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Trend of social movements in America
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SOCIOLOGY DEPT.

The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization

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AMERICAN sociologists have been intrigued with the phenomena of social movements. They have studied and analyzed movements ranging from those on the left wing aimed at overturning the social order to those on the right wing aimed at restoring an earlier order. But they have not neglected moderate movements with ameliorative goals or movements with no apparent political goals or implications (e.g., movements related to individual deviance such as alcoholism or to a belief in the end of the world). To understand the rise and fall of all of these movements—and their related movement organizations, which normally are the unit of analysis—sociologists have focused upon members. Leites and Wolf [1970] call this a "hearts and minds of the people" approach, which assigns primary importance to the state of consciousness of members and potential members. The development of group consciousness, the relation of a group's life situation to the formation of ideology and to social action have been primary concerns of this study and analysis.

We stress a different approach. Our "resource mobilization" approach emphasizes the resources, beyond membership consciousness and manpower, that may become available to potential movements. These resources support the growth and vitality of movements and movement organizations. This view does not necessarily deny the existence of grievances. It stresses the structural conditions that facilitate the expression of grievances.

In the past, the resource mobilization approach has been characteristic of American right-wing political analysis. Conservatives, wishing to deny the validity of left radical and reform movements, have stressed the importance of "outside" resources. Right-wing analysts deemphasize felt grievances as the motor of social movements; they focus on concepts like "outside agitators" and "the communist conspiracy," including especially the charge of outside funding that creates the appearance of widespread grievances.

We feel this view contains more than a kernel of validity, though we reject much of this analysis. Serious analysis of social movements must, for instance, recognize the similarity of the concepts of "outside agitator" and "community organizer."

We have come to this view after realizing that few American social movement organizations have resembled the "classical" sociological model. The picture of movements composed of aggrieved individuals banding together to fight for their due seems to us seriously inadequate. We do not claim that resource mobilization should replace the concerns of the "hearts and minds" approach. Neither analytic approach is adequate by itself; we must understand both the aggrieved group and the process of resource mobilization. In response to the "hearts and minds" bias of previous work, we stress resource mobilization in this analysis.

Some may mistake our emphasis on the material bases of current social movements for hostility to the aims of the movements. This is not so. Our discussion concerns the conditions that affect a movement's potential for success, and these are as important to movement leaders and supporters as they are to social scientists.

Introduction

Although our approach focuses upon the resources available to social movements, we must explore the major alternative explanation for the recent burst of social movement activity, the alleged increase in rates of socio-political participation. In the 1960s, according to many scholars and social critics, the American population greatly expanded its rate of participation in socio-political activities and will continue to do so. For example, in *The Public Interest*, Daniel Bell and Virginia Held note ". . . that there is more participation than ever before in American society, particularly in the large urban centers such as New York, and more opportunity for the active interested person to express his personal and political concerns" [1969, p. 142]. With respect to future prospects, James Q. Wilson writes, ". . . in fact participatory democracy has all along been the political style (if not the slogan) of the American middle and upper class. It will become a more widespread style as more persons enter into these classes" [1968, p. 120].

A participatory interpretation of events of the 1960s must inevitably raise a number of questions. The simplest to ask and possibly the most difficult to answer is whether or not the purported upsurge in socio-political participation is real. Remember, De Toqueville, Martineau, and other observers of an earlier day were struck by the quantity of such participation in American society. Has there been an increase in the absolute amount of such participation?

There are, of course, numerous avenues for expressing socio-political concerns. One can throw a bomb or vote, join a social movement organization or write a letter to the local newspaper or to a congressman; one can argue with friends and neighbors or commit a major part of income to worthy causes; one can attend endless meetings of special purpose organizations or send a campaign contribution to a candidate of one's choice; one can choose a life career that expresses these concerns or advise one's children to do so. These many ways of expressing concern vary in their costs and consequences. Has the likelihood of action along each of these avenues increased? Or have observers generalized from the flamboyant manifestations? Have the rates of riots, pickets, and marches increased as compared to 1880? 1920? If so, are these rates accurate indicators of trends in more traditional activities? If only certain forms of participation are increasing, while others remain stable or decline, what are the structural causes of the apparent independent variation?

On a more general and analytic level, what implications do changes in participation have concerning the assumptions and logic of accepted theories of social movements? Since it has been common for sociological theories to define social movements in terms of participation, questions about rates of participation and relevant causative factors are tied to questions about the future of social movements. Social movements are voluntary collectivities that people support in order to effect changes in society. Using the broadest and most inclusive definition, a social movement includes all who in any form support the general ideas of the movement. Social movements contain social movement organizations, the carrier organizations that consciously attempt to coordinate and mobilize supporters. In the traditional view, social movements are *dependent* upon their participating members.

Social movements range from those that are radical and all-embracing, aimed at totally changing the structure of society, to specifically focused reform attempts. They encompass idea movements aimed at changing the world by changing individual thought and movements tied to specific ideologies and tactics. At the level of social movement organizations they include in some degree radical and clandestine terrorist groups, retreatist sects that revalue the world, reform-oriented political action groups, and interest groups aimed at

changing a law or policy to benefit its members.[1] Despite this variety, the standard sociological view has been that social movement organizations are dependent upon their members for movement operation. Members provide all of the resources for the infrastructure of social movements. Organizations depend upon members for money, work (time and energy), sacrifice (death or prison), and leaders. And they are also dependent upon their members to demonstrate to elites that society must change to accommodate the movement. The "resource mobilization" approach leads us to raise two related questions here. First, have American social movement organizations been as typically dependent upon members as the "hearts and minds of the people" approach suggests? Second, do the ebbs and flows of social movement organizational activity over time directly reflect changing rates of socio-political participation within the population?

In the classical view member participation is tied to grievances and deprivation. But grievances ought to be inversely related to per capita income. If affluence leads to grievance satiation (the satisfaction of wants), would not the classical tradition of social movement analysis predict the decline of participation, and hence social movements, in a society whose per capita income has enormously increased since World War II? Even if one does not accept such a crude materialistic assumption about the motivation to participate in social movements, in predicting trends should one not consider the changing costs to participate, as well as the drives and benefits presumed to arise from participation?

Finally, what can be said of the long-range trends? Can what has been termed the "participatory revolution" be reversed by either historical forces or planned intervention? Does America in the 1960s and 1970s represent a relatively unique historical period where a confluence of specific issues—Vietnam, civil rights, women's liberation, environmental pollution—has galvanized and mobilized the population for a short historical moment? Or have structural changes made grievance mobilization more likely today than in earlier periods?

The view we will develop, speculatively and at some length, suggests that the rates of participation for many forms of socio-political involvement do vary somewhat independently in modern America. This is partially explained by the advent of social movement organizations unlike those treated by the traditional model. Our view substantially challenges the usual assumptions about participation and social movements in America. The functions historically served by a social movement membership base have been, we will argue, increasingly taken over by paid functionaries, by the "bureaucratization of social discontent," by mass promotion campaigns, by full-time employees whose professional careers are defined in terms of social movement participation, by philanthropic foundations, and by government itself. Moreover an affluent society makes it possible for people devoted to radical change and revolution to eke out a living while pursuing their values. Modern society easily supports a large cadre of revolutionaries. For revoluntionary and nonrevolutionary alike, modern American society makes it easy to pursue one's values in social movements.

The essay is divided into five parts. First, we weigh evidence for the claim that participation has in fact *generally* increased. Second, we describe changes in factors related to socio-political participation—affluence, leisure, and changes in discretionary time. In the third part we turn to changes at the institutional level, the funding patterns of foundations and churches and changes in participatory careers. The implications of these trends for a theory of social movements are addressed in the fourth part. At this point we counterpoise the traditional or classical model of social movements and a type of social movement organization, the professional movement organization, that is becoming more prevalent. In the last part we conclude with a discussion of the implications of social trends for the future of social movements in America. We also discuss whether the rate of social movements can be manipulated by authorities and elites.

Much of our argument will be inferential and speculative; at crucial points we must rely upon data and indicators that are only loosely connected with the concepts and problems we are examining. At times we are forced to rely on hearsay evidence. Whatever the particular weaknesses, however, we believe that our general interpretation is consistent with the available evidence and suggests serious rethinking of traditional modes of explanation.

Everyone a Participant?

Has there in fact been a participatory revolution? As we began our study we posed the following question to ourselves and colleagues. "If the Vietnam War

1. As an aside it is worth noting that political scientists use the phrase "interest groups" and sociologist write about "social movement organizations" without acknowledging their overlapping functions and processes. See Lowi [1971] for a recent attempt to combine these previously separate traditions of analysis.

ended next month and racial equality somehow appeared on the scene, would the present level of social activism decline?" The normal response was an emphatic "No!" or "Not very much." First of all, many other issues seem to be waiting in the wings for a chance at center stage—the environment issue, population growth, rural poverty, women's lib, and the starving children of Pakistan. Such issues seem more numerous today. Why so many issues today as compared to yesterday?

Rather than arguing the alteration of actual circumstances as the cause of the multiplication of issues, one might argue that the high rate of issue formation will continue because people are more willing to participate in social movements based upon such sentiments. A larger proportion of the population may be willing to participate, because American society has become increasingly middle-class (as in the argument by Wilson above). Numerous studies show that the middle class participates in voluntary organizations and political activities more than the working class, although only tiny minorities at every level can be called "activists" [Hausknecht 1962]. Educational attainment and economic position both correlate positively with socio-political participation; therefore, the more America becomes a middle-class society, the higher the societal rate of participation in socio-political concerns.

First, we must concede that there is impressive consistency in the relationship between education and political participation.

> Perhaps the surest single predictor of political involvement is number of years of formal education. There are apathetic college graduates and highly involved people of very low educational level but the overall relationship of education and political interest is impressive. It is impossible to say with confidence why it is that formal schooling makes people more responsive to political stimulation. One may surmise that education tends to widen the scope of one's acquaintance with political facts, to increase capacity to perceive the personal implications of political events, or to enlarge one's confidence in his own ability to act effectively politically. Whatever the precise nature of the educational process, it has clear effects on political interest [Campbell 1962, p. 20].

But what of the mechanisms through which education produces such profound effects upon political behavior? A summary of findings from a five nation survey elucidates these mechanisms. Each of these findings is supported in all of the five nations of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the United States. The chapter references are from *The Civic Culture* [Almond and Verba 1963, p. 380–381].

> (1) The more educated person is more aware of the impact of government on the individual than is the person of less education (chapter 3);
>
> (2) The more educated individual is more likely to report that he follows politics and pays attention to election campaigns than is the individual of less education (chapter 3);
>
> (3) The more educated individual has more political information (chapter 3);
>
> (4) The more educated individual has opinions on a wider range of political subjects; the focus of his attention to politics is wider (chapter 3);
>
> (5) The more educated individual is more likely to engage in political discussion (chapter 4);
>
> (6) The more educated individual feels free to discuss politics with a wider range of people (chapter 4); those with less education are more likely to report that there are many people with whom they avoid such discussions;
>
> (7) The more educated individual is more likely to consider himself capable of influencing the government; this is reflected both in response to questions on what one could do about an unjust law (chapter 7) and in respondents' scores on the subjective competence (chapter 9).
>
> The above list refers specifically to political orientations, which vary the same way in all five nations. In addition, our evidence shows that:
>
> (8) The more educated individual is more likely to be a member—and an active member—of some organization (chapter 11); and
>
> (9) The more educated individual is more likely to express confidence in his social environment: to believe that other people are trustworthy and helpful (chapter 10).

Although in all five countries in the Almond-Verba study, education is related to political participation, there is some evidence that this relationship is strongest in the United States and is mediated through organizational affiliation. That is, education leads to general involvement, leading to political involvement [Nie, Powell, & Prewitt 1969a, 1969b].

Clearly we would expect an increasingly educated society to be an increasingly participatory one. The argument is plausible, but inferential. It requires demonstrating both that socio-political participation has increased and that the size of the highly participating middle class has increased. Then the link between the two trends must be demonstrated. Unfortunately, two or more surveys with similar questions about associational participation taken over long periods of time have not been done. However, Hyman and Wright have published one article comparing 1955 and 1962 survey data based upon similar national samples and closely similar question wording.[2] A summary of their evidence is reported in table 1. Although the seven-year period resulted in some upward shift, still more than 50 percent reported no memberships. From table 1 and other analysis Hyman and Wright reach the following major conclusions:

2. 1955: "Do you happen to belong to any groups or organizations in the community here? Which ones? Any others?" 1962: "Do you belong to any groups or organizations here in the community? Which ones? Any others?"

(1) Voluntary association membership is not characteristic of the majority of Americans (a finding originally from data in the 1950s, now confirmed by data from the 1960s). (2) A relatively small percentage of Americans belongs to two or more voluntary associations (another finding from the earlier study, confirmed by the new data). (3) There was a small but noteworthy increase in voluntary association memberships between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s. (4) The trend toward more membership in associations was not caused by the cohort who came of age during the period from 1955–1962, the two points in the study. (5) Membership is directly related to current socio-economic position, as measured by a variety of indicators (a relationship established in the earlier study, confirmed by data from the 1960s). (6) The trend toward increase in associational memberships is not confined to the more well-to-do strata of the population, but occurs all along the line and especially among those of poorer economic means. (7) Current economic situation appears to have more effect upon membership than does one's station of origin. (8) The trend toward increased membership applies to both Negro and White adults but is somewhat more evident among the former, thereby tending to reduce previous subgroup differences in membership. However, these findings are most tentative because of the small number of Negro respondents found in each sample [Hyman & Wright 1971, pp. 205–6].

Table 1. Percent belonging to voluntary association by family income.

	1955				1962			
Family Income:	*1*	*1*	*2*	*N*	*0*	*1*	*2*	*N*
–$2,000	76%	17%	7%	385	69%	16%	14%	230
2,000–2,999	71%	17%	12%	304	62%	24%	14%	167
3,000–3,999	71%	18%	11%	379	70%	21%	10%	175
4,000–4,999	65%	21%	14%	450	58%	26%	16%	183
5,000–7,499[b]	57%	22%	21%	524	56%	25%	20%	592
7,000 or more[b]	48%	22%	30%	328	45%	21%	35%	389
Total	64%	20%	16%	2379[a]	57%	22%	21%	1775[a]

[a] Total N differs from marginal N because of unknowns.
[b] In 1962 the break point on this category was above and below 8,000.
SOURCE: Herbert Hyman and Charles R. Wright, "Trends in Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults." *American Sociological Review*, 1971, 3:191–206.

We return to aspects of the Hyman and Wright analysis later. But let us turn to trends in specific types of social participation. There are two sources of data that measure trends in specific types of participation; extensive time series data on voting rates have been compiled, and for a recent 16-year period we have data on church attendance, union participation, and participation in political activity.

Table 2 presents the average percentage of voting-age population voting in presidential elections and in off-year elections for U.S. representatives, by decades. Clearly, the half-century from 1920 to 1968 shows a trend toward higher rates of participation. In the 1920s and 1930s, of course, much of the increase is usually attributed to an increase in voting by women. The off-year elections show a similar path of increasing rates of participation, 10 to 20 percent behind the presidential years. From our point of view the most interesting aspect of these data is the continuity of rates. In particular the voting rates of the 1960s are close (within 2–4 percentage points) to those of the 1950s. Furthermore, the rate of voting in the 1968 election was the lowest of the decade. No participatory revolution here. Even in the 1960s the absolute rate of voting turnout just began to reach the level of turnout in most national elections in Europe,[3] although Americans have been more likely to use informal means (such as letter writing and joining organizations) to influence politics.

Table 2. Voters as percentage of voting-age population: Presidential and off-year House of Representatives elections, by decade, since 1920.

Presidential Elections		House of Representatives	
Year of Election	% Range	Year of Election	% Range
1920–24–28	43.5–51.9	1922–26	29.8–32.1
1932–36	52.5–57.0	1930–34–38	33.7–44.1
1940–44–48	51.3–59.2	1942–46	33.9–37.4
1952–56	60.1–62.6	1950–54–58	41.6–43.4
1960–64–68	61.8[a]–64.0	1962–66	46.3–46.7

[a] 61.8 is the 1968 figure.
Source: *Bureau of the Census* 1970, p. 368.

However, these data do not directly indicate the effects of an enlarged middle class. For that evidence we turn to the relation of socio-economic status and "reported" voting in the 1952–56 period and the 1968 period collected by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center.

One should remember that more people usually report having voted than actually did vote. Also, these data are not age standardized, and we know that the group aged 21–25, although more educated, tends to vote less because of mobility and other factors. Table 3 supports the relationship that has consistently emerged between education and political action; the more the education, the more likely the vote. The dif-

3. Burham [1965]. For a review of the factors involved in the U-shaped curve of voting participation from the 1840s until 1960.

ferences between the two time periods within each educational category are minor except for the group of respondents who have had some college, where a substantial decline in the reported voting rate is evident. On the other hand, it can be observed that the relative size of the more highly educated groups has increased over this time period. This accounts for the slight increase in total reported voting between the two time periods, lending some support to a *embourgeoisement* argument for increasing national rates of participation. The argument is weakened, however, by the decline in the rate of reported voting in the "some college" category.

Table 3. Education and reported voting, 1952–1968.

	1952–56[a]			1968[b]		
Education	*N*	*% of Sample*	*% Voting*	*N*	*% of Sample*	*% Voting*
Less than 8	635	19.6%	57.2%	149	10.7%	53.0%
8	478	14.8%	63.6%	140	10.1%	65.7%
9–11	648	20.0%	68.8%	272	19.6%	69.1%
High School Graduate	905	28.0%	82.0%	433	31.2%	83.8%
Some College	322	10.0%	8.8%	206	14.8%	79.1%
College Graduate	247	7.6%	90.7%	190	13.7%	89.5%
Totals	3,235	100.0%	73.1%	1,390	100.0%	75.9%

[a] These figures are approximate and are a recomputation of figures presented in Table 15–1 of *The American Voter* [Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1964]. The authors present only 1952 and 1956 combined.

[b] These figures are based upon the 1968 Survey Research Center Post-Election Survey.

One body of data does give us comparable evidence concerning several types of voluntary participation aside from voting. From 1952 on, the Survey Research Center has asked questions about church participation, union participation, and political participation. Table 4 presents this information for four points in time. The responses to these questions over time do not indicate increasing socio-political participation. Electoral participation outside of voting has not increased. Religious participation has shown a decline and *labor union membership has remained stable*. These data, though limited in time span, certainly do not indicate a massive increase in social and political involvement.

Table 4. National trends in political and social involvement: 1952–1968[a].

Questions	1952[b]	1956[c]	1964[c]	1968[c]
"Do you belong to any political clubs or organizations?	2%	3%	4%	3%
"Did you give any money or buy tickets or anything to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates?"	4%	10%	10%	9%
"Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that?"	7%	7%	9%	9%
"Did you wear a campaign button or put a campaign sticker on your car?"		16%	15%	14%
"Does anyone in this household belong to a labor union?"		27%	24%	25%
"Would you say you go to church regularly, often, seldom, never?"[d]		60%	62%	52%

[a] All of these figures are based upon Survey Research Center national post-election survey samples. Unless otherwise designated the percentage entry refers to the proportion of the total sample answering affirmatively.

[b] The 1952 figures are from Campbell, et al., 1964.

[c] The 1956, 1964, and 1968 figures are based upon data made available by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

[d] These percentages refer to those who answered either "regularly" or "often."

It could be argued that we have missed the whole point of the participatory revolution, for the revolution is outside regular electoral political channels. Yet these data do bear on one interpretation of that supposed revolution: its relation to an enlarged middle class.[4] At the very least these data indicate no large

4. *Some* readers will insist that the real participatory revolution is missed because it has occurred among the blacks and the poor. While the civil rights movement effloresced in the 1960s, it is not at all clear that Negro social participation changed that much. Myths of non-participation to the contrary, several studies have shown that at each class level blacks belong to associations as much or *more* than whites of the same income-education group. See Orum [1966] for a review of this literature.

Moreover, a study of the Office of Economic Opportunity Community Action Agencies (CAA's) in several large cities concludes that "CAA's seem unable to produce or create participation where it doesn't exist and unable to increase it very much where it already does exist" [Vanecko 1969].

increase in participation in general, nor greater participation by the broadly defined middle class. If non-electoral participation has been *dramatically* increasing, we believe it ought to be partially reflected in electoral and voluntary association participation, for numerous studies have shown them to be positively related [see Milbrath 1965]. So our initial answer to the question of a participatory increase seems to be negative—some change, not much. But the appearances leading us and other observers to such a view remain. To be sure, these data exclude, to a large extent, the student population. But are the appearances based exclusively upon the behavior of the student group? We think not, though student participation is important. In the following section we attempt to account for the appearances that are not reflected in these data.

Components of Participation: Social Structure and Individual Opportunities

The usual approach to explaining the higher rate of middle-class participation in organizations and politics is through cognition and motivation. On the one hand, education leads to greater awareness of political events and a greater awareness of the discrepancy between the observed world and values. On the other hand, higher status leads to higher self-esteem; high self-esteem leads to a sense of personal efficacy and the utility of participation. These approaches often ignore the costs of participation. Participation requires some combination of money, leisure or discretionary time, and energy. The unequal command of such resources across the class structure, we believe, ought to bear importantly upon participation rates in addition to motivation and cognition. It is necessary, then, to examine trends in factors related to time and money expenditures for such behavior.

Affluence and Leisure

One argument for the alleged link between an enlarged middle class and an increase in participation is through a purported increase in leisure; the increase in leisure provides an opportunity for participation. But there is good reason to believe that an increase in leisure is mythical, especially among those segments of the population that are most likely to show high rates of socio-political participation [Wilensky 1961].

First, over the last three decades the average work week in manufacturing has stabilized at around 40 hours a week. Second, among white-collar and blue-collar workers, those in higher status occupations work longer hours than those in lower status occupations. A larger proportion of the incumbents of professional and managerial occupations than of clerical and sales occupations work more than 49 hours a week. Indeed, managers and officials in 1965 comprised 8.6 percent of the full-time workers but 18.2 percent of those working more than forty-nine hours a week [Carter 1970]. This is a complicated matter, and our example, though it captures the trend, exaggerates the picture. But the *trend* from 1948 to 1965 reflects an increasing proportion of the labor force working over 49 hours a week, from 13 per cent to 20 per cent. Since professionals and managers intrinsically tend to value work more highly than laborers and clerks, it is precisely the upper-middle class, it seems, that is more likely to opt for work over leisure, given the choice.

Two other trends blunt the implications of a leisure time argument for organizational participation—the labor force participation of women and the "costs of consumption." By now it is well known that there has been a massive increase in the labor-force participation of women. Each decade since 1900 has found an increasing proportion of women in the labor force. The trend is especially strong among women over thirty-five [Waldman 1967, p. 32]. A likely consequence is that both men and women must use available non-work time for "service-time" household and physiological maintenance (e.g. cleaning of homes, care of possessions). Staffan B. Linder [1970] argues briefly that as income increases, what he terms "consumption costs" increase. This thesis suggests another trend affecting the availability of leisure time. The sharp increases in per capita income have led to an increase in discretionary income that can be used to purchase consumer goods. But every new purchase, beyond the time spent making it, requires time for use and for service. (Linder distinguishes between work, personal work, and consumption or leisure.) Increased affluence leads to an *increase* in personal work. Since non-work time on the average is not increasing (as shown above), there are increasing dollars competing for available non-work hours. Furthermore, as the productivity of work increases, there is an increasing pressure to increase utility yield of leisure time, for there is a strong tendency to balance utility yields in different sectors of activity. Linder argues that high-yield leisure activities will substitute for low-yield ones. Thus motor boats supplant row boats, and physiological necessities as sex and eating lose ground in available-time allocations. We would add to Linder's list of low-yield leisure activities participation in social movement organizations. There are few ways of making these activities

yield greater individual utility in a given time unit. Episodically it may be exciting to attend a rally or "sit-in," but it gets boring. For low-yield social movement activities Linder would predict a declining allocation of time.

Most of the argument presented above is inferential; a direct test would require trend data on time budgets by socio-economic groupings. The middle class may get less sleep, for instance. But some evidence does exist on the relation of occupation and education to time allocation. As part of an international study of time budgets, the Survey Research Center studied time allocations of the American population. They found, for instance, that the professional and semi-skilled expend an average of two-tenths of an hour on organizational activities a day, while lower white-collar workers expend an average of three-tenths of an hour on such activities. The fact that semi-skilled workers used mass media for an average of 2.6 hours a day and both professional and lower white collar workers an average of 2.3 hours a day [Robinson and Converse 1966, Table 6, p. 35], however, suggests both the low priority most Americans place upon organizational activities and at least the availability of a fair amount of non-work time outside of "consumption costs."[5] The data on education parallel these findings. On the average, both college-educated persons and grade-school graduates spend less than 15 minutes a day in organization activities; there is little variation in average participation by educational attainment [Robinson and Converse 1966, Tables 5 and 34].

The evidence and inference presented above strongly suggest that our affluent society is not creating an enlarged pool of leisured middle-class citizens who are potential organizational participants. This view is consistent with the trend evidence on actual participation. Yet the appearance of more vigorous social activism remains. There are many ways, however, in which the affluent society does contribute to the creation of social movements besides time allocations.

Organizational Involvement and Social Status

The consistent positive association in American surveys between membership involvement and social status is well known. Yet, our arguments have led us to expect, if any change, a *decreasing* proportion of non-work time to be available for such involvement; at least in the last three or four decades. Two points need to be clarified. First, the association between status and involvement may well be a function of the way in which membership involvement is measured. Second, the fact that a small segment of the middle and upper class is in fact heavily involved in social-political concerns is partly a function of a "ladder process" of socio-political involvement.

If the members of the middle and working classes do not differ substantially in the amount of time available for participation, their differences in involvement may be a function of their allocation of money. The relation between class and involvement is normally demonstrated by differences in the number of organizational memberships. It is well known that many organizational memberships require nothing more than yearly dues. In particular we know that deductions for charitable and social contributions as a *proportion* of total income remain relatively constant at each income level. Higher rates of participation among the middle class may result from the fact that they have more money to join organizations.

As part of a study of the activities of foundations, the Treasury Department [*U.S. Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations* 1965, p. 75] studied various trends in charitable giving, a form of social participation closely aligned, we assert, to political and social movement funding. This information reflects immense increases in absolute dollars of charitable giving—bequests, corporate gifts, and gifts of living individuals—between 1924 and 1960. In 1940, for instance, gifts of living individuals were estimated at little more than one billion dollars, while in 1960 the estimate is close to $10 billion. Increases in bequests and corporate gifts are large, though not as dramatic during the same period.

The increase in giving of living individuals is related to the growth of personal income and the increase in the percentage of income allocated to contributions. From 1924 to 1962 adjusted gross income increased 650 percent, an advance far surpassing the rate of inflation and reflecting a massive increase in Gross National Product per capita. Over the period 1924–1962 there is also an increase in the percentage of adjusted gross income given to charitable organizations. From 1924–1962 the ratio of contributions from the income of living individuals increased by 40 percent. The donor estimate and recipient estimate series, which includes corporate and estate contributions, does not increase as dramatically as the individual contributions ratio.

Now, with both per capita income and proportion contributed increasing, we would expect, as well, vol-

5. Watching television could be considered a "consumption cost"—a $500 investment in a color television set *must* be utilized. If organizational participation is in high-priority competition for the time allocated to tube gazing, consider the participatory implications of an America with no television.

By increasing the wasteland content of TV, revolutionaries could mobilize more activists from among the bored.

untary organizations to be gaining in contributions. That is, discretionary income can be allocated to organizations ranging from the church to educational institutions, from hospitals to politics. Important to our later argument, there is evidence to indicate that as discretionary income increases, citizens contribute to organizations further removed from their own personal experience. The *U.S. Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations* [1965, p. 78] also gives the total amount and rates of contributions of individuals deducted for specific types of purposes. In 1962 the higher the income class the less the ratio of contributions for religious purposes. We assume that deductions for religious organizations are usually for church activities with which one is directly and closely affiliated.

Other evidence supports this interpretation, showing that the upper educational and income groups are more heavily over-represented in organizations that pursue "public regarding" (or stated otherwise, non-self regarding) goals.[6]

Table 5 presents the proportion of adult Americans who belonged to different kinds of voluntary groups in 1953 and the proportion of upper and lower income and education groups in their membership. The top four types of groups are those in which people join largely for expressive and social relational benefits; the bottom four types tend to be those through which people pursue either occupational or public-regarding values, and they tend to deemphasize immediate personal benefits. These data reflect the general tendency of greater over-representation of upper socio-economic status groups in civic and special purposes groups than in the more clearly expressive organizations. It is apparent that they are especially over-represented in groups such as political clubs.

Table 5. Membership in voluntary organizations by income and education.

Type of Organization	Percent of Adult Population Belonging[a]	Percent of Members, Some College or More	Percent of Members, More than $5000/yr. Income
Veterans, Patriotic	14.0	21.0	38.0
Fraternal	31.0	25.0	55.0
Church and Religious	25.0	23.0	38.0
Social and Recreational	16.0	27.0	47.0
Civic and Service	38.0	39.0	59.0
Political and Pressure	4.0	42.0	56.0
Economic & Professional	90.	36.0	52.0
Cultural, Educational, & Alumni	40.	50.0	42.0

[a] In 1953 when these data were collected, approximately 16.8 percent of the population had gone to college; 28 percent of the population earned more than $5,000 annually. Though the middle class is over-represented in each category, they are less heavily over-represented in "expressive" categories.

Source: Hausknecht 1962, pp. 84, 89, 90.

The general thrust of the above argument has been that affluence gives people resources to support their civic values; they can join and contribute widely to organizations. Such joining need not reflect an increase in leisure or of time committed to organizational activity. Instead it may reflect nothing more than an interest in the purposes of these organizations and discretionary resources to back up that interest.

The amazing funding potential of this state of affairs is illustrated in George McGovern's use of mailed solicitations for money to support his 1972 Presidential bid. In April 1971 it was reported that "From 260,000 letters sent out at the time of the McGovern candidacy announcement in mid-January, a net total of $250,000, almost all in small amounts, has come in" [*Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 1971, p. B6]. Further, it is reported that 1,500 individuals pledged $100 a month, to the campaign and between 2,000 and 3,000 others, are expected to do so. Such a response occurred at a time when Senator McGovern was preferred by approximately five percent of his party's supporters as a presidential prospect.

It is important to note that joining an organization may be a prelude to later involvement and activity. Joining is the lowest rung of the ladder of participation. Although our general argument has been that the population *in general* does not participate at a markedly increased rate now as compared to several decades ago, the needs of organizations require them to co-opt members who might otherwise be more passive participants [see Long 1958, Ross 1954]. A precondition to such co-option is visibility, and appearance on a membership list can be one of the important bases of visibility.

But the important conclusion from these last two parts is that even if actual volunteer time spent in social movement activity has not increased markedly, more people are in a position to join and contribute money.

Discretionary Time and Transitory Teams

Analysis of trends in leisure time and its usage suggests that *in general* there will not be a markedly

6. See Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson [1963, p. 234–140] for a discussion of how readiness to note and support activities that do not appear to have a direct payoff to oneself or one's own groups varies by class and ethnicity.

increased amount of time available for socio-political and social movement activity. Even if *more* time has not become available, however, some occupations, we argue, allow one more flexibly to arrange the allocation of time to socio-political activities. Evidence suggests, as well, that the highly educated who enter these occupations carry their commitment to work and competence in work over into a commitment to active leisure [Wilensky 1964]. These occupations are a growing part of the labor force.

Three related propositions are advanced: (1) the growth of mass higher education creates a large pool of students whose discretionary time can be allocated to social movement activities; (2) as the relative size of the social service, administrative, and academic professions increases, more and more professionals can arrange their time schedules to allow participation in social movement-related activities; (3) a relative increase in discretion over work-time allocation permits the emergence of transitory teams to engage in socio-political activities.

Student Involvement

Though students in general devote large amounts of time and energy to their academic obligations, they can increasingly rearrange their schedules to fit the needs of socio-political action. Traditional techniques of social control over college students have been relaxed. Dormitory hours have been reduced, and more students live outside of dorms. Class attendance requirements have been weakened, and the introduction of pass-fail grading and independent study produces increasing discretion over time schedules for larger proportions of the student population. Once class attendance is not required, a student can devote large blocks of time to social movement activities either on or off campus and make up his academic obligations afterwards. Such freedom over schedule has probably been more typical of graduate students in the past. That such transitory involvement does not necessarily detract from academic performance is suggested by many studies of student political involvement in which involved students have been shown, on the average, to receive better grades than non-involved students [Kenniston 1968, Appendix]. [7] Except at examination time, and even then, too, if an issue finds widespread enough support, students are in an optimum position to rearrange time schedules to accommodate extra-curricular interests. This interest need not be political, but when such freedom over time allocation intersects with socio-political sentiment, students may become the troops for social movement battles.

Indeed one might argue that the connection between leisure and social movement activities holds for students as it does not for the adult population. Since their personal incomes tend to be low and task constraints are weak, they do not face the money consumption problems discussed above. Since they are unmarried, family demands do not pull away from social movement activity. Furthermore, since they have not been heavily involved in political activity before, they are not issue-satiated. Each new cause leads to renewed involvement [Strickland and Johnston 1970].

There are apparent empirical patterns to student availability. They are less available in the summertime, at least on campus. They may, however, be more available for concentrated mission tasks during the summer—e.g., Appalachia, Mississippi, specific volunteer programs. They are less available at the beginning of semesters and at finals. It is clear they are maximally available right after spring vacation. The weather is conducive, the hiatus in university-wide athletics and the strain of a year of study show best then.

The periodicity of student availability may be affected by the degree of political activity in the off-campus community. Where many students and ex-students live year-round near the university in a quasi-bohemian state, a support organization for campus politics can develop, though the best studies of this kind of community suggests that a very small proportion of non-students maintain any continuous political involvement through organized groups [Watts and Whittaker 1968; Lofland 1970].

Two tendencies are important here. First, in an affluent society the person who rejects affluence by rejecting full-time employment and its related consumption costs can drastically increase his discretionary time. Although we know of no studies of the time and financial budgets of campus non-students, our assumption is that one or two days' work a week can support a meager life style for a single individual. By sharing the cost of housing and food, an individual can maximize discretionary time since he has no academic responsibilities. Secondly, if he works on or near campus, work time and social movement time can easily interpenetrate. Moreover, the existence of an off-campus ghetto supports other infra-structure activities and settings that facilitate social movement organizational development, e.g., coffee houses, restaurants, and newspapers.

The combination of the lengthening of the student generation and the increasing size of student cohorts means that *more* people are available to participate

7. The brighter students might get even better grades if they were not so involved in social movement organizations activity.