Volunteer Activism and Professionalism in Social Movement Organizations*

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The effects of professionalism on volunteer activism within social movement organizations (SMOs) are more complex than generally recognized. Professionalism can inhibit or erode, substitute for, or facilitate volunteer activism. Most studies identify one of these patterns as typical of SMOs or dominant in a particular case. This article argues that some combination of the three, rather than a single pattern, is probably more typical of SMOs. To identify such combinations two analytic tools are needed: a more complex concept of volunteer activism than is generally used, and, a broader understanding of the means by which professionals influence volunteer activism. This article develops these tools through a comparative case study of the umbrella organizations of three major peace campaigns — the Emergency Peace Campaign (1936-1937), the atomic test ban campaign (1957-1963), and the nuclear weapons freeze campaign (1979-1986). The umbrella organizations are then shown to incorporate different combinations of the three basic patterns of professional-volunteer relations.

Introduction

The use of paid professionals in social change organizations including unions, parties, and social movement organizations (SMOs) has long been an important feature of political life. Since Michels's (1962 [1915]) formulation of the "iron law of oligarchy," the effects of professionals on volunteer activism have been debated by scholars and activists. More recently, the rise of resource mobilization perspectives on social movements has led to extensive analysis of movement professionalism and its relationship to volunteer activism in the civil rights (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Jenkins and Eckert 1986), women's (Staggenborg 1988), environmental (Cable 1984) and other movements.

Taken together, these and other studies find three basic patterns of influence: professionals inhibit or erode volunteer activism; they replace it; or they facilitate it. Most studies either claim that one of these three patterns is typical of SMOs or identify only one as dominant in a particular case. It is my contention that SMOs are more likely to incorporate some combination of the three effects, at the same time or over time, than to include only one pattern. However, recognition of combined and complex effects is inhibited by two problems — analyses rarely attend to the complexity of volunteer activism, and they do not examine the various means by which professionals influence volunteer activism.

In this article I propose to analyze the concept of volunteer activism into its key qualitative and quantitative dimensions and to identify the major means of influence of professionalism on volunteer activism. I will do this through a comparative case study of the umbrella organizations of the peace movement's major peacetime mobilizations since World War I: the Emergency Peace Campaign (1936-1937); the atomic test ban campaign (1957-1963); and, the nuclear weapons freeze campaign (1979-1986). I will then show that using a complex conception of volunteer activism and recognizing several means of professional influence on

volunteer activism, I can identify different combinations of the three basic patterns of influence in the campaign organizations.

I proceed in three basic steps. First I discuss social movement professionalism and volunteer activism, emphasizing major findings and debates about the relations between the two. Second I present my findings about the peace campaigns. This section is the most extensive. Here I give a brief overview of the peace movement and peace campaigns, discuss data and methods, and present a brief history of each campaign. I use these histories to develop a typology of volunteer activism consisting of several quantitative and qualitative variables. Next I examine how professionalism affected these different dimensions of volunteer activism. The discussion is organized by the four key means of influence I find, and shows that in each campaign organization professionalism had mixed effects on volunteer activism, involving different combinations of inhibition/erosion, substitution, and facilitation. Finally, in the third step, I discuss the implications of my findings for social movement theory.

Social Movement Professionalism and Volunteer Activism

McCarthy and Zald (1973) introduced the concept of the professional social movement organization (PSMO) as one that is founded and run by paid staff members who raise money rather than recruit volunteers. PSMOs typically rely upon resources raised from outside any active membership. I use the term "professionalism" more broadly, meaning the use of paid staff supported by either outside or internal resources or both. While it is customary in this literature to refer to all paid staff as "professionals," most analyses, including this one, actually focus on staff members in leadership and decision-making roles rather than on clerical or other support staff. This does not imply, however, that these staff members possess particular skills and credentials that might be typical of professionals outside the social movement sector.

Discussions of professional-volunteer relations are pitched at both organization and movement levels. This article focuses on the internal dynamics of SMOs but translates movement-level claims into organization-level arguments. The implications of my findings for movement-level issues are examined in the final section of the article.

Inhibition or Erosion

Within organizations, the best known analysis stems from two classic accounts, Max Weber's theories of bureaucracy and the routinization of charisma, and Robert Michels's iron law of oligarchy. In this "Weber-Michels model" (Zald and Ash 1966), social change organizations become dominated by oligarchical leaders who chart a cautious and conservative course to ensure organizational survival, minimize elite opposition, and maximize their career chances inside and outside the organization. This model suggests that professionals *inhibit or erode* volunteer activism by discouraging participation by members in the internal affairs of the organization and by avoiding political strategies that require grassroots mobilization. This pattern of inhibition and erosion may reflect tendencies that do express themselves in many organizations (Jenkins 1989). However, it is not, according to Zald and Ash and other critics, an inevitable outcome. Studies have shown cases of organizational democracy in which rank-and-file participation does not decline dramatically over time (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956) and in which paid leaders tend to be more radical than volunteer members (Jenkins 1977).

At the movement level, Piven and Cloward (1979) claim that for movements of the poor, the construction of formal organization leads to mass demobilization. Organization-building diverts grassroots energy from unruly protest, the most effective tactic. This is partly

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an argument about professionalism, as paid staff are particularly vulnerable to elite efforts at cooptation. Despite criticism on historical and theoretical grounds (e.g., Jenkins 1979; Massad 1980) this analysis remains influential.

A less sweeping argument is that the outside funding that often accompanies professionalism may lead to the erosion of volunteer activism. SMOs dependent on elite sponsorship may moderate their goals and tactics, turning more often to lobbying and publicizing than to protest (Jenkins 1987, 1989). At the movement level there is the possibility of a "channeling" effect. Jenkins and Eckert (1986) claim that elites responded to the civil rights movement by funding moderate, relatively-professionalized organizations rather than more radical grassroots groups. This contributed to the moderation of the movement as a whole and to the demobilization of volunteer activists.

Substitution

A second net effect is *substitution*. McCarthy and Zald (1973) claim that PSMOs may represent the interests of deprived constituencies and marginalized voices. Their assertion that PSMOs are becoming more dominant within movements means that at the level of movements, professionalism may substitute for volunteer activism. Lost in the debates over which, if any, movements have become more professionalized (and when) is the important insight that professionalism, under some circumstances, can substitute for some of the functions of volunteer activism. One can make a similar analysis of SMOs themselves — within organizations, the actions of paid staff may substitute for the actions of volunteer activists, provided funds can be raised to support the paid staff. Of course, a few staff members cannot do the same things as masses of activists, but they can both sustain organizations during times of limited political opportunity (Morris 1984; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989) and take advantage of expanded opportunities to build public support and generate political pressure (McCarthy 1987; Staggenborg 1988). The effects of such substitution are debatable. The arguments about channeling, demobilization, and cooptation cannot be ignored. Where volunteer mobilization is difficult to catalyze or maintain, however, professionalism is often seen as a viable way of promoting a campaign (Cable 1984) or of sustaining a movement or organization (McCarthy and Zald 1973).

Facilitation

A third effect is that professionalism may *facilitate* volunteer activism. This may happen more or less deliberately and directly at the movement level and within organizations. Indirectly and almost accidentally, by helping to maintain the ideals and goals of a movement during times of limited political opportunity and little volunteer activism, professionals may contribute to an upsurge in activism when opportunity expands. Rupp and Taylor (1987) describe the women's movement in the "doldrums" between World War II and the resurgence of activism in the 1960s as partly "elite-sustained."

In other cases facilitation is more direct and deliberate. "Movement halfway houses" (Morris 1984:139-173) are small and socially marginal organizations, such as the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), that include paid staff and a small group of volunteers. They help to sustain oppositional cultures and ideals, but they also bring together and train volunteer activists. The FOR, the Highlander Folk School, and other groups were instrumental in training indigenous civil rights leaders in the philosophy and tactics of nonviolent mass protest and in other aspects of organizing. Halfway houses are one variety of "movement mentoring organization" that inspire volunteer activism but rarely incorporate it within its organizational boundaries (Edwards and McCarthy 1992). Professionals play key roles in many of these organizations.

Within SMOs professionals may facilitate volunteer activism during both movement doldrums and upsurges. Staggenborg's (1988) analysis of pro-choice groups shows how professionals increased both the effectiveness and the duration of volunteer activism through coordination, training, and the formalization of organizational structure. Many SMOs, labor unions, and other organizations employ professional organizers whose job is to recruit and train volunteer activists.

To avoid going too far outside the scope of this article, I would simply suggest that to understand more fully the dynamics of professional-volunteer relations within organizations, it is helpful to differentiate the concept of SMO, which, like the concept of volunteer activism, is often treated as a simple one. For example, it might be fruitful to distinguish sustaining from mobilizing organizations. When professionals facilitate volunteer activism within organizations, this may create tensions between paid staff and volunteers (Kleidman 1993). For this and other reasons, some SMOs are poorly equipped to incorporate an influx of volunteer activists. The transition from a sustaining structure to a mobilizing structure may be difficult or impossible. That is one reason that the core peace organizations established separate campaign organizations. (Ironically, the campaigns eventually suffered from the difficulties encountered by the umbrella organizations in sustaining volunteer activism long enough to achieve success in the face of political setbacks.) Beyond the distinction between sustaining and mobilizing structures, it is important to recognize the role of mentoring organizations, which may be outside of what is usually considered the social movement sector.

Facilitation involves more than just numbers. Staggenborg's and Morris's studies identify dimensions of volunteer activism such as skill level, and means of influence such as training, that will be included in the analysis below.

Of the three basic patterns — inhibition/erosion, substitution, and facilitation — existing models or studies tend to demonstrate or emphasize only one. This tendency is caused in part by treating volunteer activism as a simple unitary concept. Even with such a concept, it is reasonable to expect changes over time in how professionalism affects volunteer activism within a single SMO or within a movement. For example, as suggested above, substitution may eventually lead to facilitation, as organizations and movements dominated by professionals catalyze volunteer activism when political space expands. However, professionals may react to new opportunities by stepping up professional activism rather than turning to new volunteer activists — substitution is different from facilitation, even over the long term. Professionals may even discourage new volunteer activism that does not fit their model of change or that threatens their dominance of a movement or organization (Ratcliff 1985) — substitution may lead to inhibition or erosion.

Scholars have rarely examined such changes over time in professional-volunteer relations. However, if one breaks down volunteer activism into several variables, not only would one expect mixed effects over time, but one would also expect that at any given time professionalism might have different effects on the different dimensions of volunteer activism. Professionalism may facilitate some aspects of volunteer activism while inhibiting others and substituting for still others.

Professionalism has been recognized as a complex concept. McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) acknowledge that their model of the PSMO is an ideal type. The two basic variables, the use of paid staff and reliance on outside resources, are separable although they tend to go together (Oliver 1983). They also vary both qualitatively and quantitatively. Quantitatively, SMOs range from total reliance on paid staff to completely volunteer driven, and from full dependence on outside funding to use of only indigenous resources. Qualitatively, Oliver (1983) notes that paid staff includes a variety of positions with varying interests. Entrepreneurs establish organizations, staff run them, and organizers seek to recruit and train volunteer activists and leaders. Similarly, Oliver shows, there are differences in outside resources.

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They may be raised in small or large amounts from a variety of sources, with concomitant changes in constraints imposed on the SMOs that mobilize these particular types of resources.

Volunteer activism, as I will show, is likewise a complex concept. If one sees both professionalism and volunteer activism as multidimensional, then one is more likely to find mixed effects. It is also easier to locate different ways in which professionalism affects volunteer activism. Existing studies have identified some. For example, the Weber-Michels model suggests that professionals may influence, if not control, organizational structure. While SMOs may tend toward oligarchy for various reasons, the actions of professionals may accelerate this tendency and discourage volunteer activism. Alternatively, staff may try to minimize oligarchy and encourage volunteers. A second means of influence involves training. The previously-mentioned studies by Morris and by Staggenborg, and discussions of the staff role of organizer (e.g., Oliver 1983), suggest that training provided by staff has important effects on volunteer activism. In the next section, I identify systematically the major means by which professionalism affected the various dimensions of volunteer activism within peace campaign organizations. I will then revisit the debates about how professionalism affects volunteer activism, with a greater ability to identify complex patterns of influence.

The Peace Movement and Peace Campaigns

Since World War I, the peace movement in the United States has been sustained by a core of a few organizations, pacifist and nonpacifist, that have relied on paid professionals and a small group of volunteer activists. Three times these organizations have succeeded in launching major peacetime campaigns. In 1936, fearing the approach of World War II, they created the Emergency Peace Campaign (EPC) to promote United States neutrality and international economic cooperation. In 1957, as the dangers of atmospheric testing received great publicity, they initiated an atomic test ban campaign. In 1979 and 1980, as cold war tensions escalated, they started the nuclear weapons freeze campaign. Each time, staff members of the peace groups formed a coalition, developed basic goals and strategies, and created umbrella organizations to coordinate the campaigns: the EPC; the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), and the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA) during the test ban campaign; and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC).[1]

Data and Methods

This analysis is based on examination of documents generated by the campaign organizations and the sponsoring peace organizations,[2] interviews with key informants, observations of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (I was active within the organization at local, state, and national levels) and secondary sources.

The method used is that of the comparative case study (George 1979; Ragin 1987) or comparative history (Goldstone 1990). In analyzing similar processes in different historical contexts, these methods attempt to develop not universal laws but specific explanations grounded in general variables. The ultimate goal is the development of "typological theory"— rich, differentiated theory that identifies both the variety of possible causal patterns

1. In the EPC the central organization was almost coterminous with the broader campaign, and both are typically capitalized. The nuclear weapons freeze campaign extended far beyond the bounds of the NWFC organization and is typically referred to in lower-case while the organization is capitalized.

2. Campaign documents include the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.: Emergency Peace Campaign (EPC); Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA); SANE, A Citizens' Organization for a Sane World [formerly The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy] (SANE); and the Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri - St. Louis: Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC).

and the conditions under which each might occur (George 1979). This article stresses the first of these two; the second, identifying conditions likely to produce each pattern, requires further research in other cases.

Typological theory building requires concept development and the identification of causal patterns. Both involve a combination of deductive and inductive logic. In this research, concept development starts with existing notions of volunteer activism, hypothesizes that it is a complex concept, and then examines the cases to identify its different dimensions. My use of the term "variable" to refer to these dimensions implies only that they are concepts that may take on a range of values. It is not meant to imply a model of linear causation. Comparative historical analysis recognizes that causation may be multiple and conjunctural (Ragin 1987) and dependent on historical context and temporal issues such as the pace, duration, and trajectory of events (Aminzade 1992). Causation may also be reciprocal — while I emphasize the effects of professionalism on volunteer activism, it is also true that the actions of volunteers shape and constrain those of professionals.

The identification of causal patterns followed a similar process of reconstruction of existing ideas (Burawoy 1991). Here I began with a few hypotheses, discussed in the preceding literature review, about how professionalism affects volunteer activism. I then looked at the cases individually and together to discover how and when these and possibly other effects occurred. The identification of cause-and-effect relations depends upon constructing a plausible historical account from the existing traces of evidence (Goldstone 1990).

Plausibility typically involves combining a credible narrative and the construction or use of sound theory (George 1979; Goldstone 1990). In this article the historical accounts must be somewhat brief; a more detailed analytic narrative of each campaign can be found in Kleidman (1993). In terms of theory, I show in this article that the causal patterns identified — the means of influence and their effects (inhibit/erode, substitute, or facilitate) — are consistent with existing understandings of professional-volunteer relations, even though they combine in ways more complex than usually recognized.

To develop the key concepts and identify important causal patterns, I compare similar cases — the umbrella organizations of the three major peace campaigns in the United States since World War I. These campaigns represent the peaks of peacetime mobilization of the peace movement in the United States since World War I. Their umbrella organizations were given identical mandates by the coalition members — to catalyze and coordinate a major campaign that would achieve one or two key goals in a limited time period. They faced similar political opportunities — widespread public fears during peacetime and an elite divided over policy. They followed similar trajectories — a rapid start, early success, political and organizational problems, a quick decline. There were also important differences in the state of the peace movement and in political and social context. However, the differences in volunteer activism and professional-volunteer relations are not merely reflections of differences in context. Within each organization, the plans and practices of professionals shaped volunteer activism.

I exclude from this analysis antiwar protests. While they also are grounded in the peace movement, such protests differ in many ways that would, at least initially, make comparative study of both antiwar protests and peace campaigns difficult. Among these differences are: political opportunity (only rarely are elites divided once war breaks out); constituencies (potential draftees, for example, may be more important during antiwar movements than peace campaigns); and, organizational dynamics (few antiwar movements center on one or two organizations in the ways that peace campaigns do).

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The Peace Campaigns

This section presents brief narratives of the campaigns, highlighting issues relevant in the analysis section, which will also add some further descriptive data.

The Emergency Peace Campaign

The Emergency Peace Campaign was launched in 1936 to promote U.S. neutrality and international economic cooperation. The umbrella organizations' top leaders and staff members were mostly staff members from the pacifist organizations, along with a few from liberal internationalist groups. The EPC had a large budget — almost $2 million for each of its two years (in 1984 dollars, a standard I use for all three campaigns). Funds came mainly from wealthy Quaker families. At its peak in early 1936 the EPC employed a national and regional staff of 200. Many staff members were serving at subsistence wages, understanding that the Campaign was a brief emergency mobilization and wishing to devote full time to it before returning to jobs, mostly outside social movement groups.[3] At the local level, the Campaign generated almost 1,700 chapters. Most of these, however, consisted of one or two activists who helped run programs such as mass meetings that were planned by the national office.

The Atomic Test Ban Campaign

The test ban campaign also began as a coalition between pacifists and liberal internationalists. Catalyzed by evidence of health risks from atomic fallout and inspired by a small but visible international movement for a test ban, peace leaders in the United States established two organizations. The Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA, first known as Nonviolent Action Against Nuclear Weapons) began and remained a handful of pacifists who participated in small but often dramatic direct actions, such as sailing ships into the Pacific testing sites and demonstrating at missile factories and launch sites, sometimes breaking the law to go inside or to blockade these sites. Except for a paid staff member, all CNVA activists were volunteer.

SANE, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, was to be a liberal organization engaged in high-level lobbying and public education with a small outreach effort to involve local activists. From the start of the test ban campaign in 1957 until the signing of the limited test ban treaty in 1963, the professional component of SANE was smaller than that of the EPC, never exceeding 12 paid staff or a budget of more then $760,000 (in 1984 dollars) in any year. However, local response to the campaign was much greater than its founders expected. One hundred seventy-five chapters were formed by local activists, giving the organization a group of between 4,000 and 7,000 volunteer activists (figuring between 20 and 40 activists per local chapter). Local chapters were mostly self-directed and local leaders soon played a major role in national SANE's policymaking. After the treaty was signed, the organization declined sharply in size (number of chapters and volunteer activists), activity, visibility, and influence. SANE was kept alive by a few paid staff at the national level and a handful of volunteer-sustained chapters, and went on to form part of the liberal wing of the protest movement against the Vietnam War.

The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign

The nuclear weapons freeze campaign started in 1979 at both local (western Massachusetts) and national levels. It was the major U.S. component of the next wave of international protests against the nuclear arms race. The national organization, the NWFC, was established

3. James Mullin (former Assistant Director, Emergency Peace Campaign), May 5, 1989, Iowa City, Iowa, personal communication.

by a group of peace movement leaders along with dozens of local activists from community, environmental, religious, and other groups. It began with the stated intention of combining an extensive network of grassroots activists with a small national clearinghouse devoted to facilitating local work. The grassroots component spread quickly, coming to include 1,800 chapters with some 45,000 to 72,000 volunteer local activists. These chapters sponsored local and then state-level ballot referenda and legislative resolutions, almost all of which passed, as part of a strategy of building pressure from the ground up for a freeze.

The clearinghouse began to attract foundation and major donor funding, raising its budget to $1.3 million per year and the number of paid staff to 25. In addition, local and state chapters hired 55 paid staff (or the full-time equivalent). After the House of Representatives passed a nonbinding freeze resolution in 1983 and Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984, the campaign and its leading organization declined in size (paid and volunteer activists and number of chapters), activity, visibility, and influence. In 1987 the NWFC merged with SANE to form an organization renamed Peace Action in 1993.

Variations in Volunteer Activism

By comparing the four organizations, one can see both obvious and subtle dimensions of volunteer activism. The most obvious are *quantitative* differences. These include *number* of activists, *duration* of activism, and *intensity* of activism. Both the EPC and SANE included between 3,000 and 4,000 volunteer activists, while the NWFC was much larger with perhaps ten times as many. Both antinuclear groups maintained varying numbers of volunteer activists for more than five years, while the EPC lasted only two. Any assessment of volunteer activism would start with these salient facts, to which I will return in assessing means of influence and overall impact. Both number of volunteer activists and duration of volunteer activism increased over time across the campaign organizations. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on intensity of volunteer activism. Researchers rarely attempt to measure this, although they are aware of the difference between devoting every waking hour to a cause, typical of core activists during peak mobilization, and spending a few hours a month or less, typical of peripheral members and of non-peak periods.

The more subtle variations in volunteer activism differences are *qualitative*. I examine four: the *degree of voluntariness* of activism (from uncompensated to full-time paid); its *autonomy*; its *rootedness in local communities*; and its *efficacy*. See Figure 1.

Voluntariness

The notion of voluntary labor is not as simple as it first appears. Rather than treating paid and unpaid labor as a dichotomy, it is better to consider a *range of voluntariness* that varies by amount of compensation and sacrifice. The people who worked full time for the EPC in return for subsistence wages cannot be considered pure volunteers, but neither were they career movement staffers. Recognizing this puts a different face on what appeared to be a largely professionalized organization. Similarly, many local NWFC staff members were poorly compensated, worked long hours, and had little or no job security. Some worked as office staff, some as door-to-door canvassers. They took these positions for a mix of motives, not surprisingly. Oliver (1983) found that paid activists do not necessarily differ from volunteers in their commitment to a cause. Some local Freeze staffers hoped to make activism a career, and some succeeded. Those who saw this poorly-paid activism as a break from their ordinary careers or pursuits were similar to the EPC staff members — i.e., they can be seen as quasi-volunteers. Differences in degree of voluntariness may be related to the quantitative variable

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of intensity — one way activists manage to devote long hours for some period of time to a movement is to find some position within an SMO that provides subsistence compensation.

Autonomy

The *autonomy* of local activists also varied. This variation is related to the distinction made by McCarthy and Zald (1977) between federated and isolated organizations. SANE and the NWFC were federated organizations in which local activists worked mainly in chapters, developing programs, building organizations, and cultivating local leaders. The EPC was closer to an isolated organization, one in which little if any face-to-face interaction occurs among local volunteer activists, who relate upward to an office rather than horizontally to peers. The local chapters of SANE and the NWFC were highly autonomous, guided but not directed by national offices. Although some federated organizations are more centralized and give local chapters less freedom than did SANE and the NWFC, it is probably the case that activists in most federated organizations enjoy more autonomy than those in isolated organizations. Local chapters both require and create more freedom to innovate than is found in isolated structures. Isolated structures also are less likely to promote the rise of indigenous leaders or to develop roots in local communities.

Rootedness

Rootedness is another qualitative variable. The terms "grassroots" and volunteer activism are sometimes used interchangeably, but they are not the same, nor are they identical to local activism. Local activism may be paid, although local groups tend to rely more on volunteer activism than do national organizations (Oliver and Furman 1990). Volunteer activism may be more or less grassroots. Grassroots implies a base in a community, whether residential or occupational. Of the four campaign organizations, CNVA had the highest proportion of volunteer to paid activists and the greatest propensity to use disruptive protest, both hallmarks of grassroots activism. It had no local chapters or other community links, however. Activists traveled to symbolically-important locations and then returned (one protest involved a longer-term presence but still did not establish links with the local community).

However one chooses to use the term grassroots (Alger and Mendlovitz 1983 discuss several meanings), it is important to recognize the rootedness variable of grassroots activism. It may, for example, be linked to the issue of duration, particularly if one takes a long-term view of movements and activism. Campaigns and other mobilizations affect movements and politics by changing activists' beliefs and identities, and by developing leaders, networks, and organizations (Gusfield 1981; Marwell, Aiken, and Demerath 1987; McAdam 1988; Meyer and Whittier 1992; Taylor 1989; Whalen and Flacks 1989; Whittier 1994). Many of these effects operate at the community level and are strongest when SMOs establish deep roots.

Efficacy

Finally, volunteer activism varies greatly in *efficacy*. This is the most difficult variable to measure. Movement outcome is notoriously hard to determine, and the contribution of volunteer activism to outcome is equally difficult to establish. Nevertheless it is important to recognize this variable and to make some informed speculations about how professionals may affect it. I do this below in discussing training as an intangible resource. Like intensity of activism, there are little data available concerning the efficacy of activism in the campaign organizations. Of the three campaign organizations, the NWFC put the greatest emphasis on volunteer training and may have had the greatest facilitating effect on efficacy.

Volunteer activism is a complex concept. It includes quantitative dimensions — numbers, intensity, duration — and qualitative dimensions — degree of voluntariness, autonomy, community rootedness, and efficacy. By recognizing these dimensions and treating them as variables, one can better understand both the consequences of volunteer activism and how it is affected by professionalism.

Effects of Professionalism on Volunteer Activism

Professionalism may inhibit or erode, substitute for, or facilitate volunteer activism. Each core peace campaign organization showed some combination of the three. Some of these effects are only apparent if one looks at both quantitative and qualitative aspects of volunteer activism. I organize this analysis by identifying four key means by which professionals influence volunteer activism: *leadership, planning, and coordination; development and implementation of strategies and tactics; shaping the structure of SMOs;* and the *mobilization and deployment of resources within SMOs.* See Figure 1.

For each means of influence, I look at effects (inhibit/erode, substitute, facilitate) on both quantitative and qualitative measures of activism. Rather than systematically assessing the effects of each mechanism on each variable for all three organizations, I will examine the strongest or most interesting effects. The goal here is to identify the various mechanisms of influence and their effects, it is not to try to give a full account of the course of each organization or to develop hypotheses about when professionalism has each effect. I will analyze only the three core campaign organizations — the EPC, SANE, and the NWFC. The fourth, CNVA, did not have any substantial level of professionalism. The overall model is shown in Figure 1.

Leadership, Planning, Coordination

In all three organizations, professionals increased the number of volunteer activists in the peace movement by devising and initiating the campaigns. They focused the campaigns on one or two key goals that were popular or potentially popular. They framed key issues in ways that were simple, compelling, and favorable to the peace movement. They provided to potential activists an effort that appeared both short-term and winnable. They attracted enough elite support to legitimize the campaigns. They provided coordination so that the work of activists in different locales was focused on similar goals and so that there was some relatively efficient division of labor within the larger campaigns.

Professionals also inhibited or eroded potential or actual volunteer activists. In the EPC, very strong staff leadership along with a highly centralized structure and a strategy that avoided mass tactics (discussed below) inhibited any greater increase of grassroots activism and limited the autonomy of those activists who were mobilized. SANE's top staff responded to Congressional red-baiting in a way that many volunteer activists saw as timid and capitulating, leading many to leave the organization and some to drop out of the movement (some moving into civil rights and other work). They also instituted chartering requirements that reduced the autonomy of local chapters. Sympathetic critics of the NWFC (e.g., Solo 1988; Meyer 1990) argue that the staff of the NWFC failed to provide sufficient leadership and coordination to keep a sense of momentum after political setbacks in 1983 and 1984. In essence they handed over symbolic and strategic leadership of the freeze campaign to politicians, leading to the institutionalization of the campaign and the demobilization of the volunteer base of the freeze organization and other groups.