ship requirements [cf. Zald and Ash 1966]. Inclusive membership is not new. It has characterized churches, unions, and most voluntary associations in America for decades. The American Civil Liberties Union is an inclusive organization. The large bulk of the membership participates in the activities of the organization only through its contributions. A large number of the recent anti-war groups have functioned as inclusive organizations, in the same manner as did many of the earlier civil rights organizations. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) demands little more of members than regular contributions. Anyone who has contributed funds to such an organization knows how widespread the phenomenon of mailed requests for such funds has become. The growth of a middle class with disposable income and ideological commitment activated through the portrayal of real-ideal disparities is all that is necessary to guarantee the growth of such movement organizations. The donor to such a movement has little control over the movement leadership short of withholding funds. Withholding funds, however, does insure some control if other funding sources are lacking, and requires that a leadership properly gauge and mold donor grievances. A classic illustration is provided by the different response of SCLC, CORE, and NAACP to charges of anti-semitism. Both SCLC and NAACP have been closely tied to Jewish financial support, and both have responded to protect their lines to the Jewish community. CORE, which has attempted to be a more militant social movement organization, has been more ready to play to its mass base rather than its supporters. The important point, however, is that as more and more organizations that are at the same time inclusive and heterogeneous develop, they will become less dependent upon any single base of support. As will be seen below, movement organizations based upon inclusive membership contributions may represent mixed forms displaying characteristics of both classical and modern forms.

Professional Social Movements

The rise of professional social movements results from changed funding patterns and resulting changed career patterns of social movement leaders. Movement leaders in this matrix become social movement entrepreneurs. Their movements' impact results from their skill at manipulating images of relevance and support through the communications media. The professional social movement is the common form of recent movements and represents a sharp departure from the classical model. Although movement entrepreneurs have always existed and some earlier movements closely

resemble the professional movement (viz. the social movement organizations making up the Progressive movement), modern conditions bring them to the fore.

Daniel Moynihan [1969] coined the phrase, "the professionalization of reform," to describe the extent to which the Kennedy-Johnson "War on Poverty" was conceived and implemented by the government and foundations. The War on Poverty represents a case of political issue entrepreneurship. Its only partial link to the classical model was its connection to the civil rights movement. Our analysis goes beyond Moynihan's, we think, in making explicit the departures from the classical model.

Professional social movements are characterized by:

(1) A leadership that devotes full time to the movement.

    (a) A large proportion of resources originating outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent.

(2) A very small or nonexistent membership base or a paper membership (membership implies little more than allowing name to be used upon membership rolls.)

(3) Attempts to impart the image of "speaking for" a potential constituency."

(4) Attempts to influence policy toward that same constituency.

As we noted earlier, we do not believe that the existence of professional social movements is a new phenomenon; such an organizational form has existed in the past. It is the widespread nature of the phenomenon that characterizes the modern era. Earlier periods of intense social movement activity have spawned many similar organizations.

For instance, while the progressive movement apparently possessed a substantial sentiment base, there is some evidence that progressive social movement organizations had difficulty in recruiting active memberships. And even though memberships were small in such organizations, "only a small part of the membership did more than pay their yearly dues or make more generous contributions to their favorite organizations" [Yellowitz 1965, p. 77]. "In general, the regular activities of the organizations were performed by a small staff of paid employees, while the general membership made up the governing boards, did some of the committee work, and paid expenses" [Yellowitz 1965, p. 77]. Finally, ". . . most of the reform organizations depended upon a small group of wealthy patricians, professional men, and social workers for their financial support and leadership. Wealthy women, including some from New York City society, were indispensable to the financing and staffing of the Consumer's League" [Yellowitz 1965, p. 71].

Lacking large membership bases, these organizations relied heavily upon the media to mobilize sentiment bases in order to directly and indirectly influence elite decision makers. As Smith observes, "The basic method utilized by progressive movement organizations was to publicize investigations undertaken by themselves or by government agencies. Simply worded leaflets described in muckraking style the conditions discovered by these investigations and proposed a specific piece of legislation to deal with the problem. Extensive use of photographs, cartoons, graphs, etc., illustrated the "Evil" produced by the excesses of the industrial system" [Smith 1968, p. 21].

The ferment accompanying the Depression and New Deal era also produced movements at odds with the classical mold. Huey Long's Share Our Wealth Society is such an early departure. The funding of the society came from Long's personal reserves, deriving ultimately from his Louisiana organization. Membership in local Share Our Wealth clubs required no dues, and at its peak, in 1935, the society claimed a membership of between four and seven million members. Through national radio broadcasts, again funded by Long, he encouraged the formation of clubs, and a large national staff of organizers and office workers was employed to aid this process. The national office of the society provided organizational material and propaganda for the local clubs. Long made all of the important decisions concerning the policies of the society and liked to ". . . boast that the Share Our Wealth clubs represented a powerful national movement, 'an active crusading force' that someday would sweep into control of the government" [Williams 1970, p. 735].

At about the same time, Father Charles E. Coughlin founded the National Union for Social Justice. Concerning this organization McCoy says, "It should be emphasized that instead of offering encouragement and guidance to a spontaneous organization of the discontented by the discontented, Coughlin offered them a ready-made organization and ideology. Throughout the existence of the National Union, any real participation by the membership in decision-making processes seemed to be lacking" [McCoy 1958, p. 119].

Membership in these organizations was inclusive and implied little more than support for the founders' stated aims. Indeed, both organizations were developed to demonstrate that widespread support existed. Since membership implied neither activity nor much in the way of financial support, the membership could not have been expected to have a serious voice in policy formation of the organizations.

An excellent modern example of the phenomenon outlined above is The Citizen's Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States [Brown

1970]. The Citizen's Board was originally organized by the Citizen's Crusade Against Poverty, an anti-poverty organization drawing its financial support from a private foundation. The Citizen's Board drew upon a highly trained professional staff who employed the media effectively as a rallying device against hunger. The potential mass base of hungry Americans were never involved in this movement. Hungry Americans did not provide the resources employed by this organization. Financial support for the organization was drawn from the "Citizen's Crusade Against Poverty, the United Auto Workers, and six foundations" [Brown 1970, p. 119]. The media cooperated by giving broad coverage to the Board's activities and the final report issued by the Board. The media also produced a television documentary dealing with the issue raised by the Board (CBS, "Hunger in America"). We do not imply that the Board misrepresented the needs or desires of hungry Americans or that hungry Americans would not have become involved in such a movement if they had been given a chance or were needed to effect policy. The point is that the organization functioned without mass involvement.

A somewhat different example of a professional social movement is the National Council of Senior Citizens for Health Care through Social Security (NCSC). It was possibly more typical of professional social movements in that it arranged to appear as a classical movement, inclusive type, while it was clearly professional in its operating orientation. Its major source of funding was the AFL-CIO [Rose 1967, p. 423]. The professional staff of the organization conducted rallies around the country in support of health care for the elderly and encouraged mass petitioning. Such funding also allowed professional expertise to be made available to smaller groups, which were encouraged and aided in holding hearings in support of health care for the aged. The staff also wrote press releases that were used across the country by constituent groups, and the media responded by publicizing the organization. ". . . By the close of 1961 [NCSC] claimed a membership of 400,000 elderly persons and 900,000 supporting members of all ages" [Rose 1967, p. 433].

The example of the NCSC deviates from our characteristics of a pure professional social movement in that it possessed a large membership base. That membership base, however, was created after the fact. If the Citizen's Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States had desired to develop a loosely organized membership in this fashion, we suspect that it could have. The decision by a professional staff to devote resources to this method of image manipulation will vary from situation to situation. The NCSC was pushed in this direction by the contention

of the American Medical Association that the aged did not lack medical care and that existing health insurance schemes adequately met the needs of the elderly [Rose 1967].

A more recent example of a professional social movement is "Common Cause," headed by John W. Gardner, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. This organization has assembled a professional staff of about 30 and has ". . . managed to build a respectable financial base of about $1.75 million with $15 in dues from each of its members, plus seed money from such contributors as John D. Rockefeller, 3rd., the Ford Motor Company, and Time, Inc." [Halloran 1971]. The organization claims a membership of 105,000 citizens. Observation of the scale of the advertising and mailing campaigns launched by the organization suggests that a major financial investment was required to enlist the membership, and the New York Times reported initial funding of $250,000 from a group of wealthy backers [Halloran 1971].

Several points are worth noting about Common Cause. First, many of the staff members have been involved in other professional movement organizations. Indeed, the President and chief executive officer of Common Cause in 1971, Jack Conway, was involved in the hunger campaign discussed above through his involvement in the Child Development Group of Mississippi. Conway had also been employed by the AFL-CIO in a political action role. Second, members of the organization have no serious role in organizational policy making short of withholding membership dues. The professional staff largely determine the positions that the organization takes upon issues. In general, the membership seems to relate to the organization primarily through the mails and the media, though the staff attempts to activate the membership for pressure campaigns upon decision makers—thereby making membership constitute something more than a financial contribution. Furthermore, Common Cause develops other groups and helps start pilot projects in various states. By 1972 Common Cause had developed a variety of mechanisms for building local groups.

Let us conclude our discussion of modern professional social movement organizations with a brief look at the highly publicized set of organizations developed by Mr. Ralph Nader. Though this set of organizations has been continually expanding, in 1971 three organizations represented the core of Mr. Nader's activities: the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, the Public Interest Research Group, and the Center for Auto Safety. While the three organizations have continued to operate, specific issue groups have been formed for short periods of time. Issue groups, normally termed "Raiders" by the press, work closely with the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, which sponsors the reports of their inquiries [McCarry 1972].

The source of funds for the various activities of these organizations varies from the proceeds of published reports, Nader's speaking fees, and foundation and private donations. In 1970, for instance, the Midas International Foundation gave Nader's various projects $100,000 of the more than one-half million dollars contributed by foundations and private donors [McCarry 1972]. In 1971, Public Citizen, Inc. was developed to solicit small donations from a broader base through mailed requests for funds. "From June through October 1971, Public Citizen collected $100,000" [McCarry 1972, p. 210]. The Center for Auto Safety in 1971 received two thirds of its funds from Consumers Union and Public Citizen, Inc. [Marshall 1971].

This complex of organizations illustrates very clearly the staffing trends we have outlined above. Reliance upon both full-time professional staff and episodic student volunteer manpower is the mode. The core organizations depend primarily upon full-time professionals who are paid at subsistence wages—a lawyer for the Public Interest Research Group, for instance, receives $4,500 a year. Members of the full-time staff organize the use of summer student volunteers.

Each organization claims to represent and fight for an unorganized constituency. It is only through Public Citizen, Inc., though, that any direct support tie to such a purported constituency has been attempted. Beyond Public Citizen, Inc., none of the organizations are in any sense membership organizations. Professional competence rather than broad citizen action characterizes these organizations, with a heavy use of the media as a critical component of utilizing this competence as a lever for social change.

It is not that professional movement organizations in Machiavellian fashion manufacture pseudo-problems, though this remains a possibility. There are always grievances at large among the citizenry. But for many such grievances the individual rewards for organizing to solve individual problems, if in fact they are soluble, are likely to be less than the energy and resource expenditure required.[14] If vehicles are pro-

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14. See Mancur Olsen, Jr. [1965] for an analysis that sharply challenges the assumptions of interest group theorists that people will devote time, money, and energy to collective causes that promise only small personal rewards. Olsen would argue that individuals are more likely to be "free riders" on these causes. Our analysis, however, substantially deflects the *importance* of Olsen's argument, since, as we have argued, individual citizen participation may be unimportant to movement vitality. We accept the validity of Olsen's analysis, but its central importance rests upon its pessimistic conclusions about the possibility of organized

vided, however, for attacking such grievances and participation is essentially costless, minimal levels of citizen participation are an increased likelihood. Professional social movement organizations can provide such vehicles. (Indeed, professional movements might *pay* members to participate in the name of citizen identification, much as War on Poverty groups paid the poor to represent the poor.) These organizations do not necessarily manufacture grievances—they do make it more likely that such grievances will receive a public hearing and policy action. Even minimal levels of citizen participation are dispensable, though, as professional movement organizations may be effective in their absence.

The process of the definition of strain and grievance is altered by the advent of professional movement organizations and the conditions that favor their birth. *We suggest that the definition of grievances will expand to meet the funds and support personnel available*, and the criterion for the existence of such personnel may be a foundation's willingness to believe a professional entrepreneur's characterization, rather than the perception of strain in the minds of the potential constituency. If large amounts of funds are available, then, problem definition becomes a strategy for competing for them, and we would expect more and more sophisticated attempts at problem definition. Those intellectuals who engage in such problem definition will not normally have been subject to the odious conditions they seek to allay, and their definitions will depend upon disparities between general value commitments and the realities of social organization. Many of the supporters of such organizations, as well, will base their support upon such disparities rather than upon personal experience.

Government agencies, as well, are many times involved in the early stages of grievance manufacture. Agency involvement is not always reaction to issues defined by external groups. Issuing reports and calling public attention to problems may serve to build a favor-

able environment for the development of social movement organizations around an issue. The facilitation of apparent grass-roots concern, of course, is ample evidence that agency appropriations be increased to attack the problem at hand. The recent attempts of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to increase the representation of female faculty in American universities illustrate this pattern. This action has encouraged campus feminist groups to organize and press for change supporting the agency's case that grievances requiring affirmative action exist.

Finally, we may carry our argument even further away from the classical model by positing the distinct possibility of the development of professional social movement organizations that create rather than mobilize grievances.[15] We have assumed to this point that movement organizations engineer the appearance of grievances in good faith. But, it is entirely likely that the creation of the appearance of grievances by such an organization will bear no relationship to any preexisting grievance structure. In such an event movement entrepreneurs can be thought of as representing no one but themselves in such pursuits unless their efforts lead to the development of actual feelings of grievance among a target population. Success in such manufacture will be seen as leadership, while failure will be seen as hucksterism. In any case, movement origins will occur outside of the mass.

Stability and Change in the New Careers and Organizations

Earlier we argued that there has been a marked increase in the number of career positions in organizations related to social movements. People commit their lives to working in organizations related to their change-oriented values. These careers are contingent upon organizational opportunities and upon the survival of the social movement industry and of particular movement orgations. The next part examines the ways in which the infra-structure processes we have discussed shape the overall size and direction of the industry. Here, however, we need to ask how particular professional movement organizations and full-time social movement careers are affected by the vicissitudes of their relationships to media, to funding sources, and to membership and beneficiary bases.

The New Careers

Ministers, community organizers, public relations directors, membership and development specialists,

action to rectify citizen grievances. Furthermore, outside funding allows the possibility of easily offering what Olsen terms "by-products" for citizen involvement in movement organizations; by-products could be low-cost loans, aid in gaining welfare benefits, transportation to agencies, or even outright payment for membership. See Leites and Wolf [1970] for an analysis parallel to ours that stresses the dispensability of citizen participation given outside resource supply in the context of guerilla warfare.

Social movement organizations will probably feel called upon to conceal their material by-products; the moral rhetoric of social movements is tarnished by making self-interest an explicit rationale for membership. This is, in fact, one important difference between "interest groups" and "professional social movements." See Edelman [1967] for an analysis of the differences in rhetoric of social movements and narrow, self-regarding interest groups.

15. We are indebted to Mr. Gary Long for bringing this implication of our arguments to our attention.

lawyers, doctors, and engineers are some of the occupations from which the professional movement organization attracts its cadres. They are distinguished from their colleagues in these professions largely by their rejection of traditional institutional roles, careers, and reward structures. One consequence, we suspect, is a lower commitment to professionalism *per se*. That is, they define their opportunities less in terms of the use of professional skills and more in terms of social change objectives. Of course, traditional professionals are not strictly tied to professional settings for their careers. For instance, lawyers often take jobs as business executives or in government agencies, and engineers become administrators. But most professionals commit themselves to professionally related settings.

If professional movement organizations exhibit stability and elongated hierarchical organization, careers in movement organizations may come to resemble those in other professional settings, but one of the characteristics of these organizations is that their funding is unstable. As there is an ebb and flow of foundation support, as individual contributors change interests, and as society passes on to new issues, sectors of movement support are likely to dry up and new ones expand. A likely consequence is that personnel will switch from organization to organization and move among locales. As personnel shift from organization to organization, a national network of personnel relations develops. Some movement organizations may routinize their funding sources, however, as community consensus develops around their goals. The Planned Parenthood Association exhibits this pattern where in many locales it has come to be funded by the United Givers Fund.

Also, many of these movement organizations will probably intersect with traditional institutions that have some relation to particular issue sectors. Just as personnel go between the Defense Department and the defense industries, so we may expect movement personnel to flow back and forth among movement organizations, foundations, and the government agencies and professional schools that maintain a tie to the policy issue at stake. Lawyers flow in and out of law schools and government. A community organizer is attached to a metropolitan housing authority one year and to a neighborhood action group the next. A state health department loses a middle-level bureaucrat to a health action council, and the health action council loses an executive to a comprehensive health center. A "guerilla administrator" with the Department of Housing and Urban Development takes a job with a Fair Housing organization, and so on. For some of the movement professionals, one of the steps leads into a traditional career setting, even though it builds upon the expertise he has acquired. The overall direction and rate of flow between traditional and untraditional settings depends upon the overall growth of traditional versus new careers.

Several recent developments support a view of the rationalization of social movement organization careers. The first is the beginning of routinized training for such positions in the form of training institutes for social movement personnel. The most notable examples of such institutes are those sponsored by the Industrial Areas Foundation, the Citizens College Organizing Committee, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The second is the growth of a literature that attempts to systematize the knowledge required for success at such activity. Some recent examples of the growth of this literature are Michael Walzer's *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics* [1971], Si Kahn's *How People Get Power* [1970], Saul Alinsky's *Rules for Radicals* [1971], Lakey and Oppenheimer's *Manual for Direct Action* [1965], and *The Organizer's Manual* [O. M. Collective 1971]. Though these manuals in general focus upon what is termed "grass-roots" organizing *à la* classical model, several of them advise how the potential organizer goes about exploiting the infra-structure of social movement organization support we have outlined. For instance, *The Organizers' Manual* explains in detail how to apply for foundation grants. Presumably, the next step in the process is the founding of a social movement organizers' association and the institution of formal credentialing procedures.

Product Diversification Change in Movement Organizations

One line of analysis of classical movement organizations suggests that they have a strong tendency to perpetuate themselves and to develop oligarchic and bureaucratic features. In doing so they moderate their goals and institutionalize careers. Zald and Ash [1966] argue that this tendency is dependent upon a routinization of resource flow. Many movement organizations will fail or shrivel if they cannot define a relationship to a support base. Some of the movement organizations that we are discussing easily transform themselves into service institutions. A poverty law firm routinizes its relationship with the government, and as long as it does not transgress political boundaries, its chances of survival are increased. Obviously, shifts in political control can lead away from movement goals.

Other movement organizations are more clearly focused upon policy changes, upon political action that is more difficult to transform into services. What hap-

pens to them? Needless to say, the less the movement organization is tied to enduring cleavages or issues, the less likely it is to survive. It is hard to imagine inclusive organizations like the ACLU or the NAACP going out of business, because they relate to enduring issues. The NAACP relates to a basic racial-status cleavage in the society, while the ACLU relates to an abstract value that can never be fully attained. Both may have to shift programs to meet the competition for their support base provided by other movement organizations, but they can do so merely by shifting program definitions and personnel. On the other hand, narrowly defined organizations such as an organization for day-care centers or "Citizens for Clean Water" may find themselves without an issue.

In this regard an organization like Common Cause is especially interesting. It is a "conglomerate" of the ameliorative social movement industry, for it speaks for reform in general, allying with many special interest groups. On the one hand, as it loses some supporters when it takes on issues outside of or opposed to their interests, it picks up others. On the other hand, as a problem or reform is achieved, it switches to a new issue. Its growth and stability depend upon picking up a new product line for social action. Its diversity of change goals also protects it against the faddishness of issue definition. As long as the media focus upon it and foundations and individuals contribute some resources to it, it is able to maintain or protect its less popular causes. Much as a conglomerate or diversified manufacturer, as compared to a single-line producer, is better able to invest in a product that has long-range potential, a diversified social movement organization can invest in projects that have long-range change potential, even though current definitions of the important issue would not lead it to invest in them.

Professional Social Movements in Modern America: Does the Piper Call the Tune?

A fundamental conclusion of the analysis is that we have recently witnessed a major increase in professional social movement activity and that this phenomenon has been interpreted by many as a participatory revolution. This so-called revolution is, we believe, the result of several secular trends—in funding, through foundations and personal income, the increased importance of television and other communication devices, in discretionary time, and in career alternatives. We are not convinced that the increased size of the middle class in modern America has produced dramatic increases in the time and energy devoted to social movement organizations by private

citizens. Nor do we believe that the increasing number of social arrangements defined as problematic reflects an increase in "objective" problem incidence. Besides, it is problem perception, not objective problem incidence, that is relevant to our arguments here. Man may or may not be closer to doom today than at the time of the Black Plague. For our purposes what is important is how a society channels and perceives the "objective problem" [Blumer 1971].

How permanent are the trends we have described? If increases in the size of the middle class have produced the so-called revolution, then it ought to be rather permanent. Indeed, we would expect more of the same as the middle class grows in size, both relatively and absolutely. If an increase in the objective incidence of problems has produced it, the satiation element of the classical model explaining the rise and fall of social movements would direct us to base predictions of permanence, short of actual revolution, upon the willingness and ability of the political elite to deal with the problems. The political elite, those in positions to act upon grievances and change social policies, are, in the classical model, the gatekeepers of social movements; they either respond or fail to respond to demands, and in so doing membership motivations are either satisfied or frustrated. On the other hand, if the apparent revolution is the result of the trends outlined above, an analysis of the permanence of *these* trends permits an assessment of the permanence of this revolution and its ideological directions.

Social Control and Social Movement Analysis

Sociological analysis of social movement organizations has focused primarily upon the internal dynamics of specific organizations. Even attempts to focus upon the relationship between such organizations and the broader environment have tended to ignore the social control attempts of authorities directed toward movements and organizations.[16] We too are influenced by this tradition. While we have focused upon techniques by which professional social movement organizations can influence elites and upon the internal dynamics of such movements, we have paid little attention to the other side of the coin—the processes by which elites, in and out of government, attempt to exercise social control over professional social movement organizations. Such processes are no doubt operative with what we have termed classical social movement organizations. However, the potentialities of control by elites are highlighted by a focus upon professional

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16. Smelser [1963] is a notable exception to this generalization. See also Gamson [1968].

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social movement organizations when the questions of permanence and direction are considered.

We would expect elite groups, especially when they are in government, to take a rather jaundiced view of social movement organizations with publicly stated radical goals. We would not expect established institutions—i.e., foundations, established churches, corporations, and above all the federal government—to vigorously support such movements. Assuming that social control is perceived as necessary, there are two very general approaches that authorities can take toward the sort of participatory revolution we have outlined above. Elites may enter by attempting to control the direction of dissent (the quality issue), thereby molding the implications of it, or they may respond by attempting to minimize dissent, thereby molding the quantity of it. Let us address these two possibilities as they might affect the participatory revolution we have outlined.

Does the Piper Call the Tune?

One reason why we have stated that professional social movements highlight the potentialities of elite social control is the dependence of professional movement organizations on elites for funds. We noted the independence from a mass support base that is implied in such funding procedures, but clearly this independence implies another dependence. If it is displeased, a source controlling major amounts of organizational funds can destroy a social movement organization overnight. Though mistakes might be made, we would not expect established institutional sectors to support radical professional social movement organizations for any length of time. Foundations, churches, and government agencies are involved in a web of institutional controls that prohibit them from getting too far out of line. Consequently, though it may appear obvious, we believe that the bulk of the institution-backed participatory revolution is ameliorative rather than radical in intent. Even the charge of "radical" against organizations funded through these sources is likely to produce pressure upon the organizations to soften both rhetoric and behavior. Goulden's [1971] accounts of the behavior of the Ford Foundation in several "politically charged" instances illustrate the point.

The effects of established institutions' involvement in the backing of professional social movement organizations should have the broader implication of directing organized dissent into legitimate channels. That student energies can be diverted into legitimate channels by flourishing professional social movement organizations remains a distinct possibility. By applying large amounts of resources, then, in ameliorative

directions, elites may have the effect of diffusing the radical possibilities of dissent in general.

Such an argument does not hinge upon the motives of the elite groups. Whether or not their motives are sincere concern or social control, their actions are likely to have the same general effects. Action, however, that supports the massive infra-structure of dissent may provide some indirect support for social movement organizations with radical goals. The resources available in the ameliorative sphere may easily, we believe, be diverted to radical organizations. For instance, the publication facilities of ameliorative organizations are regularly made available to almost any movement organization [see The Organizers Manual, O. M. Collective 1971], regardless of its tactics and goals. Legal representation has been provided to members of radical social movement organizations as a result of the existence of ameliorative organizations. Our own view is that the interstices of the massive ameliorative movement[17] sponsored by elite sectors provides more in the way of resources for the radical segment of the movement than would be available without it. And when the well-funded sources dry up, the radical movement organization moves to less well-funded ones. From government agencies it falls back on the churches.

Minimization of Dissent: Surviving the Piper's Demise

If the political elite decided to attempt to minimize the scope and quantity of dissent in American society in the 1970s, could it? This suggests two related questions: (1) How would withdrawal of support for social movement activity affect the trends we have outlined as affecting professional social movement organizations? And, (2) would the massive elite involvement we have outlined have any lasting effect upon the level of movement activity following such withdrawal?

The institutional funding patterns we have discussed are highly vulnerable to change. The federal government has already begun to cut back its support of social movement organizations through its Community Action Program agencies of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Though possibly it could, the govern-

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17. Let us note that the interstices of modern society in general support social movement organizations. Earlier we noted how easy it is for individuals to get by if they want to commit themselves to a life in social movement activity. "Quickie" organizations can also get by; they can get telephones installed and rent office space and not pay the bills. Since our corporation laws are loose and social movement organizations are often of short duration, some short-lived social movement organizations resemble fly-by-night businesses in their style of operation.

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ment has by no means, however, cut back all such programs. The funding by churches and foundations is also vulnerable in that rules governing funding by such agencies can be changed. Indeed, legislative action has been interpreted by some foundations as having already moved toward restriction upon grants [see Goulden 1971]. Further, foundation boards of directors and church constituencies could press for an end to such funding. We believe that the trends in funding for such activity could be reversed very rapidly by a *determined* federal administration. But such determination would require an attack upon tax laws and the institutional independence of the churches and foundations beyond informal pressure. This would require a major confrontation and, in our view, is highly unlikely.

The media's willingness to trade in citizen grievances and hence aid professional social movements in their activities is also vulnerable, given federal control over television broadcasting. The reality of this control makes the possibility of threat and innuendo by administration figures a real force. It is obvious from the Russian example that an industrial society can systematically control the dissemination of information and hence grievance accumulation. Similarly competing for mass audiences seems to lead the media away from serious issues that have low current interest. But it is unlikely, short of a fascist regime in America, that all of the grievances portrayed by the media could be suppressed.

Several of the trends we have discussed, however, are not as vulnerable to short-run action on the part of a political elite committed to decreases in movement activity. These factors tend to be related to the general level of prosperity in the society. Though they should be sensitive to economic recessions, mailed donations to movement organizations are probably likely to continue.

The ability of youth with intense value commitments to survive on subsistence incomes probably means continued periods of involvement in social movement activity for many members of this group [see Kenniston 1968]. However as the relative proportion of youth decreases, as it is likely to in the future, this source of energy and involvement should also tend to decrease in importance. Whether a period of intense involvement during youth implies that individuals will continue heavy outlays of energy and resources in later life to movement activity seems an open question to us, unless funding allows career involvement.[18] There

is no doubt that we have seen increased involvement during youth.

Whether the intense value commitments leading to action will continue to characterize youth, we cannot say. Introspection does appear to be a serious competitor to action. Indeed, a clear result of the triumph of Charles Reich's "Consciousness III" [Reich 1970] would be a withdrawal from movement activity of the sort we have focused upon. Whether self-examination can have structural consequences is beyond the scope of our remarks here. Social movement analysis is not very instructive on this point. It does not point to the structural solution of alienation, anomie, and breast-beating in general.

We are led to conclude that some portion of the increase in professional social movement activity could quite rapidly be reversed if the political elite were determined to bring about such a change. On the other hand, if prosperity continues, there are several factors that would lead an observer to expect a proportion of the increase in such activity to remain. Higher and higher standards of living, through these factors, would lead to an expectation of future increases in spite of the actions of political elites directed specifically at movement activity. Where the classical model of social movements predicts less activity in prosperous times, our analysis predicts just the reverse.

If one accepts our analysis of the development of a massive social movement industry in modern America, then it follows that the industry will act as a powerful source of pressure in behalf of its own lines of support. Representatives of this industry and its supporting institutions will be likely to resist pressures to cut off resource flows and even attempt to expand them. In this regard the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings in May of 1972 to consider changes in the Internal Revenue Service Regulations" . . . controlling the tax exempt status of nonprofit organizations which attempt to influence legislation" (*Nashville Tennessean* 1972, p. 8). During these hearings the National Council of Churches argued very strongly for liberalization of regulations as they affect the activities of church groups. If such a change were to occur, we would expect more resources to become available to professional social movement organizations.

Finally, the ability of specific professional social movement organizations to convert to classical social movement organizations through time would seriously qualify the effects of elite withdrawal.[19] If there is a high likelihood of such an occurrence—by telescoping

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18. See Greene [1970] for a discussion of withdrawal from action by many leaders of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement following the taking on of family and job responsibilities.

19. Cf. SDS, which was originally sponsored by adult labor radicals (League for Industrial Democracy) but broke away from them.

the early organizational and interest articulation phases—then the short-run effects of elite withdrawal from the support of movement activity would be blunted. That is, the withdrawal of foundation and institutional support would have little effect. Only longitudinal case studies of professional social movements could suggest the likelihood of such occurrences and hence the importance of this dimension to an overtime prediction of the general societal level of movement activity. We tend to believe that movement organizations based upon deep interest cleavages are more likely to be able to utilize elite support for the construction of viable classical social movement organizations than are multi-interest and soluble issue movement organizations. A professional movement organization can become a classical social movement organization by attaching itself to a major social cleavage and developing a unified membership support base. If this is so, the extent to which movement organizations are based on such cleavages will determine the elite's ability to throttle movement activity.

One question mentioned above demands fuller attention as we attempt to predict the future of social movements in modern America: What is the relationship between Consciousness III, the value counter-culture, and the future of social movements? Our analysis has focused upon the infra-structure of costs and organizational facilitation created by some of the secular trends of affluence. We have ignored, or treated only in passing, the values and attitudes that motivate individual social movement participation.

Our references to the enduring potential of the civil rights movement were based upon a perception of how the racial cleavage and value disparities based upon that cleavage create an enduring base for a social movement. Is there a similar potential to serve as an enduring base for social movements in the culture/counter-culture cleavage? An answer seems based upon several contingencies.

An enduring social cleavage is based upon differences in status, position, and belief that are relatively irreconcilable by "normal relations" in the short run. (The short run is defined in terms of the time perspective of those who are trying to change status, position, and belief differentials.) To the extent that the counter-culture leads its members to encounter the larger culture as an enemy, the counter-culture can be seen as self-reinforcing of an important cleavage and specific issues based upon it. As long as contacts with the police, schools, families, and work institutions maintain a negative quality, reinforcing the distinction, then

membership in the counter-culture will be likely to continue to lead to some form of social movement activity—whether of a retreatist, reformist, or revolutionary type.

On the other hand, the dominant culture may react by partial incorporation, taking over some of the values and behavior of the counter-culture. The relaxation of marijuana laws, sympathetic police officers, and the relaxation of dress and hair codes in many institutional settings may all contribute to a deemphasis of the culture/counter-culture cleavage. Insofar as the cleavage is based upon style and belief, then, partial incorporation is likely to moderate the effects of the cleavage. Such an argument leads us to doubt that this cleavage will persist.

There is also the fact that the "counter-culture" is based on a transient role, that of young persons, whereas the civil rights/black power and labor movements are based on relatively permanent roles. A brief hiatus in civil rights activity still leaves lots of experienced black organizers around to socialize newcomers. An interruption in a "youth-movement" can lead to a situation in which later cohorts may experience the same problems as earlier ones, but lack role models and interpreters of their experience. There is an absence of movement "tradition" in the counter-culture—no one thinks of himself as an extension of the Beat Generation or sees rock as equivalent to jazz in terms of social position. Non-student pacifists and blacks, however, have a relatively strong sense of a movement past.

Conclusion

Our analysis has stressed two subjects: secular trends in modern society affecting social movements and the theoretical analysis of social movements. Possibly the most important point that needs to be made in conclusion is the following: Classical analysis has had too much in common with "bleeding heart–liberal" analysis focusing upon the life situation of the oppressed. We make such a statement at the risk of being thought cynical men without sympathy for the oppressed. But a vision of the future runs the risk of remaining just a vision if it does not confront the sources and weaknesses of movement activity aimed at bringing it about. Social analysis *must* confront the infra-structure of social movement funding, supply and demand of labor, the media, and the interaction of movements and elites before it can be of much utility in the grievance proceedings of modern society.

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