GLOBALIZING RESISTANCE: THE BATTLE OF SEATTLE AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS*

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The massive protests at the Third Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization in November 1999 resulted from broad and accelerating changes in global social and political relations. Many protesting groups had been involved in previous struggles for global economic justice that shaped their identities and strategies in Seattle. This study examines the participants, activities, and political context of the "Battle of Seattle." It explores the transnational activist linkages and suggests that a division of labor was present whereby groups with local and national ties took on mobilization roles while groups with routinized transnational ties provided information and frames for the struggle. An examination of the tactics used in Seattle suggests that national protest "repertoires" have been adapted for use in global political arenas. There is also some evidence of protest innovation in response to global political integration and technology. While this study encompasses only a single protest episode, it suggests that increasing globalization and transnational protests have enduring effects on the organization and character of social movements.

On the evening of November 29, 1999, Seattle business and political leaders hosted an elaborate welcoming party in the city's football stadium for delegates to the World Trade Organization's Third Ministerial Conference. At the same time, thousands of activists rallied at a downtown church in preparation for the first large public confrontation in what became the "Battle of Seattle."[1] Protesters emerged from the overflowing church and joined thousands more who were dancing, chanting, and conversing in a cold Seattle downpour. They filled several city blocks and celebrated the "protest of the century." Many wore union jackets or rain ponchos that proclaimed their opposition to the World Trade Organization. Several thousand marchers (police estimates in local newspapers were 14,000, activists estimated 30,000, see Njehŭ 2000) progressed to the stadium, and around it formed a human

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[1] During the weekend prior to the WTO meeting, a number of smaller street protests and other events took place, beginning on Friday afternoon with a regularly scheduled "critical mass" bicycle ride through the streets of downtown Seattle and an evening "teach-in" organized by the International Forum on Globalization.

chain—three or four people deep—to dramatize the crippling effects of the debt crisis. The protest deterred more than two-thirds of the expected 5,000 guests from attending the lavish welcoming event. The human chain's symbolism of the "chains of debt" was part of an international campaign (Jubilee 2000) to end third world debt. It highlighted for protesters and onlookers the enormous inequities of the global trading system, and kicked off a week of street protests and rallies against the global trade regime.[2]

The Seattle protests revealed a broad and diverse opposition to the recent expansion of the neoliberal global economic policies. The "Battle of Seattle" and its predecessor campaigns against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and "fast track" authorization represented some of the first major popular challenges in the U.S. to these policies. Indeed, these campaigns may mark a turning point in economic globalization by demonstrating a capacity for mass challenges to international trade agreements and high levels of popular concern about global human rights, labor rights, and environmental protection.[3]

The Seattle protests challenge our understanding of state-social movement relations because they demonstrate how global-level politics affect a wide range of local and national actors. Scholars must ask how global economic, political, and social integration affect both *mobilization* and *collective action*. In terms of mobilization, Seattle raises questions about processes across national boundaries, and across class and cultural divides. Can social movements transcend local and national identities and interests to coherently oppose state and corporate elites (see e.g., Tarrow 2001; Fox 2000; Smith 2000)?

In terms of collective action, scholars must ask how global processes affect social movement repertoires that are forged primarily through nationally oriented contention. Global integration clearly alters traditional, state-level politics. If interstate relationships are becoming more important, then state decisions and practices are constrained by their relationships with other states and economic elites. How do global agreements alter domestic political structures? How do differences in power and interests among states affect challengers' leverage? To date, relations between social movements and inter-governmental organizations such as the U.N. have been largely accommodative, but Seattle points to a more contentious relationship.

What does this contrast tell us about today's global political system and of the role social movements within it? This article traces the origins and mobilizing structures behind the Seattle protest, and analyzes its tactics and their relevance to international institutional contexts. By asking both *who* and *what* constituted the Battle of Seattle, this analysis advances understandings of how global integration affects social movement mobilization and action.

BACKGROUND: THE SEATTLE MINISTERIAL

The original 1994 WTO agreement committed member states to a Millennium Round of talks that would expand trade liberalization policies under the WTO. The U.S. and other Western

[2] This account and other details about the Seattle protest events are drawn from participant observation research which included: observation at Seattle marches and rallies, attendance at teach-ins, lectures, cultural events, press conferences, and strategy sessions organized by various factions of the anti-trade liberalization movement, informal interviews with participants; observation of the single pro-trade Seattle rally held by the local Christian Coalition chapter and the Chamber of Commerce, and analysis of organizational literature and electronic communications in addition to local, national, and some international media coverage.

[3] Evidence of the impact of the Seattle protests on at least the discourse of neoliberalism's advocates abounds. For instance, early in 2000, reports were released by the WTO, World Bank, IMF and OECD attempting to bolster the case that more trade is needed in order to address the needs of the world's poor. A report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (2000) noted the need for advanced security measures at international financial meetings. And the discourse at a meeting of the world's bankers and economists revealed elite attempts to respond to widespread "antipathy toward free market competition" (Stevenson 2000).

nations were strong advocates of WTO expansion, and they extensively tried to advance these goals before the Seattle meeting. For many states in the global South, however, the WTO was a disappointment. Although initially attracted by the promise of greater access to Western markets and greater influence in the IMF and World Bank, Southern governments found themselves left out of important WTO decisions.[4] Key deliberations were held in closed-door, "Green Room" meetings organized at the behest of the U.S., Canada, European Union, and Japan (referred to as "the Quad"). Secret agreements were then presented to Southern members who were most vulnerable to pressure from the powerful Quad states (Vidal 1999; Zoll 1999). Southern governments also realized fewer economic rewards from expanded trade under the WTO than they had expected. Their agenda in Seattle was therefore to review existing agreements and to make them more equitable rather than to support a Millennium Round that would expand the WTO regime under rules they saw as highly skewed towards Western and corporate interests. This division among states was an important cause of the ultimate breakdown of talks in Seattle. In addition to this North-South split, there were divisions between European and U.S. interests over food safety standards and agricultural issues. In short, governments faced difficult prospects for staging a successful meeting in Seattle. All hope of bridging the North-South gap was effectively lost when President Clinton succumbed to pressure from protesters and called for labor protections within the WTO.

Social movement forces allied against the WTO expansion also contributed to these difficulties. Strong European resistance to genetically modified foods made it difficult for European governments to liberalize regulations on agricultural imports. Farmers' movements, which are strong in many European countries, also fought against cuts to subsidies and other agricultural supports. Southern governments benefited from analyses of researchers who were intellectual leaders of the anti-WTO movement.[5] Certainly, Southern challenges to the Quad dominance in the WTO were bolstered by massive protests of Quad states' own citizens. It would be hard to argue that the Seattle Ministerial would have failed as miserably as it did without the tens of thousands of protesters surrounding the meeting site.

The major protest slogan was "No WTO" (or "Hell no, WTO" if you were a steel worker or Teamster), but there was no clear consensus among protest groups about whether the WTO itself should be abolished or reformed. What was clear was that virtually all protesters in the streets of Seattle sought to democratize and incorporate values other than profit making into global economic institutions.

These goals could not be promoted effectively in national contexts for a number of reasons. First, for citizens of countries with small markets and little economic power, attempting to influence domestic policies is useless because these governments carry little weight in international negotiations. Second, in countries like the U.S. (as well as in global economic institutions), economic policies are considered technical, not political, decisions. They are formulated by bureaucrats in the U.S. Treasury Department and in the Trade Representative's office, and are not open to democratic scrutiny for reasons of trade-secret

[4] The WTO rules, for instance, progressively liberalize tariffs and other trade restrictions over a set period. Rules for different categories of goods vary, so that tariffs on primary commodities– i.e., those that are exported from the South to the North– remain high until the end of the WTO phase-in period, while those on manufactured goods are reduced more rapidly. Moreover, most of the rules take 1994 tariff and subsidy levels as the starting point, so the Southern countries that typically had less extensive sets of tariffs and minimal agricultural subsidies were prevented from adding new ones, even as they were forced to compete in a market dominated by countries that had relatively high tariffs and subsidies to protect their domestic industries (see Khor 1999). Voting in the WTO provides one vote per country member, but in the IMF and World Bank it is weighted according to a government's financial contribution, and the U.S. enjoys the largest voting share (nearly 20%).

[5] For instance, members of the International Forum on Globalization's board of directors, including Laurie Wallach and Martin Khor, among others, reported providing analyses of trade issues for government officials.

protection and competitiveness. Most citizens know very little about these offices and are deterred by the technical language. Third, the WTO agreement has removed key decisions from national policy debates. WTO limits on citizens' ability to affect even national policies have made the WTO agreement itself a target. Even in the U.S., which wields the strongest influence in the WTO, citizens cannot simply work within domestic contexts to affect changes. They may seek to influence WTO policies domestically, but they gain more leverage as collective actors at the multilateral level, where they can exploit differences among states.

MOVEMENT ORIGINS: STRUCTURES AND IDENTITIES

The Seattle resistance grew from earlier local, national, and transnational mobilizations against trade liberalization agreements, World Bank and IMF policies, and failures to protect human rights and the environment. The Seattle protests were novel because of substantial participation by citizens from the U.S. and other advanced industrialized countries against an international organization. They also involved a web of transnational associations and movement networks that developed out of activist streams of the 1980s and 1990s. This web facilitated cooperation and exchange across national boundaries.

The organizations most prominent in Seattle had previously mobilized against global trade and multilateral financial policies. Labor organizations, consumer groups (most notably Nader's Public Citizen), and major North American environmental organizations began focusing on trade liberalization especially during negotiations around Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and subsequent North American Free Trade Agreement (see, e.g., Audley 1997; Aaronson forthcoming; Ayres 1998; Shoch 2000; Naím 2000). Seattle's neoliberal trade opposition had even earlier roots. Perhaps the earliest resistance began in the global South with resistance to IMF-imposed structural adjustment policies (Walton and Seddon 1994). Environmental and human rights campaigners increasingly tried to curb World Bank lending for projects that threatened peoples and ecosystems in the global South (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rich 1994). These efforts drew the attention of Northern peace activists in the 1980s. Many of the older activists in Seattle, particularly those mobilized around "Jubilee 2000" or affiliated with peace movement organizations like the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, traced their opposition back to the 1980s mobilizations around third-world debt and its relationship to conflict and economic justice in Central America and other developing regions (see, e.g., Smith 1994; Marullo, Pagnucco and Smith 1996). Partly as a result of these struggles, the annual World Bank/IMF meetings became sites of protest rallies in the late 1980s (Scholte 2000; Gerhards and Rucht 1992). An international "Fifty Years is Enough" campaign emerged in the mid-1990s to mobilize against the 1995 "celebration" of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference and the founding of the World Bank and IMF (Foster 1999:145-153; Cleary 1996: 88-89).

Research on social movements has shown that formal social movement organizations play important roles in framing movement agendas, cultivating collective identities, and mobilizing collective actions. At the same time, churches, community organizations, friendship networks, and professional associations provide resources for movements and often engage in similar kinds of protest-oriented activities, even though these are not their principal purpose. Because these "extra-movement" groups have routine contacts with broad segments of society, they promote wider social movements participation and legitimacy (McCarthy 1996; C. Smith 1996). The anti-WTO protests included many of these "extra-movement" organizations and informal networks as important participants. For instance, many churches and unions with standing committees on social justice or solidarity issues had at least some regular contact with social movements. Many U.S. labor unions provided logistical and financial support so that their members could participate in an entire week of protest and

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educational activity.[6] Also, churches played an important role by disseminating information about the protests and by providing meeting spaces, legitimacy, and other resources. Jubilee 2000 was based largely in churches and faith-based social justice organizations, and drew many protesters to Seattle. School groups, in particular those opposing sweatshop labor, also helped raise awareness of protests and mobilize participation. In addition, protest organizers worked consciously to cultivate ties with community groups and with an active social movement sector in the Pacific Northwest.[7]

But the Seattle protests also were built upon transnational mobilizing structures that shaped leadership and strategies. For instance, the rapid expansion transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) during the past fifty years provided many activists with substantive knowledge of the political views of groups from different parts of the world, opportunities to gain skills and experience in international organizing work, expertise in international law, and familiarity with multilateral negotiations (Sikkink and Smith, forthcoming). TSMO growth promoted transnational dialogue and helped organizers to coordinate interests and propose policies that accounted for the needs of people in both the global North and South. By facilitating flows of information across national boundaries, organizations with transnational ties helped cultivate movement identities, transcend nationally defined interests, and build solidary identities with a global emphasis (cf. Gamson 1991).[8] These identities are crucial for long-term mobilization and alliances across national boundaries where routine face-to-face contact is rare. They require deliberate efforts to define "who *we* are" in order to sustain activists' commitment.

TSMOs must demonstrate wide geographic representation if they are to be effective in multilateral political arenas. Engaging participants from many different countries lends credibility to an organization's agenda and until recently a central criterion for official U.N. accreditation. It also provides an organization with first-hand information on conditions in a variety of countries, facilitating efforts to link local examples to global policy debates. To cultivate a diverse membership these organizations must create spaces for transnational dialogue on common goals and strategies (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997). While most protesters in Seattle were from the U.S. and Canada, there were many from other parts of the world, particularly among the speakers at protest rallies and teach-ins. Southern activists and scholars were 30-40% of the panelists at the largest protest rallies and the People's Assembly. Many of the activists from poor countries traveled to Seattle as a consequence of their participation in transnational associations. Data on TSMOs show a trend towards greater participation of global South countries (Smith 2000). The Ministerial's location in Seattle

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[6] Labor organizations have typically been considered outside at least the contemporary U.S. social movement sector because of their historical association with institutionalized politics and their tendency to focus on member services and contract negotiations rather than class struggle. In practice, some U.S. labor organizations resemble SMOs in their approach to struggle, most notably the longshore worker's union, which has traditionally emphasized radical confrontation and class solidarity (Levi and Olson 2000). The experience of labor in the Battle of Seattle and contemporary debates within the AFL-CIO suggest a possibility that labor issues could take a more contentious turn vis-à-vis political institutions. Social movement scholars may find need to re-think their assumptions about relationships between the social movement sector and organized labor in the U.S.

[7] People for Fair Trade (supported and initially staffed by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen/ Global Trade Watch) provided tools for community organizers and organized neighborhood working groups on the WTO in preparation for the Ministerial meeting (www.peopleforfairtrade.org/).

[8] According to Gamson (1991), organizational identities result from activists' association of their personal identity with a particular SMO. Such identification can precede or lead to movement and solidary identities. Movement identities refer to the association of the goals and values of a movement with one's own, and solidary identities involve the inclusion of the individual or group in a wider community of fate. Examples of the latter would include class identities or identities such as victims of corporate exploitation.

meant under-representation of Southern activists, but when U.N. conferences are held in the South they draw many Southern representatives (Clark et al. 1998; Smith, Pagnucco and Lopez 1998)

In the process of building coalitions and joint strategies, activists learn each other's positions and, where conditions favor it, build relationships and trust that are crucial for ongoing cooperation (Rose 2000). For instance, while Western environmental and labor activists might accept a policy of promoting environmental and labor protections through existing WTO mechanisms, dialogues with their counterparts in developing countries led to a position opposing the extension of WTO authority into other areas. As a result, the common statement endorsed by nearly 1500 citizens' organizations from 89 countries called on governments to adopt "a moratorium on any new issues or further negotiations that expand the scope and power of the WTO." It also called for review of existing agreements to address their negative effects on human and labor rights, health, women's rights, and the environment.[9] While it is difficult to determine the effects of these kinds of joint statements, the process of preparing them and, for many groups, the decisions about whether or not to sign them, can involve extensive group deliberations about shared interests and identities.

Table 1 maps structures of major organizational participants in the Seattle anti-WTO actions. We hope to learn whether the participants are principally national or transnational organizations, and whether transnational groups differ from the others in their mobilization roles. Prevalent TSMO roles suggest that globalization processes, like consolidation processes of the modern nation state, affect how people associate for political purposes.

While the table is not an exhaustive list of organizations protesting in Seattle, it does include those most directly involved. The table clarifies an important division of labor between groups with formalized transnational ties and those with diffuse ties. Groups with no ties or with diffuse transnational ties and groups with informal and decentralized organizations were principally involved in mobilizing and education, as well as in efforts to "shut down" the meetings.

Groups with formalized transnational connections were also involved in education and mobilization, but they more importantly played roles in framing and informing protester critiques of the global trading system. They also lobbied government delegations and relayed information from official meetings to protest groups that lacked official accreditation. They supported other groups' mobilization efforts by developing educational materials, speaking at rallies and teach-ins, and bringing in speakers from the global South. These groups were the international specialists that had ready access to detailed information about WTO processes and regulations. They could produce examples of the effects of global economic policies, and frequently had privileged access to official documents and delegations. As in national contexts where the different foci of local versus national groups create rifts in group identities and perceptions, there is some evidence of conflict across this division of labor, although it does not appear to have seriously detracted from protest efforts.

Groups without formal transnational ties are principally local chapters of national groups and local groups formed around the anti-WTO mobilization. United for a Fair Economy, for instance, is a national group focusing on inequalities in the U.S. economy. These groups were important in local participant mobilization in Seattle, and they often worked with or were mobilized because of groups like Direct Action Network, Public Citizen, or others with more extensive transnational ties. Groups with diffuse ties include regional organizations whose memberships cross the U.S.-Canada border and/or groups with other

[9] The "Statement from Members of International Civil Society Opposing a Millennium Round or a New Round of Comprehensive Trade Negotiations" can be found at: www.citizen.org/pctrade/mai/Sign-ons/WTOStatement.htm.

Table 1. Mobilizing Structures Behind the "Battle of Seattle" and "N30"

Type of Transnational Tie	Movement[a]	Extra-Movement
No formal TN ties	Local chapters of national SMOs (e.g., NOW) Neighborhood no-WTO Committees United for a Fair Economy	School groups Friendship networks
Diffuse TN ties	Direct Action Network Reclaim the Streets Ruckus Society Coalition for Campus Organizing	Union Locals Some churches
Routine TN ties	Public Citizen Global Exchange Rainforest Action Network United Students Against Sweatshops Council of Canadians Sierra Club	AFL-CIO United Steel Workers of America International Longshore and Warehouse Union Some churches
Formal transnational organization[b]	Greenpeace Friends of the Earth International Forum on Globalization Third World Network Peoples Global Action 50 Years is Enough Network Women's Environment and Development Organization	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions European Farmers Union

[a] This list is illustrative, not comprehensive. The organizing scheme draws from McCarthy's (1996) distinction between social movement structures, which are explicitly designed to promote social change goals, and "non-movement" (here "extra-movement") mobilizing structures. The latter group is important for social movements, but their basic organizational mandates encompass goals beyond those of social movements.

[b] Organizations vary in forrmalization and hierarchy: Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have defined organizational structures and institutional presences; groups like Peoples Global Action resist forming an organizational headquarters; and Reclaim the Streets sustains a loose, network-like structure relying heavily on electronic communication and affinity groups.

transnational ties that grow out of their organizing efforts. For instance, the Berkeley-based Ruckus Society (whose leaders include former Students for a Democratic Society organizers) primarily brings together Canadians and Americans for nonviolence training. The Coalition for Campus Organizing does progressive organizing on college campuses, and recently has focused on sweatshops and educational issues, including issues raised by the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).[10] Its international work has led to cooperation with student organizations in Canada.

[10] The GATS agreement progressively opens trade in services just as traditional trade agreements served to open markets for trade in goods. Such services range from banking and finance to public education, utilities, and health, which were on the agenda for the failed Seattle talks.

Organizations listed as having "routine" transnational ties typically are national organizations which have staff devoted to international organizing or solidarity building, have standing committees to work on international issues (e.g., Sierra Club, AFL-CIO, Public Citizen), or have sustained cooperation with activists from other countries (e.g., Global Exchange, USAS). In practice, these organizations' transnational interpersonal and inter-organizational contacts can substantially affect their agendas and frames.

Organizations with formal transnational structures incorporate transnational cooperation into their operational structures. Groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have a federated structure with national-level branches that disseminate information on global campaigns but often tailor it to national needs. Their headquarters facilitate research and information exchange and, in the some cases, conduct global-level direct action protests and lobbying. The International Forum on Globalization (IFG) is a cadre organization made up of international experts on globalization. Founded in 1994, it produces educational materials and organizes teach-ins about global financial integration. IFG leaders have been called "paradigm warriors" because they advance public debate about globalization. Third World Network has a similar structure, though it consists entirely of scholars and experts from the global South. Peoples Global Action (PGA) is a loose coalition of mostly grassroots organizations with a web site, but no headquarters. PGA includes many groups from India and other parts of the global South that came together after Zapatista organizers issued an electronic call for an international meeting (PGA 2000). It has convened several international meetings on globalization since the mid-1990s and supported protests at earlier meetings of the WTO and G-7 countries. The 50 Years is Enough Network is one example of what may be an increasingly common coalitional form. Rather than having national branches, groups sharing the Network's views to join as partners to participate in joint statements and actions. This maintains local groups' autonomy while keeping them informed about global issues and offering flexibility about campaign participation. The important point is that these organizations have formal mechanisms for sustained transnational communication and cooperation.[11]

Extra-movement mobilizing structures for the Seattle protests also demonstrate transnational linkages. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) held its annual conference in Seattle just prior to the WTO gathering, attracting labor leaders from over 100 countries. These international exchanges promote labor solidarity and force U.S. labor leaders to confront their isolationist and nationalist positions. Churches also often promote transnational exchanges and solidarity (C. Smith 1996), such as missions, solidarity work in support of affiliated churches, and fact-finding visits. Because they help link global identities and interests with routine social activities, both religious and labor alliances can advance transnational mobilization to a general audience.

This overview demonstrates that globalization processes affect how social movements mobilize and organize. Substantial transnational ties among key organizations lie behind the Seattle protests, suggesting a transnational-national (or local) division of labor. Transnational ties can be diffuse, growing out of shared purposes, or formal. In between, we find numerous innovative mechanisms for transnational cooperation. Groups with routinized transnational structures seem to be more involved in lobbying and information gathering than national and local groups, which disseminate information and mobilize protesters. Although this article is only a snapshot of a single protest episode, the data show that social movements have developed formalized, integrated, and sustained organizational mechanisms for transnational

[11] With the exceptions of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (both formed in 1971) and Third World Network (formed in 1984), the transnational SMOs listed here were formed during the 1990s.

cooperation around global social-change goals (see also Smith 2000). This development is reinforced by the political demands of the global policy process, political socialization, and globally oriented identity construction.

GLOBAL POLITICAL PROCESSES AND MOVEMENT TACTICS

Changes in the global politics parallel earlier changes in national polities (cf. Tilly 1984). They both involve cooperative and conflictual interactions between states, citizens, and challengers. Global institutions are formally controlled by states, but historical analyses show that social movement challengers can influence them through interventions in domestic and multilateral policy processes (Chatfield 1997; Finnemore 1996; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Smith 1995). States are more vulnerable to social movement challengers because multilateralism creates new arenas to question state agendas, to draw international attention to domestic practices, and to cultivate alliances with powerful actors outside the domestic political arena, including other states. At the same time, the centralization of political authority at the global level raises the costs of effective political challenges. Contenders seeking to shape local policies governed by global political arenas must mobilize resources in a broader political arena.

As political authority moves towards global institutions, we should expect similar of changes in social movement repertoires that Tilly observed with the rise of nineteenth-century national polities, such as special-purpose associations and the targeting of then-remote national structures. These changes paralleled the rise of national electoral politics:

> The distinctive contribution of the national state was to shift the political advantage to contenders who could mount a challenge on a very large scale, and could do so in a way that demonstrated, or even used, their ability to intervene seriously in regular national politics. In particular, as electoral politics became a more important way of doing national business, the advantage ran increasingly to groups and organizers who threatened to disrupt or control the routine games of candidates and parties. (Tilly 1984: 311)

By the late twentieth century, the growth of international institutions imparted political advantages to transnational contenders who could intervene regularly in inter-governmental political processes. Social movements and corporate actors have found that they must develop capacities to monitor and participate in transnational political processes.[12]

Does Seattle provide evidence to support this interpretation? Table two categorizes some of the major protest activities according to their relationship to established protest forms. We would expect protest repertoires to overlap substantially during periods of transnational restructuring, just as "old," pre-national protest co-existed during the rise of national protest repertoires. Moreover, because global institutions are based on constitutional forms consistent with Western state institutions, they further reinforce repertoire overlap. However, we should also expect adaptations in national protest forms to challenge a state's international policies as well as the policies of international institutions.

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[12] The advantage of transnational mobilization certainly varies according to issue. Whereas human rights and some environmental activists find natural and necessary connections to multilateral processes, other areas, such as the abortion debate, are less directly affected by multilateral policies and require more local and national emphases.

Adapting the Repertoire

The left hand column of table 2 lists adaptations of older protest forms. Many simply represent a change in target from the nation state to the international policy arena. Thus, the age-old blockade is used to prevent international meetings from taking place. Similarly, street protests and rallies are widely evident. Both dramatize the worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment of groups supporting social movement goals—as they do in national protests (see McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, forthcoming). The "N30" protests called as part of an "International Day of Action," (to coincide with the WTO conference opening on November 30) nicely demonstrate how old forms are applied to transnational targets. "N30" protests occurred at urban financial centers and U.S. embassies dramatized the global character of WTO opposition. One account reported demonstrations in over twenty countries, including Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, India, Pakistan, The Philippines, Spain, and Turkey (www.n30.org). Protests in London, France, Mexico, and India were among those resulting in property damage and/or other violence.

Education and Mobilization. An important part of the protests in Seattle and elsewhere were educational actions, which included speaker panels and other events to inform the public about economic globalization and its effects on local policies and democratic institutions. "Teach-ins," first used in the anti-Vietnam war protests (Gamson 1991), were employed throughout the United States and Canada (and elsewhere) to educate citizens about the global policy process and the rules and consequences of the WTO. They served as important low-cost and low-risk opportunities for sympathizers to begin or reinforce their involvement in the movement. In Seattle, many of these teach-ins brought together labor activists with other groups, enabling dialogues that were unlikely to happen elsewhere. These events were spaces where participants' commitment and identity with a growing movement and with other victims of "corporate-led globalization" were cultivated. Rather than focusing on U.S. policies, the speakers emphasized the global trade regime and how state policies shape it. While mass media focused on street protests, more long-term damage to official trade policies may have been done in the churches, union halls, and schools where activists and the public engaged in global civic education.

Activists furthered mobilization efforts by drawing new sympathizers from schools, churches, and other social movement groups. A tactic used by the Direct Action Network was to develop "affinity groups," which coordinated activists while preserving the benefits of local participation, such as flexibility, responsiveness, and protection from police repression. Affinity groups resembled strategies used in earlier U.S. movements (see Epstein 1991) and are characteristic of the large anarchist contingent in the Seattle protests. Also assisting efforts to resist police repression were efforts by groups like the Ruckus Society and DAN to educate activists about nonviolent action and prepare them for confrontations with police. Training workshops in nonviolence, first aid, and legal observation supplemented others promoting skills like puppet making and banner hanging.

Public protests also served to generate awareness of issues and to encourage sympathizers to become involved in the movement. Although protests typically rely upon media coverage to help spread their message, they also serve movement-building functions by motivating and encouraging movement sympathizers and adherents (see, e.g., Lipsky 1968). Mass rallies and protests create a relatively (in many Western contexts) low-cost means for people with limited knowledge of an issue to learn about and begin movement involvement. Moreover, the act of protesting builds activist identities by dramatizing conflict and creating "us-versus-them" identities. It can generate new levels of commitment on the part of both new and long-term activists (see McAdam 1988; Gamson 1991). When protesters

Table 2: Globalization and Protest Repertoires: Selected Anti-World Trade Organization Protest Forms

Adaptations of Existing Forms	Innovations in Traditional Protest Forms[a]
Education and Mobilization	*Organization/ Mobilization Actions*
Cultivating organizations and "affinity groups"	Transnational organization
Public demonstrations at global site	Producing NGO newspaper at global conferences
Teach-ins and speaker forums	
Coordinated "N30" protests around the globe	
Polity-bridging– Local MAI-Free Zones	*Borrowing Official Templates*
Nonviolence training/ medic training	Global Peoples' Assembly
	Participation in government delegations to multilateral forum
Framing and Symbolic Mobilization	People's Tribunal versus corporate crimes
Press Center/ press conferences for mainstream media	
Global witnessing / Transcontinental Caravan	*Electronic Activism*[b]
Satirical newspaper wraps	Information exchange: Internet, list serve
Dramaturgy	Independent Media Center
-Street theater and puppets	Rapid response action networks
-Greenpeace's condom drop	Virtual sit-in
-Banner hangs	Mirror web sites
-Boston WTeaO Party	E-mail and fax jams
-Bové's roquefort resistance	
Disruption	
Blockade of international conference site	
Civil disobedience	
Legal observers	
Vandalism against corporate sites	

[a] These activities are innovative in that they have been introduced to social movement repertoires more recently, although some have been used to some degree for many decades. Most of these forms had been used frequently prior to the protests in Seattle by actors targeting global institutions.

[b] For details on these activities, see "Electronic Civil Disobedience" *Car Busters* Winter 2000, 1 (7): 22-3 (www.antenna.nl/ayfa/cb), "Fax Off, Bastards," *Car Busters*, Winter 2000 1(7): 23; *Seattle Times*, November 30, 1999, p. A1.

face state repression—particularly the extreme physical violence and large numbers of arrests used in Seattle—this effect is amplified.

Protest also disseminates information about movement goals to a wider public. Protest participants affect the ways their own organizations and informal networks of family and friends perceive the protests and interpret media frames. They provide alternative sources of information from mainstream media frames or by encouraging friends and kin to pay greater attention to the public discourse on the protests than they otherwise would. In addition, when protesters interact with bystanders, they convey humanized interpretations of the protest purposes and goals distinct from those in the mass media.

Another strategy for mobilizing new sympathizers was adapted from the 1998 "MAI free zones" campaign. This was an effort to block a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, a "bill of rights for investors" that would have liberalized international investment rules and

restricted the ability of local governments to control local economic decisions (see Barlow and Clarke 1998). Seattle activists argued that governments were seeking to revive the MAI in WTO negotiations. Drawing on the nuclear-free-zone tactic of the 1980s, movement organizers educated local legislators and the public about how MAI elements of WTO agreement impinged on local authority and democracy. It was a strategy that won some influential and credible allies to their cause. The Seattle city council declared the Ministerial site an "MAI-free zone," which set an ominous tone for trade delegates facing an agenda full of MAI elements within the WTO framework.

Symbolic Mobilization. Seattle protesters also took extensive efforts to mobilize symbols and to frame their messages. Public Citizen and other well-resourced organizations sponsored an NGO press center and organized press conferences. More provocative groups wrapped copies of *Seattle Post Intelligencer* with a satirical headline page titled *The Voice of the People.* Headlines like "Jordan Gives Nike the Boot, Joins Worldwide Boycott," "Mumia Freed," and "Monsanto Patents Food Chain" (by Dolly Bah) greeted those purchasing papers from vending machines near delegates' hotels and conference sites.

Speakers at teach-ins and other educational events engaged in what might be called "global witnessing" about the effects of global economic policies. Tactics emphasizing such witnessing were the transcontinental "caravans" across the U.S. and Canada that brought international representatives of citizens' organizations to protest at the outlets and headquarters of U.S. corporations and to speak in local communities about how globalization affects their countries.[13] These events gave human faces to global interdependencies and implicated Western industry and consumption practices in world suffering. Some caravan speakers brought word of victories of local resistance against corporate globalization. Others provided tangible testimony to counter officials' claims that the WTO's principal aim is to help poor countries.[14] Speakers from the global South expressed willingness to share their knowledge and experience in order to help their American counterparts understand corporate globalization and how to resist it. One panel included both third world activists and legislators from the U.S. and Canada, who remarked that the accounts they heard from Southern activists would help them face their neoliberal opposition in future legislative battles.[15]

Guerilla theater played an important role in the Seattle protests and took several forms. Greenpeace activists showered government delegates with condoms bearing the slogan "practice safe trade" from a balcony of an official meeting venue. A "Boston WTeaO Party" demanded "no globalization without representation" and dumped into Seattle's harbor rejected products such as shrimp caught with nets that kill endangered sea turtles and steel imported at prices below U.S. production costs. At the same time, a hero of global protesters, José Bové, resisted globalization—this time not by smashing McDonald's restaurants— but by distributing nearly 500 pounds of embargoed Roquefort cheese amid a chorus of protesters'

[13] The caravans were organized by groups associated with Peoples' Global Action. The U.S. caravan suffered minor setbacks when U.S. officials denied visas to several participants.

[14] Despite the ambiguous evidence of trade's effects on poor countries (see UNDP 1998, 1999), in the wake of the failed Seattle talks, WTO Director General Mike Moore stated: "I feel particular disappointment because the postponement of our deliberations means the benefits that would have accrued to developing and least-developed countries will now be delayed . . . . The longer we delay launching the [WTO expansion] negotiations, the more the poorest amongst us lose" (http://www.wto.org/wto/new/ press160.htm). For details on discrepancies between economic data and the claims of trade advocates, see Weisbrot 2000; Smith and Moran 2000).

[15] The November 29 panel, "Environment and Health Day" featured a "People's Tribunal" on "The Human Face of Trade: Health and The Environment." U.S. representatives George Miller and Maxine Waters and Canadian MP Bill Blaikie participated, in addition to Magda Aelvoet, the Belgian Minister of Consumer Protection. Activists from Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, Trinidad, Pakistan, and Ghana addressed the tribunal.

cheers.[16] A group of U.S. and Canadian activists calling themselves "Art and Revolution" practiced "puppet-ganda" and street theater on WTO issues. The Direct Action Network promoted puppet making, contributing to the festive atmosphere while providing opportunities for creative, irreverent, and often humorous activism. Finally activists risked arrest and safety by scaling buildings and scaffolding to display massive banners. One Seattle banner that survived a few hours before police removed it displayed "WTO" with an arrow pointing in one direction followed by "DEMOCRACY" with an arrow pointing in the opposite direction.

Disruption. Disruption and confrontation were important tactics in Seattle, and certainly left lasting media impressions. The main protest web site and many mobilizing flyers called upon activists to "Shut Down Seattle." The direct-action training focused on blocking access to the meeting site. Using "lock down" and "tripod"[17] strategies in which activists risked serious physical harm in order to complicate police efforts to remove them, protesters occupied key intersections and forced delegates to stay in their hotels for much of the first day. When activists encountered delegates in the streets, they presented critiques of the WTO to them. The use of the decentralized, affinity-group strategy complicated police efforts to respond to protest actions, contributing to both their diversity and effectiveness (Gillham and Marx 2000).

On mid-morning, November 30, blockades rather than property damage actually triggered the first indiscriminate use of tear gas by police (Author's observation notes; Ackerman 2000: 63). Apparently frustrated by their inability to guarantee delegates' access to the opening ceremony, police used tear gas to clear a path for delegates for the opening session. Anarchist groups, who had announced over protest electronic list servers their intentions to target downtown shops, did not use violence first. The authorities began the cycle of violent confrontation, which escalated into what was essentially a police riot.

Other forms of nonviolent civil disobedience abounded throughout the week. Some was directed at communicating protester messages to delegates. Some of the first arrests were Global Exchange organizers who—wearing their NGO badges to enter the opening ceremony—took the podium and addressed the handful of delegates who managed to pass through the barricades. Outside the hall, delegates from the People's Tribunal against Corporate Crimes were arrested as they crossed police lines to deliver their "indictment" to the leaders of G-8 countries. Many more protesters were moved by police crackdowns to engage in disruptive protest against police violence and denial of First Amendment rights. Clogging up jails and hampering police booking procedures through "jail solidarity" (refusing to give names until all arrestees were guaranteed reduced sentences), protesters adopted some classic forms of civil disobedience developed in civil rights and anti-Vietnam war protests.

Innovative Repertoires

Although many tactics used in Seattle are adaptations of earlier repertoires, others are innovative in the sense that they target multilateral arenas and that they often involve TSMOs. Transnational associations are not new, but the last half-century has seen an explosion in their numbers. Their tactics often rely on new technologies, ironically the same ones that have fueled the global economic expansion the protesters resist.

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[16] The United States had outlawed the importation of Roquefort cheese and other luxury products after the WTO backed its claim that the EU ban on the import of hormone-treated beef violated trade laws.

[17] "Lock-downs" involve the use of chains, bicycle locks, clamps, and PVC pipes to link activists' limbs, making the involuntary removal of any one of the lock-down participants hazardous. The tripod involves three tall poles that are arranged in a tripod and secured by three activists. One activist climbs the poles and sits on or hangs from the tripod. To remove the barricade without causing injury, authorities must bring in a crane or fire truck.

Organization and Mobilization. One of the most basic innovations is the creation of transnational associations. Others include the creation of transnationally oriented movement media, such as the NGO newspapers inter-governmental conferences. These papers present counter-hegemonic interpretations of negotiations and highlight the proposals and activities raised by challenger groups. Such newspapers have proved important in pressing governments to take up concerns of challenger groups and in providing alternatives to great-power dominated conference frames. They have been used at many inter-governmental conferences, including those on nuclear disarmament, Law of the Sea, human rights, and women's and environmental issues (Atwood 1997; Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; Levering 1997; Willetts 1996).[18]

Borrowing Official Templates. Activists in Seattle and other multilateral contexts structure their collective action around official templates. For example, one of the Seattle coalitions organized a "Peoples' Assembly" to parallel official deliberations. Daily panels centered on a different agenda item such as environment and health, women, human rights, labor, and agriculture.

Another way that challengers borrow official forms is by getting sympathetic experts or even movement activists onto national delegations to international meetings. Because international negotiations are highly technical, governments look beyond their diplomatic corps to fill their delegations. In some fields, such as human rights, environment, and women's issues, some of the most widely respected experts are social movement activists. Their expertise and familiarity with the international negotiation processes make them a rich resource for governments seeking to influence negotiations. While they are obviously not likely to appear on delegations of countries opposing their views, activist experts may sit on delegations of sympathetic countries. Or they may force their way onto a delegation by using national laws such as the U.S. Federal Advisory Council Act that requires government advisory panels at international meetings to represent a fair balance of viewpoints.[19] When movement sympathizers serve on delegations, they are often conduits of information between official and popular forums.

Another form of official template borrowing involves dramaturgy in the application of international legal principles. In Seattle, the Program on Corporations, Law, and Democracy and the National Lawyers Guild Committee staged a "Global People's Tribunal on Corporate Crimes Against Humanity." Its purpose was to dramatically "bring to trial" corporate practices around the world. "Witnesses" included a former sweatshop worker from the Philippines who had worked for a Gap subcontractor until she was fired for promoting union activities, a farmers' organization representative from India discussing the effects of Monsanto's seed marketing practices on Indian farmers, and an Indian medical doctor who treated victims of Union Carbide's 1984 chemical disaster in Bhopal. The lawyer-activists facilitating the event educated the audience and "jury" on the relevant international law and tribunal procedures, and the Tribunal issued an "indictment" for crimes against humanity of the governments under whose laws the guilty corporations were established.[20] The appeal to

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[18] Many of these cases show that government delegates from some (especially poor or less central) states have come to rely on movement publications, particularly the newspaper, for information on technical aspects of the problems under negotiation and/or the political processes surrounding the negotiations.

[19] Environmentalists sued U.S. Trade Representative's office in order to have this law respected and their viewpoints reflected in the makeup of trade advisory panels on paper and wood (*World Trade Observer* November 18, 1999, p. 1; also available at www.worldtradeobserver.org). As a result of the decision, Friends of the Earth-U.S. president Brent Blackwelder joined the U.S. delegation as a Trade Advisory Council member.

[20] People's Tribunals were also used during anti-Vietnam War protest and UN conferences. Their use of international human rights law and international legal proceedings make them tactical innovations.

international law against state and corporate practices serves to emphasize the legitimacy or worthiness of the protesters' cause even in the authorities' own terms.

Electronic Activism. Perhaps the most significant innovations result from the same technological innovations that have advanced economic globalization, namely, electronic communications and exchange. These were likely introduced simultaneously to both national and transnational protest repertoires as technologies facilitating inexpensive transnational communications became widely available. Both national and transnational social movement groups make extensive use of Internet sites and electronic list serves to expand communication with dispersed constituencies and audiences. These communication networks allow organizers to almost instantaneously transmit alternative media accounts and images of protests to contrast those of mainstream, corporate-owned media outlets. Alternative electronic media networks also rapidly disseminate information about resistance against economic globalization in the global South, such as the Mexican student strikers. This conflict escalated shortly after Seattle as students rallied in solidarity with the jailed Seattle protesters. New technologies also allowed transmission of police radio communications during the protests that undermined authorities' legitimacy.

Rather than rely solely on the mainstream media to convey the images of the protests to the general public, activists organized an "Independent Media Center" (IMC) in Seattle, issuing press badges to volunteer photographers, video recorders, and reporters (no formal credentials necessary) wanting to cover the protests. IMC volunteers had access to a press office and could post their reports, pictures and video (some for direct cable broadcast) onto a web site linked to other movement sites.

Electronic civil disobedience also becomes possible as commerce and other essential activities are linked to the flow of electronic information. Anti-WTO protesters who could not get to Seattle could satisfy their desire to join in the protests by engaging in electronic "sit-ins" at the WTO Internet site to block other information-seekers' access to the site. At least one hacker developed a "mirror" site that drew in unwitting information seekers who thought they were viewing the official WTO web page. The site was subtly different from the official one, and carried criticisms of the WTO (*Seattle Post Intelligencer*, November 29, 1999, p. A1). More confrontational "e-protest" takes the form of e-mail and fax jamming, where large faxes (e.g., protest letters written one word per page) and e-mail messages are sent to disrupt routine flows of information to targets.

Reviewing the tactics employed in Seattle, we find a protest repertoire that both adapts forms that have been typical of national social movement repertoires and expands the repertoire to address multilateral institutional arenas. This protest repertoire can be attributed to the global-level reorganization of political and economic relations in which challengers themselves play a role. Events in Seattle should be examined as part of a more continuous process of evolving forms of contentious politics that began late in the nineteenth century, but gathered momentum especially during the latter half of the twentieth century, through which challengers have increasingly sought to influence international policy and processes (see, e.g., Chatfield 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). The Battle of Seattle, then, was not the first, nor likely the last, in the contest to shape global economic, political, and societal integration. It is part of an interactive process of contention between elites and popular challengers that will have implications for the course of future conflicts and institutional changes.

CONCLUSIONS

This examination of the Battle of Seattle reveals that protests around global trade liberalization involve extensive transnational mobilizing structures that are likely to develop further as a consequence of the Seattle mobilization. It also shows that tactical repertoires are altered and

that a shift from nation states to transnational actors is under way. While nation states remain a focus, challengers face an emerging system of "multi-level governance" (Marks and McAdam 1996) or "complex multilateralism" (O'Brien et al. 2000) whereby the relations among states become resources or obstacles to movement goals. For instance, U.S. WTO policy depends upon support from European allies. Mobilizations against trade in genetically altered foods challenged the unity of Western positions, and made the U.S. insistence on unlimited trade a threat to its alliance with other Western states.

When considering globalization's impact on popular protest, however, the crucial question is not whether globalization diminishes the power of states or the importance of national political processes, but rather *how* international institutions affect abilities of states, corporations, and challengers to influence political processes. Indeed, many international campaigns seek to change international policy by shaping individual state decisions, and therefore urge participants to target their own (or sometimes other states') domestic policies. The rifts between the U.S. and European states over agricultural and safety issues, and among rich and poor countries over trade liberalization rules, were important contributors to Seattle's success. So while states indeed control international institutions, they cannot control all aspects of day-to-day operations. Moreover, they do not stand together as a united front against all challengers. Some states may serve as movement allies on particular issues, or they may see their strategic interests served by movement opposition to other governments' policies. Global activists exploited these divisions among states to prevent agreement at the Seattle Ministerial meeting.

There are other important questions about the effects of globalization on protest. The repression faced by protesters should raise warning flags for scholars of social movements about how globalization affects democracy (see, e.g., Markoff 1999). In the U.S. where free speech and assembly are staunchly defended, officials successfully enforced an illegal "no-protest zone." Moreover, agents in support of the neoliberal trade regime revealed a blatant disdain for democracy. For instance, Slade Gorton, the Republican U.S. Senator from Washington State appeared on the local television news on the night of the N30 protests and vandalism, arguing that Mayor Schell should have declared the entire city a "no-protest zone." This comment produced no immediate discussion despite its obvious disregard for the democratic process. Further contempt for democratic principles is apparent in a document from a pro-trade think tank, the Institute for International Economics. It suggests advancing U.S. trade interests by eliminating public participation and democratic accountability by obfuscating references to "fast track" executive authority. Such authority essentially eliminates a meaningful Congressional role in trade negotiations by forcing the legislative branch to either reject or approve the whole of agreements (Institute for International Economics 1999).[21] Former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz highlights this problem in his critique of the IMF: "Economic policy is today perhaps the most important part of America's interaction with the rest of the world. And yet the culture of international economic policy in the world's most powerful democracy is not democratic" (Stiglitz 2000).

Beyond infringements of democratic rights, states also retain the ability to inhibit mobilization by denying visas to activists (as the U.S. did for some Seattle protesters) and by scheduling global meetings in remote locations where democratic rights are not recognized. Singapore was the site of the 1996 WTO ministerial, and future meeting sites are likely to be considerably less open and accessible than Seattle. For instance, the Middle Eastern kingdom of Qatar is the site of the next WTO ministerial meeting. These and other tactics raise the costs of protest through repression, counter-mobilization, and outright exclusion of activist

[21] Movement pressure twice defeated Clinton's earlier efforts for "fast track" negotiating authority.

groups. They must be considered as we continue to explore the role of globalization for democracy and contentious politics.

The Battle of Seattle has triggered broad public appreciation for the need of expanded public discourse about globalization and for greater transparency and accountability in multilateral institutions. Activists outside the United States have been inspired by seeing protesters in what one of my informants called a "politically underdeveloped nation" stand up—even in the face of brutal repression—to resist the neoliberal expansion that their own government has been championing for decades. The Battle of Seattle is one of the most significant recent episodes of collective action, and it points to a future of social movements that is increasingly global in both target and in form and that is in more direct confrontation with global institutions than its historical predecessors.

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