The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization

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AMERICAN sociologists have been intrigued with the phenomena of social movements. They have studied and analyzed movements ranging from those on the left wing aimed at overturning the social order to those on the right wing aimed at restoring an earlier order. But they have not neglected moderate movements with ameliorative goals or movements with no apparent political goals or implications (e.g., movements related to individual deviance such as alcoholism or to a belief in the end of the world). To understand the rise and fall of all of these movements—and their related movement organizations, which normally are the unit of analysis—sociologists have focused upon members. Leites and Wolf [1970] call this a "hearts and minds of the people" approach, which assigns primary importance to the state of consciousness of members and potential members. The development of group consciousness, the relation of a group's life situation to the formation of ideology and to social action have been primary concerns of this study and analysis.

We stress a different approach. Our "resource mobilization" approach emphasizes the resources, beyond membership consciousness and manpower, that may become available to potential movements. These resources support the growth and vitality of movements and movement organizations. This view does not necessarily deny the existence of grievances. It stresses the structural conditions that facilitate the expression of grievances.

In the past, the resource mobilization approach has been characteristic of American right-wing political analysis. Conservatives, wishing to deny the validity of left radical and reform movements, have stressed the importance of "outside" resources. Right-wing analysts deemphasize felt grievances as the motor of social movements; they focus on concepts like "outside agitators" and "the communist conspiracy," including especially the charge of outside funding that creates the appearance of widespread grievances.

We feel this view contains more than a kernel of validity, though we reject much of this analysis. Serious analysis of social movements must, for instance, recognize the similarity of the concepts of "outside agitator" and "community organizer."

We have come to this view after realizing that few American social movement organizations have resembled the "classical" sociological model. The picture of movements composed of aggrieved individuals banding together to fight for their due seems to us seriously inadequate. We do not claim that resource mobilization should replace the concerns of the "hearts and minds" approach. Neither analytic approach is adequate by itself; we must understand both the aggrieved group and the process of resource mobilization. In response to the "hearts and minds" bias of previous work, we stress resource mobilization in this analysis.

Some may mistake our emphasis on the material bases of current social movements for hostility to the aims of the movements. This is not so. Our discussion concerns the conditions that affect a movement's potential for success, and these are as important to movement leaders and supporters as they are to social scientists.

Introduction

Although our approach focuses upon the resources available to social movements, we must explore the major alternative explanation for the recent burst of social movement activity, the alleged increase in rates of socio-political participation. In the 1960s, according to many scholars and social critics, the American population greatly expanded its rate of participation in socio-political activities and will continue to do so. For example, in *The Public Interest*, Daniel Bell and Virginia Held note ". . . that there is more participation than ever before in American society, particularly in the large urban centers such as New York, and more opportunity for the active interested person to express his personal and political concerns" [1969, p. 142]. With respect to future prospects, James Q. Wilson writes, ". . . in fact participatory democracy has all along been the political style (if not the slogan) of the American middle and upper class. It will become a more widespread style as more persons enter into these classes" [1968, p. 120].

A participatory interpretation of events of the 1960s must inevitably raise a number of questions. The simplest to ask and possibly the most difficult to answer

is whether or not the purported upsurge in socio-political participation is real. Remember, De Toqueville, Martineau, and other observers of an earlier day were struck by the quantity of such participation in American society. Has there been an increase in the absolute amount of such participation?

There are, of course, numerous avenues for expressing socio-political concerns. One can throw a bomb or vote, join a social movement organization or write a letter to the local newspaper or to a congressman; one can argue with friends and neighbors or commit a major part of income to worthy causes; one can attend endless meetings of special purpose organizations or send a campaign contribution to a candidate of one's choice; one can choose a life career that expresses these concerns or advise one's children to do so. These many ways of expressing concern vary in their costs and consequences. Has the likelihood of action along each of these avenues increased? Or have observers generalized from the flamboyant manifestations? Have the rates of riots, pickets, and marches increased as compared to 1880? 1920? If so, are these rates accurate indicators of trends in more traditional activities? If only certain forms of participation are increasing, while others remain stable or decline, what are the structural causes of the apparent independent variation?

On a more general and analytic level, what implications do changes in participation have concerning the assumptions and logic of accepted theories of social movements? Since it has been common for sociological theories to define social movements in terms of participation, questions about rates of participation and relevant causative factors are tied to questions about the future of social movements. Social movements are voluntary collectivities that people support in order to effect changes in society. Using the broadest and most inclusive definition, a social movement includes all who in any form support the general ideas of the movement. Social movements contain social movement organizations, the carrier organizations that consciously attempt to coordinate and mobilize supporters. In the traditional view, social movements are *dependent* upon their participating members.

Social movements range from those that are radical and all-embracing, aimed at totally changing the structure of society, to specifically focused reform attempts. They encompass idea movements aimed at changing the world by changing individual thought and movements tied to specific ideologies and tactics. At the level of social movement organizations they include in some degree radical and clandestine terrorist groups, retreatist sects that revalue the world, reform-oriented political action groups, and interest groups aimed at

changing a law or policy to benefit its members.[1] Despite this variety, the standard sociological view has been that social movement organizations are dependent upon their members for movement operation. Members provide all of the resources for the infrastructure of social movements. Organizations depend upon members for money, work (time and energy), sacrifice (death or prison), and leaders. And they are also dependent upon their members to demonstrate to elites that society must change to accommodate the movement. The "resource mobilization" approach leads us to raise two related questions here. First, have American social movement organizations been as typically dependent upon members as the "hearts and minds of the people" approach suggests? Second, do the ebbs and flows of social movement organizational activity over time directly reflect changing rates of socio-political participation within the population?

In the classical view member participation is tied to grievances and deprivation. But grievances ought to be inversely related to per capita income. If affluence leads to grievance satiation (the satisfaction of wants), would not the classical tradition of social movement analysis predict the decline of participation, and hence social movements, in a society whose per capita income has enormously increased since World War II? Even if one does not accept such a crude materialistic assumption about the motivation to participate in social movements, in predicting trends should one not consider the changing costs to participate, as well as the drives and benefits presumed to arise from participation?

Finally, what can be said of the long-range trends? Can what has been termed the "participatory revolution" be reversed by either historical forces or planned intervention? Does America in the 1960s and 1970s represent a relatively unique historical period where a confluence of specific issues—Vietnam, civil rights, women's liberation, environmental pollution—has galvanized and mobilized the population for a short historical moment? Or have structural changes made grievance mobilization more likely today than in earlier periods?

The view we will develop, speculatively and at some length, suggests that the rates of participation for many forms of socio-political involvement do vary somewhat independently in modern America. This is partially

explained by the advent of social movement organizations unlike those treated by the traditional model. Our view substantially challenges the usual assumptions about participation and social movements in America. The functions historically served by a social movement membership base have been, we will argue, increasingly taken over by paid functionaries, by the "bureaucratization of social discontent," by mass promotion campaigns, by full-time employees whose professional careers are defined in terms of social movement participation, by philanthropic foundations, and by government itself. Moreover an affluent society makes it possible for people devoted to radical change and revolution to eke out a living while pursuing their values. Modern society easily supports a large cadre of revolutionaries. For revoluntionary and nonrevolutionary alike, modern American society makes it easy to pursue one's values in social movements.

The essay is divided into five parts. First, we weigh evidence for the claim that participation has in fact *generally* increased. Second, we describe changes in factors related to socio-political participation—affluence, leisure, and changes in discretionary time. In the third part we turn to changes at the institutional level, the funding patterns of foundations and churches and changes in participatory careers. The implications of these trends for a theory of social movements are addressed in the fourth part. At this point we counterpoise the traditional or classical model of social movements and a type of social movement organization, the professional movement organization, that is becoming more prevalent. In the last part we conclude with a discussion of the implications of social trends for the future of social movements in America. We also discuss whether the rate of social movements can be manipulated by authorities and elites.

Much of our argument will be inferential and speculative; at crucial points we must rely upon data and indicators that are only loosely connected with the concepts and problems we are examining. At times we are forced to rely on hearsay evidence. Whatever the particular weaknesses, however, we believe that our general interpretation is consistent with the available evidence and suggests serious rethinking of traditional modes of explanation.

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1. As an aside it is worth noting that political scientists use the phrase "interest groups" and sociologist write about "social movement organizations" without acknowledging their overlapping functions and processes. See Lowi [1971] for a recent attempt to combine these previously separate traditions of analysis.

Everyone a Participant?

Has there in fact been a participatory revolution? As we began our study we posed the following question to ourselves and colleagues. "If the Vietnam War

ended next month and racial equality somehow appeared on the scene, would the present level of social activism decline?" The normal response was an emphatic "No!" or "Not very much." First of all, many other issues seem to be waiting in the wings for a chance at center stage—the environment issue, population growth, rural poverty, women's lib, and the starving children of Pakistan. Such issues seem more numerous today. Why so many issues today as compared to yesterday?

Rather than arguing the alteration of actual circumstances as the cause of the multiplication of issues, one might argue that the high rate of issue formation will continue because people are more willing to participate in social movements based upon such sentiments. A larger proportion of the population may be willing to participate, because American society has become increasingly middle-class (as in the argument by Wilson above). Numerous studies show that the middle class participates in voluntary organizations and political activities more than the working class, although only tiny minorities at every level can be called "activists" [Hausknecht 1962]. Educational attainment and economic position both correlate positively with socio-political participation; therefore, the more America becomes a middle-class society, the higher the societal rate of participation in socio-political concerns.

First, we must concede that there is impressive consistency in the relationship between education and political participation.

> Perhaps the surest single predictor of political involvement is number of years of formal education. There are apathetic college graduates and highly involved people of very low educational level but the overall relationship of education and political interest is impressive. It is impossible to say with confidence why it is that formal schooling makes people more responsive to political stimulation. One may surmise that education tends to widen the scope of one's acquaintance with political facts, to increase capacity to perceive the personal implications of political events, or to enlarge one's confidence in his own ability to act effectively politically. Whatever the precise nature of the educational process, it has clear effects on political interest [Campbell 1962, p. 20].

But what of the mechanisms through which education produces such profound effects upon political behavior? A summary of findings from a five nation survey elucidates these mechanisms. Each of these findings is supported in all of the five nations of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the United States. The chapter references are from *The Civic Culture* [Almond and Verba 1963, p. 380–381].

(1) The more educated person is more aware of the impact of government on the individual than is the person of less education (chapter 3);

(2) The more educated individual is more likely to report that he follows politics and pays attention to election campaigns than is the individual of less education (chapter 3);

(3) The more educated individual has more political information (chapter 3);

(4) The more educated individual has opinions on a wider range of political subjects; the focus of his attention to politics is wider (chapter 3);

(5) The more educated individual is more likely to engage in political discussion (chapter 4);

(6) The more educated individual feels free to discuss politics with a wider range of people (chapter 4); those with less education are more likely to report that there are many people with whom they avoid such discussions;

(7) The more educated individual is more likely to consider himself capable of influencing the government; this is reflected both in response to questions on what one could do about an unjust law (chapter 7) and in respondents' scores on the subjective competence (chapter 9).

The above list refers specifically to political orientations, which vary the same way in all five nations. In addition, our evidence shows that:

(8) The more educated individual is more likely to be a member—and an active member—of some organization (chapter 11), and

(9) The more educated individual is more likely to express confidence in his social environment: to believe that other people are trustworthy and helpful (chapter 10).

Although in all five countries in the Almond-Verba study, education is related to political participation, there is some evidence that this relationship is strongest in the United States and is mediated through organizational affiliation. That is, education leads to general involvement, leading to political involvement [Nie, Powell, & Prewitt 1969a, 1969b].

Clearly we would expect an increasingly educated society to be an increasingly participatory one. The argument is plausible, but inferential. It requires demonstrating both that socio-political participation has increased and that the size of the highly participating middle class has increased. Then the link between the two trends must be demonstrated. Unfortunately, two or more surveys with similar questions about associational participation taken over long periods of time have not been done. However, Hyman and Wright have published one article comparing 1955 and 1962 survey data based upon similar national samples and closely similar question wording.[2] A summary of their evidence is reported in table 1. Although the seven-year period resulted in some upward shift, still more than 50 percent reported no memberships. From table 1 and other analysis Hyman and Wright reach the following major conclusions:

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2. 1955: "Do you happen to belong to any groups or organizations in the community here? Which ones? Any others?" 1962: "Do you belong to any groups or organizations here in the community? Which ones? Any others?"

(1) Voluntary association membership is not characteristic of the majority of Americans (a finding originally from data in the 1950s, now confirmed by data from the 1960s). (2) A relatively small percentage of Americans belongs to two or more voluntary associations (another finding from the earlier study, confirmed by the new data). (3) There was a small but noteworthy increase in voluntary association memberships between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s. (4) The trend toward more membership in associations was not caused by the cohort who came of age during the period from 1955–1962, the two points in the study. (5) Membership is directly related to current socioeconomic position, as measured by a variety of indicators (a relationship established in the earlier study, confirmed by data from the 1960s). (6) The trend toward increase in associational memberships is not confined to the more well-to-do strata of the population, but occurs all along the line and especially among those of poorer economic means. (7) Current economic situation appears to have more effect upon membership than does one's station of origin. (8) The trend toward increased membership applies to both Negro and White adults but is somewhat more evident among the former, thereby tending to reduce previous subgroup differences in membership. However, these findings are most tentative because of the small number of Negro respondents found in each sample [Hyman & Wright 1971, pp. 205–6].

Table 1. Percent belonging to voluntary association by family income.

Family Income:	1955				1962			
	1	1	2	N	0	1	2	N
−$2,000	76%	17%	7%	385	69%	16%	14%	230
2,000–2,999	71%	17%	12%	304	62%	24%	14%	167
3,000–3,999	71%	18%	11%	379	70%	21%	10%	175
4,000–4,999	65%	21%	14%	450	58%	26%	16%	183
5,000–7,499 [b]	57%	22%	21%	524	56%	25%	20%	592
7,000 or more [b]	48%	22%	30%	328	45%	21%	35%	389
Total	64%	20%	16%	2379 [a]	57%	22%	21%	1775 [a]

[a] Total N differs from marginal N because of unknowns.
[b] In 1962 the break point on this category was above and below 8,000.
SOURCE: Herbert Hyman and Charles R. Wright, "Trends in Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults." *American Sociological Review*, 1971, 3:191–206.

We return to aspects of the Hyman and Wright analysis later. But let us turn to trends in specific types of social participation. There are two sources of data that measure trends in specific types of participation; extensive time series data on voting rates have been compiled, and for a recent 16-year period we have data on church attendance, union participation, and participation in political activity.

Table 2 presents the average percentage of voting-age population voting in presidential elections and in off-year elections for U.S. representatives, by decades. Clearly, the half-century from 1920 to 1968 shows a

trend toward higher rates of participation. In the 1920s and 1930s, of course, much of the increase is usually attributed to an increase in voting by women. The off-year elections show a similar path of increasing rates of participation, 10 to 20 percent behind the presidential years. From our point of view the most interesting aspect of these data is the continuity of rates. In particular the voting rates of the 1960s are close (within 2–4 percentage points) to those of the 1950s. Furthermore, the rate of voting in the 1968 election was the lowest of the decade. No participatory revolution here. Even in the 1960s the absolute rate of voting turnout just began to reach the level of turnout in most national elections in Europe,[3] although Americans have been more likely to use informal means (such as letter writing and joining organizations) to influence politics.

Table 2. Voters as percentage of voting-age population: Presidential and off-year House of Representatives elections, by decade, since 1920.

Presidential Elections		House of Representatives	
Year of Election	% Range	Year of Election	% Range
1920–24–28	43.5–51.9	1922–26	29.8–32.1
1932–36	52.5–57.0	1930–34–38	33.7–44.1
1940–44–48	51.3–59.2	1942–46	33.9–37.4
1952–56	60.1–62.6	1950–54–58	41.6–43.4
1960–64–68	61.8[a]–64.0	1962–66	46.3–46.7

[a] 61.8 is the 1968 figure.
Source: *Bureau of the Census* 1970, p. 368.

However, these data do not directly indicate the effects of an enlarged middle class. For that evidence? we turn to the relation of socio-economic status and "reported" voting in the 1952–56 period and the 1968 period collected by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center.

One should remember that more people usually report having voted than actually did vote. Also, these data are not age standardized, and we know that the group aged 21–25, although more educated, tends to vote less because of mobility and other factors. Table 3 supports the relationship that has consistently emerged between education and political action; the more the education, the more likely the vote. The dif-

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3. Burham [1965]. For a review of the factors involved in the U-shaped curve of voting participation from the 1840s until 1960.

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ferences between the two time periods within each educational category are minor except for the group of respondents who have had some college, where a substantial decline in the reported voting rate is evident. On the other hand, it can be observed that the relative size of the more highly educated groups has increased over this time period. This accounts for the slight increase in total reported voting between the two time periods, lending some support to a *embourgeoisement* argument for increasing national rates of participation. The argument is weakened, however, by the decline in the rate of reported voting in the "some college" category.

Table 3. Education and reported voting, 1952–1968.

Education	N	1952–56[a] % of Sample	% Voting	N	1968[b] % of Sample	% Voting
Less than 8	635	19.6%	57.2%	149	10.7%	53.0%
8	478	14.8%	63.6%	140	10.1%	65.7%
9–11	648	20.0%	68.8%	272	19.6%	69.1%
High School Graduate	905	28.0%	82.0%	433	31.2%	83.8%
Some College	322	10.0%	8.8%	206	14.8%	79.1%
College Graduate	247	7.6%	90.7%	190	13.7%	89.5%
Totals	3,235	100.0%	73.1%	1,390	100.0%	75.9%

[a] These figures are approximate and are a recomputation of figures presented in Table 15–1 of *The American Voter* [Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1964]. The authors present only 1952 and 1956 combined.

[b] These figures are based upon the 1968 Survey Research Center Post-Election Survey.

One body of data does give us comparable evidence concerning several types of voluntary participation aside from voting. From 1952 on, the Survey Research Center has asked questions about church participation, union participation, and political participation. Table 4 presents this information for four points in time. The responses to these questions over time do not indicate increasing socio-political participation. Electoral participation outside of voting has not increased. Religious participation has shown a decline and *labor union membership has remained stable.* These data, though limited in time span, certainly do not indicate a massive increase in social and political involvement.

Table 4. National trends in political and social involvement: 1952–1968[a].

Questions	1952[b]	1956[c]	1964[c]	1968[c]
"Do you belong to any political clubs or organizations?	2%	3%	4%	3%
"Did you give any money or buy tickets or anything to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates?"	4%	10%	10%	9%
"Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that?"	7%	7%	9%	9%
"Did you wear a campaign button or put a campaign sticker on your car?"		16%	15%	14%
"Does anyone in this household belong to a labor union?"		27%	24%	25%
"Would you say you go to church regularly, often, seldom, never?"[d]		60%	62%	52%

[a] All of these figures are based upon Survey Research Center national post-election survey samples. Unless otherwise designated the percentage entry refers to the proportion of the total sample answering affirmatively.

[b] The 1952 figures are from Campbell, et al., 1964.

[c] The 1956, 1964, and 1968 figures are based upon data made available by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

[d] These percentages refer to those who answered either "regularly" or "often."

It could be argued that we have missed the whole point of the participatory revolution, for the revolution is outside regular electoral political channels. Yet these data do bear on one interpretation of that supposed revolution: its relation to an enlarged middle class.[4] At the very least these data indicate no large

4. *Some* readers will insist that the real participatory revolution is missed because it has occurred among the blacks and the poor. While the civil rights movement effloresced in the 1960s, it is not at all clear that Negro social participation changed that much. Myths of non-participation to the contrary, several studies have shown that at each class level blacks belong to associations as much or *more* than whites of the same income-education group. See Orum [1966] for a review of this literature.

Moreover, a study of the Office of Economic Opportunity Community Action Agencies (CAA's) in several large cities concludes that "CAA's seem unable to produce or create participation where it doesn't exist and unable to increase it very much where it already does exist" [Vanecko 1969].

increase in participation in general, nor greater participation by the broadly defined middle class. If non-electoral participation has been *dramatically* increasing, we believe it ought to be partially reflected in electoral and voluntary association participation, for numerous studies have shown them to be positively related [see Milbrath 1965]. So our initial answer to the question of a participatory increase seems to be negative—some change, not much. But the appearances leading us and other observers to such a view remain. To be sure, these data exclude, to a large extent, the student population. But are the appearances based exclusively upon the behavior of the student group? We think not, though student participation is important. In the following section we attempt to account for the appearances that are not reflected in these data.

Components of Participation: Social Structure and Individual Opportunities

The usual approach to explaining the higher rate of middle-class participation in organizations and politics is through cognition and motivation. On the one hand, education leads to greater awareness of political events and a greater awareness of the discrepancy between the observed world and values. On the other hand, higher status leads to higher self-esteem; high self-esteem leads to a sense of personal efficacy and the utility of participation. These approaches often ignore the costs of participation. Participation requires some combination of money, leisure or discretionary time, and energy. The unequal command of such resources across the class structure, we believe, ought to bear importantly upon participation rates in addition to motivation and cognition. It is necessary, then, to examine trends in factors related to time and money expenditures for such behavior.

Affluence and Leisure

One argument for the alleged link between an enlarged middle class and an increase in participation is through a purported increase in leisure; the increase in leisure provides an opportunity for participation. But there is good reason to believe that an increase in leisure is mythical, especially among those segments of the population that are most likely to show high rates of socio-political participation [Wilensky 1961].

First, over the last three decades the average work week in manufacturing has stabilized at around 40 hours a week. Second, among white-collar and blue-

collar workers, those in higher status occupations work longer hours than those in lower status occupations. A larger proportion of the incumbents of professional and managerial occupations than of clerical and sales occupations work more than 49 hours a week. Indeed, managers and officials in 1965 comprised 8.6 percent of the full-time workers but 18.2 percent of those working more than forty-nine hours a week [Carter 1970]. This is a complicated matter, and our example, though it captures the trend, exaggerates the picture. But the *trend* from 1948 to 1965 reflects an increasing proportion of the labor force working over 49 hours a week, from 13 per cent to 20 per cent. Since professionals and managers intrinsically tend to value work more highly than laborers and clerks, it is precisely the upper-middle class, it seems, that is more likely to opt for work over leisure, given the choice.

Two other trends blunt the implications of a leisure time argument for organizational participation—the labor force participation of women and the "costs of consumption." By now it is well known that there has been a massive increase in the labor-force participation of women. Each decade since 1900 has found an increasing proportion of women in the labor force. The trend is especially strong among women over thirty-five [Waldman 1967, p. 32]. A likely consequence is that both men and women must use available non-work time for "service-time" household and physiological maintenance (e.g. cleaning of homes, care of possessions). Staffan B. Linder [1970] argues briefly that as income increases, what he terms "consumption costs" increase. This thesis suggests another trend affecting the availability of leisure time. The sharp increases in per capita income have led to an increase in discretionary income that can be used to purchase consumer goods. But every new purchase, beyond the time spent making it, requires time for use and for service. (Linder distinguishes between work, personal work, and consumption or leisure.) Increased affluence leads to an *increase* in personal work. Since non-work time on the average is not increasing (as shown above), there are increasing dollars competing for available non-work hours. Furthermore, as the productivity of work increases, there is an increasing pressure to increase utility yield of leisure time, for there is a strong tendency to balance utility yields in different sectors of activity. Linder argues that high-yield leisure activities will substitute for low-yield ones. Thus motor boats supplant row boats, and physiological necessities as sex and eating lose ground in available-time allocations. We would add to Linder's list of low-yield leisure activities participation in social movement organizations. There are few ways of making these activities

yield greater individual utility in a given time unit. Episodically it may be exciting to attend a rally or "sit-in," but it gets boring. For low-yield social movement activities Linder would predict a declining allocation of time.

Most of the argument presented above is inferential; a direct test would require trend data on time budgets by socio-economic groupings. The middle class may get less sleep, for instance. But some evidence does exist on the relation of occupation and education to time allocation. As part of an international study of time budgets, the Survey Research Center studied time allocations of the American population. They found, for instance, that the professional and semi-skilled expend an average of two-tenths of an hour on organizational activities a day, while lower white-collar workers expend an average of three-tenths of an hour on such activities. The fact that semi-skilled workers used mass media for an average of 2.6 hours a day and both professional and lower white collar workers an average of 2.3 hours a day [Robinson and Converse 1966, Table 6, p. 35], however, suggests both the low priority most Americans place upon organizational activities and at least the availability of a fair amount of non-work time outside of "consumption costs."[5] The data on education parallel these findings. On the average, both college-educated persons and grade-school graduates spend less than 15 minutes a day in organization activities; there is little variation in average participation by educational attainment [Robinson and Converse 1966, Tables 5 and 34].

The evidence and inference presented above strongly suggest that our affluent society is not creating an enlarged pool of leisured middle-class citizens who are potential organizational participants. This view is consistent with the trend evidence on actual participation. Yet the appearance of more vigorous social activism remains. There are many ways, however, in which the affluent society does contribute to the creation of social movements besides time allocations.

Organizational Involvement and Social Status

The consistent positive association in American surveys between membership involvement and social status is well known. Yet, our arguments have led us to expect, if any change, a *decreasing* proportion of

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5. Watching television could be considered a "consumption cost"—a $500 investment in a color television set *must* be utilized. If organizational participation is in high-priority competition for the time allocated to tube gazing, consider the participatory implications of an America with no television.

By increasing the wasteland content of TV, revolutionaries could mobilize more activists from among the bored.

non-work time to be available for such involvement; at least in the last three or four decades. Two points need to be clarified. First, the association between status and involvement may well be a function of the way in which membership involvement is measured. Second, the fact that a small segment of the middle and upper class is in fact heavily involved in social-political concerns is partly a function of a "ladder process" of socio-political involvement.

If the members of the middle and working classes do not differ substantially in the amount of time available for participation, their differences in involvement may be a function of their allocation of money. The relation between class and involvement is normally demonstrated by differences in the number of organizational memberships. It is well known that many organizational memberships require nothing more than yearly dues. In particular we know that deductions for charitable and social contributions as a *proportion* of total income remain relatively constant at each income level. Higher rates of participation among the middle class may result from the fact that they have more money to join organizations.

As part of a study of the activities of foundations, the Treasury Department [*U.S. Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations* 1965, p. 75] studied various trends in charitable giving, a form of social participation closely aligned, we assert, to political and social movement funding. This information reflects immense increases in absolute dollars of charitable giving—bequests, corporate gifts, and gifts of living individuals—between 1924 and 1960. In 1940, for instance, gifts of living individuals were estimated at little more than one billion dollars, while in 1960 the estimate is close to $10 billion. Increases in bequests and corporate gifts are large, though not as dramatic during the same period.

The increase in giving of living individuals is related to the growth of personal income and the increase in the percentage of income allocated to contributions. From 1924 to 1962 adjusted gross income increased 650 percent, an advance far surpassing the rate of inflation and reflecting a massive increase in Gross National Product per capita. Over the period 1924–1962 there is also an increase in the percentage of adjusted gross income given to charitable organizations. From 1924–1962 the ratio of contributions from the income of living individuals increased by 40 percent. The donor estimate and recipient estimate series, which includes corporate and estate contributions, does not increase as dramatically as the individual contributions ratio.

Now, with both per capita income and proportion contributed increasing, we would expect, as well, vol-

untary organizations to be gaining in contributions. That is, discretionary income can be allocated to organizations ranging from the church to educational institutions, from hospitals to politics. Important to our later argument, there is evidence to indicate that as discretionary income increases, citizens contribute to organizations further removed from their own personal experience. The *U.S. Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations* [1965, p. 78] also gives the total amount and rates of contributions of individuals deducted for specific types of purposes. In 1962 the higher the income class the less the ratio of contributions for religious purposes. We assume that deductions for religious organizations are usually for church activities with which one is directly and closely affiliated.

Other evidence supports this interpretation, showing that the upper educational and income groups are more heavily over-represented in organizations that pursue "public regarding" (or stated otherwise, non-self regarding) goals.[6]

Table 5 presents the proportion of adult Americans who belonged to different kinds of voluntary groups

Table 5. Membership in voluntary organizations by income and education.

Type of Organization	Percent of Adult Population Belonging[a]	Percent of Members. Some College or More	Percent of Members. More than $5000/yr. Income
Veterans, Patriotic	14.0	21.0	38.0
Fraternal	31.0	25.0	55.0
Church and Religious	25.0	23.0	38.0
Social and Recreational	16.0	27.0	47.0
Civic and Service	38.0	39.0	59.0
Political and Pressure	4.0	42.0	56.0
Economic & Professional	90.	36.0	52.0
Cultural, Educational, & Alumni	40.	50.0	42.0

[a] In 1953 when these data were collected, approximately 16.8 percent of the population had gone to college; 28 percent of the population earned more than $5,000 annually. Though the middle class is over-represented in each category, they are less heavily over-represented in "expressive" categories.

Source: Hausknecht 1962, pp. 84, 89, 90.

6. See Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson [1963, p. 234–140] for a discussion of how readiness to note and support activities that do not appear to have a direct payoff to oneself or one's own groups varies by class and ethnicity.

in 1953 and the proportion of upper and lower income and education groups in their membership. The top four types of groups are those in which people join largely for expressive and social relational benefits; the bottom four types tend to be those through which people pursue either occupational or public-regarding values, and they tend to deemphasize immediate personal benefits. These data reflect the general tendency of greater over-representation of upper socio-economic status groups in civic and special purposes groups than in the more clearly expressive organizations. It is apparent that they are especially over-represented in groups such as political clubs.

The general thrust of the above argument has been that affluence gives people resources to support their civic values; they can join and contribute widely to organizations. Such joining need not reflect an increase in leisure or of time committed to organizational activity. Instead it may reflect nothing more than an interest in the purposes of these organizations and discretionary resources to back up that interest.

The amazing funding potential of this state of affairs is illustrated in George McGovern's use of mailed solicitations for money to support his 1972 Presidential bid. In April 1971 it was reported that "From 260,000 letters sent out at the time of the McGovern candidacy announcement in mid-January, a net total of $250,000, almost all in small amounts, has come in" [*Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 1971, p. B6]. Further, it is reported that 1,500 individuals pledged $100 a month, to the campaign and between 2,000 and 3,000 others, are expected to do so. Such a response occurred at a time when Senator McGovern was preferred by approximately five percent of his party's supporters as a presidential prospect.

It is important to note that joining an organization may be a prelude to later involvement and activity. Joining is the lowest rung of the ladder of participation. Although our general argument has been that the population *in general* does not participate at a markedly increased rate now as compared to several decades ago, the needs of organizations require them to co-opt members who might otherwise be more passive participants [see Long 1958, Ross 1954]. A precondition to such co-option is visibility, and appearance on a membership list can be one of the important bases of visibility.

But the important conclusion from these last two parts is that even if actual volunteer time spent in social movement activity has not increased markedly, more people are in a position to join and contribute money.

Discretionary Time and Transitory Teams

Analysis of trends in leisure time and its usage suggests that *in general* there will not be a markedly

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increased amount of time available for socio-political and social movement activity. Even if *more* time has not become available, however, some occupations, we argue, allow one more flexibly to arrange the allocation of time to socio-political activities. Evidence suggests, as well, that the highly educated who enter these occupations carry their commitment to work and competence in work over into a commitment to active leisure [Wilensky 1964]. These occupations are a growing part of the labor force.

Three related propositions are advanced: (1) the growth of mass higher education creates a large pool of students whose discretionary time can be allocated to social movement activities; (2) as the relative size of the social service, administrative, and academic professions increases, more and more professionals can arrange their time schedules to allow participation in social movement-related activities; (3) a relative increase in discretion over work-time allocation permits the emergence of transitory teams to engage in socio-political activities.

Student Involvement

Though students in general devote large amounts of time and energy to their academic obligations, they can increasingly rearrange their schedules to fit the needs of socio-political action. Traditional techniques of social control over college students have been relaxed. Dormitory hours have been reduced, and more students live outside of dorms. Class attendance requirements have been weakened, and the introduction of pass-fail grading and independent study produces increasing discretion over time schedules for larger proportions of the student population. Once class attendance is not required, a student can devote large blocks of time to social movement activities either on or off campus and make up his academic obligations afterwards. Such freedom over schedule has probably been more typical of graduate students in the past. That such transitory involvement does not necessarily detract from academic performance is suggested by many studies of student political involvement in which involved students have been shown, on the average, to receive better grades than non-involved students [Kenniston 1968, Appendix]. [7] Except at examination time, and even then, too, if an issue finds widespread enough support, students are in an optimum position to rearrange time schedules to accommodate extra-curricular interests. This interest need not be political, but when such freedom over time allocation intersects

with socio-political sentiment, students may become the troops for social movement battles.

Indeed one might argue that the connection between leisure and social movement activities holds for students as it does not for the adult population. Since their personal incomes tend to be low and task constraints are weak, they do not face the money consumption problems discussed above. Since they are unmarried, family demands do not pull away from social movement activity. Furthermore, since they have not been heavily involved in political activity before, they are not issue-satiated. Each new cause leads to renewed involvement [Strickland and Johnston 1970].

There are apparent empirical patterns to student availability. They are less available in the summertime, at least on campus. They may, however, be more available for concentrated mission tasks during the summer—e.g., Appalachia, Mississippi, specific volunteer programs. They are less available at the beginning of semesters and at finals. It is clear they are maximally available right after spring vacation. The weather is conducive, the hiatus in university-wide athletics and the strain of a year of study show best then.

The periodicity of student availability may be affected by the degree of political activity in the off-campus community. Where many students and ex-students live year-round near the university in a quasi-bohemian state, a support organization for campus politics can develop, though the best studies of this kind of community suggests that a very small proportion of non-students maintain any continuous political involvement through organized groups [Watts and Whittaker 1968; Lofland 1970].

Two tendencies are important here. First, in an affluent society the person who rejects affluence by rejecting full-time employment and its related consumption costs can drastically increase his discretionary time. Although we know of no studies of the time and financial budgets of campus non-students, our assumption is that one or two days' work a week can support a meager life style for a single individual. By sharing the cost of housing and food, an individual can maximize discretionary time since he has no academic responsibilities. Secondly, if he works on or near campus, work time and social movement time can easily interpenetrate. Moreover, the existence of an off-campus ghetto supports other infra-structure activities and settings that facilitate social movement organizational development, e.g., coffee houses, restaurants, and newspapers.

The combination of the lengthening of the student generation and the increasing size of student cohorts means that *more* people are available to participate

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7. The brighter students might get even better grades if they were not so involved in social movement organizations activity.

within the constraints of the student role. Increased discretion over time allocation makes larger and more concentrated blocks of time available. As the off-campus non-student bohemian community expands, discontinuity in activities can be minimized and the accumulated experience base increased, allowing more efficient utilization of the available student manpower.

Discretionary Time and the Professionals

Earlier we noted that the upper occupational groups are not working fewer hours; indeed, they may be working more, though there are variations. For instance, the self-employed and selected managerial and professional categories exhibit this pattern, while employed engineers do not [Wilensky 1961]. But many upper occupations do substantially free their members from time-space constraint, even though the decrease in self-employment over time may mean that greater numbers of the college-educated adult population find themselves subject to disciplined schedules. For instance, professors, lawyers, corporate divisional managers, and settlement house directors have freedom to "arrange" their schedules to fit their priorities. If their view of occupational responsibilities commits them to social movement engagements, at least for some time periods, they can arrange their schedules to accommodate such involvement. One of the most striking manifestations of this possibility occurred following the Cambodian invasion in the spring of 1970. Literally thousands of professors, from hundreds of campuses, cancelled classes for two or three days to travel to Washington to express their discontent. (Note also that the costs of getting to Washington and arranging lodging and food were easily borne by these professors and their colleagues.) Any occupation whose members are not tied to specific and sharply delineated time and work spaces may arrange their work loads to increase participation in social movements. Though we have no systematic evidence here, we expect that such discretionary involvement is widespread. If discretionary time is widespread, it blunts somewhat the impact of occupational differences in non-work time available.

Transitory Teams

Many social movements in modern society are composed of a small cadre and an amorphous though not unstructured collection of sympathizers and supporters. The existence of discretionary time and the increasing incomes of sympathizers make it possible for groups to be mobilized at relatively low cost for short periods of time. Students and professionals are especially available for such activities. The inability of

sympathetic individuals from other occupational groups to participate in the recent anti-war moratoria illustrates these variations in constraints. Ad hoc committees are created, newspaper ads are financed, protests are arranged by groups of people with previous experience in organizational activity (reducing experience costs) who come together for specific events and maintain only loose ties after the event. Full-time organizers and cadres may relate to these groups, but these relations, too, may be transitory.

It is probably the case that social movements have always built upon transitory teams. Only the medieval Crusades, revolutionary wars, and full-time conspiratorial social movement organizations dispense with transitory teams. The difference is that the relative coordination costs have gone down as discretionary income and time have increased and as experience with many organizations has increased. As the skills for mobilizing groups (whether the Boy Scouts or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference) become widespread, as people have money for travel or for taking out ads in newspapers, and as they have some free time to do what they wish, transitory teams are easily mounted.

In this part we have examined trends in modern society that would make available individual time and money to social movements. The idea that an increase in leisure time in general has recently made available more time for participation by individuals has been rejected. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that changes in American society have encouraged individual participation in three basic ways: (1) An increase in per capita income permits individuals to contribute money and join organizations that are compatible with their values; (2) Student life in an affluent society permits a life style and a network of contacts conducive to social movement involvement; (3) An increase in professional and managerial jobs leads to many more people being able to arrange their time schedules to participate episodically.

The data have not shown directly that individuals actually do use time for movement participation. For instance, it would be possible to use discretionary time or money for flower growing as well as social participation. Only the data in table 5 directly bear on the question of middle-class participation in political and public regarding activities. Although the middle-class participates more than any other class in public-regarding activity, it is more likely to participate in cultural and other activities, as well.

The next section shows that the basic structure of institutions and careers has been changing in such a way as to facilitate an efflorescence of social movement activity.

Institutional Funding and Career Supports

The 1960s was a period of increased social movement activity. It was also a period in which institutional support for social movement organizations became increasingly available and in which life careers in movements were more and more likely to be combined with established professional roles. Organizations not usually thought of as social movement supporters—e.g., foundations, churches, business corporations—began to support social movement activities. At the same time established professions and government itself became bases for social movement activity.

Church and Foundation Support

Although charitable trusts and foundations are not unique to the United States, they have been encouraged to a greater extent here than elsewhere. The structure of estate tax laws had led capitalists to establish foundations. Foundations date back to the nineteenth century, and by 1967 there were some 18,000 of them. The major growth of foundations has come since 1940, however. Information gathered in 1962 about the establishment of foundations with assets over $100,000 shows that most of the foundations (88 percent) had come into existence since 1940 *(U.S. Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations* 1965, p. 82). It is also apparent that the larger foundations were, by and large, founded before 1950.

More important than the sheer number of foundations is the growth in foundation assets. The growth in assets determines the ability of foundations to support voluntary organizations, including social movements. The massive increase (approximately 1500 percent) in total assets of foundations between 1930 and 1962 has become a fertile source of social movement support.

The major purpose of foundations is to support worthy causes. Worthy causes are very broadly defined, from feeding the hungry to supporting the studies of scholars. Their assets are not supposed to be used for the personal benefit of the founding contributors or their families, nor can they be used to finance political campaigns (although they are explicitly allowed to participate in voter registration campaigns), nor can they support illegal activities, such as blowing up banks, nor can they be used to finance profit-making activities. Beyond these restrictions their scope is wide.

How have foundations actually expended their funds? We have coded all grants listed in the *Foundation News* over the period 1963–1970. Because this source reports items by three categories on a rotating basis, our data actually reflect many grants given as much as one year earlier. Also it lists only grants of $10,000 or more and only those of which they are notified. We suspect that this evidence reflects the grants of the larger foundations more than the smaller ones. (It may also under-report a rise in social movement grants, which may not be publicized. We were informed of a large foundation grant of $60,000 to the first 1969 anti-war moratorium in Washington. We have not been able to trace this grant in published sources.)

This evidence shows an increase from $315 million to $677 million in foundation grants from 1962–1969. It also shows that education and international activities began to receive less support by the end of the decade. One must keep in mind that the apparent pattern may not reflect long range trends, for they can be influenced by the year to year activities of single organizations (e.g., the Ford Foundation). The growth of social participation grants—for instance, grants to community groups working on open-housing legislation, and sometimes directly to major social movement organizations such as NAACP, CORE, SNCC, or the Sierra Club—is dramatic. These grants made up 1.1 percent ($3.7 million) of total reported grants in 1962 and 8.1 percent ($54.9 million) of such grants in 1969. The increases were especially large in the areas of race relations, urban problems, and poverty problems.

While it is difficult with these data to demonstrate the exact increase that is allocated to social movement organizations, our point is clear. Foundations have become an important factor in the funding of social movements.

At the same time that foundations have become increasingly involved in social movement funding, so, too, have churches. The involvement of the Northern liberal clergy in social action is well known and documented [see, for instance Hadden 1969]. It is not a new phenomenon. What appears a new departure are trends in social action related projects for three of the *more conservative* Protestant churches, the Southern Baptist Convention, the American Baptist Convention, and the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ). Attention to the 1963–1969 period for these churches shows social action allocations increasing from $265,000 to $785,000. There is no question that evidence from the more liberal denominations would reveal an even more dramatic picture, both in terms of the absolute amount of money involved and the rates of increase. Again, the evidence does not directly demonstrate increased funding of social movements, but it strongly suggests dramatic increases in the possibilities of such funding.

12

Government Funding of Social Movements

The government itself has been involved in the business of supporting social movement organizations. While the federal government may be rapidly withdrawing such support, it is clear that its support was crucial in the latter half of the 1960s. Such support has been both direct and indirect. In terms of direct support the Community Action Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity have been most important, as have been some of the Model Cities Agencies. Other programs such as Volunteers in Service to America (Vista) and the legal service program for the poor indirectly have funded social movement staff. These programs provided the financial resources to support large staffs for social movement organizations at the local level. Many such organizations have had few members, though they have tried to cultivate the notion that they represent the interests (or desires) of a large group of citizens. The federal government's withdrawal from the encouragement and funding of these community movements is well documented [see Donovan 1970].

The government also has funded social movement activities indirectly. Groups such as the National Welfare Rights Organization have been given program grants for manpower training programs and adult education. Although the funds are not directly for social movement activity, they provide a sustenance basis for a social movement cadre. Moreover, whenever the government funds a program whose staff are likely to have strong commitments to social movement purposes, discretionary time and limited surveillance may lead to a situation in which government resources are diverted to social movement purposes. Mimeograph machines, meeting rooms, postage, and consultation by staff are available for allocation to groups and purposes related to, but formally outside of, agency goals [Gilbert 1970].

Finally, there is a third and even more indirect way that government programs create social movement participation. By requiring bureaucratic consultation with citizen "representatives" on an ad hoc or permanent basis, these programs create a visible focus for the aggregation and articulation of grievances. In some cases government programs create funded citizens groups. Even when operating program facilities and funds are not allocated for citizens groups, a program contingent upon consultation creates the opportunity for social movement activity and the emergence of leaders.[8]

8. Note that the political trials of the Nixon Administration have served a similar function. Several observers have remarked that there was no conspiracy in 1968, but there was after the trial.

The increasing support of social movement activity by foundations, the churches, government, and individual donation has led, we believe, to a massive increase in "funded social movement organizations." Most of these organizations employ staff with varying degrees of commitment to movement goals.

Managerial and Staff Personnel

Traditionally three lines of analysis have dominated thinking about the origins of the leadership and staff of social movements. First, leaders might be charismatic members of the suffering group who have emerged to articulate group needs. Second, intellectual leaders emerge from different backgrounds and, by reason of personality and specific experience, come to identify with the oppressed or deprived groups. A third perspective is that as movements become routinized and oligarchical, leaders become more and more distant from the group whose interests they presumably represent.

None of these lines of analysis allows us to address the possibility of an institutionalization of social movement staff careers independent of specific movement organizations. Yet the changed funding patterns we have discussed have caused and have been accompanied by a change in the structure of staff careers and of career aspirations that facilitate the staffing of social movements, on a part-time basis, for interim periods, and for life careers.

Part-time Participation

Many corporations have traditionally encouraged their executive personnel to participate in community activities. Indeed, successful participation in community activities has been weighted into the criteria of evaluation for promotion [Ross 1954]. Moreover, lawyers and other professionals have often offered services free of charge. More and more corporations are encouraging participation in reforming organizations, as compared to the previous involvement in consensus philanthropic activities such as the YMCA, the local hospital board, or the Red Feather Drive. Business corporations have increasingly become "involved" both by direct financial support and staff involvement.

Jules Cohen reports an interview study of 247 of *Fortune* magazine's top 500 firms [1970]. He found that 201, or 81 per cent, of the firms had some type of program for social action. Only four of these programs were operating in 1965.

The programs focused on the "urban crises," which business saw as black ghettos, enclaves of poverty, unemployment, under-employment, and racial ten-

sion. The average amount granted by these corporations to local and national groups was $175,000 each year. The study found that the organizations benefiting most from increased or redirected funding were the Urban Coalition, National Alliance of Businessmen, NAACP, United Negro College Fund, and Urban League. Twenty-five per cent of the firms had added one of the last three to its donation list since 1967. Only three first contributed to CORE, SNCC, or the National Welfare Rights Organization, which businessmen considered to be more militant. Twenty percent of the firms indicated making a special effort to contribute to local grass-roots self-help programs. One San Francisco executive's feelings were, "Let's contribute neighborhood-wise and avoid the kind of demonstrations that have hurt a few competitors." Twenty-seven companies indicated that they had sought out community groups to ask if they would accept donations.

Such funding reflects the behavior of the churches and foundations, but of particular importance here is the donation of staff time. Twenty-five percent of the firms studied donated staff and facilities under their programs. Many had one or more executives on a community board, working with Urban Coalition, advising on an anti-poverty council, working with the Model Cities program, or helping black businessmen with management problems. Some teach and others lead youth groups. About 40 percent of the companies encouraged their staff to help with community programs, and half of these firms allowed this work to be on company time. With some exceptions, community based firms that need good local community relations tend more uniformly to make donations and be involved in community activities.

Whether businesses continue to donate personnel and money and have special training and hiring programs is partly dependent upon the incentives for doing so—the perception of success, the encouragement and tax benefits offered by government, and the like. One of the benefits accruing to some businesses will be their ability to attract managerial talent, though the relative tightness of the labor market ought to reduce such competition for talent. For instance, *Business Week* (March 1970, p. 107) reports that a group of graduate students at Stanford Business School had established an evaluation of what corporations were doing about social problems. Some students said they would consult the list before joining the firm.

It may seem fanciful to believe that corporate participation in social problems would be a major determinant of job choice of business school graduates, but it is less fanciful to believe that law students will take such considerations seriously. A report in *Fortune* [Zalaznick 1969] indicates that young lawyers joining elite firms not only expect to be allowed to spend one paid day a week on social problem law, but they expect their senior partners to donate their efforts as well. Assuming (1) continuing concern with causes related to social movements and (2) a scarcity of top talent, corporations and law firms can expect to continue to be pressed for movement involvement and to continue to provide some part-time staff personnel to such movements.

Though we do not have figures demonstrating increases in the allocations of church personnel to social movement activity, we suspect that this institutional sector has increased such allocations. The recent heavy involvement of priests and nuns in both full and part-time capacities in movement-related activity, sometimes through church projects and sometimes through the outright allocation of personnel, has been much noted. Churches may face the same problem that law firms and corporations have had to face: The continued recruitment and retention of top talent may require more and more willingness to allow issue action on both a temporary and full-time basis.

Temporary Full-time Positions

A number of programs and positions have recently been developed in which individuals devote temporary periods up to two years to worthy causes. These programs include alternatives to military service, VISTA, and the Peace Corps. The goals of these programs do not require their participants to be activists, but their goals are often compatible with activist persuasions. Furthermore, the positions are often turned into activist adjuncts. It is our impression that many sponsoring local organizations maintain only loose control over these assignees, possibly because the organizations receive these services gratis. Two examples we have observed: (1) a technician fulfilling his alternative service in a local hospital who is allowed to arrange his job schedule around his major commitment: fighting urban renewal and pollution; (2) a conscientious objector fulfilling his alternative service with the Unitarian-Universalist church who is assigned full-time to a social movement organization working against "repressive legislation." The importance of such programs and positions is twofold. On the one hand, the positions swell the cadres of social movements (by some admittedly unknown factor). As important, the program becomes a mechanism for reinforcing the values and life commitments of participants.

VISTA had over 4,000 volunteers in the field in late 1970 and some 48 percent of those who had been enrolled for one year extended their stays, reenrolling for another year. A large proportion of VISTA alumni

go into the helping professions or back to collegiate education. VISTA claims that, of those returning to school, roughly half participate in part-time volunteer work.

These temporary programs, as well as the many volunteer programs of universities, are important not only because they organize a large pool of manpower for current social movement participation but because they are a reinforcing and channeling mechanism for young adults whose unease with American society has not formed into specific career choices and political ideologies. We suspect that such programs serve as a training ground for those who would make social movement activity a life career, while at the same time suggesting the possibility of such careers.

The many possibilities available for these temporary and part-time careers is reflected in a perusal of any issue of *Vocations for Social Change*.[9] Published bimonthly by a California commune, *Vocations* lists a wide variety of staff and line positions open in community and national organizations. The following sample of positions was advertised in a recent issue:

> A community-elected corporation needs a program planner director.
>
> SUDCIC (Syracuse University Draft Counseling and Information Center) is presently looking for a full-time *draft counselor* to run their draft counseling center at Syracuse U.;
>
> The World Without War Council has opening in the peace intern program . . . ;
>
> American Friends Service Committee . . . *Interns* work in teams of two in specific communities in the New York City area . . . Salary is $4500 per year. [*Vocations for Social Change* 1970]

This institutionalization of employment information for social movement organizations probably will become more widespread, unless traditional channels of employment information step in to meet the demand for such service.

Full-time Careers

Although the growth of university ghetto subculture, the emergence of communal living, and the growth of temporary programs such as VISTA all contribute to a manpower pool available for social movement activities, they do not reflect what may be the major change influencing the careers of social movement leadership: the growing institutionalization of dissent.

Briefly stated, as a result of the massive growth in funding, it has become possible for a larger number of professionals to earn a respectable income committing themselves full-time to activities related to social

movements. To put this proposition in perspective, contrast the situation today with the 1930s. Then the liberal or radical college student could attempt to enter the labor movement (e.g., Walter Reuther), become a labor lawyer, or join a government agency. The labor question was the major social movement issue. We suspect that the actual number of college graduates joining the labor movement was really quite small. The Walter Reuthers were rare exceptions. To become a full-time advocate of social change, saintliness was required and vows of poverty would have only reflected reality.

We are not the first, however, to identify the growth in such career opportunities in post–World War II America. Wilensky [1956, 1964] has called attention to the "program professional," who is a highly competent expert in a particular social policy such as public assistance or race relations. This professional moves in and out of government agencies, private agencies, community organizations, foundations, and universities. His commitment is to specific programs and policies rather than to any specific organization. Program professionals have been able to pursue successfully such careers for some time. It is the recently expanding opportunities for such careers that we wish to note here.

A number of relatively well-financed occupations that support such social change commitments have emerged in modern America. Within law, poverty law, consumer law, and civil rights law have each developed substantial funding claims. While most of the efforts of these lawyers are devoted to specific cases, an important part of these agencies' functioning involves making visible social problems and changing the structure and operation of government. These lawyers have helped organize community action groups, consumer cooperatives, housing groups, and so on. The annual budget for legal services (OEO) for instance, increased from $25 million in 1966 to $42 million in 1969. In 1967, 1200 lawyers were employed by this program [Levitan 1969]; there were roughly 2,000 in 1969. Possibly more important than the numbers of lawyers are their educational backgrounds. Leading law schools find that their best students are the most committed to activism.

Similar processes have occurred in the social work profession. Historically social work has consisted of three major branches: community organization, casework, and group work. Other subdivisions, sometimes cross-cutting the above, are administration and medical social work, psychiatric casework, and so on. Community organization, however, has not always attached itself to social change functions. It has been related predominantly to both community fund raising and inter-agency coordination. Social workers have traditionally been sympathetic to reform movements,

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9. V.S.C., Inc., Box 13, Canyon, California 94516.

but the structure of job opportunities has meant that public assistance casework has been the dominant job category [Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965]. In 1950, for instance, only 4 percent of American social workers were categorized as primarily involved in community organization [U.S. Department of Labor 1951]. Even in 1956 only 2.5 percent of the graduates of two-year schools in social work were placed in community organization positions [*Statistics on Social Work Education* 1956].

But in the 1960s, community organization was increasingly seen as a viable professional route to social change if one observes the recent trend in community organization enrollments in schools of social work. Whether you use a narrow or broad definition of community organization practitioners, between 1965 and 1969 there was well over a 300 percent absolute increase and a 200 percent relative increase in the yearly supply of community organization practitioners graduating with masters degrees in social work [*Statistics on Social Work Education* 1965–1969, tables 254, 255]. When finished with their training these professionals might be employed in OEO Community Action Programs, Model Cities planning agencies, foundation-funded neighborhood projects, job training programs, community-based delinquency programs, and the like. In one case with which we are familiar, a white community organizer with a bachelor's degree from an Ivy League school became the business advisor to the Vice Lords, a confederation of black youth gangs in Chicago.

Besides legal and community organization positions related to social movements, a variety of consulting organizations and established social action agencies have provided career options to activists. For example, an ex-Unitarian minister may become an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) development officer, an urban church may set up a community development center, a group of black college graduates may form a consulting firm to advise Model Cities groups and business corporations. It is impossible to estimate the number of positions involved. Many of these consulting firms seem to be short-lived, lasting a year or two at best.

We have investigated one source of evidence that may reflect this trend, though it is frought with problems: staffing trends in different types of national non-profit organizations listed in Gales' *Encyclopedia of Associations* [1964, 1969].[10] The major measurement problem here is that some of the movement organiza-

10. The first edition of this encyclopedia was published in 1959. It seemed clear to us that the 1959 volume was quite incomplete as a result of non-reporting of organizations. The 1964 edition appeared to reflect more comprehensive coverage, so we examined the 1965–69 time period rather than the 1959–69 period, which we would have preferred.

tions with which we are most concerned appear to be underreported in these volumes. Only national organizations are reported and short-lived ones do not appear. We, therefore, would expect this source to underestimate any trend. Nevertheless, the evidence is instructive in two respects. First, besides the category of associations we have termed task-related,[11] the public affairs and the health, education and welfare categories seem to be growing at the greatest rate in terms of absolute numbers of organizations. Second, the health, education and welfare category exhibits a dramatic increase in average staff size, a far greater increase than in any other category. Those categories that are most likely to reflect social cause organizational proliferation show above-average increases in both number of organizations and staff size. Of course, not all staff in the social issue-related associations are social movement activists. Many are clerks, secretaries, and bookkeepers with only minimal attachment to organizational goals. In spite of their problematic nature, however, these data reveal a rather substantial growth in the absolute number of organization staff positions. This trend supports our observation that it is becoming increasingly possible for a committed individual to carve out a career of social issue-related movement leadership without financial sacrifice. Further, as these staff positions multiply, the necessity of linking a career to a single movement or organization is reduced.

Let us summarize our reasoning to this point. We have accepted the observation of an appearance of dramatic increases in socio-political and social movement activity. Though no dramatic increase in the level of time and energy participation among the general citizenry is apparent—the phenomenon, if it exists, is not *general*—we have continued to search for a way of accounting for appearances. We have looked at students and professionals in this light and concluded that they are relatively free for bursts of participation in the short run, whether or not they have increasing amounts of leisure time available in the long run. Finally, we have looked into the flow of resources from several large sectors of the society, especially the foundations, organized religion, and the affluent classes through discretionary personal income and concluded that there has been a dramatic increase in both the direct and indirect flow of such resources to social movement organizations. This state of affairs has increased the possibility of both short and long range careers as social movement organization leaders.

To this point we have focused primarily upon changes in individual and institutional support for the growth of social movement organizations. In the following section we focus upon the way in which these changes influence modern social movements and the

11. Horticulture, Hobby and Avocational, and Athletic.

applicability of the classical model of social movements to the changed circumstances.

The Classical Model and Modern Social Movements

Scholars as disparate in conceptual focus as Smelser [1963], Turner and Killian [1957], and Zald and Ash [1966] have shared certain assumptions about the nature of social movements. These assumptions about motivations to participate, the conditions favoring group formation, and the natural history of movements, we label the classical model. This model is classical in two senses: It summarizes a long tradition, and it is now seriously out of date.

Traditional analysis of social movement organizations begins with (1) an analysis of a class, category, or group of individuals who have a common grievance or who are subject to common strains. Indeed, without such a mass the classical model could hardly conceive of a social movement taking form. The mere existence of a social category with a common grievance, however, does not determine the birth of a social movement. (2) Communication among the members of the group is seen as crucial to later common effort. (3) Environmental factors impinge upon the group, molding the possibilities for effective communication of common grievances and the possibilities for group action. Literacy, residential patterns, the structure of working conditions, discontinuities in personal experience, and the existence of charismatic leaders are a few of the conditions that are important in determining the likelihood of communications and its effectiveness in mobilizing the members [Burks 1961, Street and Leggett 1961]. (4) If communication is more or less effective, the group is more likely to take some concerted action to rectify the grievances. (5) In the early stages, however, the classical model teaches us to expect ill-organized, somewhat random responses designed to redress grievances. (6) Only after a well-defined leadership emerges do we find well-defined group action. (7) As emergent leaders confront the common problems of the group, they help to define them and devise explanations for their occurrence—i.e., they develop an ideology. The ideology helps to direct action toward specific targets and helps the leadership define legitimate organizational forms designed to make efficient use of the mass base.

Such an image of the genesis and development of social movement organizations makes several other assumptions, often implicit, which must be brought to the fore. (8) The membership or mass base provides the resources—money and manpower—that allow the movement to survive and carry out its program. Financial resources are needed to support the propaganda apparatus of the movement, to support organizers and

leaders, and to procure equipment—from mimeograph machines to arms. The mass base may or may not provide manpower for the program of redress; often it does not provide the leadership cadres, but it must provide manpower for cells, and an army and the mass must be mobilizable for demonstrations and electoral participation.

(9) The size and intensity of social movement organizations is thought to reflect the existence or non-existence of grievances that must be dealt with by the political leadership of the society in question. (10) Once the problems that formed the initial basis for concerted action have been solved, the mass base will be satiated, and the movement may disappear since the grievances upon which it was based have disappeared. Or, as more frequently happens, such a movement is transformed and institutionalized. Following the work of Weber [1947] and Michels [1949] modern analysis of social movements has been heavily focused upon such processes of institutionalization and the implications of such changes for goals, tactics, and the internal structure of movements.

An important characteristic of this model prior to transformation and institutionalization is its focus upon the psychological state of the member or potential member attempting to account for his motives for involvement. "Tension," "frustration," and "relative deprivation" are key terms in such an account. Even as the interdependence of the movement with environmental forces beyond its support base are analyzed, the psychological state of the support base remains crucial [Zald and Ash 1966]. (11) The leadership of the movement must be sensitive to the membership as well. Since its ability to mobilize resources and energies for concerted action depends upon the feelings of the membership, its existence as a leadership presumably depends upon its ability to sense the membership's needs.

The utility of this model for the analysis of some movements cannot be questioned. However, for reasons related to the argument above, we believe that it does not accurately describe the genesis of many modern movements. Nor does it seem to present a valid picture of the genesis of many earlier movements.

The limits of the classical model can best be demonstrated by illustrating how leaders of many modern movements operate independently of a membership during the earliest stages of organizational growth. We will then examine an alternative model, the professional movement model, and document instances where it is applicable.

The Declining Functions of the Membership Base

To repeat, in the classical model the membership base provides money, voluntary manpower, and

leadership. Modern movements can increasingly find these resources outside of self-interested memberships concerned with personally held grievances. Of course, membership base and beneficiary base (those who will personally benefit from movement success) have never been necessarily synonymous with movement organizations, though the classical model's stress upon self-interested action has tended to obscure this point. Early civil rights organizations, for instance, were heavily peopled by whites, while the prime beneficiaries of any successful civil rights action were black. One must remember this distinction in what follows, since we will argue both that the likelihood of disjunction between movement organizations and beneficiary bases has increased and that the meaning of membership for many movement organizations has been altered by the trends we have reviewed above.[12]

The Separation of Funding and Leaders from the Base

Due to the funding patterns described in the last part, it is increasingly possible that the financial support for a movement organization could be totally separate from its presumed beneficiaries. Consequently the base lacks any control over the leadership of the movement organization. The separation of funding from base probably increases the likelihood that the movement organization will survive beneficiary satiation. We would expect a movement organization leadership to have an interest in preserving the organization even after the aggrieved group has been satisfied.[13] If base and resources are sharply separated, the organization may survive without serious attempts to redefine its goals. (If the movement organization is funded by foundations, churches, and donors external to the presumed beneficiaries, leaders, in lieu of goal transformation, may have to renew their moral credentials in the eyes of their financial supporters. A leader with unimpeachable dedication to cause does not have to resort to exotic means of demonstrating

his leadership position. But where the leader has primarily emerged in a situation of separation between funding and beneficiary base demonstration of credentials can take bizarre forms.)

Gordon Tullock [1966] has argued that the "efficient" altruistic agency is one that uses its resources to maximize donor utility. If the agency uses any funds to actually alleviate problems of the population, it does so only to insure credibility in the "eyes" of the donors. For instance, since donors cannot observe their largesse being given to the starving children of Pakistan, the most important product is before-after photographs (even if made in a New York studio). Tullock's cynical argument makes an important point: The growth and maintenance of organizations whose formal goals are aimed at helping one population but who depend on a different population for funding is ultimately more dependent upon the latter than the former. Outside financial support, indeed, means that a membership in the classical sense is almost dispensable. Outside funding allows a leadership to replace volunteer manpower drawn from the base with paid staff members chosen upon criteria of skills and experience.

Mass Media and Movement Organizations

Though we will not treat the use of mass media by modern movement organizations in any systematic detail here, we must mention several characteristics of this important fact of movement organization behavior. Since the invention of printing and the growth of widespread literacy, social movement organizations have employed mass communications to build membership commitment, to garner support for movement goals, and to influence decision makers. The advent of photogravure was an important development allowing the widespread portrayal of human suffering to viewers with no direct experience of distant events. Early efforts were restricted to pamphlets and newspaper coverage, but the modern era has seen the near-universal availability of radio and television. The tremendous communication potential of these new forms cannot be controlled directly by movement organizations in the same way that pamphlet content could be controlled. The universality and immediacy of these new forms, however, allow movement organization leaders to attempt to manipulate images of social problems with far greater impact. As well, these forms permit the mobilization of sentiment without direct personal contact. It is thus possible for a well-financed movement organization to parlay a group's grievances into the appearance of seething discontent while bypassing the political processes of the classical model.

In the classical model the size and the amount of activity of a movement and its corresponding move-

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12. We may overstate the meaning of membership for the classical model. The often hazy distinction between social movement and social movement organization in this literature may cloud an understanding of the term membership. Certainly much of the individual behavior discussed within the framework of the classical model is episodic, exhibiting only minimal commitment. Traditional analysis appears to assume that the only qualification for membership in a social movement is sentiment sympathy. Organizational membership seems to be another matter but, as we will argue, may require no more.

13. See David L. Sills [1957] for an illustration of this process, normally termed goal succession, for The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis. Success in eradicating infantile paralysis required the development of new goals to justify continued organizational life.

ment organizations are presumably a tip-off to a political elite that some action on its part is necessary, be it repressive or ameliorative. Size and amount of activity are likely to energize what Lipsky [1968] calls *reference publics* of elite decision makers—those groups to whom the decision makers are most sensitive. If these publics can be convinced of widespread grievances, they may act on elite decision makers directly in favor of the goals of the movement. But the public's perception of a movement's intensity of action may reflect media coverage rather than the actual membership strength or the scope and intensity of grievances. A movement may *appear* to command a large membership in the classical sense, while in fact the membership may be nonexistent or exist only on paper. If such a state of affairs can mobilize reference publics sympathetic to movement goals, we may speak of manipulating the elite's perception of the necessity for action.

Attempts to manipulate elite perceptions of the necessity of action occur in two stages. The first addresses sectors of the elite who are most involved in funding movement organizations. Such financial support depends upon a perception by some funding source of a disparity between present reality and the proper state of the world. Once funding is secure, the movement organization can focus upon imparting this same sense of disparity to political decision makers and their reference publics. (Though these two stages can be separated analytically, in practice they are not always distinct.)

Television is well suited to portraying disparities between real and ideal conditions. First, few American homes today lack at least one television set. In 1969 95 percent of American homes had a television set [*Final Report of the National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence* 1970]. Second, the scope of coverage and the immediacy of dissemination mean that events in any area of the nation are directly observable. Occurrences on the streets in Selma, Alabama, and Roxbury, Massachusetts—indeed, anywhere on the globe—can be seen almost as they happen. This would not necessarily affect perceptions of real-ideal disparities, since coverage could be restricted to tornadoes, murders, religious observances, and the latest in clothing styles; but for one reason or another social movement activity based on real-ideal disparities receives extensive coverage on television—this material is good copy. Television has clearly created new opportunities for social movement leaders [Hubbard 1968]. By knowing which events make good television copy, movement organization leaders have used the medium to create the impression of widespread activity and grievance.

Many recent movement leaders have utilized the media in this manner. For instance, Stokely Carmichael, who during his "Black Power" phase was always good copy, received widespread coverage. The impression he clearly sought to impart was "spokesman for the American black community." The movement that he headed at the time, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), never possessed a large membership and did not attempt to recruit one [Zinn 1964]. Further, the majority of a representative sample of black respondents apparently did not approve or were unaware of Carmichael's views [Marx 1967]. But by becoming good copy Carmichael was able to gain extensive coverage and therefore appear to be speaking for a broad constituency. Of course, elites and authorities are sophisticated; they listen to the folks back home, read their mail, keep an ear open to their constituencies [Lindblom 1968]. Thus, television by itself hardly *controls* the images that elites perceive. It may have more effect upon elites indirectly through reference publics.

But at the same time that television communicates an impression of the state of the world to elite and policy makers, it also affects social movement mass support and opposition. Involvement, pro or con, becomes less dependent upon personal experience and immediate situational context and more dependent upon image and impression, which are, in great part, filtered *through* the medium. At the same time that the media shape perception, they select the events and problems to be defined [Warner 1971]. What a radical or a college professor believes is *the* problem, the media may reject. The mass media present news and problems that they define as of interest to the masses. It is possible that some issues that *ought* to generate social movements get short-changed in the process.

The Growing Trend to Inclusive Organizations

Because television can involve in a problem people who do not have direct contact with the events or problems, a larger pool of potential supporters is created. (TV news can be seen as advertisements for social causes.) Combined with increasing disposable income and the use of mailed requests for funds, the inclusive form of social movement organization is likely to characterize newly formed organizations.

Some writers, using the classical model of social movement organizations, assume what has been termed exclusive membership. That is, membership is seen as reflecting a strong commitment to the organization as the sole agency for rectifying problems. Inclusive membership, on the other hand, means partial commitment and relatively little in the way of member-

ship requirements [cf. Zald and Ash 1966]. Inclusive membership is not new. It has characterized churches, unions, and most voluntary associations in America for decades. The American Civil Liberties Union is an inclusive organization. The large bulk of the membership participates in the activities of the organization only through its contributions. A large number of the recent anti-war groups have functioned as inclusive organizations, in the same manner as did many of the earlier civil rights organizations. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) demands little more of members than regular contributions. Anyone who has contributed funds to such an organization knows how widespread the phenomenon of mailed requests for such funds has become. The growth of a middle class with disposable income and ideological commitment activated through the portrayal of real-ideal disparities is all that is necessary to guarantee the growth of such movement organizations. The donor to such a movement has little control over the movement leadership short of withholding funds. Withholding funds, however, does insure some control if other funding sources are lacking, and requires that a leadership properly gauge and mold donor grievances. A classic illustration is provided by the different response of SCLC, CORE, and NAACP to charges of anti-semitism. Both SCLC and NAACP have been closely tied to Jewish financial support, and both have responded to protect their lines to the Jewish community. CORE, which has attempted to be a more militant social movement organization, has been more ready to play to its mass base rather than its supporters. The important point, however, is that as more and more organizations that are at the same time inclusive and heterogeneous develop, they will become less dependent upon any single base of support. As will be seen below, movement organizations based upon inclusive membership contributions may represent mixed forms displaying characteristics of both classical and modern forms.

Professional Social Movements

The rise of professional social movements results from changed funding patterns and resulting changed career patterns of social movement leaders. Movement leaders in this matrix become social movement entrepreneurs. Their movements' impact results from their skill at manipulating images of relevance and support through the communications media. The professional social movement is the common form of recent movements and represents a sharp departure from the classical model. Although movement entrepreneurs have always existed and some earlier movements closely resemble the professional movement (viz. the social movement organizations making up the Progressive movement), modern conditions bring them to the fore.

Daniel Moynihan [1969] coined the phrase, "the professionalization of reform," to describe the extent to which the Kennedy-Johnson "War on Poverty" was conceived and implemented by the government and foundations. The War on Poverty represents a case of political issue entrepreneurship. Its only partial link to the classical model was its connection to the civil rights movement. Our analysis goes beyond Moynihan's, we think, in making explicit the departures from the classical model.

Professional social movements are characterized by:

(1) A leadership that devotes full time to the movement.

   (a) A large proportion of resources originating outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent.

(2) A very small or nonexistent membership base or a paper membership (membership implies little more than allowing name to be used upon membership rolls.)

(3) Attempts to impart the image of "speaking for" a potential constituency."

. (4) Attempts to influence policy toward that same constituency.

As we noted earlier, we do not believe that the existence of professional social movements is a new phenomenon; such an organizational form has existed in the past. It is the widespread nature of the phenomenon that characterizes the modern era. Earlier periods of intense social movement activity have spawned many similar organizations.

For instance, while the progressive movement apparently possessed a substantial sentiment base, there is some evidence that progressive social movement organizations had difficulty in recruiting active memberships. And even though memberships were small in such organizations, "only a small part of the membership did more than pay their yearly dues or make more generous contributions to their favorite organizations" [Yellowitz 1965, p. 77]. "In general, the regular activities of the organizations were performed by a small staff of paid employees, while the general membership made up the governing boards, did some of the committee work, and paid expenses" [Yellowitz 1965, p. 77]. Finally, ". . . most of the reform organizations depended upon a small group of wealthy patricians, professional men, and social workers for their financial support and leadership. Wealthy women, including some from New York City society, were indispensable to the financing and staffing of the Consumer's League" [Yelowitz 1965, p. 71].

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Lacking large membership bases, these organizations relied heavily upon the media to mobilize sentiment bases in order to directly and indirectly influence elite decision makers. As Smith observes, "The basic method utilized by progressive movement organizations was to publicize investigations undertaken by themselves or by government agencies. Simply worded leaflets described in muckraking style the conditions discovered by these investigations and proposed a specific piece of legislation to deal with the problem. Extensive use of photographs, cartoons, graphs, etc., illustrated the "Evil" produced by the excesses of the industrial system" [Smith 1968, p. 21].

The ferment accompanying the Depression and New Deal era also produced movements at odds with the classical mold. Huey Long's Share Our Wealth Society is such an early departure. The funding of the society came from Long's personal reserves, deriving ultimately from his Louisiana organization. Membership in local Share Our Wealth clubs required no dues, and at its peak, in 1935, the society claimed a membership of between four and seven million members. Through national radio broadcasts, again funded by Long, he encouraged the formation of clubs, and a large national staff of organizers and office workers was employed to aid this process. The national office of the society provided organizational material and propaganda for the local clubs. Long made all of the important decisions concerning the policies of the society and liked to ". . . boast that the Share Our Wealth clubs represented a powerful national movement, 'an active crusading force' that someday would sweep into control of the government" [Williams 1970, p. 735].

At about the same time, Father Charles E. Coughlin founded the National Union for Social Justice. Concerning this organization McCoy says, "It should be emphasized that instead of offering encouragement and guidance to a spontaneous organization of the discontented by the discontented, Coughlin offered them a ready-made organization and ideology. Throughout the existence of the National Union, any real participation by the membership in decision-making processes seemed to be lacking" [McCoy 1958, p. 119].

Membership in these organizations was inclusive and implied little more than support for the founders' stated aims. Indeed, both organizations were developed to demonstrate that widespread support existed. Since membership implied neither activity nor much in the way of financial support, the membership could not have been expected to have a serious voice in policy formation of the organizations.

An excellent modern example of the phenomenon outlined above is The Citizen's Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States [Brown 1970]. The Citizen's Board was originally organized by the Citizen's Crusade Against Poverty, an anti-poverty organization drawing its financial support from a private foundation. The Citizen's Board drew upon a highly trained professional staff who employed the media effectively as a rallying device against hunger. The potential mass base of hungry Americans were never involved in this movement. Hungry Americans did not provide the resources employed by this organization. Financial support for the organization was drawn from the "Citizen's Crusade Against Poverty, the United Auto Workers, and six foundations" [Brown 1970, p. 119]. The media cooperated by giving broad coverage to the Board's activities and the final report issued by the Board. The media also produced a television documentary dealing with the issue raised by the Board (CBS, "Hunger in America"). We do not imply that the Board misrepresented the needs or desires of hungry Americans or that hungry Americans would not have become involved in such a movement if they had been given a chance or were needed to effect policy. The point is that the organization functioned without mass involvement.

A somewhat different example of a professional social movement is the National Council of Senior Citizens for Health Care through Social Security (NCSC). It was possibly more typical of professional social movements in that it arranged to appear as a classical movement, inclusive type, while it was clearly professional in its operating orientation. Its major source of funding was the AFL-CIO [Rose 1967, p. 423]. The professional staff of the organization conducted rallies around the country in support of health care for the elderly and encouraged mass petitioning. Such funding also allowed professional expertise to be made available to smaller groups, which were encouraged and aided in holding hearings in support of health care for the aged. The staff also wrote press releases that were used across the country by constituent groups, and the media responded by publicizing the organization. ". . . By the close of 1961 [NCSC] claimed a membership of 400,000 elderly persons and 900,000 supporting members of all ages" [Rose 1967, p. 433].

The example of the NCSC deviates from our characteristics of a pure professional social movement in that it possessed a large membership base. That membership base, however, was created after the fact. If the Citizen's Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States had desired to develop a loosely organized membership in this fashion, we suspect that it could have. The decision by a professional staff to devote resources to this method of image manipulation will vary from situation to situation. The NCSC was pushed in this direction by the contention

of the American Medical Association that the aged did not lack medical care and that existing health insurance schemes adequately met the needs of the elderly [Rose 1967].

A more recent example of a professional social movement is "Common Cause," headed by John W. Gardner, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. This organization has assembled a professional staff of about 30 and has ". . . managed to build a respectable financial base of about $1.75 million with $15 in dues from each of its members, plus seed money from such contributors as John D. Rockefeller, 3rd., the Ford Motor Company, and Time, Inc." [Halloran 1971]. The organization claims a membership of 108,000 citizens. Observation of the scale of the advertising and mailing campaigns launched by the organization suggests that a major financial investment was required to enlist the membership, and the New York Times reported initial funding of $250,000 from a group of wealthy backers [Halloran 1971].

Several points are worth noting about Common Cause. First, many of the staff members have been involved in other professional movement organizations. Indeed, the President and chief executive officer of Common Cause in 1971, Jack Conway, was involved in the hunger campaign discussed above through his involvement in the Child Development Group of Mississippi. Conway had also been employed by the AFL-CIO in a political action role. Second, members of the organization have no serious role in organizational policy making short of withholding membership dues. The professional staff largely determine the positions that the organization takes upon issues. In general, the membership seems to relate to the organization primarily through the mails and the media, though the staff attempts to activate the membership for pressure campaigns upon decision makers—thereby making membership constitute something more than a financial contribution. Furthermore, Common Cause develops other groups and helps start pilot projects in various states. By 1972 Common Cause had developed a variety of mechanisms for building local groups.

Let us conclude our discussion of modern professional social movement organizations with a brief look at the highly publicized set of organizations developed by Mr. Ralph Nader. Though this set of organizations has been continually expanding, in 1971 three organizations represented the core of Mr. Nader's activities: the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, the Public Interest Research Group, and the Center for Auto Safety. While the three organizations have continued to operate, specific issue groups have been formed for short periods of time. Issue groups, normally termed "Raiders" by the press, work closely with the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, which sponsors the reports of their inquiries [McCarry 1972].

The source of funds for the various activities of these organizations varies from the proceeds of published reports, Nader's speaking fees, and foundation and private donations. In 1970, for instance, the Midas International Foundation gave Nader's various projects $100,000 of the more than one-half million dollars contributed by foundations and private donors [McCarry 1972]. In 1971, Public Citizen, Inc. was developed to solicit small donations from a broader base through mailed requests for funds. "From June through October 1971, Public Citizen collected $100,000" [McCarry 1972, p. 210]. The Center for Auto Safety in 1971 received two thirds of its funds from Consumers Union and Public Citizen, Inc. [Marshall 1971].

This complex of organizations illustrates very clearly the staffing trends we have outlined above. Reliance upon both full-time professional staff and episodic student volunteer manpower is the mode. The core organizations depend primarily upon full-time professionals who are paid at subsistence wages—a lawyer for the Public Interest Research Group, for instance, receives $4,500 a year. Members of the full-time staff organize the use of summer student volunteers.

Each organization claims to represent and fight for an unorganized constituency. It is only through Public Citizen, Inc., though, that any direct support tie to such a purported constituency has been attempted. Beyond Public Citizen, Inc., none of the organizations are in any sense membership organizations. Professional competence rather than broad citizen action characterizes these organizations, with a heavy use of the media as a critical component of utilizing this competence as a lever for social change.

It is not that professional movement organizations in Machiavellian fashion manufacture pseudo-problems, though this remains a possibility. There are always grievances at large among the citizenry. But for many such grievances the individual rewards for organizing to solve individual problems, if in fact they are soluble, are likely to be less than the energy and resource expenditure required.[14] If vehicles are pro-

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14. See Mancur Olsen, Jr. [1965] for an analysis that sharply challenges the assumptions of interest group theorists that people will devote time, money, and energy to collective causes that promise only small personal rewards. Olsen would argue that individuals are more likely to be "free riders" on these causes. Our analysis, however, substantially deflects the *importance* of Olsen's argument, since, as we have argued, individual citizen participation may be unimportant to movement vitality. We accept the validity of Olsen's analysis, but its central importance rests upon its pessimistic conclusions about the possibility of organized

vided, however, for attacking such grievances and participation is essentially costless, minimal levels of citizen participation are an increased likelihood. Professional social movement organizations can provide such vehicles. (Indeed, professional movements might *pay* members to participate in the name of citizen identification, much as War on Poverty groups paid the poor to represent the poor.) These organizations do not necessarily manufacture grievances—they do make it more likely that such grievances will receive a public hearing and policy action. Even minimal levels of citizen participation are dispensable, though, as professional movement organizations may be effective in their absence.

The process of the definition of strain and grievance is altered by the advent of professional movement organizations and the conditions that favor their birth. *We suggest that the definition of grievances will expand to meet the funds and support personnel available*, and the criterion for the existence of such personnel may be a foundation's willingness to believe a professional entrepreneur's characterization, rather than the perception of strain in the minds of the potential constituency. If large amounts of funds are available, then, problem definition becomes a strategy for competing for them, and we would expect more and more sophisticated attempts at problem definition. Those intellectuals who engage in such problem definition will not normally have been subject to the odious conditions they seek to allay, and their definitions will depend upon disparities between general value commitments and the realities of social organization. Many of the supporters of such organizations, as well, will base their support upon such disparities rather than upon personal experience.

Government agencies, as well, are many times involved in the early stages of grievance manufacture. Agency involvement is not always reaction to issues defined by external groups. Issuing reports and calling public attention to problems may serve to build a favor-

able environment for the development of social movement organizations around an issue. The facilitation of apparent grass-roots concern, of course, is ample evidence that agency appropriations be increased to attack the problem at hand. The recent attempts of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to increase the representation of female faculty in American universities illustrate this pattern. This action has encouraged campus feminist groups to organize and press for change supporting the agency's case that grievances requiring affirmative action exist.

Finally, we may carry our argument even further away from the classical model by positing the distinct possibility of the development of professional social movement organizations that create rather than mobilize grievances.[15] We have assumed to this point that movement organizations engineer the appearance of grievances in good faith. But, it is entirely likely that the creation of the appearance of grievances by such an organization will bear no relationship to any preexisting grievance structure. In such an event movement entrepreneurs can be thought of as representing no one but themselves in such pursuits unless their efforts lead to the development of actual feelings of grievance among a target population. Success in such manufacture will be seen as leadership, while failure will be seen as hucksterism. In any case, movement origins will occur outside of the mass.

Stability and Change in the New Careers and Organizations

Earlier we argued that there has been a marked increase in the number of career positions in organizations related to social movements. People commit their lives to working in organizations related to their change-oriented values. These careers are contingent upon organizational opportunities and upon the survival of the social movement industry and of particular movement orgations. The next part examines the ways in which the infra-structure processes we have discussed shape the overall size and direction of the industry. Here, however, we need to ask how particular professional movement organizations and full-time social movement careers are affected by the vicissitudes of their relationships to media, to funding sources, and to membership and beneficiary bases.

The New Careers

Ministers, community organizers, public relations directors, membership and development specialists,

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action to rectify citizen grievances. Furthermore, outside funding allows the possibility of easily offering what Olsen terms "by-products" for citizen involvement in movement organizations; by-products could be low-cost loans, aid in gaining welfare benefits, transportation to agencies, or even outright payment for membership. See Leites and Wolf [1970] for an analysis parallel to ours that stresses the dispensability of citizen participation given outside resource supply in the context of guerilla warfare.

Social movement organizations will probably feel called upon to conceal their material by-products; the moral rhetoric of social movements is tarnished by making self-interest an explicit rationale for membership. This is, in fact, one important difference between "interest groups" and "professional social movements." See Edelman [1967] for an analysis of the differences in rhetoric of social movements and narrow, self-regarding interest groups.

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15. We are indebted to Mr. Gary Long for bringing this implication of our arguments to our attention.

lawyers, doctors, and engineers are some of the occupations from which the professional movement organization attracts its cadres. They are distinguished from their colleagues in these professions largely by their rejection of traditional institutional roles, careers, and reward structures. One consequence, we suspect, is a lower commitment to professionalism *per se*. That is, they define their opportunities less in terms of the use of professional skills and more in terms of social change objectives. Of course, traditional professionals are not strictly tied to professional settings for their careers. For instance, lawyers often take jobs as business executives or in government agencies, and engineers become administrators. But most professionals commit themselves to professionally related settings.

If professional movement organizations exhibit stability and elongated hierarchical organization, careers in movement organizations may come to resemble those in other professional settings, but one of the characteristics of these organizations is that their funding is unstable. As there is an ebb and flow of foundation support, as individual contributors change interests, and as society passes on to new issues, sectors of movement support are likely to dry up and new ones expand. A likely consequence is that personnel will switch from organization to organization and move among locales. As personnel shift from organization to organization, a national network of personnel relations develops. Some movement organizations may routinize their funding sources, however, as community consensus develops around their goals. The Planned Parenthood Association exhibits this pattern where in many locales it has come to be funded by the United Givers Fund.

Also, many of these movement organizations will probably intersect with traditional institutions that have some relation to particular issue sectors. Just as personnel go between the Defense Department and the defense industries, so we may expect movement personnel to flow back and forth among movement organizations, foundations, and the government agencies and professional schools that maintain a tie to the policy issue at stake. Lawyers flow in and out of law schools and government. A community organizer is attached to a metropolitan housing authority one year and to a neighborhood action group the next. A state health department loses a middle-level bureaucrat to a health action council, and the health action council loses an executive to a comprehensive health center. A "guerilla administrator" with the Department of Housing and Urban Development takes a job with a Fair Housing organization, and so on. For some of the movement professionals, one of the steps leads into a traditional career setting, even though it builds upon the expertise he has acquired. The overall direction and rate of flow between traditional and untraditional settings depends upon the overall growth of traditional versus new careers.

Several recent developments support a view of the rationalization of social movement organization careers. The first is the beginning of routinized training for such positions in the form of training institutes for social movement personnel. The most notable examples of such institutes are those sponsored by the Industrial Areas Foundation, the Citizens College Organizing Committee, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The second is the growth of a literature that attempts to systematize the knowledge required for success at such activity. Some recent examples of the growth of this literature are Michael Walzer's *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics* [1971], Si Kahn's *How People Get Power* [1970], Saul Alinsky's *Rules for Radicals* [1971], Lakey and Oppenheimer's *Manual for Direct Action* [1965], and *The Organizer's Manual* [O. M. Collective 1971]. Though these manuals in general focus upon what is termed "grass-roots" organizing *à la* classical model, several of them advise how the potential organizer goes about exploiting the infra-structure of social movement organization support we have outlined. For instance, *The Organizers' Manual* explains in detail how to apply for foundation grants. Presumably, the next step in the process is the founding of a social movement organizers' association and the institution of formal credentialing procedures.

Product Diversification Change in Movement Organizations

One line of analysis of classical movement organizations suggests that they have a strong tendency to perpetuate themselves and to develop oligarchic and bureaucratic features. In doing so they moderate their goals and institutionalize careers. Zald and Ash [1966] argue that this tendency is dependent upon a routinization of resource flow. Many movement organizations will fail or shrivel if they cannot define a relationship to a support base. Some of the movement organizations that we are discussing easily transform themselves into service institutions. A poverty law firm routinizes its relationship with the government, and as long as it does not transgress political boundaries, its chances of survival are increased. Obviously, shifts in political control can lead away from movement goals.

Other movement organizations are more clearly focused upon policy changes, upon political action that is more difficult to transform into services. What hap-

pens to them? Needless to say, the less the movement organization is tied to enduring cleavages or issues, the less likely it is to survive. It is hard to imagine inclusive organizations like the ACLU or the NAACP going out of business, because they relate to enduring issues. The NAACP relates to a basic racial-status cleavage in the society, while the ACLU relates to an abstract value that can never be fully attained. Both may have to shift programs to meet the competition for their support base provided by other movement organizations, but they can do so merely by shifting program definitions and personnel. On the other hand, narrowly defined organizations such as an organization for day-care centers or "Citizens for Clean Water" may find themselves without an issue.

In this regard an organization like Common Cause is especially interesting. It is a "conglomerate" of the ameliorative social movement industry, for it speaks for reform in general, allying with many special interest groups. On the one hand, as it loses some supporters when it takes on issues outside of or opposed to their interests, it picks up others. On the other hand, as a problem or reform is achieved, it switches to a new issue. Its growth and stability depend upon picking up a new product line for social action. Its diversity of change goals also protects it against the faddishness of issue definition. As long as the media focus upon it and foundations and individuals contribute some resources to it, it is able to maintain or protect its less popular causes. Much as a conglomerate or diversified manufacturer, as compared to a single-line producer, is better able to invest in a product that has long-range potential, a diversified social movement organization can invest in projects that have long-range change potential, even though current definitions of the important issue would not lead it to invest in them.

Professional Social Movements in Modern America: Does the Piper Call the Tune?

A fundamental conclusion of the analysis is that we have recently witnessed a major increase in professional social movement activity and that this phenomenon has been interpreted by many as a participatory revolution. This so-called revolution is, we believe, the result of several secular trends—in funding, through foundations and personal income, the increased importance of television and other communication devices, in discretionary time, and in career alternatives. We are not convinced that the increased size of the middle class in modern America has produced dramatic increases in the time and energy devoted to social movement organizations by private citizens. Nor do we believe that the increasing number of social arrangements defined as problematic reflects an increase in "objective" problem incidence. Besides, it is problem perception, not objective problem incidence, that is relevant to our arguments here. Man may or may not be closer to doom today than at the time of the Black Plague. For our purposes what is important is how a society channels and perceives the "objective problem" [Blumer 1971].

How permanent are the trends we have described? If increases in the size of the middle class have produced the so-called revolution, then it ought to be rather permanent. Indeed, we would expect more of the same as the middle class grows in size, both relatively and absolutely. If an increase in the objective incidence of problems has produced it, the satiation element of the classical model explaining the rise and fall of social movements would direct us to base predictions of permanence, short of actual revolution, upon the willingness and ability of the political elite to deal with the problems. The political elite, those in positions to act upon grievances and change social policies, are, in the classical model, the gatekeepers of social movements; they either respond or fail to respond to demands, and in so doing membership motivations are either satisfied or frustrated. On the other hand, if the apparent revolution is the result of the trends outlined above, an analysis of the permanence of *these* trends permits an assessment of the permanence of this revolution and its ideological directions.

Social Control and Social Movement Analysis

Sociological analysis of social movement organizations has focused primarily upon the internal dynamics of specific organizations. Even attempts to focus upon the relationship between such organizations and the broader environment have tended to ignore the social control attempts of authorities directed toward movements and organizations.[16] We too are influenced by this tradition. While we have focused upon techniques by which professional social movement organizations can influence elites and upon the internal dynamics of such movements, we have paid little attention to the other side of the coin—the processes by which elites, in and out of government, attempt to exercise social control over professional social movement organizations. Such processes are no doubt operative with what we have termed classical social movement organizations. However, the potentialities of control by elites are highlighted by a focus upon professional

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16. Smelser [1963] is a notable exception to this generalization. See also Gamson [1968].

social movement organizations when the questions of permanence and direction are considered.

We would expect elite groups, especially when they are in government, to take a rather jaundiced view of social movement organizations with publicly stated radical goals. We would not expect established institutions—i.e., foundations, established churches, corporations, and above all the federal government—to vigorously support such movements. Assuming that social control is perceived as necessary, there are two very general approaches that authorities can take toward the sort of participatory revolution we have outlined above. Elites may enter by attempting to control the direction of dissent (the quality issue), thereby molding the implications of it, or they may respond by attempting to minimize dissent, thereby molding the quantity of it. Let us address these two possibilities as they might affect the participatory revolution we have outlined.

Does the Piper Call the Tune?

One reason why we have stated that professional social movements highlight the potentialities of elite social control is the dependence of professional movement organizations on elites for funds. We noted the independence from a mass support base that is implied in such funding procedures, but clearly this independence implies another dependence. If it is displeased, a source controlling major amounts of organizational funds can destroy a social movement organization over-night. Though mistakes might be made, we would not expect established institutional sectors to support radical professional social movement organizations for any length of time. Foundations, churches, and government agencies are involved in a web of institutional controls that prohibit them from getting too far out of line. Consequently, though it may appear obvious, we believe that the bulk of the institution-backed participatory revolution is ameliorative rather than radical in intent. Even the charge of "radical" against organizations funded through these sources is likely to produce pressure upon the organizations to soften both rhetoric and behavior. Goulden's [1971] accounts of the behavior of the Ford Foundation in several "politically charged" instances illustrate the point.

The effects of established institutions' involvement in the backing of professional social movement organizations should have the broader implication of directing organized dissent into legitimate channels. That student energies can be diverted into legitimate channels by flourishing professional social movement organizations remains a distinct possibility. By applying large amounts of resources, then, in ameliorative

directions, elites may have the effect of diffusing the radical possibilities of dissent in general.

Such an argument does not hinge upon the motives of the elite groups. Whether or not their motives are sincere concern or social control, their actions are likely to have the same general effects. Action, however, that supports the massive infra-structure of dissent may provide some indirect support for social movement organizations with radical goals. The resources available in the ameliorative sphere may easily, we believe, be diverted to radical organizations. For instance, the publication facilities of ameliorative organizations are regularly made available to almost any movement organization [see The Organizers Manual, O. M. Collective 1971], regardless of its tactics and goals. Legal representation has been provided to members of radical social movement organizations as a result of the existence of ameliorative organizations. Our own view is that the interstices of the massive ameliorative movement[17] sponsored by elite sectors provides more in the way of resources for the radical segment of the movement than would be available without it. And when the well-funded sources dry up, the radical movement organization moves to less well-funded ones. From government agencies it falls back on the churches.

Minimization of Dissent: Surviving the Piper's Demise

If the political elite decided to attempt to minimize the scope and quantity of dissent in American society in the 1970s, could it? This suggests two related questions: (1) How would withdrawal of support for social movement activity affect the trends we have outlined as affecting professional social movement organizations? And, (2) would the massive elite involvement we have outlined have any lasting effect upon the level of movement activity following such withdrawal?

The institutional funding patterns we have discussed are highly vulnerable to change. The federal government has already begun to cut back its support of social movement organizations through its Community Action Program agencies of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Though possibly it could, the govern-

17. Let us note that the interstices of modern society in general support social movement organizations. Earlier we noted how easy it is for individuals to get by if they want to commit themselves to a life in social movement activity. "Quickie" organizations can also get by; they can get telephones installed and rent office space and not pay the bills. Since our corporation laws are loose and social movement organizations are often of short duration, some short-lived social movement organizations resemble fly-by-night businesses in their style of operation.

ment has by no means, however, cut back all such programs. The funding by churches and foundations is also vulnerable in that rules governing funding by such agencies can be changed. Indeed, legislative action has been interpreted by some foundations as having already moved toward restriction upon grants [see Goulden 1971]. Further, foundation boards of directors and church constituencies could press for an end to such funding. We believe that the trends in funding for such activity could be reversed very rapidly by a *determined* federal administration. But such determination would require an attack upon tax laws and the institutional independence of the churches and foundations beyond informal pressure. This would require a major confrontation and, in our view, is highly unlikely.

The media's willingness to trade in citizen grievances and hence aid professional social movements in their activities is also vulnerable, given federal control over television broadcasting. The reality of this control makes the possibility of threat and innuendo by administration figures a real force. It is obvious from the Russian example that an industrial society can systematically control the dissemination of information and hence grievance accumulation. Similarly competing for mass audiences seems to lead the media away from serious issues that have low current interest. But it is unlikely, short of a fascist regime in America, that all of the grievances portrayed by the media could be suppressed.

Several of the trends we have discussed, however, are not as vulnerable to short-run action on the part of a political elite committed to decreases in movement activity. These factors tend to be related to the general level of prosperity in the society. Though they should be sensitive to economic recessions, mailed donations to movement organizations are probably likely to continue.

The ability of youth with intense value commitments to survive on subsistence incomes probably means continued periods of involvement in social movement activity for many members of this group [see Kenniston 1968]. However as the relative proportion of youth decreases, as it is likely to in the future, this source of energy and involvement should also tend to decrease in importance. Whether a period of intense involvement during youth implies that individuals will continue heavy outlays of energy and resources in later life to movement activity seems an open question to us, unless funding allows career involvement.[18] There

is no doubt that we have seen increased involvement during youth.

Whether the intense value commitments leading to action will continue to characterize youth, we cannot say. Introspection does appear to be a serious competitor to action. Indeed, a clear result of the triumph of Charles Reich's "Consciousness III" [Reich 1970] would be a withdrawal from movement activity of the sort we have focused upon. Whether self-examination can have structural consequences is beyond the scope of our remarks here. Social movement analysis is not very instructive on this point. It does not point to the structural solution of alienation, anomie, and breast-beating in general.

We are led to conclude that some portion of the increase in professional social movement activity could quite rapidly be reversed if the political elite were determined to bring about such a change. On the other hand, if prosperity continues, there are several factors that would lead an observer to expect a proportion of the increase in such activity to remain. Higher and higher standards of living, through these factors, would lead to an expectation of future increases in spite of the actions of political elites directed specifically at movement activity. Where the classical model of social movements predicts less activity in prosperous times, our analysis predicts just the reverse.

If one accepts our analysis of the development of a massive social movement industry in modern America, then it follows that the industry will act as a powerful source of pressure in behalf of its own lines of support. Representatives of this industry and its supporting institutions will be likely to resist pressures to cut off resource flows and even attempt to expand them. In this regard the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings in May of 1972 to consider changes in the Internal Revenue Service Regulations" . . . controlling the tax exempt status of nonprofit organizations which attempt to influence legislation" (*Nashville Tennessean* 1972, p. 8). During these hearings the National Council of Churches argued very strongly for liberalization of regulations as they affect the activities of church groups. If such a change were to occur, we would expect more resources to become available to professional social movement organizations.

Finally, the ability of specific professional social movement organizations to convert to classical social movement organizations through time would seriously qualify the effects of elite withdrawal. [19] If there is a high likelihood of such an occurrence—by telescoping

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18. See Greene [1970] for a discussion of withdrawal from action by many leaders of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement following the taking on of family and job responsibilities.

19. Cf. SDS, which was originally sponsored by adult labor radicals (League for Industrial Democracy) but broke away from them.

the early organizational and interest articulation phases—then the short-run effects of elite withdrawal from the support of movement activity would be blunted. That is, the withdrawal of foundation and institutional support would have little effect. Only longitudinal case studies of professional social movements could suggest the likelihood of such occurrences and hence the importance of this dimension to an overtime prediction of the general societal level of movement activity. We tend to believe that movement organizations based upon deep interest cleavages are more likely to be able to utilize elite support for the construction of viable classical social movement organizations than are multi-interest and soluble issue movement organizations. A professional movement organization can become a classical social movement organization by attaching itself to a major social cleavage and developing a unified membership support base. If this is so, the extent to which movement organizations are based on such cleavages will determine the elite's ability to throttle movement activity.

One question mentioned above demands fuller attention as we attempt to predict the future of social movements in modern America: What is the relationship between Consciousness III, the value counter-culture, and the future of social movements? Our analysis has focused upon the infra-structure of costs and organizational facilitation created by some of the secular trends of affluence. We have ignored, or treated only in passing, the values and attitudes that motivate individual social movement participation.

Our references to the enduring potential of the civil rights movement were based upon a perception of how the racial cleavage and value disparities based upon that cleavage create an enduring base for a social movement. Is there a similar potential to serve as an enduring base for social movements in the culture/counter-culture cleavage? An answer seems based upon several contingencies.

An enduring social cleavage is based upon differences in status, position, and belief that are relatively irreconcilable by "normal relations" in the short run. (The short run is defined in terms of the time perspective of those who are trying to change status, position, and belief differentials.) To the extent that the counter-culture leads its members to encounter the larger culture as an enemy, the counter-culture can be seen as self-reinforcing of an important cleavage and specific issues based upon it. As long as contacts with the police, schools, families, and work institutions maintain a negative quality, reinforcing the distinction, then

membership in the counter-culture will be likely to continue to lead to some form of social movement activity—whether of a retreatist, reformist, or revolutionary type.

On the other hand, the dominant culture may react by partial incorporation, taking over some of the values and behavior of the counter-culture. The relaxation of marijuana laws, sympathetic police officers, and the relaxation of dress and hair codes in many institutional settings may all contribute to a deemphasis of the culture/counter-culture cleavage. Insofar as the cleavage is based upon style and belief, then, partial incorporation is likely to moderate the effects of the cleavage. Such an argument leads us to doubt that this cleavage will persist.

There is also the fact that the "counter-culture" is based on a transient role, that of young persons, whereas the civil rights/black power and labor movements are based on relatively permanent roles. A brief hiatus in civil rights activity still leaves lots of experienced black organizers around to socialize newcomers. An interruption in a "youth-movement" can lead to a situation in which later cohorts may experience the same problems as earlier ones, but lack role models and interpreters of their experience. There is an absence of movement "tradition" in the counter-culture—no one thinks of himself as an extension of the Beat Generation or sees rock as equivalent to jazz in terms of social position. Non-student pacifists and blacks, however, have a relatively strong sense of a movement past.

Conclusion

Our analysis has stressed two subjects: secular trends in modern society affecting social movements and the theoretical analysis of social movements. Possibly the most important point that needs to be made in conclusion is the following: Classical analysis has had too much in common with "bleeding heart–liberal" analysis focusing upon the life situation of the oppressed. We make such a statement at the risk of being thought cynical men without sympathy for the oppressed. But a vision of the future runs the risk of remaining just a vision if it does not confront the sources and weaknesses of movement activity aimed at bringing it about. Social analysis *must* confront the infra-structure of social movement funding, supply and demand of labor, the media, and the interaction of movements and elites before it can be of much utility in the grievance proceedings of modern society.

The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization

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