IDEOLOGY, FRAME RESONANCE, AND PARTICIPANT MOBILIZATION

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The relationship between ideological factors—values, beliefs, meanings—and identification with social movements and participation in their activities has rarely been treated systematically or dialectically in either the theoretical or empirical literature. With the exception of a few general discussions of social movements (Turner and Killian 1987; Wilson 1973) and a scattering of critical essays (Ferree and Miller 1985; Zurcher and Snow 1981), ideational elements tend to be treated in primarily descriptive rather than analytical terms. What this treatment typically involves is a description of movement ideology or value orientation as prefatory to the analytic task of explaining the emergence and operation of social movements.

This tendency to sidestep or gloss ideological considerations in favor of other factors is particularly evident in the two current fashionable approaches to the analysis of social movements—the new social movements approach in Western Europe and the resource mobilization perspective in the United States. In the case of the former, movements are seen primarily as the carriers or transmitters of programs for action that arise from new structural dislocations. Collective action or social movement activity is seemingly contingent upon a kind of

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immanent awakening that expresses the conditions of or divisions within a population's material situation. What is problematic from this vantage point are not ideas and cognitions but underlying structural precipitants and the emergent forms of action.[1] In the case of the resource mobilization perspective, even less attention is devoted to ideological considerations. Mobilizing beliefs and ideas are seen as ubiquitous and therefore relatively unimportant determinants of movement emergence, mobilization, and success. Analytic attention is focused, instead, on the resource acquisition and deployment activities of movement organizations and on the waxing and waning of political opportunity structures.[2]

Although these two perspectives differ in terms of focal considerations and levels of analyses, both tend to treat meanings or ideas as given, as if there is an isomorphic relationship between the nature of any particular set of conditions or events and the meanings attached to them. Since meanings are produced in the course of interaction with other individuals and objects of attention (Blumer 1969; Mead 1934), it strikes us as foolhardy to take meaning and other ideational elements for granted or to treat them purely descriptively in any equation attempting to account for movement participation. Movements function as carriers and transmitters of mobilizing beliefs and ideas, to be sure; but they are also actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers. This productive work may involve the shaping and structuring of existing meanings. Movements can thus be construed as functioning in part as signifying agents and, as such, are deeply embroiled, along with the media and the state, in what Stuart Hall (1982) has referred to as the "politics of signification."

We use the verb *framing* to conceptualize this signifying work precisely because that is one of the things social movements do. They frame,[3] or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists. In an earlier paper we argued that the mobilization and activation of participants are contingent upon "the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values, and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow et al. 1986, p. 464). We referred to this linkage as "frame alignment" and identified four alignment processes in which movements engage for the purpose of participant mobilization.[4] In that paper we proceeded, for heuristic purposes, as though all framing efforts are successful. But clearly that is not the case. In this chapter we turn to consideration of the conditions that affect or constrain framing efforts directed toward participant mobilization.[5] Why are potential constituents mobilized on some occasions while at other times framing efforts fall on deaf ears and may even be counterproductive? Under what conditions do framing efforts strike a responsive chord or resonate within the targets of mobilization? What are

the key determinants of the differential success of movement framing efforts? What, in short, accounts for what might be termed *frame resonance?*

We attend to these questions by identifying and elaborating four sets of factors that affect the mobilizing potency of a movement's framing efforts and activities. The first set concerns the robustness, completeness, and thoroughness of the framing effort. Does it attend to both consensus and action mobilization, as conceptualized by Klandermans (1984), or is it partial and incomplete? A second set deals with the internal structure of the larger belief system with which the movement seeks to affect some kind of cognitive/ideational alignment. The third set concerns the relevance of the frame to the life world of the participants. Does it resonate phenomenologically? The fourth set concerns what Tarrow (1983a; 1983b) has referred to as "cycles of protest." In elaborating each of these considerations, we draw on our research on the peace movement for illustrative purposes.[6]

I. CORE FRAMING TASKS

Klandermans (1984) has argued that the success of any participant mobilization campaign is contingent upon its ability to affect both consensus and action mobilization. That is, movements must drum up support for their views and aims and activate individuals who already agree with those views and aims. While we find this distinction to be of considerable conceptual utility, we do not think it goes far enough in getting at the dynamic interactive relationship among ideational elements, movement activity, and participation. Additionally, the terms strike us as umbrella concepts of sorts in that they camouflage or gloss over the more specific tasks that need to be conducted in order to achieve consensus and to produce action.

We think the verb "framing" provides a conceptual handle for identifying and elaborating the more specific tasks. Following Wilson's (1973) decomposition of ideology into three component elements, we suggest that there are three core framing tasks: (1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration; (2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done; and (3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action. The diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks are directed toward achieving consensus mobilization. The latter task, which concerns action mobilization, provides the motivational impetus for participation.

It is our thesis that variation in the success of participant mobilization, both within and across movements, depends upon the degree to which these three tasks are attended to. The more the three tasks are robust or richly developed and interconnected, the more successful the mobilization effort, *ceteris paribus.* The general proposition can be illustrated in part with reference to the peace movement.

A. Diagnostic Framing

Diagnostic framing involves identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality. While consensus is often achieved within a movement with respect to problem identification, attributional consensus is less frequently realized or is more problematic. In the case of the peace movement, there is relatively little dispute regarding the nuclear threat. Indeed, the most richly developed imagery is represented by the mushroom cloud and the associated destructive capacity of nuclear weapons.[7] There is far less agreement, however, with respect to the factors underlying this threat (Benford 1987; Newman 1986; Yankelovich and Doble 1984). Disarmament proponents, as well as persons external to the movement, have identified a variety of factors as causes of the nuclear threat. While more than one factor is often blamed or combined in such causal attributions, the various wings or factions of a movement tend to elevate one factor above all other possible causes as the most salient or primary one. Our research indicates at least four distinctive sets of causal factors, each of which is claimed by different sections of the movement to be *the* most salient cause of the nuclear threat: (1) technological, (2) political, (3) economic, and (4) moral. Since our purpose is to illustrate our conceptual framework, we will attend to only the first two causal attributions.

Many view the nuclear threat as primarily a consequence of technological developments. Nuclear weapons are seen as representing the culmination of the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution and therefore as manifestations of our species' attempt to understand, harness, and overcome the forces of nature. Yet even among those who point to technology in general as the primary cause underlying the nuclear predicament there is disagreement regarding the more specific focus of blame. Some employ a Frankenstein analogy suggesting that our present lack of understanding of technology has led to the creation of a nuclear monster that could turn, out of control, on its creators. Others blame an overly optimistic faith in the capacity of science to solve global social and political problems. Still others stress the amoral commitment of technologists to their craft.

Within other sectors of the movement, political factors loom as most salient. There are those who argue that an anachronistic geopolitical structure is to blame, particularly one comprising sovereign states. Others locate the main impetus of the threat in the struggle for global hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union. Segments of the movement have laid the blame on the U.S. alone, contending that the U.S. has been the leader in accelerating the nuclear threat and that the Soviets have merely attempted to match U.S. strategic escalations. In sum, a variety of general and specific factors have been offered by disarmament advocates as the single most important cause of the threat, and each factor has implications for the prognostic aspect of consensus mobilization.

B. Prognostic Framing

The purpose of *prognostic framing* is not only to suggest solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics, and targets. What is to be done is thereby specified. While proposed solutions to the problems may not necessarily follow directly from the causal attributions offered by a particular segment of a movement, more often than not there is a direct correspondence between diagnostic and prognostic framing efforts.

Continuing with the illustrations employed above, we find that those who see technology as the main cause of the nuclear threat tend to focus upon technology in their prognoses. At one extreme are those who propose a rejection of technology and a return to nature, holistic lifestyles, rural communal living, and the like. The antitechnologists, who are basically retreatist, constitute a relatively small portion of the nuclear disarmament movement. At the other extreme are those who advocate technological solutions for what they see as primarily a technological problem. Groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, for instance, have focused their attention on "stopping hardware," that is, on preventing the production and deployment of particular weapon systems that they view as most dangerous, destabilizing, or likely to increase the probability of nuclear war. We are not suggesting that this wing of the movement has altogether avoided advocating political solutions but, rather, that proposed technical solutions tend to be preeminent in their framing efforts and public discourse.[8]

Those who diagnose the nuclear threat as a symptom or manifestation of political factors tend to advocate predominantly political solutions. One of the movement's wings has proposed a variety of globalistic treatments, all of which have to do with shifting the focus of political power from sovereign states to international institutions. These suggestions include proposals for establishing world federalism, strengthening international institutions, challenging the legality of nuclear weapons in the World Court, and so forth. Other segments of the movement, such as the U.S. Freeze Campaign, have focused advocacy on bilateral arms control negotiations and treaties. Still other groups, such as Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) or the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV), have proposed mobilizing citizens to pressure their governments to initiate unilateral steps toward total nuclear disarmament or to declare their political jurisdictions "nuclear free zones."

C. Motivational Framing

Variation in the content of prognostic frames within the peace movement could be elaborated in much greater detail. The foregoing discussion suffices to illustrate, however, that consensus mobilization is not only multifaceted but that its several dimensions are interconnected such that each successive

dimension is constrained by the preceding ones. This interconnection is further illustrated by consideration of the third mobilizing framing task or function: the elaboration of a call to arms or *rationale for action* that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis. Since agreement about the causes and solutions to a particular problem does not automatically produce corrective action, it follows that consensus mobilization does not necessarily yield to mobilization. Participation is thus contingent upon the development of motivational frames that function as prods to action. The substance and mobilizing potency of these frames, which consist essentially of a vocabulary of motives (Mills 1940), are obviously constrained by the diagnostic components of movement ideology, but not always in ways that are suspected or intended.

That action mobilization does not necessarily follow on the heels of consensus mobilization is particularly evident in the case of movements that seek goals that constitute what Olson (1965) calls "public goods" (i.e., indivisible, nonexcludable benefits). With its goal of a nuclear-free world, the peace movement is of that genre. It is consequently confronted with the task of convincing particular participants of both the need for and the utility of becoming active in the cause. The solution, according to Olson and the resource mobilization perspective, resides in the generation of "selective incentives" for participation. These incentives, generally speaking, encompass material, status, solidary, and moral inducements.[9]

In the case of the peace movement the rationale for participation is framed most generally and pervasively in terms of moral considerations. This moral element is reflected most clearly in Jonathan Schell's best-seller, *Fate of the Earth,* which provides not only an elegant diagnosis of the nuclear problem confronting humankind but also a clarion call for action. The moral implications of this assessment of the problem are captured by Schell's (1982, p. 116) discussion of what he refers to as "the second death."

> The possibility that the living can stop the future generations from entering into life compels us to ask basic new questions about our existence, the most sweeping of which is what these unborn ones, most of whom we will never meet if they are born, mean to us. No one has ever thought to ask this question before our time, because no generation before ours has ever held the life and death of the species in its hand.

Given this moral dilemma, it follows that we have a moral imperative to do something about it. Thus, in the book's last sentence, Schell (1982, p. 231) issues what is clearly interpretable as a moral call to action:

> Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I trust and believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril, a truth as great as life itself, and, like a person who has swallowed a lethal poison up, we will break through the layers of our denials, put aside our fainthearted excuses, and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.

Movement handbooks or "bibles" such as Schell's, Thompson and Smith's *Protest and Survive,* (1981), and Keyes's *The Hundredth Monkey* (1982) function to supply a vocabulary of moral rationales for action that routinely are given expression, in distilled fashion, within movement circles and at rallies. There are other inducements, as well, although perhaps less general and persuasive; but we need not articulate them here since our aim is only to illustrate that the generation of motivation constitutes a framing problem related to, but distinctive from, the diagnostic and prognostic components of consensus mobilization.

In some instances these components unwittingly render existing frames impotent or the development of new ones particularly difficult. This framing dilemma may occur in several ways. The problem may be framed so cataclysmically and hopelessly, for example, that ameliorative action seems highly improbable. Such a framing gives rise to a sense of fatalism. This tendency is manifest in peace movement framings that highlight and embellish the doomsday possibilities of nuclear confrontation. One of the most graphic examples of this tendency is provided by the Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) whose framings, until recently, focused solely on the horrifying consequences of nuclear weapons and their claim that "there is no medical response to nuclear war." These "bombing runs" or "apocaporn" framings, as they were dubbed within movement circles, were subsequently called into question precisely because of their numbing effects. They were seen to function as impediments rather than prods to mobilization.

Attention may also be focused so singularly on problem diagnoses that the prognostic considerations are neglected. The unintended consequence is that guidelines for action are unclear. Concern and consensus with respect to the nature and the causes of the problem may be widespread, but questions of what should be done and why may have received only the most ambiguous answers. This framing problem was eventually recognized by PSR leaders as an encumbrance to their action mobilization interests. As a former director of PSR noted:

> It has gone beyond the point where we can not responsibly sound the alarm without prescribing therapy. . . . We have an obligation to go one step further (Rizzo 1983, p. 11).

In January 1983, in an attempt to overcome this framing problem, PSR, for the first time in the group's history, recommended four specific ways of "halting and reversing the arms race."[10] In due time, then, PSR came to recognize what many movement activists and analysts tend to gloss over: that diagnostic frames alone, no matter how richly developed, do little to affect action mobilization and that, the more highly integrated the diagnostic, prognostic, and action frames, the higher the probability of becoming active in any particular cause.

A third way in which antecedent framing efforts may inadvertently stifle action is that both diagnosis and prognosis may be framed in such a way that public debate is rendered superfluous and the prospect of rank-and-file participation is undermined. This framing dilemma is evident in those wings of the disarmament movement in which the problem and solutions are framed largely in technological terms. The issue is defined as a problem for experts, a definition that forecloses public debate. The frequent use of technical terms and acronyms (e.g., throw weights, circular error probable, electromagnetic pulse, SLBMs, MIRVs), as well as discussions focused on the characteristics of particular weapons systems, not only provide a vocabulary that is foreign to all but the technically trained but also underscore the technical nature of the problem. The point is that to frame any issue in terms that are inaccessible to all but a select few, as is the case with technologically framed issues, is to reduce potential participants to spectators and so make the issue nonparticipatory.

To summarize the foregoing observations: we have shown that consensus mobilization is multidimensional and that agreement on one dimension does not ensure unanimity with respect to other dimensions. We have also emphasized the fact that action mobilization does not automatically follow from consensus mobilization, and so the development of motivational frames that function as prods to action are often required. To focus only on the substantive content of the movement's framing efforts, however, runs the risk of creating a picture of frame alignment as an overly mechanistic, nondialectical process whereby mobilizing ideas are poured into or diffused among a passive, nonsuspecting population. Clearly that is an erroneous picture of the alignment process and one that we do not wish to portray.

In his discussions of hegemony and revolution, Gramsci (1971) recognized the importance of "political education" and the development of a counter-ideology or framing as an antidote to ruling class hegemony. But with his distinction between "organic" and "nonorganic" ideology he realized that any successful political education must begin with and be linked to the nature and structure of the belief system that is the objective of transformation. Building on Gramsci, Rude (1980) has argued that the mobilizing potential of protest beliefs and ideas, which he categorizes as a variant of "derived ideology," is partly contingent on the degree to which it is built upon the stock of folk ideas and beliefs he refers to as "inherent ideology." The point is that the relationship between the framing efforts of movements and the mobilization of potential constituents is highly dialectical, such that there is no such thing as a *tabula rasa* or empty glass into which new and perhaps alien ideas can be poured. Neither Gramsci nor Rude clearly specify the ways in which "nonorganic" or "inherent ideologies" constrain the proffered framings of social movements, however. We thus turn to an elaboration of those considerations.

II. INFRASTRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS OF BELIEF SYSTEMS

Whatever the substance of any particular framing, its appeal and mobilizing potency are affected by several sets of constraints that are external to it. One set concerns the internal structure of the larger belief system or ideology with which the movement seeks to effect some form of alignment. Another pertains to the extent to which the framing effort is relevant to or resonates within the life world of potential participants. In this section we attend to the infrastructure constraints.

Previous work (Borhek and Curtis 1975; Converse 1964) on the nature of belief systems suggest at least three core components: (1) the *centrality* or hierarchical salience of any particular ideational element in relation to other such elements within the belief system as a whole; (2) the *range* of the central ideational elements or the domains of life they encompass; and (3) the degree of *interrelatedness* among the various ideational elements within the belief system.

Belief systems can vary considerably in terms of these characteristics. At one extreme are those based upon a core principle or value wherein the range of elements is highly interconnected with other elements of the system, as in the case of scientific theory. At the other extreme are systems with a number of equally salient principles or beliefs, each of which is related to a particular domain of life but in a highly compartmentalized fashion, as with polytheistic religions of the kind that flowered in classical Greece. In the case of the former, the viability of the entire system rests on the continued salience and credibility of the core principle; in the case of the latter, individual salient elements can be chipped away without the entire corpus of beliefs crumbling (Borhek and Curtis 1975; Snow and Machalek 1982). Most beliefs fall somewhere between these two extremes. Regardless of where the target constituency's belief system falls between these two extremes, however, the three components noted above function to constrain or affect the efficacy of a movement's framing efforts and mobilization campaigns.

A. Centrality

Turning to the first constraint, we see that if the values or beliefs the movement seeks to promote or defend are of low hierarchical salience within the larger belief system, the mobilizing potential is weakened considerably and the task of political education or consciousness raising becomes more central but difficult. It is axiomatic that the greater the correspondence between values promoted by a movement and those held by potential constituents, the greater the success of the mobilization effort, as measured by the number of contributors to or participants in the movement. Things are seldom that simple,

however. Individuals routinely hold numerous values that not only are arrayed hierarchically but also vary in terms of the intensity with which they are held.

Values promoted by the peace movement, for example, such as sanctity of human life, preservation of the species, and peaceful coexistence, are those with which most citizens would agree, but the questions of how intensely they feel about the values and of how salient they are in relation to other values are problematic. We suspect that the mobilization difficulties encountered by peace activists in the United States are due in part to the relatively low hierarchical salience of the issues and values promoted by the movement. This hypothetical disjuncture was clearly recognized by the former national coordinator of the Freeze Campaign following the 1984 election:

> The important message [of the election] is that the American people are in favor of a freeze but they don't feel the freeze is an urgent necessity. To them it's not more important than short-term economics or personalities.

A similar conclusion was reached by a movement analyst regarding arms control in general:

> The movement, despite the hoopla and energy exhibited by some activists, was just not able to push the arms race to the center stage in the national political debate (Corn 1984, p. 12).

Public opinion survey results suggest that these observations are empirically on target. For example, a pre-1984 election poll found that over two-thirds (68%) of Americans who thought Mondale would be more likely to reduce the threat of nuclear war than Reagan still preferred Reagan because they felt they would be better off financially with Reagan in the White House (*Washington Post*/ABC News Poll, September 6-11, 1984).

B. Range and Interrelatedness

The second two sets of internal structure constraints of belief systems—range and interrelatedness—present movements with additional framing dilemmas in the course of their mobilization campaigns. If the framing effort is linked to only one core belief or value that is of limited range, then the movement is vulnerable to being discounted if that value or belief is called into question or if its hierarchical salience diminishes within the entire belief system. In order to deal with this dilemma, as well as expand their potential constituency, movements may extend the boundaries of their primary framework by incorporating values that were initially incidental to its central objectives. In doing so, movements often find themselves confronted with the problem of frame overextension. This framing hazard has been frequently encountered by the peace movement.

A 1982 California freeze referendum, for example, represents an unsuccessful attempt to extend the movement's values beyond reducing the nuclear threat. The initial petition proposed not only that the state endorse the freeze but additionally that the funds saved from such an arms control measure would be utilized to "meet human needs." When polls indicated that this two-pronged referendum would fail at the ballot box, freeze organizers decided to drop the welfare component, and the initiative subsequently passed by a substantial margin.

Problems of frame overextension may also arise when several movement organizations establish coalitions and pool their resources to organize an event. To illustrate: in 1983 simultaneous demonstrations were organized throughout the United States and Western Europe to protest the pending deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles. Yet, as is often the case with movement coalitions, the number of goals and values being promoted extended well beyond the "Euromissile" issue to encompass gay rights, feminist concerns, Palestinian liberation, antiinterventionism, and a host of other causes associated with the Left. A statewide peace coalition organized as part of this mass mobilization effort similarly attempted to extend its focus beyond the Euromissile issue to include opposition to the U.S. involvement in Central America. One advocate of broadening the frame in this fashion explained:

> There is a problem with getting people involved in this because the threat is in Europe. We need to bring in the intervention issue because it is closer to home.

While the coalition's decision to broaden its agenda to include opposition to U.S. foreign policy may have engendered support from persons who might not have otherwise participated, our research indicates that this frame extension led others to reject opportunities to participate in movement activities—or at least provided them with rationales for doing so. This reaction was evident in the case of several freeze supporters, as one commented upon being solicited by a peace coalition member for assistance with the event:

> If your goal was still just "stop the missiles," I'd help. But now you've gone and confused the issue by including Central America. You've muddied up the waters so much that it would be a waste of my time to contribute anything to your march.

III. PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS

A third set of factors affecting the mobilizing potency of proferred framings is the phenomenological life world of the targets of mobilization. Does the framing strike a responsive chord with those individuals for whom it is intended? To what extent does it inform understanding of events and experiences within the world of potential constituents? Is it relevant to their

life situations? There appear to be three interrelated but analytically distinct constraints that bear upon this relevancy issue: (1) empirical credibility, (2) experiential commensurability, and (3) narrative fidelity.

A. Empirical Credibility

By *empirical credibility* we refer to the fit between the framing and events in the world. Is the framing testable? Can it be subjected to verification? Are there events or occurrences that can be pointed to as evidence substantiating the diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational claims of the movement? Of course, what is constitutive of evidence for any particular claim is itself subject to debate.

One of the central claims of the nuclear disarmament movement, as articulated most vividly by Schell (1982), is that not only are individual lives threatened by the nuclear arms race but the entire human species and perhaps most life on the planet would not survive a nuclear war. As is typically the case with most doomsday framings, Schell's warnings provoked virulent argumentation and discounting. The substance of Schell's claims was attacked on several fronts. The most general counterclaim was that such doomsday fears were unwarranted because of the improbability of nuclear confrontation. Furthermore, nuclear defense proponents argued that, even if such a confrontation were to occur, it was far more likely to be a limited rather than a global nuclear cataclysm. Additionally, some proponents countered that the doomsday claims of the nuclear disarmament movement were without empirical substance and thus existed merely at the level of speculative hypothesis. These countervailing framings in turn engendered more empirically concrete reframings by disarmament proponents. The nuclear winter thesis, as publicly disseminated by Sagan, is a case in point. Drawing on varied research that ranges from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the effects of volcanic eruptions, proponents attempted to strengthen the empirical credibility of the movement's claims (Turco et al. 1983).

B. Experiential Commensurability

In an area of competing frames and frame disputes, the question arises as to what determines whether one set of claims is found to be more credible than the others. The answer depends in part on the interpretive screen through which the "evidence" is filtered. One such important screening mechanism is the personal experience of the targets of mobilization. Does the framing have what we call *experiential commensurability?* Does it suggest answers and solutions to troublesome events and situations which harmonize with the ways in which these conditions have been or are currently experienced? Or is the framing too abstract and distant from the everyday experiences of potential participants?

We think this variable of experiential commensurability is perhaps one of the most important determinants of individual and cross-cultural variations in the mobilizing potency of peace movement framing efforts. Although we have not aggregated systematically derived comparative data pertaining to support for and participation in the peace movement, perusal of the popular press, media displays, and peace movement literature suggests three general cross-national observations. First, while there is widespread global consensus regarding the nuclear threat and the need to do something about it, there is disagreement over what should be done. In Japan and Western Europe there appears to be considerable support for unilateral and total nuclear disarmament; in the United States, on the other hand, the prevailing sentiment favors a bilateral freeze. A second general observation is that the proportion of the population participating in peace movement activities appears to be greater in Japan and Western Europe than in the United States. The third observation pertains to differences in the nature and level of movement activity. In Western Europe, in contrast to the United States, for example, movement activity appears to be more constant and intense.

To the extent that these observations are empirically accurate, we think they can be explained in part by differences in the nature of cross-national experience with warfare and nuclear weaponry. Experience with warfare and nuclear weapons has been less direct and immediate in the United States than it has in Japan and Europe. Although the United States has been involved in numerous wars and skirmishes, none have taken place on its soil since the mid-1800s. Additionally, U.S. nuclear weapon installations tend to be located greater distances from dense population settlements than is the case in Western Europe. Given the Europeans' direct experience with warfare and the closer proximity of nuclear weapons installations to population masses, it follows that the threat of nuclear war has far greater experiential commensurability for citizens of European countries than for Americans. And this proposition would appear to be even more relevant to the Japanese, who are the only people to have directly experienced the horrors of nuclear weapons.

Taken together, these observations help to explain our research findings regarding the difficulties faced by U.S. peace activists in concretizing the nuclear threat. In the case of the U.S., the difference in mobilization rates does not appear to stem merely from the way in which the problem is framed; it also lies in the commensurability of the frames with what most citizens have experienced. In short, the doomsday frame does not resonate experientially to the same degree within U.S. citizens that it does with citizens of European countries and Japan, and, as a consequence, it does not function as successfully in the United States as a prod to action.

C. Narrative Fidelity

Such differences can also be explained in part by the degree to which proffered framings resonate with cultural narrations, that is, with the stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one's cultural heritage and that thus function to inform events and experiences in the immediate present. When such correspondence exists, framings can be said to have what Fisher (1984) has termed *"narrative fidelity."* In other words, the framing strikes a responsive chord in that it rings true with existing cultural narrations that are functionally similar to what Gouldner (1970, pp. 29-36) calls "domain assumptions."

The importance of narrative fidelity to the success of any kind of framing effort has been recognized in different quarters. In the theological realm, for instance, Goldberg (1982, p. 35) notes that:

> a theologian, regardless of the propositional statements he or she may have to make about a community's convictions, must consciously strive to keep those statements in intimate contact with the narratives which give rise to those convictions, within which they gain their sense and meaning, and *from which they have been abstracted.*

Rude's (1980) linkage of inherent and derived aspects of ideology seems to make a similar point, as does Geertz's (1973) conception of ideology as a cultural system. Geertz's discussion of organized labor's designation of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 as a "slave labor law" provides a particularly elegant example of the linkage between cultural narratives and the efficacy of the way in which events or issues are framed. Geertz notes that, although the intent of the "slave labor" framing was to mobilize opposition to the act by suggesting that the labor policies of the Republican Party and the Bolsheviks were analogous, the framing effort fell on deaf ears and thus misfired. The reason, he suggests (1973, p. 211), was that "semantic tension between the image of a conservative Congress outlawing the closed shop and of the prison camps of Siberia was—apparently—too great." Geertz (1973, p. 212) thus concluded that if the Taft-Hartley Act were to be seen as a mortal threat to organized labor, "one must simply frame the argument . . . in some other way."

It is our contention that this variable of narrative fidelity similarly affects the mobilizing potency of movement framing efforts. Again, this connection can clearly be seen in the case of the peace movement. Internationally, two issues have been the object of intramovement debate regarding how best to reduce the threat of nuclear confrontation. One concerns arms control versus total disarmament. The other concerns the question of whether control or disarmament should be pursued unilaterally or bilaterally. In the United States there has been considerable support for a bilateral freeze but relatively little enthusiasm for either complete nuclear disarmament, however it might be pursued, or unilateral arms control.

We think these observations can be partly explained in terms of two factors. The first is grounded in the common sense understanding that all U.S. military ventures are defensive in nature, as reflected in a recent public opinion poll indicating that 81% of Americans believe it is current U.S. policy to use nuclear weapons "if and only if" its adversaries use them first (Yankelovich and Doble 1984, p. 45). The second pertains to the prevailing view among Americans that the Soviet Union is a distrustful aggressor on the world stage or "the bear in the woods" depicted in Reagan's 1984 reelection campaign commericals. The conjunction of these two strands of American folk ideology or common sense render the ideas of unilateral initiatives or total disarmament foolhardy. In the language of political analysts, such a view "would not play in Peoria." That is to say, it lacks narrative fidelity. Among U.S. peace activists recognition of this framing constraint has been widespread and has prompted them to support the freeze, irrespective of their personal beliefs. In Europe, on the other hand, where views of the Soviet Union tend to be less xenophobic, there is greater latitude, wherein both the arms control versus disarmament and the bilateral versus unilateral issues generate considerable public discussion and debate.

To summarize this section: we have suggested that the mobilizing potency of movement framing efforts is partly contingent upon the extent to which they have empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. We suggest that at least one of these relevancy variables is a necessary condition for consensus mobilization and therefore enhances the probability of action mobilization. Hypothetically, if a frame is empirically credible, experientially commensurable, and narratively resonant, the stronger the consensus mobilization and the more fertile the soil for action mobilization.

IV. CYCLES OF PROTEST

A final possible constraint affecting both the substance and mobilizing potency of a movement's framing efforts is the existence of cycles of protest or general movement activity within which specific movements are frequently embedded. Tarrow (1983 a, pp. 38-39; 1983b, p. 11) has conceptualized cycles of protest in terms of five characteristic features, one of which is "the appearance of new technologies of protest" that "spread from their point of origin to other areas and to other sectors of social protest." Cycles of protest thus add to or delimit what Tilly (1978) refers to as the "repertoire" of protest tactics and activities.

Cycles of protest do not function only as crucibles out of which new technologies or repertoires of social protest are fashioned, however. Following our earlier work (Snow et al. 1986) and Turner's (1969, p. 392) contention that within each historical era there are typically "one or two movements that colour the preoccupations and social change effected during the era," we would expand the conceptualization of cycles of protest to include a sixth characteristic

feature: that they also generate interpretive frames that either cognitively align structural/material conditions with latent mobilizing strands of "folk" (inherent or organic) ideologies or transform the meaning or significance of those conditions for the aggregations effected by them. In both cases, collective protest is inspired and justified, the tactics that evolve are given meaning and legitimated, and, as a result, structurally based protest potentials become manifest.

If we accept this general proposition as given, all else being equal, then several corollary propositions follow with respect to the nature and efficacy of movement framing activities. First, the point at which a movement emerges within a cycle of protest affects the substance and latitude of its framing efforts. Second, movements that surface early in a cycle of protest are likely to function as progenitors of master frames that provide the ideational or interpretive anchoring for subsequent movements within the cycle. And third, movements that emerge later in the cycle will typically find their framing efforts constrained by the previously elaborated master frame. Such movements may add to and embellish that master frame, but rarely in ways that are inconsistent with its core elements, unless events have discredited it and undermined its mobilizing potency.

Our research provides some illustrative observations which suggest that this line of reasoning is empirically on target. When considering peace movements historically or at a particular point in time, one can find numerous events or issues that might function as the pivotal foci for peace movement initiatives. These include, among others, international confrontations, border disputes, interventionism, weapons stockpiling, and institutional and structural violence. The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, with his strident and bellicose rhetoric, and, simultaneously, the heightened tensions in various hot spots throughout the world (e.g., the Middle East, Central America, and Africa), provided any number of events and issues around which peace activists might rally. Yet, with the revival of the peace movement in the 1980s, attention was focused almost singularly on the nuclear threat.[11]

The intriguing question thus arises as to how this highly limited focus might be explained. While undoubtedly a number of factors were at work, we think a particularly prominent role was played by the emergence of the freeze initiative and the way in which it framed the problem and solution. We previously noted some of the reasons the freeze seemed to resonate well among many Americans and how it tended to undermine the degree to which other events and values could be seen as interconnected. Because the freeze initiative framed the problem in a narrow and highly compartmentalized fashion, subsequent attempts to encompass other peace issues and link them to the nuclear threat were exceedingly difficult, as illustrated by our earlier discussion of the dilemma of frame overextension. Peace organizations—such as the Mobilization for Survival—that attempted to extend the parameters of the

frame to incorporate other events and issues were not able to engender broad-based support, in part because of the way in which the problem was initially framed in the early 1980s.

This initial framing also had implications for the tactical repertoire deemed appropriate. Consistent with the Freeze Campaign's goal of pressuring Congress to pass a resolution freezing the arms race, traditional political tactics such as petition drives, referenda, and other lobbying efforts were utilized. Direct action and civil disobedience were thus regarded as inappropriate and illegitimate by many sectors of the movement. Although the freeze initiative has more recently been called into question by virtue of the fact that it has made little headway in achieving its objectives, it still functions as a springboard for much discussion and debate within the peace movement in the United States.

CONCLUSION

Viewing movements as signifying agents actively involved in the framing of events and conditions, and thus in the production of meanings and ideas, we have attempted in this chapter to identify and elaborate the factors that affect the mobilizing potency of movement framing efforts and activities. Four sets of factors were enumerated and discussed. The first concerns the degree to which core framing tasks—diagnostic, prognostic, motivational—are richly developed and interconnected in a complementary fashion. The second addresses the internal constraints of belief systems with which a movement attempts to affect alignment. The third involves the relevance of proffered framings to the phenomenological life world of potential participants. And the fourth concerns the cycle of protest in which movements are embedded. The underlying thesis prompting this expository effort is that mobilization depends not only on the existence of objective structural disparities and dislocations, the availability and deployment of tangible resources, leaders' organizational skills, political opportunities, and a kind of cost-benefit calculus engaged in by prospective participants but also on the way these variables are framed and the degree to which they resonate with the targets of mobilization.

The factors constraining framing efforts and effecting their mobilizing potency may well go beyond those we have identified. Clearly, we do not assume that our expository effort has been exhaustive. Rather we see the four sets of constraints we have examined as constituting the conceptual scaffolding upon which subsequent research and theorizing might build.

However partial and incomplete this scaffolding, we think it suggests several important conceptual and theoretical implications. The first concerns the tremendous complexity of participant mobilization. To the extent that our observations are on target, the business of convincing and activating

prospective participants is far more interactive, dynamic, and dialectic than generally appreciated in the contemporary literature. A second implication, following from the first, is that consensus mobilization is multidimensional and that the ways in which its dimensions are framed may inadvertently impede, as well as facilitate, action mobilization. A third implication is the possibility of answers to a number of vexing questions regarding the relationship between structure and collective action: the failure of mobilization efforts when structural conditions seem otherwise ripe may be attributable in part to the absence of resonant mobilizing frames; or a decline in social movement activity when the structural conditions remain fertile may be due to the failure of movements to frame chancing events and conditions in relevant ways. In both cases, latent structural potential fails to manifest itself fully.

A final implication of our observations is that they direct attention to a side or face of movement activity that has rarely been explored. The most visible side of social movements is their public side, the one that is constituted by confrontational and obstructionist activities such as marches, rallies, boycotts, strikes, and sit-ins. Since this is the side that is captured, catalogued, and archived by the media, and since many researchers today have a penchant for examining collective action via such data sources, it is not surprising that it is the side which is featured most prominently in the literature. Social movements, however, have another side, one that is not clearly understood. It is on this side that one finds the framing efforts, negotiations, and disputes that we have discussed and that are part and parcel of the signifying work of such movements. However, these activities are fully accessible only through ongoing encounters with participants in movement activities and by firsthand contact with the international workings and operations of movement organizations as they unfold and evolve over time.

NOTES

1. For overviews of this perspective, see Klandermans (1986), Melucci (1980), and Tarrow (1986).

2. For critical overviews and discussions of this perspective, see Jenkins (1983), Klandermans (1986), Tarrow (1986), and Zurcher and Snow (1981).

3. The term "frame" is borrowed from Goffman (1974, p. 21) to denote "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective.

4. The four frame alignment processes include: (1) frame bridging, which involves "the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Snow et al. 1986, p. 467); (2) frame amplification, which refers to "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events" (1986, p. 469); (3) frame extension, which involves the expansion of the boundaries of a "movement's primary framework so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents" (1986, p. 472); and (4) frame transformation, which refers to the redefinition of "activities, events, and biographies that are already meaningful from the standpoint of some primary framework, such that they are now seen by the participants to be quite something else" (1986, p. 474).

5. It is important to keep in mind that framing efforts can vary considerably depending on the target of mobilization or influence. Perusal of the literature suggests that there are at least seven target groups that are relevant to the life histories of movements: adherents, constituents, bystander publics, media, potential allies, antagonists or countermovements, and elite decision makers. As we have indicated, our focus is on the participants, who include adherents (those who subscribe to movement objectives but do not contribute resources) and constituents (those who devote resources and are thus activated on behalf of the cause).

6. This research, which has focused primarily on the peace movement in the United States, entailed the following data gathering techniques: extensive ethnographic participation in local and regional peace movement activities and organizations; formal and informal interviews with local participants and local and national-level activists; and analyses of movement-generated documents and periodicals. The research was conducted over a four-year period by the second author (see Benford 1984; 1987; 1988) under the supervision of the senior author, among others.

7. A recent Public Agenda Foundation study (Yankelovich and Doble 1984, p. 33) that was based upon several national surveys of public attitudes concluded that an overwhelming majority of Americans (89%) agree that "there can be no winner in an all-out nuclear war." Similarly, 83% believe that "we cannot be certain that life on earth will continue after a nuclear war" (1983, p. 34). Moreover, a smaller but still sizable majority (68%) agree that if current trends in the nuclear arms race continue, "it is only a matter of time before they [nuclear weapons] are used." When the first item is compared to a 1955 survey in which only 27% of the U.S. public agreed that "mankind would be destroyed in an all-out atomic or hydrogen bomb war," the size of the 1984 majority is all the more dramatic. While it would be erroneous to credit the peace movement alone for this shift in reported attitudes, these data support our contention that the diagnostic task of problem identification is not particularly problematical for disarmament activists.

8. It is interesting to note that even opponents of the nuclear disarmament movement frequently espouse technological solutions, such as achieving a more stable nuclear deterrent by improving certain technical aspects of the weaponry or, as in the case of the Strategic Defense Initiative proponents, by developing an impenetrable shield that could destroy enemy missiles before they reached their intended targets.

9. For an insightful and critical discussion of the selective incentive concept and the logic of the rational calculus model see Fireman and Gamson (1979).

10. PSR's recommendations included "support for a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze and a comprehensive test ban, and opposition to destabilizing first strike weapons and civil defense plans against nuclear attack" (Rizzo 1983, p. 11).

11. These observations perhaps suggest, to borrow Althusser's (1970) terminology, that most movements are structurally or materially overdetermined, a situation which for us underscores all the more the importance of framing.

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