	12.2
Other organizations and groups	2.0	1.2
Unknown	-	0.7
Total	100.0%	100.0%
N	*1,009*	*5,397*

each other, but we would not have been able to gauge their weight in overall claims making on migration and ethnic relations, or cross-national differences in this respect. More importantly, we would have been limited in linking information on protest actors to the multi-organizational field in which their claims are made.

Regarding the institutional actors, the relative importance of different state and party actors reflects the different institutional structures and cultures of German and British politics. First, the relatively centralized nature of the British polity is reflected in the marginal role played by regional and local political actors. Second, legislative actors play a more important role in British politics, which is linked to the legitimacy and power that British MPs derive

from their direct mandate from the electorate as representatives of constituencies. Third, the British case is contrasted with the importance of political party organizations in Germany, where a strong role is given to political parties by the German constitution and the German electorate votes for party slates rather than for individual candidates.

These results may not be surprising for those familiar with the German and British political systems. The important point, however, is that we now have this information as an integral part of our data set, instead of as external information that is difficult to systematically relate to data on protest mobilization. Moreover, by further refining the analysis, we can arrive at more detailed information on the institutional context of claims making. The categories displayed in the table are summaries of detailed codes that allow for the identification of narrower categories of actors or even single actors. Thus, we may trace the relative importance of different governmental ministries, or of different types of courts on different levels of the polity. Another way of refining the analysis would be to differentiate by thematic area. For instance, we can compare the composition of the organizational field in immigration and asylum politics with that in policy areas such as minority integration or antiracism. One can delve even deeper and look at individual issues, for instance at the actors who made claims on the issue of local voting rights for foreigners.

Our data also allow us to present detailed information on the positions of specific actors with regard to specific issues (e.g., the Bavarian government with regard to the issue of liberalizing citizenship legislation, or Islamic organizations with regard to the issue of religious education in schools). At a higher level of aggregation, it is possible to look at the positioning of different actors in broader policy fields such as asylum politics. In table 3, we present data on an even higher level of aggregation, the broad field of migration and ethnic relations. To simplify the illustration, we limit ourselves here to the German case.

Table 3 demonstrates that analyzing even the highly general positioning of actors in the field provides interesting information on relations of consensus and conflict among actors. This is information that could not be derived either from conventional protest event analysis or from qualitative political discourse analysis. In addition to the actors listed in table 2, table 3 includes state and party actors by party affiliation, which, not surprisingly, turns out to be highly relevant for the positioning of government, legislative and party actors.[10] To compute the position figures, we have assigned to each claim a score of -1 if it supported xenophobic groups and/or called for a restriction in the numbers or rights of minorities and migrants and/or constituted a physical attack on ethnic minorities. Conversely, a +1 score was given to claims if they were directed against xenophobic groups, either verbally or physically, and/or called for the extension or defense of the rights of migrants and minorities. Ambivalent and neutral statements received a score of 0. Table 3 presents the resulting average position scores of different actors in a discursive space running from -1 (for actors whose claims are exclusively anti-minority or xenophobic) to +1 (for actors whose claims are exclusively pro-minority or anti-xenophobic). Arranging the position scores in an ascending order gives an impression of the proximity or distance of the claims making of different actors in this field.

Not surprisingly, and in accordance with the idea of social movements as challengers, we find that non-institutional actors occupy the extremes of the discursive space. On the "anti-minority" side, we find extreme right parties such as the National Democratic Party (NPD), and diverse extreme right and racist groups, including neo-nazi organizations. On the other side of the discursive spectrum, we find radical left groups including the small post-communist

[10] As a consequence, government, legislative, and party actors appear twice in the table. For instance, a claim made by Chancellor Kohl is included in both in the category "federal government" and in the party category "CDU." Thus, the sum of the Ns for the individual categories adds up to more than the N for the overall field.

Table 3. Positioning of Actors in Claims Making on Migration and Ethnic Relations in Germany, 1990-1995 (-1 = antiminority/xenophobic; +1 = prominority/antiracist)

Collective Actor	Average Position	*N*
Other extreme right and racist groups and organizations	-0.99	599
NPD (extreme right)	-0.89	9
CSU (Bavarian Christian Democrats)	-0.40	145
Republikaner (extreme right)	-0.38	50
European Union	-0.25	4
CDU (Christian Democrats)	0.08	541
Federal government	0.12	455
Regional and local governments	0.24	787
Federal legislative	0.25	371
Federal political parties	0.37	420
SPD (Social Democrats)	0.37	755
Regional and local political parties	0.43	232
Other state executive bodies	0.43	40
Judiciary	0.45	232
Regional and local legislatives	0.53	165
Police, security agencies	0.53	103
State executive agencies dealing with migration and minority issues	0.57	107
Foreign governments	0.61	38
Media	0.61	36
Welfare organizations	0.64	36
FDP (Liberal Democrats)	0.64	256
Employers' and business organizations	0.64	33
Churches	0.76	175
United Nations	0.77	26
Unions and professional organizations	0.78	177
Green Party	0.79	218
Organizations for minority rights	0.79	96
Specific welfare organizations for minorities and migrants	0.81	36
Scientific and cultural institutions and representatives	0.81	108
New social movements	0.85	34
Human rights organizations	0.87	68
Minority organizations and groups	0.93	370
Antiracist organizations and groups	0.97	313
PDS (Post-Communists)	1.00	42
Radical left groups	1.00	135
Overall avarage	0.34	5,350

Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS), antiracist groups, ethnic minority organizations, new social movement groups, and advocacy groups for minority rights and welfare. These two extremes of the political spectrum in the migration and ethnic relations field are also the two actor clusters which are responsible for the large majority of protest events that would have been included in conventional protest event studies. Had we relied on this method, we would have seen this part of the picture, but little else.

Moving from the extremes to the discursive center, we encounter state institutions and the larger political parties, which can be qualified as members of the polity. However, far from the unified "vested interest alliance" which the member-challenger dichotomy suggests, we find a broad range of positions, sometimes coming very close to those of challenging social movement groups. A very interesting case in point on the anti-minority side

of the spectrum is the position of the Bavarian Christian Democrats, the CSU, who actually occupy a position that is slightly more anti-minority than that of the extreme right Republikaner. The CSU's self-proclaimed aim is to prevent the establishment of a political party to its right—a strategy which has thus far been successful. The table suggests that this success was achieved by occupying the space of the Republikaner in the public discourse, i.e., by co-opting an important part of this extreme right party's demands with regard to restrictions in minority rights.

However, the positions taken by actors in institutional politics are, on average, clearly closer to those of the pro-minority non-institutional groups than to those of the extreme right. Thus, we find political parties such as the Greens and the liberal FDP and civil society institutions such as the unions, churches, and employers' associations close to the position of minority and antiracist groups. State executive agencies dealing with migration and minority issues, and perhaps surprisingly, also the police and security agencies, also seem to be potential allies for antiracist and minority groups within the state apparatus.

The methodological conclusion to draw from the presentation of these data is that they provide much more insight into the multi-organizational field in which antiracist, xenophobic and ethnic minority mobilization occur than conventional protest event data. Because our data measure—with the same method, sources, and unit of analysis—a broad range of claims making forms by a wide variety of actors, they allow us to map the field of claims making, and the positioning of actors within it without making the leap of faith that is often necessary when connecting protest event data to external information. This not only enables us to be more complete and context-sensitive in empirical description, but also to move towards better-grounded causal explanation.

THE INTERPLAY OF ELITE CONFLICT, DECISION MAKING, AND MOBILIZATION

To illustrate the possibilities our approach provides for causal analyses, we summarize in this section an analysis of the role of elite conflict, decision making, and xenophobic violence in the German cycle of political contention over the asylum issue in the first half of the 1990s (for further details, Koopmans 1996). After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Germany experienced a strong increase in the numbers of asylum seekers. This influx was accompanied by an intense and highly controversial debate among the German political elite that not only pitted the government against the opposition but also led to sharp conflicts within parties and between the federal government and state governments. The main issue of controversy was the question whether the—up to that date very generous—constitutional right to asylum should be restricted in a way that those asylum seekers who came to Germany for economic reasons could be more easily refused or deported. In addition to these controversies within the political elite, asylum seekers became a preferred target of extreme right and xenophobic groups, who carried out hundreds of violent attacks in the period 1991-1993. In December 1992, after another wave of violent attacks, the government parties and the opposition Social Democrats finally reached a compromise on a substantial restriction of the constitutional right to asylum, which was passed by the *Bundestag* in May and implemented in July 1993. Afterwards, the level of public debate on the asylum issue, and the number of violent attacks against asylum seekers strongly declined.

In a conventional protest event design, we would have had data on violence against asylum seekers, but no information at all on potential causes or outcomes of this form of mobilization. For some potential external variables of interest, statistical data that can be related to anti-asylum seeker violence are available. For instance, the German authorities provide monthly figures on the influx of new asylum seekers. However, no systematic

information is available on the kind of political variables that are so central to recent social movement theorizing. Thus, we would be unable to answer the question whether the rise in violence was influenced by aspects of the political opportunity structure, such as the intensity of political debate and controversy on the asylum issue, or by political decisions, such as the change in constitutional rights. Also, we would be able to say little about the political impacts of anti-asylum seeker violence. For example, did it affect the intensity of elite debate on the issue and did it contribute to the progressive restrictions in asylum seeker rights?

Table 4. Time Series Regression of the Relation between Violence Against Asylum Seekers, Political Pebate, Decision Making and Changes in the Influx of Asylum Seekers, Germany, January 1990 through December 1995 (Beta-coefficients)

	Dependents		
Independents	Violence t = 0	Political Debate t = 0	Decision Making t = 0
Violence t = -1	.50***	.38***	.72***
Political Debate t = -1	.35*	n.s.	n.s.
Decision Making t = -1	-.35**	n.s	n.s.
Change in Influx of Asylum Seekers t = -2	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Interaction: Debate t = -1 and Change of Influx t = -2	.64***	n.s.	n.s.
F	15.1***	12.2***	17.8***
Adjusted R^2	0.51	0.45	0.55
N =	*69*	*69*	*69*

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n.s. = not significant

The inclusion of institutional forms of claims making, including political decisions (which we consider to be a special form of, collectively binding, claims making) allows us to address such questions. Table 4 presents the results of three regression analyses, with the monthly number of violent acts against asylum seekers, the number of public statements on the asylum issue, and the number of political decisions as the respective dependent variables. All independent variables were lagged one month, except for the monthly change in the influx of asylum seekers, which was lagged two months. To control for autoregressive processes, the dependent variable lagged one month was always included in the equations. In addition, an interaction term between asylum seeker numbers and debate on the asylum issue was included. The rationale for this is our suspicion that, whereas the perception of asylum seekers as a problem was affected by the political debate on asylum, the impact of the political debate may also have been dependent on the extent to which it referred to actually existing problems resulting from rapid increases in asylum seekers. Thus, we expect the strongest impacts on violence against asylum seekers when both factors coincide: a high intensity of problematization of asylum seekers in the political discourse, *and* strong increases in the number of asylum seekers.

The first column of table 4 shows that this has been the case. The interaction term has a stronger impact on the level of violence than any other variable. While the intensity of the political debate has a modest impact on violence, independent from the objective extent of the asylum problem, the reverse does not hold, i.e., the influx of asylum seekers only affected violence as long as it was accompanied by a political problematization of this group. Another political opportunity variable, decisions in asylum politics, seems to have had a negative impact on violence. We may thus conclude, that elite controversy and public problematization of asylum seekers contributed to rising levels of violence, but that actual elite action in the form of restrictions in the rights of asylum seekers had the reverse effect. These results nicely fit hypotheses in the literature about mobilization chances regarding the effects of elite divisions (e.g., Tarrow 1994), social problem construction (e.g., Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995), and negative effects of successful goal attainment (e.g., Kitschelt 1986).

Next we turn to the question of movement impacts, an important question that has thus far remained understudied, not least because of a lack of data. The second and third columns of table 4 show that the xenophobic groups that violently attacked asylum seekers have been highly effective. Although themselves inspired by the opportunities signaled by the elite controversy on the issue, they, in turn, had an important effect on the political asylum debate. More important, violence had a particularly strong impact on decision making in this field. Indeed, the two most important cycles of decision making in asylum politics, around the change in asylum procedures in October 1991, and around the compromise on Constitutional change in December 1992, each followed shortly after eruptions of violence.

ANALYZING THE DISCURSIVE CONTENT OF CLAIMS MAKING IN A REPRESENTATIVE CONTEXT

Our final example of the possibilities of political claims analysis concerns the discursive content of claims. Frame and political discourse analysts have rightly criticized protest event studies for paying scant attention to the discursive content of contentious claims making. As mentioned, our political claims analysis approach attempts to breach this discursive deficit in two ways: first, by including discursively rich "speech" forms of claims making; and second, by using open, detailed category systems for the central variables that closely match the discursive content of the original claim. However, as newspaper reports on claims making are not the discursively richest source available when compared to the other written documents—programs, brochures, leaflets, or original press releases—that can be used to analyze movement discourses, it is still valid to ask what our method can do when compared to conventional discourse and framing analyses.

Our method has two important advantages. First, the discursive claims we code are the result of the actual, strategic actions of the claims makers in the public sphere. As such, claims can be directly related to other forms of action in the public sphere, such as protest mobilization or political decision making. This constitutes a gain over conventional discourse and frame analysis, which—like protest event analysis—is hampered by the difficulty of relating its data to other variables. As a result, conventional discourse approaches have difficulty in explaining why some frames or discourses are used and others not, and why some are successful and others not. Second, our data allow us to place individual discourses or frames in a representative context, as a basis for drawing grounded conclusions about the "dominance" of certain frames over others, and the "success" of some over others.

We briefly illustrate these points with an example regarding the claims making of ethnic minorities in Britain and Germany. Recent work in the field of migration and minority-ethnic relations has focussed on the challenge to the receiving liberal nation states of a "multicultural" conception of citizenship posed by migrant communities (e.g., Kymlicka 1995; Young 1998). Unlike the old Marshallian conception of citizenship, which was founded on the idea of equal civic, social, and political rights for all citizens, recent migrants and minorities, particularly those with a non-Western cultural background, are seen as bringing a new conception of citizenship based on special arrangements, rights, and exemptions from duties for cultural minorities. Evidence to substantiate this view of minority claims making, has been limited to a few paradigmatic examples that are regularly repeated in the literature, such as the French *foulard* affair, triggered by the insistence of Islamic girls on wearing their headscarves at school, and the British Rushdie affair, when Islamic groups demanded the banning of the *Satanic Verses* on the grounds of blasphemy.

Similar cases to this type of cultural demands can be found in our sample. Thus, the Muslim Youth Movement in Bradford, Northern Britain, expressed support for the *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie and stated: "Let us take him to Medina and let us stone him to death. Every Muslim should be prepared to cast the first stone." In addition to such radical claims, which are strongly dissociative in relation to the receiving country, we also find examples of more moderate minority demands for special cultural rights. Thus, the Confederation of Indian Organizations demanded that Indian languages be taught in British schools on a par with European foreign languages. In an example from the German study, the Center for Turkish Studies called for the introduction of Islamic religious education in schools, and special provisions for Muslims, such as graveyards and facilities for the slaughtering of animals according to the Islamic rite. All this, the Center emphasized, was necessary to further the "cultural identity" of Muslim immigrants. These examples drawn from our data serve as an indication of the level of discursive detail they contain.

Table 5. Claims by Migrants and Ethnic Minorities for Cultural Rights and Recognition in Britain and Germany, 1990-1995

	Britain	Germany
Number of claims for cultural rights and recognition	39	12
As a percentage of all minority claims in the field of minority rights and integration	32.5%	25.0%
As a percentage of all minority claims making on migration and ethnic relations	17.4%	2.8%
As a percentage of all minority claims making	16.5%	1.6%
Total number of minority claims	236	757

While demands for multicultural rights are certainly an element of migrant and minority claims making in Britain and Germany, the question remains whether they are as common and as representative for the overall pattern of minority claims making as the literature suggests. As table 5 shows, we found 39 claims by minority groups in Britain, and twelve in Germany, that fitted the "multicultural" discourse on citizenship, containing demands for cultural rights or for the recognition of the cultural identity of minority groups. Whether this is a little or a lot can only be assessed by relating these numbers to a wider context of minority claims making. In the second row of the table, we have presented the number of cultural claims as a percentage of all claims within the issue field of "minority

rights and integration," which in addition includes demands relating to the classical dimensions of citizenship: civic (freedom of association, access to citizenship), political (voting rights and political participation), and social (access to the labor market, education, etc.) rights and participation. As the table shows, demands within the "multicultural" citizenship frame make up a sizeable share of demands in this field, but the large majority (two thirds in Britain, three quarters in Germany) of the claims of minorities remain within the confines of the classical idea of citizenship by referring to equal rights and participation, irrespective of cultural background.

A second point of reference for assessing the relevance of multicultural claims is presented in the third row, which gives the multicultural claims as a percentage of all minority claims within the field of migration and ethnic relations (which, in addition to issues of minority rights and integration, includes immigration and asylum politics, as well as claims making against racism and discrimination). This further reduces the relative significance of multicultural claims, particularly in Germany. Finally, we relate multicultural claims making to all migrant and minority claims (the fourth row of the table), which now includes also claims outside the field of migration and ethnic relations, and in particular claims related to the politics of migrants' homelands. This further reduces the relative significance of multicultural claims to 1.6 percent in Germany. In Britain, however, multicultural claims continue to constitute a significant part of minority claims making (16.5 percent).

This is not the place to discuss the implications of these findings for theorizing on the relation between immigration, citizenship, and the nation state, nor to explain the differences between Britain and Germany (for a detailed treatment, see Koopmans and Statham 1998). What we want to emphasize in this context is that our method has allowed us to place a particular, multicultural, discourse on citizenship in a wider thematic context of minority claims making. At the very least, these data relativize the role of claims for special cultural rights in the discursive repertoire of migrants and minorities. Moreover, the data show that important differences in the relative weight of such claims may occur between countries, a finding which, probably as a result of the exclusive reliance on impressionistic evidence, seems to have been overlooked in most studies on this topic.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In recent years the analysis of protest event data, usually drawn from newspaper sources, has dramatically improved the empirical basis of research on protest, social movements and collective action. However, there are a number of disadvantages to this method. Protest event data often tend to reduce social movements, protest, and collective action to a limited range of forms of non-routine action, and to identify these phenomena with an equally limited range of non-institutional actors. Therefore, in our view, conventional protest event data present us a highly selective and biased view of the contentious politics of collective claims making. For the analysis of political contention in democratic polities, we can no longer stick to the rigid dichotomies between challengers and members of the polity, or between (unconventional, disruptive) protest and other more institutional or conventional forms of collective claims making. In addition, protest event analysis has not been very good at incorporating the discursive side of claims making, which has received important emphasis in recent theorizing. It is small wonder then that scholars who stress the role of collective identities, framing processes, and political discourse tend to be skeptical about the ambitious data gathering efforts of protest event analysts, which they see as failing to capture some of the most relevant aspects of contentious collective action.

Instead of throwing away the proverbial baby with the bath water, we have indicated that it is possible to extend the methodology of protest event analysis to incorporate a much

broader range of actors and action forms, thus situating protest and social movements in the broader field of political contention and claims making. This methodology moreover entails that protest data become part of a larger data set that also includes the claims making of other actors within the public sphere. This allows for analyses of the interaction between different actors and types of claims making, as well as identification of causes and outcomes of protest mobilization. In addition, we have indicated how political claims analysis is able to incorporate the discursive side of collective action, and may thus help us to further link and integrate political opportunity and framing perspectives.

There are, of course, limits to the possibilities of political claims analysis. Much depends on the kind of research question one seeks to address, whether it is a viable and preferable alternative to protest event analysis, or qualitative discourse analysis. Political claims analysis is not a viable alternative to protest event studies that focus on the whole protest sector in one or several countries (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht, Hocke and Ohlemacher 1992). Broadening the sample to all forms of claims making, by all actors, relating to all possible issues, would imply the coding of entire newspapers. Neither can the methodology we propose replace detailed studies of political discourse and framing on specific topics, based on documents, interviews, or focus groups. There are certainly limits to the discursive detail of claims making that can be distilled from newspaper coverage, and the more one's focus is on the framing of a relatively narrow and specific issue, the more one may want to rely on other, qualitatively richer sources.

However, especially for middle-range studies, which focus on political contention within broader issue or policy fields, or which focus on the claims making of a particular category of actors, our approach, which seeks to combine the strengths of protest event analysis with those of frame and discourse analysis, can provide important analytic insights that the other alternatives cannot. We believe that by situating protest and social movements not just theoretically, but also methodologically in a wider context of political claims making, we are in a better position to follow the recent calls for more integrated approaches, which place protest within multi-organizational fields, link it to political opportunities and outcomes, and are sensitive to its discursive message.

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