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# THE MORAL BASIS OF MORAL REFORM: STATUS DISCONTENT VS. CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION AS EXPLANATIONS OF ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY SOCIAL MOVEMENT ADHERENCE\*

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*Using data from the General Social Surveys 1973 to 1980 on beliefs and opinions about pornography, we attempt to evaluate two explanations of the social base of moral reform movements. We find that various structural conditions, such as being geographically mobile from rural areas, being self-employed, or being status discrepant, have no effect on anti-pornography social movement adherence when variables representing different socialization experiences and cultural environments are taken into account (religion, education, residence, age and sex). Historical evidence challenging previous status discontent interpretations of the American temperance movement and German National Socialism is also reviewed. It is concluded that no special theories positing status frustration are required to account for moral-reform social movement adherence.*

Social movements aimed at restricting groups or behaviors defined as dangerous and a threat to social order have been an important and recurring feature of American society and political history (Tyler, 1944; Walters, 1978; Lipset and Raab, 1978), and also of modern European history (Linz, 1976; Lacquer, 1976). Some of these movements aim at controlling personal behavior and definitions of morality (e.g., temperance and anti-pornography) and hence may be termed "moral reform."

The predominant sociological explanation of motivations to support "preservatist" (Lipset and Raab, 1978) right-wing and moral-reform movements focuses on incongruities in the stratification system with accompanying experienced dissatisfaction (status discontent). The argument suggests that moral reform supporters occupy social positions (e.g., "old middle class") for which there is a gap between the power and prestige they expect and that which they enjoy. Status discontent, experienced disproportionately by individuals occupying

the middle ranks of the stratification hierarchy, has been advanced as an explanation of support for a wide variety of right-wing movements, from German National Socialism (Lasswell, 1933; Lipset, 1981), to the Ku Klux Klan and McCarthyism (Lipset and Raab, 1978), to Temperance (Gusfield, 1963) and community anti-pornography crusades (Zurcher and Kirkpatrick, 1976).

An alternative to the status discontent/structural explanation is to explain moral reform support as an outgrowth of cognitive processes and judgments explainable by an individual's background and learning experiences just as are other beliefs and judgments. A culture and socialization alternative has been conceptually ignored and empirically confounded with status discontent in previous research. The present study attempts to evaluate these two explanations of moral-reform support using data on anti-pornography opinion and sentiment from a general population sample.

## STATUS DISCONTENT AND STATUS DISCREPANCY

Two main variants of the status discontent argument have been advanced, one focusing on status discontent accruing to groups (Lipset, 1963a, 1963b; Lipset and Raab, 1978), the other focusing on status rank inconsistencies experienced by individuals (status discrepancy) (Eitzen, 1970; Hunt and Cushing, 1970).

According to Lipset and Raab (1978:24), status discontent has been an enduring characteristic of American political history due to social change and the relative fluidity of American social structure, which have pre-

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cluded European style "status tenure" by any particular group. Right-wing political movements such as the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society, and political "tendencies" such as McCarthyism, have been supported by Americans suffering from a sense of power and status deprivation (Lipset and Raab, 1978:23, 233). Generally speaking, the groups experiencing status discontent can be classed as the "once-hads," who feel they are losing or in danger of losing their proper share of power and status, and the "never-hads," who feel they have never gained their proper share of power and status (Lipset and Raab, 1978:23, 428). "Status substitution" is the process by which feelings of deprivation brought about by declines or threatened declines in power and status become redirected toward substitute or scapegoat targets (Lipset and Raab, 1978:118, 504). Status substitution invariably occurs in a moralistic framework, in which ". . . the cultural trappings of a group stand in for the group and become invested with special significance, at once the measure and battleground of waning dominance" (Lipset and Raab, 1978:131). The focus of status substitution is typically toward some aspect of lifestyle or behavior, or ethnic or racial groups (Lipset and Raab, 1978:429).

Gusfield's (1963) "Symbolic Crusade" interpretation of the American temperance movement represents a shift of emphasis from a more economic class based version of status discontent toward a style of life or "status group" version. Gusfield's attention centers on a collectivity of individuals not necessarily located in the same economic strata who share a style of life and who act out of interest to preserve or defend that style of life against declines in prestige and influence. Despite the shift of emphasis, however, Gusfield concurs with Lipset that the ultimate source of such support for a moral-reform movement like temperance is decline in a group's power and prestige. According to Gusfield (1963:10), the American temperance movement was supported by the native Protestant "old middle class of individual enterprisers," in an attempt to restore the prestige of its ascetic and impulse-control-oriented lifestyle by bringing about the criminalization of alcohol consumption.<sup>1</sup> In the modern era the "doomed" rem-

nants of the old middle class fight a rearguard battle in defense of a traditional style of life, despite the fact that ". . . they have ceased to be relevant economic groups" (Gusfield, 1963:9).

Status discrepancy (status inconsistency) represents an ahistorical variant of status discontent in which individuals possessing inconsistent or discrepant ranks on dimensions of social status are the focus of attention. Stemming from Lenski's (1954, 1956) pioneering work, status inconsistency arguments assume that as a result of inconsistencies in socioeconomic status individuals experience stress and respond by attempting to reduce the stress in various ways. Responses to status inconsistency take various forms, including acting to change social organization. Research on status inconsistency and political behavior and attitudes has produced disparate findings and methodological critiques (Blalock, 1966, 1967; Kelly and Chambliss, 1966; Jackson and Curtis, 1972; Olsen and Tully, 1972; Stryker and Macke, 1978). Most of the earlier research did not distinguish between particular patterns of inconsistency, assuming that inconsistency in general produced a response. Moreover, much of the earlier work found evidence that status inconsistency produced political liberalism rather than right-wing sympathy or activity. Nevertheless, the logic of status discontent was extended into the status inconsistency framework (Lipset, 1963b; Rush, 1967), and certain patterns of status discrepancy were found to be associated with positive opinions about the John Birch Society (Hunt and Cushing, 1970) and the political candidacy of George Wallace (Eitzen, 1970).<sup>2</sup>

Drawing upon this earlier work, Zurcher and Kirkpatrick (1976) argued that participants in an anti-pornography movement would tend to be over-rewarded status-inconsistent individuals, whose low investments (low-status education and/or occupation) were coupled with high returns (high-status income). The reaction of anti-pornography activists (Conpornos) to their over-rewarded status inconsistency took the form of a symbolic crusade ". . . intended to maintain a societal status quo which supports the life style of the Conpornos and which sustains the benefits of their over-rewarded status inconsistency" (Zurcher and Kirkpatrick, 1976:21).

The empirical evaluation of status discontent has been hampered by statements of the theory which make less than explicit predictions about a virtual spectrum of social groupings (Polsby,

<sup>1</sup> Gusfield specifically contrasted his argument with Lipset's, arguing that moral reform is not an irrational response to declining prestige of the lifestyle of a status group. Political reform and governmental action can influence the prestige and influence accruing to different lifestyles by legalizing or criminalizing particular kinds of behavior associated with or "symbolic" of those lifestyles.

<sup>2</sup> Lipset (1963b; Lipset and Raab, 1978) was not among those finding support for status discrepancy.

1960).<sup>3</sup> An additional problem is the confounding of status discontent factors with education, religion, and other variables whose impact is due to socialization into different value orientations (cf. Hamilton, 1975:36).

The empirical specifications presented below have been drawn chiefly from Lipset and Raab's (1978) general statement, Lipset's (1981: Ch. 5) discussion of the social factors underlying fascist movements, Gusfield (1963), and Zurcher and Kirkpatrick (1976). Of these, only Zurcher and Kirkpatrick present a clear empirical specification of where status discontent should (and should not) be found. The hypotheses presented may not be the only possible ones, but we do argue that they represent the most important predictions in the status discontent tradition. Individual page citations for each of the detailed predictions are provided.

Moral-reform (anti-pornography) social movement adherence will be more likely among:

#### 1. *The Geographic Mobile*

Migrants from rural areas and small towns to cities, especially Protestant migrants (Lipset and Raab, 1978: 118, 121, 131, 159, 303; Gusfield, 1963:106).

#### 2. *The Old Middle Class*

Owners of family-owned businesses and self-employed professionals, small businesses, especially in rural and small town settings (Lipset and Raab, 1978: 210, 310; Lipset, 1981:137, 172; Gusfield, 1963:10, 106).

#### 3. *The Upward-Mobile Status Discrepant*

The newly wealthy, upward mobile Catholics, and upward mobile Blacks (Lipset and Raab, 1978: 210, 213, 306; Lipset, 1963a: 339, 350-51).

#### 4. *The Over-Rewarded Status Discrepant*

Low investments (education or occupation) coupled with high returns (income) (Zurcher and Kirkpatrick, 1976:21; Lipset and Raab, 1978:306).

<sup>3</sup> Commenting on the essays contained in *The New American Right* (Bell, 1955), Trow (1958:271) observed: "The essays show, and quite persuasively, how and why McCarthy got disproportionate support almost everywhere: among old Americans and among new Americans; among the upwardly mobile, the downwardly mobile, and the low status non-mobile; among Catholics, Yankee Protestants, and rural fundamentalists; among workers, small businessmen, the new middle class, and the 'new rich,' etc."

### ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION

The general thesis of status discontent is that declines or threatened declines in social position produce feelings of deprivation which then become the basis for social movement support. Thus, the theory conforms to a common mode of explanation found in research on social movements (Wood and Jackson, 1982). The distinctiveness of status discontent however lies in its counterintuitive prediction about the *kind* of movement supported. The crux of the argument is that the manifest goals of social movements based in status discontent are not concerned with social position and power, but instead with the "cultural baggage" (Lipset and Raab, 1978:118, 487-88) of the groups or individuals suffering deprivation. While the movement may be *about* the use of alcohol and while it may *represent itself* as concerned with pornography, these are not its underlying reality. Alcohol and pornography are "substitutions," or "symbols," for the movement's real nature, feelings of deprivation experienced by the "once-hads" and the "never-hads." Thus, while Protestant fundamentalism has often provided the universe of discourse for American preservatist right-wing movements, this is ultimately a matter of coincidence: it simply happened to be the religion of groups experiencing feelings of deprivation and status loss (Lipset and Raab, 1978:12, 117-118).

At the theoretical level, the idea that cognitive processes and religious and educational socialization experiences might be sources of preservatist right-wing and moral-reform movement support independent of status considerations is thus implicitly or explicitly disavowed in status discontent arguments.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, however, attempts to isolate empirically the social base of right-wing movements have freely utilized indices having a culture or socialization referent such as education, size of community where raised, and age, supplying these indices with a broad status frustration interpretation (Lipset and Raab, 1978:460-66). Valid empirical evaluation of status discontent predictions requires conceptual and empirical differentiation between status discontent and a culture and socialization alternative.

The proposal that cognitive processes and socialization experiences are more than incidentally linked to moral-reform movement

<sup>4</sup> Although Gusfield (1963:57-60) denied that his account of the Temperance movement reduced reformist motivations to class interests, we are not persuaded (Wallis, 1977).

support can be found in previous research and criticism on status discontent, though differences between status discontent and a cultural explanation have not been clearly specified nor the two alternatives empirically evaluated simultaneously. Wolfinger et al. (1964) studied participants at an anti-communist study group and found no support for various status discontent predictions, suggesting instead that Protestant fundamentalist beliefs were an important background characteristic. McEvoy (1971) did not find evidence of status discrepancy among approvers of George Wallace, nor did the income and occupation distributions of Wallace approvers differ significantly from those of Nixon or Humphrey approvers. However, Wallace approvers were more likely to be affiliated with fundamentalist Protestant churches, and tended to be less educated than the other candidate-preference groups. McEvoy (1971:46) observed that Lipset (1963b:398) had earlier found that "... the most important single attribute associated with opinion of McCarthy was education. . . ."

Based on their study of a textbook-protest movement in Kanawha County, West Virginia, Page and Clelland (1978:267) argued that the textbook controversy should be interpreted as a lifestyle issue rather than a conflict over declining status "... because participants on both sides view it as a conflict over beliefs and ways of life and because neither economic nor prestige issues are major elements in the conflict." Analysis of communications from movement supporters showed major concerns with disrespect for traditional conceptions of God and the Bible, the use of profanity and vulgar language, disrespect for authority, and advocacy of moral relativism. The portion of Kanawha County threatening secession over the textbook issue contained most of the rural population of the County, with a significantly less-educated and older population. Page and Clelland (1978:279) concluded that the textbook-protest movement, and other movements concerned with sex education, pornography, evolution, busing and "decency," should be seen not as "... examples of irrational, displaced aggression in response to an economic deprivation or some general undefined frustration. Rather, they are attempts to build and sustain moral orders which provide basic meaning for human lives."

Wallis (1977) criticized Gusfield (1963) and Zurcher and Kirkpatrick (1976) along similar lines, arguing that moral indignation was a source of motivation in its own right, independent of status loss. Bland and Wallis (n.d.) found education rather than status inconsistency to be related to respondent's opinion

about the legal availability of pornography, and concluded (Bland and Wallis, 1977:429) that "... active concern about pornography is a matter of culture rather than social stratification, a matter of beliefs rather than status."<sup>5</sup> Leahy et al. (1982) studied the anti-abortion movement using various sources of data and found no direct support for status discontent, suggesting (Leahy et al., 1982:17-18) that moral crusades "... might best be interpreted as collective action aimed at controlling the nature and production of culture."

As opposed to status discontent explanations, we suggest that motivations to support moral-reform movements are an outgrowth of socialization processes and an expression of cultural values. The overall world view and belief system found among moral-reform supporters has been termed "cultural fundamentalism" (Page and Clelland, 1978; Gusfield, 1963). As shown by Page and Clelland (1978), Zurcher and Kirkpatrick (1976), Lipset and Raab (1978), and others (Clabaugh, 1974; Crawford, 1980), cultural fundamentalism involves adherence to traditional norms, respect for family and religious authority, asceticism and control of impulse. Above all, it is an unflinching and thoroughgoing moralistic outlook on the world; moralism provides a common orientation and common discourse for concerns with the use of alcohol and pornography, the rights of homosexuals, "pro-family" and "decency" issues. Rather than being coincidentally associated with moral-reform movements, traditional Christian orthodoxy and especially Protestant fundamentalism provide a frame of reference for an overall world view which is an important common denominator among supporters.

Based on the social movement research discussed above, and research on public opinions about anti-abortion, anti-ERA, and anti-busing movements (Lo, 1982), as well as research on tolerance for sexual and political nonconformity (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn et al., 1978; Stephan and McMullin, 1982; Sullivan et al., 1982; Corbett, 1982), we suggest that Christian and especially conservative Protestant religious affiliation, size of community where raised (or current residence), and education will be predictive of motivation to support moral reform, but that this occurs through cognitive and cultural means rather than through status frustration. Being raised in smaller size communities is associated with stronger adher-

<sup>5</sup> See also Zurcher and Kirkpatrick's (1977) response to Wallis, and Wilson and Zurcher's (1977) response to Bland and Wallis.

ence to traditional values and less tolerance of deviance than in urban communities, independent of other social variables; urban unconventionality is produced by the influence of deviant subcultures and cultural diversity in urban environments (Fischer, 1975a, 1975b; Glenn and Hill, 1977; Whitt and Nelson, 1975). Education, independent of other social variables including status factors, is associated with weakened adherence to traditional values and increased tolerance of deviance (Hyman and Wright, 1979; Davis, 1982). An empirically grounded account of how educational attainment affects attitudes and values is not presently available (Davis, 1982:585), but most researchers have favored a cognitive explanation (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn et al., 1978; Sullivan et al., 1982).

Age and gender predict value commitments due to their association with variation in socialization and role expectations.<sup>6</sup> The socialization experiences and adult outlook of older persons differ from those of younger persons with respect to sexual matters, including exposure to pornography (Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, 1970, 1971; Money and Athanasiou, 1973). Similarly, the sex-typed nature of commercially available pornography, and different patterns of socialization and exposure, are associated with gender differences (Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, 1970, 1971; Money and Athanasiou, 1973; McCormack, 1978, 1983; see also Merrit et al., 1975).

In addition to these variables southernness may also be an important predictor of support for moral reform. Being a southerner in the U.S. has been argued to be associated with status discontent (Lipset and Raab, 1978), but it can just as well be argued to be reflective of a particular culture (Killian, 1970; Reed, 1975; Nunn et al., 1978). We include it in the analysis because it has been found to be associated with traditional values and less tolerance of non-conformity in previous research, but we do not identify it solely with either the status discontent or the culture and socialization argument.

According to arguments linking value orientations and opinion preferences to patterns of culture and socialization processes, moral-reform (anti-pornography) social movement adherence will be correlated:

1. *Positively with conservative religious affiliation.*
2. *Negatively with education.*

<sup>6</sup> Whatever additional effects are also represented by age (e.g. Davis, 1975) and gender, we know of no evidence that status discontent processes are included.

3. *Positively with rural residence (whether as an adolescent or as an adult).*
4. *Positively with age.*
5. *With being female.*

#### ADHERENTS, CONSTITUENTS, AND ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY

A common problem with previous research on status discontent has been a tendency to make inferences about the nature of popular support for a movement based upon analysis of public statements and social characteristics of leaders and movement activists (Wolfinger et al., 1964). As Trow (1958:281) concluded from his study of McCarthy supporters in Vermont: "Whatever may be said or learned regarding the leaders and activists of right-wing radical movements, it is not likely that these characteristics and sentiments will be found in close association in the population at large." In the case of status discontent applied to moral reform, the two most influential supportive studies (Gusfield, Zurcher and Kirkpatrick) employ data on movement leadership and activists.

The failure of previous research on status discontent to maintain careful distinctions among different types and levels of data is not a unique problem. Social movement research has tended to confound the analytically separate questions of the *incidence* and mobilization of social movements with the question of *participation* in them (Pinard, 1983a). We will be concerned in the present research with the general question of participation rather than incidence, and particularly with motivations underlying participation.

We interpret status discontent theory to be fundamentally a social psychological theory explaining *motivations* to support moral reform. The culture and socialization alternative similarly attempts to explain motivations, but on different grounds. It focuses not on economic or power-induced deprivations, but upon the presence of cognitive processes and learning. In general, previous models of motivation utilized in social movement research have been almost exclusively concerned with deprivations to the neglect of other sources of motivation. As delineated by Pinard (1983a, 1983b), motivations to support or participate in social movements may be produced by any (or all) of three analytically distinct types of influences: deprivations; moral obligations; and goals and aspirations. Motivations, as "push" factors, are in turn analytically separate from rewards offered as incentives for participation, or "pull" factors.

Because of the nature of our particular re-

search problem—evaluating the status discontent and culture socialization explanations of motivations to support moral-reform movements—we will focus on *adherents* (individuals believing in the goals of the movement) as opposed to *constituents* (individuals providing resources for the movement) (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), for several important reasons. First, in order to carry out the kind of multivariate analysis we have proposed, a relatively large sample with adequate variance on relevant social variables is required. It would be difficult if not impossible to obtain such a sample from the membership of a typical local and community-focused moral-reform movement (assuming that the movement organization indeed had a definite specification of its membership). Second, we can observe that to the extent the “free rider” problem applies to a given social movement, data on the constituency of that movement may not be relevant for empirically evaluating a theory dealing with motivations (Pinard, 1983b). As representatives of the “resource mobilization” perspective argue (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977), approval of the goals of a movement does not necessarily translate into provision of resources to the movement. To overcome the “free rider” problem, movements must offer selective incentives to convert adherents into constituents. An implication of this observation for social movement research is that a theory of movement motivation cannot be effectively evaluated with data on social characteristics of a self-interested constituency without the specification and control of the amount of incentives offered to each individual. Finally, the common-sense assumption widely held among social movement researchers and theorists (e.g., Lipset and Raab, 1978:288–89; McCarthy and Zald, 1977), that adherents are more likely to become constituents than indifferents, bystanders, or opponents, is supported by evidence from studies of voluntary associations. A variety of evidence reviewed by Smith and colleagues (1972, 1975, 1980) indicates that specific attitudes and issue preferences are significantly related to voluntary social participation, particularly for entry into participation.

For our empirical evaluation of status discontent applied to moral reform we choose to focus on anti-pornography social movement adherence. Our choice is influenced by the theoretical relevance of anti-pornography, the fact that detailed community studies of two anti-pornography movements have previously been carried out, and the availability of survey data containing items reflecting anti-pornography social movement adherence.

Our measure of anti-pornography social movement adherence is a scale comprised of

three items from the General Social Survey.<sup>7</sup> Two of the items, “sexual materials [pornography] lead people to commit rape” and “sexual materials [pornography] lead to breakdown of morals,” clearly reflect the public statements and concerns of anti-pornography movements (Zurcher and Kirkpatrick, 1976:114). Linkages between a social behavior or practice and destructive individual and social consequences are commonly found in the literature of moral reform.<sup>8</sup> The third item gauges the respondent’s opinion about the extent to which pornography should be legally available. If a social movement is defined as “. . . a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure . . .” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1217), then the three items combined should constitute a sound measure of anti-pornography social movement adherence: the strongest adherents will be respondents indicating pornography deteriorates the moral order, leads to the commission of serious criminal acts, and should be prohibited by law for all citizens regardless of age.

## DATA AND METHODS

### *Data*

Data are from the General Social Surveys (GSS) for 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, and 1980. Each survey provides data on a representative sample of persons 18 years of age and over residing in the 48 contiguous states of the U.S., and was conducted by the National

<sup>7</sup> The difficulties involved in defining the term “pornography” are well known. Our respondents were read the following preamble equating pornography with verbal or pictorial materials having explicit sexual content: “The next questions are about pornography—books, movies, magazines, and photographs that show or describe sex activities (Davis, 1980:149).” We are aware that the term pornography entails a negative value judgment (Zurcher and Kirkpatrick, 1976:ix; Eysenck and Nias, 1978:13). We use the term deliberately instead of the more neutral “erotica” since our research interest concerns negative judgments of explicit sexual materials.

<sup>8</sup> For example, temperance crusaders defined drink not only in terms of sin and moral failing, but as productive of physical, mental, and social deterioration as well (Willard [1883] 1972, Tyler, 1944; Kober, 1973; Walters, 1978). The comments of a congressional advocate of prohibition, Senator Henry W. Blair (1888:348), illustrate: “It turns parentage into a crime, and young life into inherited misery and debasement; loads childhood with burdens which maturity cannot bear; blasts existence with shame and want; sickness and despair; transmits crime and idiocy, insanity, disease, pain and perchance (by good fortune) death.”

Table 1. Presumed Effects of Sexual Materials/Pornography, and Opinion About Pornography Laws, National Sample, 1973-1980<sup>a</sup>

Presumed Effects of Sexual Materials/Pornography	Yes	No	Don't Know No Answer
Sexual materials lead to breakdown of morals	55%	38%	7%
Sexual materials lead people to commit rape	53%	38%	9%
<b>Opinion About Pornography Laws</b>			
There should be laws against the distribution of pornography whatever the age.	41%		
There should be laws against the distribution of pornography to persons under 18.	49%		
There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography.	8%		
Don't Know; No Answer.	2%		

<sup>a</sup> NORC Surveys (Davis, 1980).

Opinion Research Center. The sample size is 7,493, with approximately 1,500 persons for each year of the survey. Sampling details may be found in Davis (1980). All analyses were performed on all 5 years combined. Analyses run year by year do not differ substantively from those presented.

#### Method

We use multiple regression to assess the relative power of status discontent and culture socialization variables to predict anti-pornography social movement adherence. First, we enter the theoretically prior culture and socialization variables. Second, the status discontent variables are entered as a comparison. We then add interaction terms to examine the joint effect of geographic mobility and religion, and self-employment and rural residence, presenting finally an analysis with all statistically significant predictors. Statistical significance at .05 allows for a liberal test of the status discontent argument, since using the five General Social Surveys provides over 6000 usable cases. In this situation even miniscule effects will be significant.

#### Dependent Variable

Table 1 presents the basic frequencies for the pornography items in the General Social Survey. Of the combined 1973-1980 sample of 7,493 individuals, 55 percent agree that pornography leads to a breakdown of morals, 53 percent agree that it leads people to commit rape, and 41 percent are of the opinion that pornography should be made unavailable by law to all persons regardless of age.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The General Social Survey has contained nearly identical questions relating to presumed effects of pornography and legal availability since 1973. These questions were patterned after items included in a

We created an additive scale of the three items. For the two items about presumed effects of pornography we dummy coded the yes answers one, and no and do not know as zero. For the item concerning the law, we coded responses indicating that pornography should be made legally unavailable to all as one and all other responses as zero. The variables therefore indicate agreement with the statements describing negative social effects for the morals and rape questions as well as high intolerance of the legal availability of pornography for the law question. The additive scale created out of these items has an alpha reliability coefficient of .69 for respondents in all five years combined.

#### Status Discontent Variables

For our indicator of geographic mobility from rural to urban areas we constructed a dummy variable which equals one if the respondent indicated in the GSS that he or she lived in the country, on a farm, or in a small city or town (less than 50,000) when 16 years old and that his/her current place of residence is within an SMSA. Otherwise, the dummy variable equals zero.

To measure the old middle-class dimension we developed a set of occupational categories and constructed appropriate dummy variables. Persons who indicated they were professional or technical workers (DOT 001-199), were managers or administrators (DOT 200-246), or were craftsmen or laborers (DOT 400-799), and also indicated they were self-employed,

national survey conducted on behalf of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1970, 1971). The results from the Commission's survey are similar to the results obtained on the GSS pornography items: 56 percent agreed with the "morals" item, 49 percent agreed with the "rape" item, and 31 percent favored legal restriction of pornography.



were classified as small-business persons (cf. Hamilton, 1975). We further divided this group into those who were *self-employed professionals* and *technical persons* and those who were *self-employed business persons*. Respondents who indicated they were craftsmen or laborers (DOT 401-799) and were employed by others and also all respondents who said they were service workers (DOT 901-999) were coded as *manual*. Respondents indicating they were professional and technical workers (DOT 001-199) or were managers or administrators (DOT 200-246) but were employed by others were classified as *upper white collar*. Persons who indicated they were clerical or sales workers (DOT 260-399) were classified as *lower white collar*. For the regression analysis, four dummy variables (coded 0 and 1) were included, representing (1) the self-employed professionals, (2) the self-employed business persons, (3) the manual workers, and (4) the lower white-collar workers. The upper white collar (professionals and administrative) was the comparison category. The first two categories constitute our indicators of "old middle class."

We chose two groups of upward mobile, status-discrepant persons to evaluate the third status discontent prediction. Dummy variables were created to represent (1) upward-mobile black persons and (2) upward-mobile Catholics. For both black persons and Catholics who indicated that at age 16 their family income was *below average* but indicated on the current family income item that their current income was *high* (high for Catholics was fixed at \$15,000 and above; for blacks, \$10,000 and above) were coded 1 on the dummy variable. One dummy variable was constructed for blacks, and one for Catholics.

The last dimension of status discontent (over-rewarded status discrepant) is measured with two dummy variables, one for each of the theoretically relevant categories of status inconsistency. The dummy variables were coded: (1) 1= high-income persons with low education, 0= others; and (2) 1= high-income persons with low occupational prestige, 0= others. We defined high income for these variables as \$15,000 or more, low education as less than 12 years education, and low occupational prestige in the lower third of the occupational prestige distribution.

#### *Culture and Socialization Variables*

Our indicators of culture and socialization variables include a dummy variable indicating affiliation with the more conservative Protestant denominations (Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, or "other"—largely fun-

damentalist groups);<sup>10</sup> years of education; two dummy variables indicating being raised in rural areas (1= at age 16 respondent lived in an area of less than 50,000 population, 0= otherwise) and living in rural areas (1= presently lives in an area with less than 50,000 population, 0= otherwise); age in years; and sex (1= male, 0= female). The comparison category for the religion dummy variable includes those in relatively nonconservative, non-Catholic religions (Episcopal, Unitarian, Jewish) and those with no religious affiliation. For reasons indicated below, we also included a dummy variable for Catholics (1= Catholic, 0= other). Living in a southern state, which seems to represent both cultural and status effects, was also measured with a dummy variable (1= residence in a southern state, 0= otherwise).<sup>11</sup>

#### *Control Variables*

Since our indicators of upward-mobile status discrepancy and over-rewarded status discrepancy are essentially interaction variables, in the analysis of their effects we need to include all of the component variables. The variables not included in our culture and socialization list

<sup>10</sup> To our knowledge, there is no commonly accepted way of dividing religions in the U.S. into those which are conservative and those which are not. In order to develop a dummy variable representing conservative religion, we used data from the General Social Surveys. Looking first at GSS samples for years not containing the pornography items, we examined the relationship between religion and a variety of attitudes (e.g. sexism, sexual behavior, abortion, tolerance) reflecting social conservatism. We found a consistent pattern that Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians and "other" Protestants (not Episcopal) were the most conservative. Those in the "other" category, largely fundamentalist, were found consistently to be the most conservative, the strongest believers, and the most frequent church attenders. We also found that persons indicating they were Jewish, Episcopal, did not have a religion, or were in some other religion (i.e., other than those mentioned here) were the most "liberal" on these issues. We then looked at a variety of issues among samples in survey years in which the pornography items had been asked, and found the same pattern. Finally, we looked specifically at the pornography items and the pornography scale used in this study, and found again the same pattern. The results of this investigation are too cumbersome to be presented here, but tables will be made available to those requesting them along with a short manuscript investigating this issue (Hughes and Hertel, 1983).

<sup>11</sup> The states were: Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas.

which we would have to include in these analyses are *being black*, *being Catholic*, *income*, *family income at age 16*, and *occupational prestige*. We used the scale for income in categories from 1 to 12 in the GSS as the measure of family income. For family income at age 16 we used a 5-category ordinal scale variable which is the respondent's estimate of family income at age 16 (1= far below average, 2= below average, 3= average, 4= above average, 5= far above average). Finally, for occupational prestige we used the Hodge, Siegel and Rossi occupational prestige scale (Davis, 1980:285-88).

### ANALYSIS

Table 2 presents the results of four regression analyses.<sup>12</sup> For each analysis the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients for each variable along with a t-value to evaluate statistical significance are presented. The first equation shows that when only the culture socialization variables are included, the strongest predictor is age ( $\beta = .301$ ), followed by sex (male) ( $\beta = -.139$ ) and education ( $\beta = -.113$ ). Also statistically significant, but with  $\beta$ s less than .10, are conservative Protestant religion, rural residence at 16, current rural residence, and southern region.

The second equation includes the status discontent variables and control variables described above along with the culture socialization variables. As indicated in the second three columns in Table 2, none of the status discontent variables is a statistically significant predictor of opinion and sentiments about pornography. The strongest predictor is still age ( $\beta = .298$ ), followed by conservative Protestant religion ( $\beta = .202$ ) and being Catholic ( $\beta = .161$ ). Sex ( $\beta = -.127$ ) and education ( $\beta = -.092$ ) remain, relatively speaking, moderately strong predictors, and being black (a control variable) is similar in magnitude ( $\beta = -.108$ ). Income at age 16 ( $\beta = -.025$ ) and southern region ( $\beta = .044$ ) both have small but significant effects. Being a manual worker ( $\beta = .057$ ) or being a lower white-collar worker ( $\beta = .063$ ) are associated with having significantly more negative opinions about pornography than is being

upper white collar (professional, technical, managerial and administrative personnel who are not self-employed). Geographic mobility, being self-employed (professional or otherwise), being upward-mobile status-discrepant, and being over-rewarded (either in regard to education or occupational prestige) are all unrelated to attitudes about pornography.

In the third analysis we add interaction terms for (1) geographic mobility with conservative religious affiliation, and (2) self-employed business persons and self-employed professionals with rural residence, to assess whether these combinations predict negative attitudes about pornography. None of these interaction terms is significant.

Finally, in the final three columns of Table 2 we include only variables significant at .05 or better with associated dummy variables. None of the status discontent variables is a significant predictor of our measure of anti-pornography social movement adherence.

The regressions reported do not include all those we performed, but only those analyses providing the most economical presentation of results. We ran all culture socialization variables together with each status discontent variable both singly and in combinations which we thought might be theoretically relevant, or which we thought might conceivably reveal one or more of the status discontent variables to be a significant predictor. With one minor exception noted below, no one status discontent variable, or combination, was a significant predictor of opinion and sentiments about pornography.

By contrast, the culture and socialization variables appear to be relatively strong and consistent predictors of our measure of anti-pornography social movement adherence. Age, religion, sex, and education have consistently strong effects. Conservative Protestant religion appears weak in the first analysis, but its coefficient is biased due to the fact that there is no dummy variable for Catholics in the analysis. In the second and third regressions, the presence of insignificant geographic mobility items biases the effects of rural residence and rural socialization (residence at age 16) variables. For the final regression in which insignificant predictors are deleted, the rural items have significant effects, as do all of the culture and socialization and some control variables.

The fact that southern region remains a weak but significant predictor in the last regression appears to be the only measure of support for status discontent obtained in our results, though as previously discussed southern region may be argued to be an indicator both of status discontent and a particular culture.

<sup>12</sup> Due to the use of occupational items in the regressions (both type of occupation and prestige) we only have data on people who have ever had an occupation. This leaves out roughly 450 persons on whom we would otherwise have complete data who were at the time of the interview "keeping house." If these persons are included in the analysis under a separate dummy variable for keeping house (as an occupation), the results are almost precisely the same as those presented.

Table 2. Regression Analyses Presenting the Effects of: (1) Culture and Socialization Variables; (2) Culture and Socialization Variables, Status Discontent Variables, and Control Variables; (3) Culture and Socialization Variables, Status Discontent Variables, Control Variables and Selected Interaction Terms; and (4) All Significant Predictors, on Anti-Pornography Scale

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	B	$\beta$	t	B	$\beta$	t	B	$\beta$	t	B	$\beta$	t
Culture and Socialization Variables:												
Age of Respondent	.021	.301	24.303†	.021	.298	23.484†	.021	.298	23.450†	.021	.299	24.002†
Sex (Male)	-.326	-.139	-11.746†	-.297	-.127	-10.265†	-.297	-.127	-10.247†	-.290	-.124	-10.152†
Education	-.042	-.113	-9.082†	-.034	-.092	-5.590†	-.034	-.092	-5.601†	-.032	-.085	-5.692†
Conservative Protestant Religion	.157	.066	5.258†	.483	.202	11.549†	.488	.204	10.331†	.483	.202	11.560†
Rural Residence	.136	.054	4.258†	.095	.038	1.296	.091	.036	1.225	.102	.041	3.223**
Rural Residence at Age 16	.111	.046	3.558†	.108	.044	1.454	.109	.045	1.467	.100	.041	3.243**
Southern Region	.065	.026	2.094*	.111	.044	3.602†	.110	.044	3.592†	.110	.044	3.600†
Status Discontent Variables:												
Occupation:												
Manual				.134	.057	2.465*	.133	.057	2.456*	.102	.043	2.465*
Lower White Collar				.172	.063	3.595†	.172	.063	3.589†	.161	.059	3.785†
Self-Employed Business Person				.095	.022	1.495	.099	.022	1.287	.082	.019	1.368
Self-Employed Professional				-.173	-.016	-1.391	-.206	-.019	-1.457	-.179	-.017	-1.440
Rural Self-Employed							-.009	-.001	-.087			
Rural Self-Employed Professional							.140	.006	.491			
Geographic Mobility				-.009	-.004	-.115	-.002	-.001	-.028			
Geographic Mobility $\times$ Conservative Religion							-.015	-.006	-.258			
Upward Mobile Catholic				.116	.018	1.375	.115	.017	1.361			
Upward Mobile Black				.175	.020	1.531	.174	.020	1.53			
Over-Rewarded Education				.020	.004	.318	.020	.004	.319			
Over-Rewarded Prestige				-.088	-.020	-1.475	-.088	-.020	-1.476			
Control Variables:												
Income (Family)				.004	.011	.764	.004	.011	.767			
Income of Family at 16				-.036	-.025	-1.970*	-.036	-.025	-1.972*	-.047	-.033	-2.702**
Occupational Prestige				.001	.007	.370	.001	.007	.365			
Black				-.426	-.108	-8.015†	-.426	-.108	-8.011†	-.401	-.101	-8.366†
Catholic				.432	.161	9.320†	.432	.161	9.305†	.446	.167	9.866†
Constant	1.011		12.182†	.575		4.184†	.576		4.180†	.641		5.334†
R <sup>2</sup>	.177		.205				.205			.204		
F	188.320		74.879				65.503			111.747		
n	6117											

\* p < .05. \*\* p < .01. † p < .001.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

We did not find empirical support for status discontent predictions about anti-pornography social movement adherents when variables representing culture and socialization processes were taken into account. Status discontent, however, might still be a valid explanation of moral-reform adherence if: (1) we failed to identify groups or individuals experiencing status frustration in the 1970s; or (2) the groups and individuals we did identify suffered status discontent historically but no longer do so. While neither of these possibilities can be ruled out entirely, we have little reason to suppose either is true.

First, we believe we have identified the major empirical predictions of both major variants of the status discontent tradition reaching back over two decades. The fact that these predictions were not supported by the data gives us little reason to suppose that we failed to identify groups or individuals that are experiencing status frustration in the modern era. On the whole, status discontent arguments have not been reticent in attempting to identify groups and individuals suffering from status frustration.

Second, although our analysis is based on recent survey data, our findings are consistent with recent historical scholarship disputing previous status discontent interpretations of the American temperance movement and German National Socialism. Historical interpretations of the American temperance movement as a peripheral and reactionary response of status-frustrated nativist Protestants to the dislocations and problems of an industrializing society (Hofstadter, 1955; Sinclair, 1962) have been challenged by recent scholarship emphasizing: (1) drunkenness and alcohol abuse as a genuine social problem in early nineteenth-century American society and temperance as an understandable response to that problem; and (2) temperance as part of the mainstream of social-reform efforts aimed at dealing with problems of a developing American society, led by forward-looking innovators in business, religious, and professional life rather than by defenders of the status quo (Clark, 1976; Kyvig, 1979; Paulson, 1973; Rorabaugh, 1979; Tyrell, 1979). Reinterpretations of temperance have also turned to the role of women. Bordin (1981) re-evaluated the role of women in the post-Civil War phase of the temperance movement and concluded that temperance had major importance for women as a political issue and was linked with the general cause of equality for women. In the latter part of the nineteenth century at least, it could be argued that temperance represented a

"symbolic crusade" not of Protestant status discontent, but of women's lack of control over their lives and their efforts to secure that same control (Bordin, 1981:162).

One of the most persistent theories of the electoral base of German National Socialism, status discontent experienced by the "lower middle class" (e.g. Lasswell, 1933; Lipset, 1981), has recently been challenged by Hamilton (1982). Previous consideration of this thesis (O'Lessker, 1968-69; Schnaiberg, 1968-69; Hagtvet, 1980; Hagtvet and Kuhl, 1980; Payne, 1980) has been hampered by limitations with aggregate data on German voting patterns during the critical election years of 1924-1932. Hamilton (1982) attempted to establish who voted for Hitler by identifying the class composition of voting districts within Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Munich, and other larger German cities, and comparing the voting pattern of each district. While even this exhaustive effort did not provide for a completely unambiguous test of the thesis, the argument did not receive confirmation. On the contrary, "... support for the National Socialists in most cities varied directly with the class level of the district" (Hamilton, 1982:421). In addition, Hamilton's (1982:472) review of previous literature revealed almost no supporting data despite the widespread acceptance of the lower middle class status-discontent thesis, suggesting to him a problem area for the sociology of knowledge: "... for all practical purposes, the argument was accepted on faith alone."

The results of our analysis lead us to believe that no special theories concerned with status frustrations or status deprivations are required to account for the social base of moral-reform movements: popular support for moral reform is explainable in terms of learning experiences and particular cultural environments. However, while our results do not support status discontent as an explanation of anti-pornography social movement adherence, it does not follow that status discontent likewise fails to account for movement participation by leadership and activists. If the argument is framed in terms of loss of moral authority instead of loss of status, and in terms of certain individuals rather than groups, then status discontent may well explain the behavior of "moral entrepreneurs" (Becker, 1963), or moral-reform leadership and activists (Gusfield, 1963; Zurcher and Kirkpatrick, 1976).

Overall, our results point to the importance of principle, beliefs and ideology over class and material interests in the development of support for moral reform. Recent conceptual and empirical criticism of utilitarian approaches to social movements (Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Perrow, 1979; Turner, 1981; Zurcher and

Snow, 1981; Walsh, 1981; Pinard, 1983a, 1983b) has emphasized the importance of solidarity, principle, and ideology for any social movement. Yet, we are struck by the fact that over half of the population (far higher among certain groups) agrees with assertions that pornography leads to deterioration of morals and to serious criminal acts—a fact standing in marked contrast to the current legal availability of pornography and the strength and visibility of contemporary anti-pornography social movement organizations. It would appear that students of social movements can afford to denigrate neither the importance of leadership, resources, and mobilization, nor the role of principle, values, and beliefs, in their attempts to explain the generation and maintenance of collective attempts to change the social order.

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