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FRAME ALIGNMENT PROCESSES, MICROMOBILIZATION, AND MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION*

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This paper attempts to further theoretical and empirical understanding of adherent and constituent mobilization by proposing and analyzing frame alignment as a conceptual bridge linking social psychological and resource mobilization views on movement participation. Extension of Goffman's (1974) frame analytic perspective provides the conceptual/theoretical framework; field research on two religious movements, the peace movement, and several neighborhood movements provide the primary empirical base. Four frame alignment processes are identified and elaborated: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. The basic underlying premise is that frame alignment, of one variety or another, is a necessary condition for participation, whatever its nature or intensity, and that it is typically an interactional and ongoing accomplishment. The paper concludes with an elaboration of several sets of theoretical and research implications.

A long standing and still central problem in the field of social movements concerns the issue of support for and participation in social movement organizations (SMOs) and their activities and campaigns. There is growing recognition that a thoroughgoing understanding of this issue requires consideration of both social psychological and structural/organizational factors. This realization is reflected in recent literature reviews and critiques (Ferree and Miller, 1985; Gamson et al., 1982:7–12; Jenkins, 1983:527, 549; Zurcher and Snow, 1981) as well as in research on the correlates of support for or involvement in a variety of contemporary social movements (Isaac et al., 1980; Klandermans, 1984; McAdam, 1984; Useem, 1980; Walsh and Warland, 1983; Wood and Hughes, 1984). To date, however, little headway has been made in linking together social psychological and structural/organizational factors and perspectives in a theoretically informed and empirically grounded fashion.

Our aim in this paper is to move forward along this line, both conceptually and empirically, by elaborating what we refer to as frame alignment processes and by enumerating correspondent micromobilization tasks and processes. By *frame alignment,* we refer to the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary. The term "*frame*" (and framework) is borrowed from Goffman (1974:21) to denote "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. So conceptualized, it follows that frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation, whatever its nature or intensity. Since we have identified more than one such alignment process, we use the phrase *frame alignment process* as the cover term for these linkages.[1] By *micromobilization,* we refer simply to the various interactive and communicative processes that affect frame alignment.[2]

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[1] The concept of alignment as used here should not be confused with what Stokes and Hewitt (1976) have termed "aligning actions." These refer to "largely verbal efforts to restore or assure meaningful interaction in the face of problematic situations."

[2] The term micromobilization has been used only sparingly in the literature to refer to a set of interactive processes that are relevant to the operation of SMOs and that are analytically distinguishable from macromobilization processes such as changes in power relationships and opportunity structures (Gamson et al., 1982:1–12; Walsh, 1981:3). Our use of the concept is consistent with

We illustrate these processes with data derived primarily from our studies of the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement (Snow, 1979, 1986), of Hare Krishna (Rochford, 1985), of the peace movement (Benford, 1984), and of urban neighborhood movements.[3] Drawing upon these empirical materials, on Goffman's frame analytic perspective (1974), which we extend and refine for our purposes, and on a range of literature pertinent to the issue of movement participation, we discuss and illustrate the frame alignment processes we have identified, and elaborate related micromobilization tasks and processes. Before attending to this agenda, however, we consider several major problems that plague most extant analyses of participation in SMOs and movement-related activities and campaigns. This excursion will provide a more solid grounding for our utilization of Goffman's frame analytic scheme and our elaboration of the various frame alignment processes.

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BLIND SPOTS AND SHORTCOMINGS

Most analyses of movement participation can be conceptualized as variants of two generic perspectives on social movements: the psychofunctional perspective, variously referred to as convergence theory (Turner and Killian, 1972), the hearts and minds approach (Leites and Wolf, 1970), and breakdown theory (Tilly et al., 1975); and the resource mobilization perspective associated with the work of McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977), Oberschall (1973), and Tilly (1978), among others. Although these approaches are routinely juxtaposed as countervailing perspectives on social movements, both share three fundamental shortcomings with respect to the participation issue. They neglect the process of grievance interpretation; they suggest a static view of participation; and they tend to over-generalize participation-related processes.

NEGLECT OF GRIEVANCE INTERPRETATION AND OTHER IDEATIONAL ELEMENTS

The most striking shortcoming is the tendency to gloss questions concerning the interpretation of events and experiences relevant to participation in social movement activities and campaigns. This tendency is particularly evident in the treatment of grievances. Too much attention is focused on grievances per se, and on their social psychological manifestations (e.g., relative deprivation, alienation), to the neglect of the fact that grievances or discontents are subject to differential interpretation, and the fact that variations in their interpretation across individuals, social movement organizations, and time can affect whether and how they are acted upon. Both the psychofunctional and resource mobilization perspectives ignore this interpretive or framing issue. The psychofunctional approaches do so by assuming an almost automatic, magnetic-like linkage between intensely felt grievances and susceptibility to movement participation.[4] Lip service is given to subjective/interpretive considerations, but they are rarely dealt with thoughtfully or systematically.

Resource mobilization perspectives also skirt this interpretive issue by assuming the ubiquity and constancy of mobilizing grievances. This assumption is stated most strongly by Jenkins and Perrow (1977:250–51, 266), McCarthy and Zald (1977:1214–15), and Oberschall (1973:133–34, 194–95). Tilly (1978:8) can be read as having reservations about the assumption, but deferring it to others for analysis. However, it is not so much this ubiquity/constancy assumption that we find troublesome,[5] but rather the meta-assumption that

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this previous usage; however we would broaden the conceptualization to refer to the range of interactive processes devised and employed by SMOs and their representative actors to mobilize or influence various target groups with respect to the pursuit of collective or common interests. Although the specific targets of these mobilization or influence attempts can vary considerably from one movement to another, the literature suggests that there are at least seven distinct target groups relevant to the life histories of most SMOs: adherents, constituents, bystander publics, media, potential allies, antagonists or countermovements, and elite decision-makers or arbiters. Although there are specific micromobilization tasks pertinent to each of these groupings, we are concerned in this paper only with those micromobilization tasks and processes that pertain to participation in general and to what we have called frame alignment in particular.

[3] Since the first three studies are described in the works cited, it will suffice to note here that each was based on ethnographic fieldwork lasting over a year and involving first-hand participtiion in SMO activities, campaigns, and rituals, informal and in-depth interviews with other participants, and systematic inspection of movement-related documents. The study of urban neighborhood movements in Austin, Texas, has traced to date the careers and micromobilization activities of five different SMOs associated with three different campaigns, one to curtail development, another in opposition to expansion of the city's airport, and a third in opposition to the relocation of the local Salvation Army Shelter in or near residential neighborhoods. This research is also based on ethnographic fieldwork procedures, which we have found particularly well-suited for studying and capturing the interactive, dynamic, and multifaceted nature of micromobilization and participation related processes.

[4] For varied and pointed criticism of this psychofunctional breakdown approach, see Turner and Killian (1972:365), Useem (1975:11–18), Zurcher and Snow (1981), and Zygmunt (1972).

[5] Observations regarding the prevalence of grievances are rather commonplace, ranging from Trotsky's (1959:249)

this exhausts the important social psychological issues and that analysis can therefore concentrate on organizational and macromobilization considerations. This leap skirts, among other things, "the enormous variability in the subjective meanings people attach to their objective situations" (McAdam, 1982:34). Questions concerning the interpretation of grievances and their alignment with social movement organizations' goals and ideologies are thus ignored or taken for granted.

There are, however, a handful of students of social movements who have alluded to this oversight, thereby implicitly suggesting the importance of this line of inquiry. Turner (1969), for one, has argued that the emergence of a significant social movement requires a revision in the manner in which people look at some problematic condition or feature of their life, seeing it no longer as misfortune, but as an injustice. In a similar vein, Piven and Cloward (1977:12) emphasize that "the social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and immutable must come to seem both unjust and mutable" before collective action is likely, a process that McAdam (1982) calls "cognitive liberation." And Gamson et al. (1982), drawing on Moore (1978) and Goffman (1975), suggest that rebellion against authorities is partly contingent on the generation and adoption of an injustice frame, a mode of interpretation that defines the actions of an authority system as unjust and simultaneously legitimates noncompliance.

Taken together, these observations buttress the contention that what is at issue is not merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations. But such interpretive issues have seldom been the object of empirical investigation or conceptual development. Recent social psychological work, taking a rational calculus perspective, appears at first glance to have attempted to remedy this neglect by focusing attention on the process by which prospective participants weigh the anticipated costs of action or inaction vis-a-vis the benefits (Granovetter, 1978; Klandermans, 1983, 1984; Oberschall, 1980; Oliver, 1980). But that decision-making process has tended to be treated rather mechanistically and non-processually. Aside from considering a limited number of variables, such as expectations regarding group support, little attention is given to the actual process by which certain lines of action come to be defined as more or less risky, morally imperative in spite of associated risks, or instrumentally pointless. Klandermans' (1984) distinction between consensus and action mobilization alludes to the importance of these definitional concerns,[6] but his empirical research addresses only the matter of action mobilization. Consequently, the interpretive issues implied by the notion of consensus mobilization remain undeveloped.

The neglect of grievance interpretation not only side-steps the previously noted observations, but also flies in the face of long-standing concern in the social sciences with experience and its interpretation (Bateson, 1972; Berger and Luckmann, 1966; James, 1950; McHugh, 1968; Mead, 1932; Schutz, 1962), the most recent notable contribution being Goffman's *Frame Analysis* (1974). For Goffman, as well as for those on whom he builds, concern with interpretive issues in the everyday world is grounded in the readily documentable observation that both individual and corporate actors often misunderstand or experience considerable doubt and confusion about what it is that is going on and why.[7] Such common interpretive problems are particularly relevant to understanding the operation of SMOs and the generation of support for and participation in social movement activity. SMOs and their activists not only act upon the world, or segments of it, by attempting to exact concessions from target groups or by obstructing daily routines, but they also frame the world in which they are acting. Moreover, the strategic action pursued by SMOs, their resource acquisition efforts, and their temporal viability are all strongly influenced by their interpretive work. Accordingly, a thoroughgoing understanding of the participation process requires that closer attention be given to the interpretation of grievances and other ideational elements, such as values and supportive beliefs. The concept of frame alignment and its various processes are developed with these considerations in mind.

Static View of Participation

A second shortcoming that pervades the literature is the tendency to treat participation (or willingness to participate) as a rather static dependent variable

observation that if privations were enough to cause an insurrection the masses would be always in revolt, to public surveys (ISR, 1979:4) revealing that Americans readily avow numerous anxieties and problems.

[6] Action mobilization involves the activation of individuals who already support movement goals and activities; consensus mobilization refers to an SMO's efforts to drum up support for its views and aims. In the language of McCarthy and Zald (1977:1221), action mobilization refers to the process of turning adherents into constituents, whereas consensus mobilization involves the generation of adherents.

[7] This is not to demean the interpretive capacity of everyday actors. Rather, it underscores the obdurate reality that interpretation is a problematic enterprise that can be encumbered by intentional deception, incomplete information, stereotypic beliefs, disputes between allegedly "authoritative" interpreters, and so on. Indeed, much of Goffman's *Frame Analysis* is devoted to the analysis of such encumbrances.

based in large measure on a single, time-bound, rational decision. This tendency, which is especially prominent among work informed by both psychofunctional and rational calculus perspectives, is misguided in several ways. First, it overlooks the situation/activity-based nature of much movement participation. Seldom do individuals join a movement organization per se, at least initially. Rather, it is far more common for individuals to agree to participate in some activity or campaign by devoting some measure of time, energy, or money (Lofland and Jamison, 1984; McAdam, 1984; Snow et al., 1980).

Just as movement activities and campaigns change with developments in a movement's career and environment of operation, similarly there is variation in the individual's stake in participating in new or emergent activities. Decisions to participate over time are thus subject to frequent reassessment and renegotiation. Indeed, we have been repeatedly struck by the fact that the various movement participants we have observed spend a good deal of time together accounting and recounting for their participation; they jointly develop rationales for what they are or are not doing.

While this sense-making or account-construction might be subsumed under the rubric of rational calculus, it is clear to us that it is neither an individual nor time-bound entity. Rather, rationales for participation are both collective and ongoing phenomena. This dynamic aspect of the social psychology of participation is not easily grasped, however, by procedures that tend to abstract the participant/respondent from the context and networks in which the rationales are developed and embellished. Because of this tendency participation is rarely conceptualized or studied as a processual, even stage-like or step-wise, phenomenon. The concept of frame alignment and its variant forms are elaborated in part with this more processual and activity-oriented understanding of participation in mind.

Overgeneralization of Participation-Related Processes

A third shortcoming with much of the work on movement participation involves the failure to specify the extent to which various participation-related processes, such as bloc recruitment (Oberschall, 1973:125), network recruitment (Rochford, 1982; Snow et al., 1980; Stark and Bainbridge, 1980), mobilization of pre-existing preference structures or sentiment pools (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McCarthy, 1986) and conversion (Snow and Machalek, 1983, 1984), vary across social movements. The tendency is to write and speak in terms that are too general, as if there are one or two overarching microstructural or social psychological processes that explain participation in all movements, regardless of variation in objectives, organizational structure, and opposition.

This tendency, which is due in large measure to the practice of studying and then using as a basis for generalization a single SMO, a segment of its membership or a particular activity, such as a strike or freedom ride, is even eflected in the previously cited works that emphasize the importance of injustice frames or interpretations. But are shifts in interpretive frames a necessary condition for participation in all kinds of social movements and across all forms of collective action, regardless of variability in the costs or risks of participation? Is the mobilization of sentiment pools the major process that accounts for participation in most contemporary movements, or is it more pertinent to some kinds of movements and activities than it is to others? Similarly, is conversion a general process that obtains across all movements, or is it relevant to participation in only some movements? The notion of frame alignment processes also addresses these questions and concerns.

TYPES OF FRAME ALIGNMENT PROCESSES

Earlier we defined frame alignment as the linkage or conjunction of individual and SMO interpretive frameworks. We now propose and elaborate four types of frame alignment processes that are suggested by our research observations, and which attend to the blind spots and questions discussed above. The four processes include: (a) frame bridging, (b) frame amplification, (c) frame extension, and (d) frame transformation. For each variant of alignment we indicate correspondent micromobilization tasks and processes. The underlying premise is that frame alignment, of one variety or another, is a necessary condition for movement participation, whatever its nature or intensity, and that it is typically an interactional accomplishment.

Frame Bridging

By frame bridging we refer to the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem. Such bridging can occur at the organizational level, as between two SMOs within the same movement industry, or at the individual level, which is the focal concern of this paper. At this level of analysis, frame bridging involves the linkage of an SMO with what McCarthy (1986) has referred to as unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters. These sentiment pools refer to aggregates of individuals who share common grievances and attributional orientations, but who lack the organizational base for expressing their discontents and for acting in pursuit of their interests. For these sentiment pools, collective action is not preceded by

consciousness or frame transformation, but by being structurally connected with an ideologically isomorphic SMO.

This bridging is effected primarily by organizational outreach and information diffusion through interpersonal or intergrouop networks, the mass media, the telephone, and direct mail. In recent years, opportunities and prospects for frame bridging have been facilitated by the advent of "new technologies," namely the computerization of lists of contributors or subscribers to various causes and literature (McCarthy, 1986). The micromobilization task is first, to cull lists of names in order to produce a probable adherent pool, and second, to bring these individuals within the SMO's infrastructure by working one or more of the peviously mentioned information channels.

Evidence of frame bridging abounds in contemporary social movements. Indeed, for many SMOs today, frame bridging appears to be the primary form of alignment. Well-known examples include Common Cause, the National Rifle Association, the prolife and prochoice movements, and the Christian Right. In the case of the latter, for example, frame bridging was crucial to its rapid growth. Liebman (1983) reports that in its initial year, the Moral Majority infrastructue raised in excess of 2.2 million dollars via mass mailing campaigns, which in turn, supplied the funds to appeal to religious conservatives in general and tie them into the organization's network through extensive media campaigns. Richard A. Viguerie, a new Christian Right organizer and strategist, further underscores the role of direct mail as an important bridging mechanism in the outreach and mobilization activities of the Christian Right:

> We alert our supporters to upcoming battles through the mail. We find new recruits for the conservative movement through the mail. Without the mail, most conservative activity would wither and die. . . . (Viguerie, 1980:123–27)

For Viguerie and other new right leaders, the utility of direct mail as a key bridging mechanism rests on the presumption of the existence of ideologically congruent but untapped and unorganized sentiment pools. Computer scanning and name culling provide the lists of prospective constituents; direct mail provides the key to frame bridging.

The use of such bridging techniques and avenues is not peculiar to the Christian Right. Research on the peace movement in Texas revealed, for example, that peace groups also utilize the direct mail and similarly develop their mailing lists from a variety of sources, including lists of individuals who attend events sponsored by other liberal organizations and who subscribe to left-oriented periodicals such as *Mother Jones, The Texas Observer,* and *The Progressive* (Benford, 1984). As with other SMOs that rely on frame bridging techniques for diffusion and mobilization, the peace movement subscribes in part to the assumption of ideologically consistent or frame-compatible sentiment pools. In the words of a local peace activist, "we assume that most anyone whose name appears on one of these lists would share our views on the nuclear arms race, apartheid, and U.S. interventionism in Central America." This assumption is also shared at the national movement level, as reflected in a recent SANE (Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy) fundraising letter:

> I'm sure you're well aware that most people in this country oppose the nuclear arms buildup by the two superpowers. . . . An overwhelming majority of Americans are deeply concerned that the arms race poses an awesome danger to our lives and to the future of the world.
>
> In sending this letter, I make one assumption. I assume you are one of those millions of Americans.

The foregoing illustrations point to the widespread existence of frame bridging as an alignment process and suggest its salience for mobilizing participants and other resources. But frame bridging does not sufficiently explain all varieties of participation in all forms of movements or movement activities. Yet, most work within the resource mobilization tradition concerned with participation has approached it primarily in terms of frame bridging. The orienting assumption that grievances are sufficiently generalized and salient to provide support for SMOs turns subjective orientations into a constant, and thus focuses attention on the mechanistic process of outreach and bridging.

The appropriateness of viewing micromobilization as largely a bridging problem has been suggested by a number of recent studies demonstrating the salience of both interpersonal and group networks in relation to the emergence and diffusion of social movements and their SMOs (Morris, 1981; Oberschall, 1973; Rochford, 1982; Snow et al., 1980; Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). Yet, to focus solely on networks as the key to understanding participation patterns can easily yield a misguided and overly mechanistic analysis (Wallis and Bruce, 1982). Networks frequently function to structure movement recruitment and growth, but they do not tell us what transpires when constituents and bystanders or adherents get together. Since a good portion of the time devoted to many SMO activities is spent in small encounters, an examination of the nature of those encounters and the interactional processes involved would tell us much about how SMOs and their constituents go about the business of persuading others, effecting switches in frame, and so on. McCarthy and Zald alluded to such concerns when

they suggested that sometimes "grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" (1977:1215), but this provocative proposition has neither been examined empirically nor integrated into a more general understanding of constituent mobilization. Our elaboration of the other variants of frame alignment addresses these considerations, thus moving us beyond the frame bridging process.

Frame Amplification

By frame amplification, we refer to the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events. Because the meaning of events and their connection to one's immediate life situation are often shrouded by indifference, deception or fabriction by others, and by ambiguity or uncertainty (Goffman, 1974), support for and participation in movement activities is frequently contingent on the clarification and reinvigoration of an interpretive frame. Our research experiences and inspection of the literature suggest two varieties of frame amplification: value amplification and belief amplification.

Value Amplification. Values can be construed as modes of conduct or states of existence that are thought to be worthy of protection and promotion (Rokeach, 1973; Turner and Killian, 1972). Because individuals subscribe to a range of values that vary in the degree to which they are compatible and attainable, values are normally arrayed in a hierarchy such that some have greater salience than others (Rokeach, 1973; Williams, 1970). Value amplification refers to the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons. They may have atrophied, fallen into disuse, or have been suppressed because of the lack of an opportunity for expression due to a repressive authority structure (Tilly, 1978) or the absence of an organizational outlet (McCarthy, 1986); they may have become taken for granted or cliched (Zijderveld, 1979); they may not have been sufficiently challenged or threatened (Turner and Killian, 1972); or their relevance to a particular event or issue may be ambiguous (Goffman, 1974). If one or more of these impediments to value articulation and expression is operative, then the recruitment and mobilization of prospective constituents will require the focusing, elevation, and reinvigoration of values relevant to the issue or event being promoted or resisted.

Examples of value amplification were readily apparent among several of the SMOs we studied. Particularly striking was the ongoing value amplification in which local neighborhood activists and SMOs engaged in order to generate mobilizable sentiment pools. In following the careers of five local SMOs associated with three different campaigns through 1985, values associated with family, ethnicity, property, and neighborhood integrity were continuously highlighted and idealized. In the case of generating neighborhood opposition to the proposed relocation of the local Salvation Army shelter for the homeless, for example, SMO activists appealed to prospective constituents on the basis of familistic values. Proximate relocation of the shelter was repeatedly portrayed as a threat to women and children in particular. Once such sentiments were validated, amplified, and diffused, periodic mobilization of neighborhood constituents to engage in other organizational activities, such as signing petitions, carrying placards, and participating in media displays of neighborhood solidarity, became considerably less problematic.

The use of value amplification as a springboard for mobilizing support was also evident in the peace movement. Fundamental values such as justice, cooperation, perseverance, and the sanctity of human life were repeatedly embellished. The movement's most frequently idealized values, however, were those associated with democracy, particularly the values of equality and liberty. Peace activists amplified such values by asserting their "constitutional right" to speak out on the nuclear arms race, national security, and foreign policy. A popular movement speaker, for example, often bracketed his speeches with the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution and excerpts from the Declaration of Independence. Similarly, the Texas Coordinator of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, when asked in an interview what he thought needed to be done in order to achieve a nuclear freeze and move toward disarmament, responded succinctly, "just make the democratic system work."

By framing their mobilization appeals in the language of cherished democratic principles, peace activists not only attempt to build "idiosyncracy credit" (Hollander, 1958; Snow, 1979), but they also seek to redefine their public image as a movement serving the best interests of their country, in part through revitalization of what they see as atrophied values such as the right to redress grievances and express dissent.

Belief Amplification. Broadly conceived, beliefs refer to presumed relationships "between two things or between some thing and a characteristic of it" (Bem, 1970:4), as exemplified by such presumptions as God is dead, the Second Coming is imminent, capitalists are exploiters, and black is beautiful. Whereas values refer to the goals or end-states that movements seek to attain or promote, beliefs can be construed as ideational ele-

ments that cognitively support or impede action in pursuit of desired values.[8]

There are five kinds of such beliefs discernible in the movement literature that are especially relevant to mobilization and participation processes: (1) the previously discussed beliefs about the seriousness of the problem, issue, or grievance in question (Gamson et al., 1982; McAdam, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Turner, 1969); (2) beliefs about the locus of causality or blame (Ferree and Miller, 1985; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Zurcher and Snow, 1981); (3) stereotypic beliefs about antagonists or targets of influence (Shibutani, 1970; Turner and Killian, 1972); (4) beliefs about the probability of change or the efficacy of collective action (Klandermans, 1983, 1984; Oberschall, 1980; Olson, 1965; and Piven and Cloward, 1977); and (5) beliefs about the necessity and propriety of "standing up" (Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Oliver, 1984; Piven and Cloward, 1977).

Since it is sociologically axiomatic that the nature of action toward any object is contingent in part on beliefs about that object, it follows that participation in movement activities to eliminate, control, or change a category of individuals, a lifestyle, or an institutional practice is more likely given a positive articulation between beliefs about the object of action and the nature of that action. The reality of everyday life in the modern world, however, is such that the relationship between beliefs and objects is not always transparent or uniformly unambiguous and stereotypic, and often times the relationship between beliefs and lines of action is antithetical or contradictory as well (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Borhek and Curtis, 1975; Goffman, 1974). Consequently, participation in movement activity is frequently contingent on the amplification or transformation of one or more of the foregoing sets of beliefs. Since the first two sets will be discussed in relation to frame transformation, we illustrate the relevance of belief amplification to participant mobilization here by considering the latter three varieties of belief.

Examples of the amplification of stereotypic beliefs about antagonists or targets of influence are not difficult to find in the social movement arena, especially since such beliefs frequently function as unambiguous coordinating symbols that galvanize and focus sentiment. The efforts of neighborhood organizers to mobilize citizens to oppose the relocation of the Salvation Army shelter provides a graphic illustration. As previously noted, proximate relocation of the shelter was portrayed as a significant threat to the neighborhood ideal and to familistic values. The problem confronting organizers was to substantiate unambiguously the claim that the shelter would indeed "destroy our neighborhoods." Since the Salvation Army has long been identified with the values of Christian charity, it did not readily lend itself to rhetorical broadsides by neighborhood activists. Effective mobilization thus required a more negatively evaluated target of opposition. The growing number of homeless, transient males who had migrated to Austin and were served by the Salvation Army provided such a target. As one neighborhood activist candidly explained:

> Everybody believed we couldn't fight the Salvation Army because it is good. But you can make anything look bad. So we focused on the transients, and emphasized how they threatened neighborhood residents, particularly women and children.

And indeed the activists did. Public hearing after public hearing in city council chambers were little more than rituals of vilification. Personified as slothful, alcoholic, mentally deranged, criminalistic, and sex-crazed, the homeless population came to be seen not only as an unambiguous threat to neighborhoods, but as being outside of the normative order and thus beyond what Coser (1969) has labelled the "span of sympathy." Neighborhood activists did not invent these negative typifications, though. Rather, they focused attention on and amplified selected beliefs and characterizations that have been associated historically with transient men so as to unify neighborhood residents, on the one hand, while neutralizing countervailing themes and interpretations, on the other. As one observer of the micromobilization process noted, "everybody can agree to spit at sort of half-alcoholic, twenty to twenty-eight-year-old, unshaven men."

Moving from beliefs about antagonists to beliefs about the efficacy of collective action, we turn to what has been the primary concern of recent efforts to integrate social psychological considerations with the resource mobilization perspective. The basic proposition, rooted in value-expectancy theory, is that social action is contingent on anticipated outcomes (Klandermans, 1984). If people are to act collectively, it is argued, then they "must believe that such action would be efficacious, i.e., that change is possible but that it will not happen automatically, without collective action" (Oliver, 1985:21). Optimism about the outcome of a collective challenge will thus enhance the probability of participation; pessimism will diminish it. We do not quibble with this proposition, especially since it has received considerable empirical support from different quarters (Forward and Williams, 1970; Gamson, 1968; Klandermans, 1984; Paige, 1971; Seeman, 1975). But we do find troublesome the tendency to take for granted the process by which optimism or

[8] For a more thoroughgoing discussion of the distinction and relationship between beliefs and values, see Bem (1970) and Rokeach (1968, 1973).

a sense of efficacy is developed and sustained. Our research observations suggest that such beliefs or expectancies are temporally variable and can be modified during the course of actual participation and by the micromobilization efforts of SMOs as well. As one formerly pessimistic neighborhood activist recounted:

> Much to my surprise, I came to the Austin neighborhood movement with more conservative expectations than other neighborhood representatives on matters such as development politics, environmental concerns, and the real possibilities of influencing change. . . . But after three months with the movement, I had more hope for grass-roots influence. . . .

The problematic nature and processual development of efficacy were also evident in our peace movement research. Nuclear disarmament activists were often heard to lament about finding themselves confronted by audiences who, on the one hand, agreed with the movement's assessment of the dangers of the nuclear arms race, but, on the other hand, did not seem to share the activists' beliefs that ordinary people can have any effect on the course of defense policy. Consequently, much of the micromobiliztion activity engaged in by peace activists involves the amplification of beliefs regarding the efficacy of their campaigns. Toward that end, disarmament leaders frequently cite and embellish the apparent successes of past movements. A favorite analogy is drawn between present attempts to rid the world of nuclear weapons and the nineteenth-century abolitionist movement. Parallels are drawn between those who believed that slavery would never be abolished and those who believe that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated. Likewise, peace activists cite the presumed achievements of the anti-Vietnam War movement, as illustrated by the following excerpt from a campus rally speech:

> Some people think decisions are made in Washington and Moscow, but this is not necessarily the case. Decisions are made by the people. The decision that brought an end to the war in Vietnam was not made by politicians in Washington. The decision to stop it was made right here by people like you and me.

Such observations suffice to illustrate that beliefs about the efficacy of collective action are temporally and contextually variable and subject to micromobilization efforts to amplify them. Such is also the case with beliefs about the necessity and propriety of "standing up" and "being counted." Beliefs about necessity refer to beliefs about the instrumentality of one's own efforts in pursuit of some movement objective. Such beliefs are often of the "if-I-don't-do-it-no-one-will" genre, and are thus rooted in part in pessimism about the prospects of other potential participants "taking up the sword." As Oliver (1984:608–609) found in her research that compared active and token contributors to local collective action, activists were "more pessimistic about their neighbors' willingness to make active contributions" and therefore believed "that if they want(ed) something done they (would) have to do it themselves."

Our research on neighborhood movements and the peace movement similarly revealed pessimism on the part of activists about stimulating and sustaining constituent participation. But such pessimism was typically privatized. Moreover, it was frequently seen as something that might be neutralized in part through micromobilization activities to generate "a sense of necessity" on behalf of potential participants. Thus, organizers of a movement in opposition to expansion of the city airport exhorted proximate neighborhood residents to "speak up," emphasizing not only that their "voices count," but that it is a matter of necessity "because no one else will stand up for your home." In a similar vein, local peace activists emphasized repeatedly how critical it is to communicate to individuals that their contribution to the peace movement is of utmost necessity if nuclear war is to be prevented. As one leader related:

> Personally, I'm more pessimistic, but I think to be involved is the only alternative. If you're not involved the nuclear holocaust will happen, for sure. To be involved is the only slight chance that maybe it won't. That's what we have to emphasize.

Implied in such comments is a connection between beliefs about the necessity and instrumentality of standing up, on the one hand, and the propriety of doing so, on the other. Indeed, beliefs about the former are often associated with and buttressed by beliefs about the moral propriety of standing up. Propriety can be conceptualized in terms of what Fireman and Gamson (1979:31–32) call loyalty and responsibility, both of which are properties of cultural codes or belief systems and not merely individual attributes. As Fireman and Gamson (1979:32) correctly note, "individuals exist in a climate of cultural beliefs about their obligations to those groups with which they identify." But since there is considerable variability in the salience of these beliefs both individually and culturally, it is often necessary to amplify them so as to increase the prospect that some potential participants will see their involvement as a moral obligation. The leadership of the Nichiren Shoshu movement seemed to understand this well. Members were constantly reminded of their obligation to carry out "a divine mission that was set in motion thousands of years ago." In the words of the movement's Master, "members were born into this world as Bodhisattvas of the Earth whose noble mission is to propagate true Buddhism

throughout the world." Similarly, peace movement leaders often invoked notions of moral obligation and duty as mobilizing prods in their efforts to activate adherents, as illustrated by the comments of a media personality, before a crowd of demonstrators gathered at the gates of the Pantex nuclear weapons facility on the 40th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing: "I've learned that we not only have a right, but a responsibility to tell our government . . . when they have gone against our wishes."

Frame Extension

We have noted how SMOs frequently promote programs or causes in terms of values and beliefs that may not be especially salient or readily apparent to potential constituents and supporters, thus necessitating the amplification of these ideational elements in order to clarify the linkage between personal or group interests and support for the SMO. On other occasions more may be involved in securing and activating participants than overcoming ambiguity and uncertainty or indifference and lethargy. The programs and values that some SMOs promote may not be rooted in existing sentiment or adherent pools, or may appear to have little if any bearing on the life situations and interests of potential adherents. When such is the case, an SMO may have to extend the boundaries of its primary framework so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents. In effect, the movement is attempting to enlarge its adherent pool by portraying its objectives or activities as attending to or being congruent with the values or interests of potential adherents. The micromobilization task in such cases is the identification of individual or aggregate level values and interests and the alignment of them with participation in movement activities.

Evidence of this variety of frame alignment was readily discernible in the movements we studied. In the case of the peace movement, frame extension is commonplace. Movement leaders frequently elaborate goals and activities so as to encompass auxiliary interests not obviously associated with the movement in hopes of enlarging its adherent base. The employment of rock-and-roll and punk bands to attract otherwise uninterested individuals to disarmament rallies, and the dissemination of literature explicating the services sacrificed by a community as a result of an escalating defense budget are illustrative of this practice. A recent decision by the Austin Peace and Justice Coalition (APJC) illustrates this alignment process even more concretely. Since its inception four years ago, this city-wide coalition of some 35 peace groups had organized most of its activities around the movement's goals of "nuclear disarmament, stopping military intervention, and redirecting military spending to the needy." During this period, the movement appealed primarily to "white middle-class baby-boomers." Efforts were made to mobilize racial and ethnic minorities under the banner of "peace and justice," but with little success. A recent APJC memo attributes the failure of this outreach campaign to two factors, and urges an expansion of the movement's framework:

> Two important reasons for this lack of interracial coalition are: (1) APJC's failure to actively work on issues important to minority groups such as hunger, better public housing, and police brutality; and (2) APJC's stated goals and purposes do not clearly define its intention to oppose racism and unjust discrimination. . . . With the recent rapid growth of the anti-apartheid movement in Austin, it is time for APJC to definitively affirm its intentions and sympathies, which were previously only implied.

As a solution, APJC decided to add a fourth goal to its statement of purpose and promotional literature: "To promote social justice by nonviolently confronting racism, sexism, and all forms of discrimination and oppression." Whether this frame extension will broaden the movement's constituency remains to be seen, but it clearly illustrates the way in which the peace movement has attempted to enlarge its adherent pool.

Frame extension also surfaced on occasion during research on local neighborhood movements. The most vivid example occurred when the proprietors of bars and restaurants within a popular downtown nightlife strip were confronted with the prospect of the Salvation Army shelter being built in their area. In order to protect their interests, they quickly attempted to win the support of neighborhood residents throughout the city by invoking the already successful neighborhood frame and identifying their interests with those of Austinites in general. Thus, the rallying slogan became: "Let's Save 6th Street—Austin's Neighborhood." Once the frame was extended, organizers played upon and amplified the pieties of neighborhood in hopes of mobilizing support, as illustrated by the following appeal extracted from a flyer and newspaper advertisement:

> WE NEED YOUR HELP!! We feel about our neighborhood just as you do about yours—and we ask the same consideration. If Austin is to keep the Sixth Street Neighborhood as we know it, and it is to be utilized by all of the people of Austin as it is now, then you must help!! Please take a few minutes to call the Mayor and the City Council Offices. Tell them how you feel about YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD—Sixth Street. Ask them to seek an alternative to this problem. Please do it now!!

Frame extension was also operative in both the

Nichiren Shoshu and Hare Krishna movements, but at a more interpersonal level. In the case of Nichiren Shoshu, the operation of this process was particularly evident at the point of initial contact between prospective recruits and movement members. The primary aim of these initial recruitment encounters was not to sell the movement or to get individuals to join, but simply to persuade the prospect to attend a movement meeting or activity. Toward that end, members attempted to align the prospect's interests with movement activities, practices, or goals. They did this by first trying to discover something of interest to the prospect, and then emphasized that this interest could be realized by attending an activity or chanting. In a similar manner, Hare Krishna devotees strategically attempted to assess the interests of persons contacted in various public places in an effort to relate the movement's religious philosophy to individual interests and concerns. As one ISKCON leader explained:

> The principle, basically, is just trying to relate the book to where a person is at. . . . So devotees are really just trying to scope the person out as they are coming up to them. Trying to be more sensitive to them, asking them what their job is and even going so far as X (a devotee known within ISKCON as the king of book distribution) who would approach somebody and say: "What are you into, man?" Y: "I'm into guns." X: "Well, here take this because in this book there are a lot of things about all kinds of ancient weapons from 5000 years ago."

Since the purpose of such encounters is to encourage the prospect to attend or contribute to a movement function, members' appeals can vary widely, ranging from playing a musical instrument to meeting members of the opposite sex. Consequently, the reasons or interests prompting initial investigation of movement activity may not be relevant, if related at all, to the decision to join and become, at the very least, a nominal member. As one Nichiren Shoshu member related when discussing how he got involved in the movement and why he joined:

> I didn't want to go to a meeting when first asked. But then the person who recruited me started telling me about the many pretty girls that would be there. So I said, "Well, it can't be that bad if they have all those pretty girls in this religion." So I agreed to go to a meeting that night and take a look at all those girls. . . . But that isn't why I joined Nichiren Shoshu. It was the happiness and friendliness of the members, and the fact that I kind of liked chanting, that made me decide to become a member and receive my Gohonzon (sacred scroll). But that decision didn't occur until, gee, several weeks after attending my first meeting.

And just as the interests that prompted investigation of movement activity were not always the same as those that motivated joining, so the latter were not always the same as the interests that sustained participation. This was clearly illustrated by comparison of the accounts of the same members over an extended period of time. What was found was that the interests associated with participation were frequently redefined or elaborated. The longer the member's tenure, the more likely he or she would articulate interest in world conditions and peace rather than in material or physiological matters, which was typically the case with novitiates. As one member noted when reflecting on her four and a half years in the movement:

> When I first joined I was concerned most with my looks and with getting a nice car and a nice apartment. But I eventually came to realize that those material things don't really count that much. What really matters to me now is whether people are happy.

Inspection of the accounts of Krishna devotees similarly revealed temporal variation in and elaboration of motives for participation. As one Krishna devotee recounts:

> When I first joined in 1973, I didn't know much about the philosophy, but I was suffering greatly at the time. When I met the devotees the second time I knew that I would join them. . . . Now I realize that this life and body are temporary and miserable, and that ISKCON is divine.

These findings indicate that sustained participation in movements such as Nichiren Shoshu and Hare Krishna is frequently contingent on a change in interpretive frame, thus suggesting that for some individuals in some movements, frame extension is but a "hooking" (Lofland, 1977) process that functions as an initial step along the path to the more thoroughgoing type of alignment we refer to as frame transformation.

Frame Transformation

Thus far we have noted how the alignment of individuals and SMOs may be effected through the bridging, amplification, and grafting or incorporation of existing interpretive frames and their attendent values and beliefs. The programs, causes, and values that some SMOs promote, however, may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames. When such is the case, new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or "misframings" reframed (Goffman, 1974:308) in order to garner support and secure participants. What may be required, in short, is a transformation of frame.

According to Goffman (1974: 43–44), such a transformation, which he refers to as a "keying," redefines activities, events, and biographies that are already meaningful from the standpoint of some primary framework, in terms of another framework, such that they are now "seen by the participants to be something quite else." What is involved is "a systematic alteration" that radically reconstitutes what it is for participants that is going on (Goffman, 1974:45).

We have identified two such transformation processes that are pertinent to movement recruitment and participation: transformations of domain-specific and global interpretive frames. We shall first consider the similarities between these two alignment processes, and then turn to their differences.

The obvious similarity is that both involve a reframing of some set of conditions, be they biograhic or social, past, present, or future. The objective contours of the situation do not change so much as the way the situation is defined and thus experienced. Two analytically distinct aspects comprise this interpretive change. First, as noted earlier, there is a change in the perceived seriousness of the condition such that what was previously seen as an unfortunate but tolerable situation is now defined as inexcusable, unjust, or immoral, thus connoting the adoption of an injustice frame or variation thereof (Gamson et al., 1982).

But the development and adoption of an injustice frame is not sufficient to account for the direction of action. A life of impoverishment may be defined as an injustice, but its relationship to action is partly dependent, as attribution theorists would argue, on whether blame or responsibility is internalized or externalized. Thus, the emergence of an injustice frame must be accompanied by a corresponding shift in attributional orientation.[9]

Evidence of such a shift manifested itself repeatedly in research on conversion to the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement, as illustrated by the words of a 20-year-old convert:

> Before joining Nichiren Shoshu I blamed any problems I had on other people or on the environment. It was always my parents, or school, or society. But through chanting I discovered the real source of my difficulties: myself. Chanting has helped me to realize that rather than running around blaming others, I am the one who needs to change.

Since Nichiren Shoshu is a religious movement that emphasizes personal transformation as the key to social change, it might be argued that this feature of alignment is pertinent only to participation in religious, personal growth, and self-help movements. But this clearly is not the case; for a shift in attributional orientation is also frequently a constituent element of mobilization for and participation in movements that seek change by directly altering sociopolitical structures. In the case of participation in such movements, however, the shift involves a change from fatalism or self-blaming to structural-blaming, from victim-blaming to system-blaming, as documented by research on leftist radicalism in Chile (Portes, 1971a, 1971b), unemployed workers' movements in the U.S. (Piven and Cloward, 1977) and Cuba (Zeitlin, 1966), protest orientations among American blacks (Forward and Williams, 1970; Gurin et al., 1969; Isaac et al., 1980) and on the development of feminist consciousness (Bird, 1969; Deckard, 1979). Moreover, this literature suggests that this shift can not be assumed.

We have thus far suggested that transformations of both domain-specific and global interpretive frames are contingent on the development and adoption of injustice frames and correspondent shifts in attributional orientation, but we have yet to distinguish between the two types of transformations. We now turn to that consideration by examining how they differ in terms of scope.

Transformation of Domain-specific Interpretive Frames. By transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames, we refer to fairly self-contained but substantial changes in the way a particular domain of life is framed, such that a domain previously taken for granted is reframed as problematic and in need of repair, or a domain seen as normative or acceptable is reframed as an injustice that warrants change. We construe "domain" broadly to include an almost infinite variety of aspects of life, such as dietary habits, consumption patterns, leisure activities, social relationships, social statuses, and self-perception. While each of these as well as other domains of life can be and frequently are interconnected, they can also be bracketed or perceptually bounded (Goffman, 1974:247–300), as often occurs in the case of single-issue movements. The interpretive transformation that occurs with respect to one domain may affect behavior in other domains, but the change of frame is not automatically generalized to them.[10]

Domain-specific transformations frequently appear to be a necessary condition for participation in movements that seek dramatic changes in the status, treatment, or activity of a category of people. Concrete examples include movements

[9] For overviews and discussion of attribution theory, see Crittenden (1983), Jones and Nisbet (1971), Kelley and Michela (1980), and Stryker and Gottlieb (1981).

[10] That such self-contained reframings can occur is not only suggested by Goffman (1974), but is also consistent with Mills' vocabularies of motive thesis (1940) and Kelley's work on causal schemata (1972).

that seek to alter the status of a category of people such as women, children, the aged, handicapped, and prisoners, or that seek to change the relationship between two or more categories, as in the case of many ethnic and racial movements. In each case, a status, pattern of relationships, or a social practice is reframed as inexcusable, immoral, or unjust. In the case of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, for instance, the misfortune of the tragic loss of a loved one has been redefined as an injustice that demands an increase in the severity and certainty of penalties for drunk driving. However, as Turner (1983) has suggested, participation involves not only coming to see as an inexcusable tragedy what was formerly seen as an unfortunate accident, but also redefining the status of drunk driver in more negative terms than was previously the case.

While movements for the liberation or integration of negatively privileged status groups have considerably broader and more far-reaching goals, the success of their mobilization efforts also rests in part on effecting changes in the way their potential constituents view not only their life situation, but also themselves. As Carmichael and Hamilton argued in *Black Power* (1967:34–35):

> . . . we must first redefine ourselves. Our basic need is to reclaim our history and our identity. . . . We shall have to struggle for the right to create our own terms through which to define ourselves and our relationship to society, and to have those terms recognized. This is the first right of a free people. . . .

Domain-specific transformations have also been central to the participation process in the many self-help and personal growth movements that have flowered during the last 15 years or so, such as est and TM (Katz, 1981). A less obvious but important linkage between domain-specific transformation and the participation process is also frequently found among movements whose mobilization efforts involve in part a reframing of heretofore taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life. A case in point is provided by one of the neighborhood movements we studied that has sought to curtail encroaching development in the name of "historical preservation." The mobilizing potency of that ideology, however, was contingent on the prior and ongoing transformation of stylistically outdated residential structures into architecturally unique repositories of historically sacred values and sentiments. As one neighborhood resident explained:

> We are shaped by these houses, their architecture, their floorplans, what the spaces between the houses, the absence of driveways and garages, and the sidewalks all say about the conduct of human life. We are close to our grandparents' values here. When we preserve houses, we keep with us the people whose lives were expressed here.

Support for and participation in some SMOs is thus partly contingent in the reframing of some domain-specific status, relationship, practice, or environmental feature or condition. Yet there are still other movements for which a far more sweeping transformation is frequently required in order to secure more than nominal participation.

Transformations of Global Interpretive Frames. In this final frame alignment process, the scope of change is broadened considerably as a new primary framework gains ascendance over others and comes to function as a kind of master frame that interprets events and experiences in a new key. What is involved, in essence, is a kind of thoroughgoing conversion that has been depicted as a change in one's "sense of ultimate grounding" (Heirich, 1977) that is rooted in the "displacement of one universe of discourse by another and its attendant rules and grammar for putting things together" (Snow and Machalek, 1983:265–66). Domain-specific experiences, both past and present, that were formerly bracketed and interpreted in one or more ways are now given new meaning and rearranged, frequently in ways that previously were inconceivable, in accordance with the new master frame. As a female convert to Nichiren Shoshu recounts:

> I am an entirely different person now. I never thought I would have much of a future or grow up to enjoy the world. I was against everything. I hated myself most of all, but I didn't know it until chanting and the Gohonzon (the sacred scroll) showed that there was a different kind of world. Now I see things totally different.

One of the major consequences of this more sweeping variety of frame transformation is that it reduces ambiguity and uncertainty and decreases the prospect of "misframings" or interpretive "errors" and "frame disputes" (Goffman, 1974:301–38). In short, everything is seen with greater clarity and certainty.

This pattern also manifested itself in discussions and interviews with some peace activists. One veteran activist noted, for example, that during the course of her involvement the perceptual boundaries between war and peace issues and other aspects of the world gradually dissolved until there were no longer any distinctive, mutually exclusive domains. Nearly every domain of life, from her interpersonal relations to global issues, came to be reframed in terms congruent with the peace movement.

> . . . The planet is all one system. And therefore it follows logically that we're all one people living on it. And, if people see that, how in the world could they get into a thing, you know, that's going to hurt each other? You've got to try

> to figure out how to make it all work. I mean, to me, it's a political, spiritual thing that's totally tied together. And I feel that it's the way it is whether or not people realize it. I'm sure of it. And the only real hope is for more people to realize it and to do whatever it takes to make them realize it.

What it takes, in those cases where there is little if any transparent overlap between the perspectives of potential adherents and SMOs, is frame transformation or conversion. In those cases, the micromobilization task is to affect conversion by "keying" the experiences of prospective participants, including events that they observe, so that what is going on for them is radically reconstituted (Goffman, 1974:45), as reflected in the above activist's account of her transformation from a "right wing racist" into a peace movement activist:

> My senior year was the time when I changed from the extreme right to . . . left of liberal . . . Everything I learned about it (the peace movement) convinced me how wrong and racist it was to be, you know, right wing. . . . I was in Oklahoma City then, and the peace movement was really late getting there.

While this radical transformative process may be a necessary condition for the participation of some individuals in an array of movements, it is undoubtedly more central to the participation process of some movements than others. Hare Krishna provides a case in point, as graphically illustrated by the following remarks routinely made to recruits at the New York ISKCON temple in 1980:

> As Krishna explains in the *Bhagavad-Gita,* our lives thus far have been in darkness, in the mode of ignorance. *All our learning up to now has been illusion, garbage.* This is because this past learning we have received does not allow us to know the Absolute, Krishna Consciousness (leader's emphasis).

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

We have attempted to clarify understanding of adherent and constituent mobilization by proposing and analyzing frame alignment as a conceptual bridge that links social psychological and structural/organizational considerations on movement participation. We have pursued this task by addressing three deficiencies in research on movement participation—neglect of grievance interpetation, neglect of the processual and dynamic nature of participation, and overgeneralization of participation-related processes, and by identifying and elaborating six concrete points. First, participation in SMO activities is contingent in part on alignment of individual and SMO interpretive frames. Second, this process can be decomposed into four related but not identical processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. Third, initial frame alignment cannot be assumed, given the existence of either grievances or SMOs. Fourth, frame alignment, once achieved, cannot be taken for granted because it is temporally variable and subject to reassessment and renegotiation. As we have noted, the reasons that prompt participation in one set of activities at one point in time may be irrelevant or insufficient to prompt subsequent participation. Fifth, frame alignment, in one form or another, is therefore a crucial aspect of adherent and constituent mobilization. And sixth, each frame alignment process requires somewhat different micromobilization tasks.

Taken together, these observations suggest several sets of questions and propositions that subsequent research ought to address. A first set of questions concerns the relationship between types of frame alignment and types of movements. Is each of the frame alignment processes identified more likely to be associated with some kinds of movements rather than others? Frame bridging, for example, appears to be the modal type of alignment associated with low demand, professional social movements that often are difficult to distinguish from conventional interest groups. Similarly, value amplification might be hypothesized as the modal type of alignment associated with two sets of movements: those that are reactive in the sense that they defend the status quo, such as many conservative movements; and those that arise among people who are segmentally organized in relation to dominant power structures (in the sense discussed by Oberschall, 1973:118–24) and who have constituted, as a result, long-standing subcultures of resistance and contention, such as Catholics in Northern Ireland, Palestinians in the Middle East, Rastafarians in Jamaica, the Basque in Spain, and Blacks in South Africa. In a similar vein, we suspect that frame transformation of the global variety, given its extensive scope and radical nature, is most likely to be associated with participation in movements that share two characteristics: they have "world-transforming" goals or aspirations in the sense that they seek total change of society across all institutions (Bromley and Shupe, 1979); and they are comparatively "greedy" in terms of time, energy, and orientation (Coser, 1974). Examples of movements that can be defined in these terms include Hare Krishna, the Unification Church, Nichiren Shoshu, most millenarian movements, and early communism.

While each of the frame alignment processes may be operative in varying degrees at some point in the life history of most movements, what we are hypothesizing is that there is a kind of elective affinity between forms of alignment and movement goals and perspectives, such that we can speak of modal types of alignment for particular types of

movements. Investigation of this hypothesized relationship becomes especially important when we consider that the differential success of participant mobilization efforts may be due in part to variation in the capacity of SMOs to skillfully effect and then sustain a particular type of alignment.

A second issue concerns the relationship between types of frame alignment and what Tarrow (1983a, 1983b) has referred to as "cycles of protest." Cycles of protest are characterized by, among other things, "the appearance of new technologies of protest" that "spread from their point of origin to other areas and to other sectors of social protest" (Tarrow, 1983a:39), thus adding to what Tilly (1978) refers to as the "repertoire" of protest activity. *But* cycles of protest do not function only as crucibles out of which new technologies of social protest are fashioned; they also generate interpretive frames that not only inspire and justify collective action, but also give meaning to and legitimate the tactics that evolve. Just as some forms of innovative collective action become part of the evolving repertoire for subsequent SMOs and protesters within the cycle, so it seems reasonable to hypothesize that some movements function early in the cycle as progenitors of master frames that provide the ideational and interpretive anchoring for subsequent movements later on in the cycle. If so, then the corollary proposition follows that there ought to be cyclical variation in the predominance of particular types of frame alignment, such that transformation is more likely to be predominant in the early stages, followed by amplification and bridging.

Perhaps the occurrence, intensity, and duration of protest cycles are not just a function of opportunity structures, regime responses, and the like, but are also due to the presence or absence of a potent innovative master frame and/or the differential ability of SMOs to successfully exploit and elaborate the anchoring frame to its fullest. Hypothetically, the absence of innovative master frames may account in part for the failure of mass mobilization when the structural conditions seem otherwise ripe; or a decline in movement protest activity when the structural conditions remain fertile may be partly due to the failure of SMOs to exploit and amplify the anchoring frame in imaginative and inspiring ways. In either case, latent structural potential fails to manifest itself fully.

A third set of issues implied by the foregoing considerations concerns the factors that account for variation in the relative success or failure of framing processes in mobilizing potential constituents. In arguing that one or more varieties of frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation, we have proceeded as if all framing efforts are successful. But clearly that is not the case. Potential constituents are sometimes galvanized and mobilized; on other occasions framing efforts fall on deaf ears and may even be counter-productive. This obdurate fact thus begs the question of why framing processes succeed in some cases but not in others. There are at least two sets of factors at work here.

One involves the content or substance of proferred framings and their degree of resonance with the current life situation and experience of the potential constituents. Does the framing suggest answers and solutions to troublesome situations and dilemmas that resonate with the way in which they are experienced? Does the framing build on and elaborate existing dilemmas and grievances in ways that are believable and compelling? Or is the framing too abstract and even contradictory? In short, is there some degree of what might be conceptualized as frame resonance? We propose that one of the key determinants of the differential success of framing efforts is variation in the degree of frame resonance, such that the higher the degree of frame resonance, the greater the probability that the framing effort will be relatively successful, all else being equal. Many framings may be plausible, but we suspect that relatively few strike a responsive chord and are thus characterized by a high degree of frame resonance. Consideration of this issue calls for closer inspection than heretofore of not only the nature of the interpretive work and resources of SMOs, but also of the degree of fit between the resultant framings or products of that work and the life situation and ideology of potential constituents.

The second set of factors that we think bears directly on the relative success or failure of framing efforts concerns the configuration of framing hazards or "vulnerabilities" (Goffman, 1974:439–95) that confront SMOs as they go about the business of constructing and sustaining particular frame alignments. The excessive use of frame bridging techniques by SMOs, for example, may lead to an oversaturated market. Consequently, a movement may find itself vulnerable to discounting, particularly when potential adherents and conscience constituents are inundated by a barrage of similar impersonal appeals from a variety of competing SMOs.

Frame amplification, too, has its own vulnerabilities, as when a movement fails to consistently protect or uphold those core values or beliefs being highlighted. If, on the other hand, a value becomes discredited or loses its saliency, or a belief is popularly refuted, it may drag associated frames down along with it.

Similar hazards may be associated with the frame extension process. If, for instnce, an SMO fails to deliver the promised auxiliary and incidental benefits, suspicion of the construction of an exploitative fabrication may arise. Moreover, the very use of such inducements that are not central to the movement's stated goals may result

in the trivialization of the sincerity of its claims and objectives, and perhaps of even the movement itself. Social movement organizations and coalitions further run the risk of clouding a frame when they extend their primary frame to encompass goals and issues beyond the scope of their original platform. Adherents and conscience constituents may not embrace the extended frame as enthusiastically as they would a relatively clear, domain-specific frame. Indeed, popular support may be withdrawn following a frame extension strategy, as was the case when some nuclear freeze proponents attempted to link nuclear disarmament goals with a defense of social welfare programs.

Frame transformation is not immune to its own vulnerabilities. Domain specific conversion, for example, though resistent to small changes in opinion climate, is often so narrowly based that either a sudden failure or an unexpected success may test the organization's adaptive abilities. Another risk associated with this form of frame alignment is the occasional fostering of an excessive and unbridled enthusiasm that threatens to spill over into domains extraneous to the movement's frame, thereby undermining its integrity and the movement's mode of operation. Movements involved in global transformation, on the other hand, are less likely to find such generalized enthusiasm problematic, but may find themselves devoting a greater proportion of their resources to internal frame maintenance or "ideological work" (Berger, 1981) to ward off external symbolic threats in the form of ridicule or the downkeyings of "deprogrammers" and other opponents.

The foregoing observations suffice to illustrate that the frame alignment process is an uneasy one that is fraught with hazards or vulnerabilities throughout a movement's life history, and particularly at certain critical junctures, as when SMOs seek to establish coalitions or when they are attacked by countermovements. The ways in which SMOs manage and control these frame vulnerabilities, as well as interpretative resources in general, thus seem as crucial to the temporal viability and success of an SMO as the acquisition and deployment of more tangible resources, which to date have received the lion's share of attention by research informed by the resource mobilization frame.

By focusing on the role SMOs play in the frame alignment process, we have not intended to suggest that there are not other micromobilization agencies or contexts. Clearly, there is evidence that everyday social circles and local, non-movement communal organizations can function as important micromobilization agencies. The organizing role of the black churches in the early stages of the civil rights movement has been well documented (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984), as has the similar role performed by Islamic Mosques throughout the Middle East (Snow and Marshall, 1984). Mass protests that exist apart from SMOs have also been suggested as important mobilizing vehicles by European scholars (Melucci, 1980; Pizzorno, 1978; Touraine, 1981), and single protest events have been hypothesized to function in a similar manner as well (Tarrow, 1983a, 1983b). Precisely how these latent mobilizing structures and incidents of collective behavior affect frame alignment, and thereby facilitate consensus or action mobilization, is not clear, however. Thus, a fourth issue subsequent research ought to address concerns the relationship between extra-movement, micromobilization agencies and the various types of frame alignment, focusing in particular on the processes and mechanisms through which frame alignment effected in different contexts.

One might ask, of course, what difference it makes whether we can specify empirically how and in what contexts frame alignment of one variety or another is effected. Is it not enough to know that frame alignment is produced and constituents are mobilized? The answer is *no* for several reasons. As Tilly (1978) and his associates have shown, collective actors come and go. Some show up when not anticipated. Others fail to mobilize and press their claims, even when they appear to have a kind of natural constituency. And those that do show up vary considerably in terms of how successful they are. The argument here is that the reasons why some show up and others do not, why some stay in contention longer than others, and why some achieve greater and more enduring success, have to do not only with changes in opportunities and the expansion and appropriation of societal resources, but also with whether frame alignment has been successful effected and sustained.

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