White usually seen in positive terms, transnational mobilization can sometimes hurt movements as well as help them. An examination of the transnational network of organizations supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland between 1967 and 1972 suggests that international involvement, not only can exacerbate problems encountered by domestic coalitions, but can also introduce additional obstacles to the effective pursuit of social change. Using a wide range of sources, four types of impediments to positive issue network dynamics are conceptualized and illustrated--structural, organizational, cultural, and ideological. Structurally, the civil rights network brought together groups outside of Northern Ireland that otherwise would not have attempted to cooperate because of diametrically opposed positions on domestic issues. In terms of organization, spatial variations in Irish Diaspora and New Left protest limited sustained network activity to a few societies. Weak ties between organizations located in dif ferent societies reduced the likelihood of cooperation. Competition for resources led to the formation of rival transnational blocs within the issue network. Cross-societal differences in cultural norms and group identities led to clashes. Interactions across horders exported and amplified ideological tensions already existing on the domestic-level. The findings suggest that political process assumptions regarding the effects of the presence of external allies require qualification.

While certainly existing prior to World War II, transnational issue networks have flourished in the post-war era as major advances in communication, transportation, and information technologies have increased the scope, frequency, and intensity of interactions across borders. I define transnational issue networks as coalitions of non-governmental and/or governmental organizations based in more than one society, engaging in, with some degree of cross-societal communication and exchange, activities to promote a common explicit objective on an issue of mutual concern. [1] These networks have formed around issues such as arms proliferation, human rights standards, democratization, development, environmental protection, labor relations, and the statuses of women, indigenous peoples, and ethnic minorities.

Research, to date, has emphasized the positive contributions of transnational issue networks to domestic protest capacities and to campaigns that successfully alter institutional policies at the national and international levels (Keohane and Nye 1977; Meyer and Marullo 1992; Pagnucco and McCarthy 1992; Sikking 1993; Pagnucco and Atwood 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Smith 1995; Coy 1997; Schulz 1998; Hrycak 1999; Rothman and Oliver 1999). While clearly establishing the importance of transnational issue networks, this literature has largely overlooked the possible negative consequences of international involvement for "domestic" protest, conflict, and social change. Are there instances where external intervention diminishes the resources and organizational capacities available to a network for mobilization, reduces levels of cooperation among participating organizations, and diverts attention away from generating pressure on behalf of common objectives?

To explore how mobilizing upon an issue in more than one society impacts the ability of an issue network to effectively pursue its goals, I examined international activities in support of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland (1967-1972). From its inception in 1920, the state of Northern Ireland has witnessed conflict between the mostly Protestant majority of the population supporting a political union with Great Britain and the largely Catholic minority seeking the reunification of Northern Ireland with the other twenty-six counties of the island of Ireland. A deep desire to ensure the retention of British links coupled with a recalcitrant, irredentist opposition, produced political and economic institutions largely controlled by, and favoring, the Protestant unionist majority. The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, together with its support abroad, effectively challenged the second-class citizenship status of the Catholic nationalist minority without raising the issue of partition. [2] The network demanded fundamental changes in housing allocation, the electoral system, and policing. Ensuing policy changes resulted in a violent backlash from the hard-line "loyalist" segment of the unionist population. The backlash, in turn, led to the renewal of an armed republican campaign for Irish reunification. As the civil rights movement began to decline, many promised reforms remained unimplemented or were reversed. Ironically, the transnational network supporting civil rights demands brought Northern Ireland as close to, and as far away from, the non-violent institutionalization of political dissent as it has ever come. Understanding the roles played by external actors, therefore, promises lessons regarding transnational dimensions of domestic protest, conflict, and social change.

Because researchers have only recently begun to conceptualize barriers to successful cooperation across borders, I draw upon both national-level and transnational-level studies to, both, identify and develop a series of concepts explaining the negative dynamics that can emerge within transnational issue networks. I, then, apply these concepts to the Northern Ireland case. A number of ideas drawn upon here, such as structures of political opportunity and resource competition, have their roots in analyses of social movements taking place during the 1960s and 1970s. While developed in reference to more recent instances of organizational interaction, other concepts, such as the strength of personal ties and frame alignment processes, still identified important sources of tension within a case study occurring roughly three decades ago.

While external organizations initially assisted the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, their involvement eventually weakened the movement's ability to achieve its demands. Outside participation, not only exacerbated problems frequently encountered by domestic coalitions, it also introduced new barriers to inter-organizational cooperation. In particular, heightened protest internationally contributed in a number of ways to reduced cooperation, increased feuding, and distractions within the issue network. These findings suggest that, contrary to expectations based on political process theory, transnational mobilization [3] not only can facilitate, but also can hinder, the effective pursuit of social change.

Theory--Obstacles to Effective Transnational Mobilization

Research on social movement organizations operating within the context of the nation-state has identified four types of factors shaping coalition dynamics: structural, organizational, cultural, and ideological. [4] Although empirically intertwined, analytically, it is useful to distinguish among them. In the sections that follow, I discuss how mobilizing across borders during a period of heightened protest, internationally affects each set of factors. The literature's emphasis upon building coalitions often necessitates the introduction of factors conducive to cooperation prior to discussion of converse factors that impede cooperation across borders. In addition, because the case study involves ethnic issues, I devote considerable attention to the impact of transnational migration upon network dynamics.

I. Structural Factors

Structures of Political Opportunity. Exceptional political opportunities or threats facilitate coalition formation (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway and Meyer 1993.5). Conversely, the passing of such opportunities or threats hastens their demise as organizations pursue other issues and form new alliances where they perceive greater opportunities or threats (Jenkins 1987; Meyer and Immig 1993; Meyer and Whittier 1994). While under-theorized, instances of this phenomenon can also be observed on an international level. When the Dominican Revolutionary Party lost control of the presidency in 1986, the transnational network demanding voting rights for Dominicans abroad waned until a resurgence in the 1990s (Perez-Godoy 1999).

Issue Network Overlap. Because of their national or local levels of analyses, past research on coalitions has not identified problems associated with issue network overlap. Concepts like "families of social movements" (della Porta and Rucht 1995) and "social movement spillover" (Meyer and Whittier 1994) capture the tendency of social movement organizations using similar collective action frames to work together on multiple issues. As a result, local and national-level networks formed around different issues often have overlapping memberships (i.e., share organizations in common). For instance, Gerhards and Rucht (1992) find that two coalitions of West German organizations--one protesting against a visit by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, and the other protesting an annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank--had roughly one-third of their organizational memberships in common. While similarities between collective action frames increase the likelihood of organizations cooperating with one another, considerable differences between these frames make cooperation more difficult (Benford 1993). As a result, little overlap tends to occur between networks of domestic organizations with contrasting messages regarding domestic social stratification. [5] Groups upholding the distributive status quo in one domestic issue arena are not likely to support redistribution in others, particularly during periods of heightened polarization where widespread unrest threatens to undermine the existing social order in its entirety.

Transnational issue networks, however, are more likely to bring together organizations that fall on opposite sides of major social cleavages and ideological divisions within the societies where they are based. Groups that deny structural inequalities in a domestic context may more readily acknowledge them in other societies where their own status, conduct, and identities are not directly in question. Furthermore, selective emphasis by a national mainstream media or state, upon the grievances of subordinated social groupings in hostile states, may prompt action by organizations opposing efforts to address similar grievances at home or in allied states (Lee and Craig 1992; Carragee 1996). For example, in 1973, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) assisted a U.S. government-backed military coup against a democratically elected socialist regime in Chile (Sims 1991). Less than a decade later, the Federation supported the Solidarity movement in Communist Poland--a regime opposed by the U.S. government and negatively portrayed in the American media. In so doing, the AFL-CIO joined with organizations they had previously opposed on Chile, such as the World Council of Churches.

The tendency for mobilization across borders to bring together foes on other issue frequently leads to tensions within transnational issue networks. Using the same example, objections by leftist American and Western European non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to international human rights activities based on Cold-War politics (Cortright 1993; Kleidman 1993) ensured tensions with AFL-CIO 'cold warriors' belonging to the pro-Solidarity network. Other issues also divided the network, such as Palestinian-Israeli relations (Abraham, et al. 1988).

Transnational migration offers another source of antagonisms associated with issue network overlap. Ethnic groups that are structurally subordinated through inward or outward migration flows, may come to form part of a structurally dominant group. In the case of emigration, transnational issue networks supporting the mobilization of a subjugated ethnic group back home, will probably include, not only Diaspora-based organizations, but organizations representing marginalized ethnic groups within the society or societies where the Diaspora constitutes part of an ethnic/racial elite. Given the likelihood of movements among subordinated ethnic groups emerging during periods of heightened protest internationally, antagonisms frequently erupt within transnational networks addressing ethnic claims as parallels are drawn between the status and grievances of the ethnic group supported abroad and ethnic groups excluded at home.

II. Organizational Factors

Even in the absence of negative consequences emerging from issue network overlap, poorly organized transnational issue networks may not be able to take advantage of precipitous structures of political opportunity internationally. Underdeveloped and uneven organizational capacities, weak ties between members of different organizations, and resource competition among organizations participating in the network--all present barriers to effective cooperation across borders. I now discuss each of these factors in turn.

Organizational Capacities. On a national level, researchers have found that an underdeveloped organizational field militates against successful 'mesomobilization' [6] (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). Recent studies of transnational networks have reached similar conclusions. The general absence and overall weakness of non-governmental organizations in Mexico and Guatemala during the 1970s, and the poorest, rural regions in post-war El Salvador hindered transnational mobilization on human rights and rural development issues respectively (Keck and Sikkink. 1998; Flint 1999). A study of two separate indigenous rights campaigns found that strong, indigenous, grass-roots organizational capacities contributed to more balanced interaction and effective cooperation across borders (Maney 1999). Conversely, weak local capacities resulted in unilateral influence and decision-making by INGOs resulting in a less successful campaign to protect indigenous rights.

The specific patterns of both transnational migration and a given international cycle of protest affect the organizational capacities of transnational networks addressing ethnic issues. Large, long-standing, and ongoing emigration flows tend to produce sizable and well-established Diaspora-based organizations (Hrycak 1999). Conversely, low levels of emigration, resulting from immigration controls or improved conditions in the homeland, can hinder organizing. The location of migrant populations also impacts their ability to participate in transnational issue networks. Ethnic enclaves in major urban areas achieve an ecological concentration conducive to organizing (Topp 1997). More dispersed and rural patterns of emigration render the opposite effect as lower levels of interaction and a smaller local resource base constrain capacity building. In addition, since heightened levels of protest entail the formation and utilization or organizational capacities, it follows that organizational in societies most caugh t up in the wave of international protest will, ceteris paribus, be most central to network activities, while those in societies escaping turmoil will play only major roles.

Strength of Ties. Since Granovetter's (1985) influential work, as large body of research has emphasized the importance of strong personal ties for effective inter-organizational cooperation (e.g., della Porta 1988; Opp and Gern 1988; Evans 1995). These relationships are characterized by a high degree of familiarity, informality, and reciprocity that facilitate communication, cooperation, and planning among the individuals involved. Frequent interaction generates the trust, sense of group identity, and commitment characteristic of relations between actors with strong personal ties (Powell 1990' Carley 1991). Studies of transnational networks have reached similar conclusions (Sikkink 1993; Smith 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). It follows, then , that organizations with weak ties between their members will operate less effectively.

The international patterns of both migration and protest affect the strength of ties within a transnational ethnic network. Migrant populations that retain strong individual and organizational ties across borders are more likely to effectively assist movements originating in their homelands as seen, for instance, in Diaspora support for the anti-fascist movement in Italy and independence rebellions in Ireland (Topp 1997, Hanagan 1998). A failure to maintain contacts, on the other hand, makes close cross-societal communication and exchange more difficult, Moreover, strong cross-societal ties are likely to emerge among individuals and groups adopting the collective the collective action frame, collective identity, and forms of contention characteristic of an international protest cycle. For instance, close friendships arose between members of the American New Left and the German New Left in inspired (McAdam and Rucht 1993). Conversely, individuals and organizations from societies with lower levels of protest w ill, ceteris paribus, have weaker ties.

Resource Competition. Organizational imperatives may override strong personal ties existing between individuals affiliated with different groups. Research in the resource mobilization tradition has identified problems associated with competition for resources among organizations advancing the same or similar causes (Zald and McCarthy 1980). Concerns about organizational maintenance can lead to either attempted 'takeovers' of a coalition or, in contrast, to minimal contributions to its efforts. Both actions produce tensions (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway and Meyer 1993.5). In a study of human rights groups mainly targeting the United Nations, Smith (1995) notes competition among transnational social movement organizations with similar constituencies. Similarly, Flint (1999) finds that differential access to resources provided by sister cities created conflict among domestic agrarian organizational seeking rural development in El Salvador.

III. Cultural Factors

The existence of political opportunities and strong organizational capacities still does not guarantee the emergence of a successful issue network. An emotive impetus must be present to compel organizations not only to act, but act in concert with each other. The relevance of cultural factors, therefore, must be carefully considered. Just as a homogeneous membership increase the durability of networks, a heterogeneous membership can render domestic coalitions highly tenuous (Carley 1991; McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic 1992). Differences in collective identifies can produce fear and mistrust, inhibiting the development of strong personal ties (Rose 1995; Diaz-Veizades and Chang 1996; Kriesberg 1998). Fear and mistrust are especially likely when identities are constructed in opposition to one or more of the identities or characteristics of other coalition members. Other cultural differences, such as linguistic barriers and styles of presentation, can impede effective communication--preventing consensus, cre ating misunderstandings, and excluding participants unfamiliar with the modus operandi established within the coalition.

By increasing heterogeneity, transnational issue networks face greater obstacles to positive, sustained interaction. Smith (1994:424--425) finds that even individual organizations experience this challenge. "One major difficulty for transnational social movement organizations is that of integrating culturally diverse and geographically dispersed memberships." During peaks in protest internationally, a high level of issue network overlap further increases the degree of heterogeneity. As people from markedly different backgrounds interact, the social and cultural distance between them can overwhelm the unity produced by broad agreement on the issue at hand.

Diaspora organizations with strong personal ties in the homeland can narrow the cultural gap existing within transnational issue network. Cultural proximity between those of common ancestry, however, should, by no means, be taken for granted. Ethnic identities and practices are negotiated within, and articulated with, the context of the hose country. The fragmented and multifaceted nature of these identities offers opportunities for selective and constrasting emphases upon group conceptions (Ruane and Todd 1996). Even when ethnic identities and practices have been constructed on a mutual and transnational basis, a failure to sustain close, cross-societal ties, over time, can eventually result in divergence. What once faithfully reproduced a collective identity in the homeland, in the course of a generation, may come to be viewed as a fossilized, romantic fantasy.

During peaks in international protest, new cultural forms--often linked within protest--diffuse rapidly across borders (Brand 1990; McAdam and Rucht 1993; Melucci 1995). When these forms challenge the traditional basis for international solidarity, tensions may surface between those motivated by old versus new ways of thinking and acting.

IV. Ideological Factors

Another component of culture--ideology--also plays an important role in coalition dynamics. While the development of a collective action frame that all network members can draw upon is commonly seen as a prerequisite for effective mobilization (Gerhards and Rucht 1992), organizations can disagree to the point where a consensus cannot be reached (Meyer and Kleidman 1991). Such disagreement often reflect different sets of beliefs regarding the underlying social problem, the solution to the problem, and the symbolic-emotive basis for appealing for action (Benford 1993). Furthermore, different analyses of a social problem produce markedly divergent agendas. While some organizations link a host of topics to one common core cause, to those not sharing such an analysis, the issues are unrelated. Consequently, effort to introduce issues beyond those around which the coalition formed, can create disputes among groups espousing contrasting ideologies.

Exporting and Amplifying Ideological Divisions. The participation of external organizations can exacerbate ideological differences within issue networks. In the case of transnational ethnic networks, Diaspora groups amplify antagonisms, not only by introducing new beliefs, but also by replicating and reinforcing existing ideological divisions in the homeland (Poros 1999). During peaks in international protest, the expanded scope of insurgency and similarity in forms of contention foster the sense that domestic mobilization represents part of a common international struggle transforming the world (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As external organizations intervene on behalf of those with similar beliefs, tensions previously confined to one society are 'exported' to other societies. Moreover, by adding fuel to the fire of existing arguments, organizations in others lands amplify domestic disagreements. As the dissonance reaches a crescendo, the reverberations can shatter the thin cohesion that had previously held a co alition together.

Method

To illustrate the assertions made above, I examined the transnational network of organizations supporting civil rights demands made in Northern Ireland between 1967 and 1972. Because of its timing during the later half of the 1960s, the case offers an excellent opportunity to gain insights on the relationship between international cycles of protest and transnational issue network dynamics. Moreover, with nearly three decades passing, a considerable amount of data on inter-organizational relationships within the network has become available. A number of historical accounts, memoirs, and biographies covering the civil rights period in Northern Ireland provide rich sources of relevant information (e.g., Devlin 1969; Arthur 1974; Feeney 1974; Farrell 1976, 1988; McCluskey 1989; Purdie 1990; Odochartaigh 1994; Wilson 1995). I also examined ephemera deposited at the Political Collection of the Linen Hall Library in Belfast, the Hibernica Collection at the Queen's University of Belfast Main Library, and the Public R ecords Office of Northern Ireland. Research consisted of locating and reading correspondence, minutes, internal memos, publications, and public notices produced by groups described in historical accounts and by those identified as playing key roles in the network.

In addition, during the 1998-1999 academic year, I conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals holding leadership positions within the network (Appendix I). Informants were asked to identify organizations, both inside and outside of Northern Ireland, supporting civil rights demands, the degree and forms of cooperation across borders, the contributions of external organizations to civil rights contention, and sources of tension within the network.

From the interviews and archival searches, I created files listing all organizations known to have participated in civil rights contention, their activities, and their relationships with one another. The data set offers insights into the composition, exchanges, and dynamics of the transnational network supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland. [7]

Results

I. Structural Factors

The transnational network supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland emerged during a peak in protest internationally and declined rapidly, thereafter, because of the closing of political opportunities and the negative consequences of issue network overlap.

Timing of the Network and Levels of International Participation. The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland emerged as a mass movement at the very peak of protest internationally. [8] The first mass marches were held in Northern Ireland in 1968--one of the most contentious years of the century. As a result, conditions were ripe for the establishment of a vibrant transnational network supportive of civil rights demands in Northern Ireland. Just as some in Northern Ireland protested for an end to the Vietnam War, nuclear disarmament, and the abolition of apartheid, others outside the six counties supported demands for social justice in Northern Ireland (ODochartaigh 1994; Coulter 1988; Farrell 1988; Dooley 1998). For those educated and inspired by events of the day in their own societies and beyond, the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland constituted part of an international struggle to break the chains of oppression and liberate ordinary people from injustice and domination.

To gain an idea of the approximate level of international involvement, I compiled a data file listing all governmental and non-governmental organizations inside and outside of Northern Ireland known to have supported civil rights demands between 1967 and 1972. [9] The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association Archive at the Linen Hall Library's Political Collection (herein referred to as LHPC) served as a particularly rich source of information. Table 1 presents three rough measures of involvement. Each successive measure controls for additional factors that might exaggerate the level of international participation. The first measure includes all organizations known to have supported civil rights demands in Northern Ireland. Using this measure, external groups accounted for over 78 percent of all supportive organizations. [10] Second, in an effort to account for variations in organizational structure across societies, chapters/branches of groups were treated as the unit of analysis. [11] Because the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association served as an umbrella group for organizations working on civil rights, as well as aggressive efforts by the People's Democracy to organize beyond their student base, Northern Ireland had the most centralized organizational field within the network. Nonetheless, chapters based outside the six counties represented nearly three-quarters of all those participating in the network. Third, to control for the possibility of external groups providing only "one-off" assistance or existing on paper only, I pared down the list to include only those organizations and branches where sources offered two or more concrete instances of activities supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland. [12] Given the relative scarcity of research and the greater geographic dispersion of archival materials on the activities of network to drop considerably. While more sustained activity occurred within Northern Ireland than in any other single society, the third measure still indicates that there wer e roughly as many active organizations outside of Northern Ireland as Inside.

Insufficient data exist to estimate the relative level of network activity in different societies. In all likelihood, groups in Northern Ireland held more collective public events involving, on average, larger numbers of people than their external counterparts in the network. Nonetheless, Table 1 makes it clear that a large of organizations outside of Northern Ireland actively supported the movement--supplying informational, money, publicity, and political presure on behalf of the cause. With regard to financial assistance, the main umbrella organization in Northern Ireland, the Northern Civil Rights Association (NICRA), writes (1978:25):

The office and the staff were financed by American dollars which poured into NICRA after the August [1969] violence and by the "windows mites" gathered in Northern Ireland. As the only readily identifiable anti-unionist organisation from a distance of 3,000 mile, the American support groups had little bother in collecting the much-needed cash.

NICRA depended heavily upon international financial support to fund its activities. As Table 2 shows, large sums came from not only the United States, but a number of other societies as well.

Closing Opportunities, Cyclical Downturn, and Network Decline. Just as increasing political opportunities in Northern Ireland and beyond facilitated the emergence of the transnational network supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland, the closing of these opportunities contributed to its decline. By late 1969, a combination of repression and policy concessions raised the likely costs and lowered the likely benefits of further civil rights agitation in Northern Ireland. Escalating violence against demonstrators and the broader Catholic community by the Northern Ireland state and loyalist vigilantes produced a split within the republican Movement. [13] In 1970, the majority of republicans opted to effectively exit from the civil rights movement and support an armed campaign for the reunification of Ireland conducted under the newly constituted Provisional Sinn Fein and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. [14] With concessions to key civil rights demands and increasing violence at demonstrations, s everal leading figures within the civil rights movement formed the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) in early 1970. The SDLP largely abandoned street politics in favor of pursuing change through legislative arenas. The further intensification of repression sealed the network's demise. On January 30, 1972--commonly known as Bloody Sunday--thirteen civilians were shot to death by British Army paratroopers during a civil rights march against internment. Most observers agree that the civil rights movement ended at this point (NICRA 1978; Devlin-McAliskey 1988; Farrell 1988). [15] In the words of one activist: "things shifted--it was war."

The changed political conditions in Northern Ireland also contributed to tensions and exits beyond its borders. From the network's inception, many external support groups saw the key issue as the reunification of Ireland, not equal rights as British citizens for the Catholic Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland. After rioting broke out in Northern Ireland in April of 1969, antagonisms intensified between those wanting to continue the non-violent pursuit of civil rights demands and those favoring armed insurrection to end the partition of Ireland. The official history of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association states: "In America, Australia, and Britain, support groups became divided and confused about what was happening..." (NICRA 1978:19-20; LHPC). Much to the annoyance of activists in Northern Ireland who deliberately downplayed Irish nationalist imagery and demands, external organizations increasingly open advocated reunification. During a parade in New Zealand led by a car adorned with a massive Irish tricolor flag, NICRA Treasure Ann Hope "had difficulty explaining that I wasn't part of the armed struggle; that the struggle had shifted" (interview with the author). Organizations focusing mainly upon civil rights demands declined rapidly. By the end of 1970, the two largest American organization supporting the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland no longer existed, as the bulk of their members joined groups supporting armed republicanism. [16]

The shifting of political opportunities in societies beyond Northern Ireland's borders also contributed to the network's decline. The election of a Conservative Party government in Great Britain in 1970, coupled with the increasing threat to sovereignty posed by armed republicanism, hampered the efforts of Labour backbenchers to pressure the British government to intervene in Northern Ireland on behalf of civil rights demands. As a NICRA flier ("NICRA's DEMANDS" nd; LHPC) states:

The record of the British people has been good in responding to appeals for help. Their Parliament has been much slower to act except under pressure from an informed and aware public opinion. ... However, the return of the Tories to power, coupled with right-wing Unionist pressure, soon thwarted and ultimately ground the reform program to a halt.

As political opportunities for effective protest faded, the international coalition of organizations supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland quickly unraveled. These findings demonstrate the usefulness of structures of political opportunity as a tool for understanding the dynamics prevailing in transnational issue networks.

Issue Network Overlap. Negative dynamics had already emerged prior to the closing of political opportunities, undermining the network's ability to weather the proverbial storm. A number of disagreements arose over issue pertaining to policies and practice outside of Northern Ireland. For example, while most American organizations could agree upon the goal of equal citizenship status for the Catholic nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, disagreements over civil rights for African Americans and U.S.- military intervention in Vietnam ensured bitter disputes. [17] Figure 1 illustrates how mobilization of civil rights in Northern Ireland brought together organizations in the United States who, otherwise, has not attempted to cooperate with one another. A portion of groups active in the U.S. civil rights and peace movements also supported civil rights demands in Northern Ireland. These included the Black Panther Party, Communist Party USA, International Socialist Organization, Southern Christian Leadership Co nference, Students for a Democratic Society, and Young Socialists of America. However, Irish American organizations involved in the network (signified by the bold ellipse)--such as the American Congress for Irish Freedom (ACIF), the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), and Clann na Gael--opposed the U.S. civil rights movement and supported the war in Vietnam.

Like the American public as a whole, Irish Americans were deeply divided over issue of racial equality and U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. To articulate and attract support, the National Association for Irish Justice (NAIJ)--an umbrella organization with a young, diverse, and mostly progressive membership--compared the plight of Catholics in Northern Ireland to the struggles of African Americans and the Vietnamese people (interview with Ann Hope). In contrast, in older, working class, urban areas, such as South Boston, a racially informed ethno-nationalist identify forged over a century of competition for group advancement and preservation fueled opposition to both the U.S. civil rights and peace movements (Allen 1994; Ignatiev 1995). [18] As a result, organizations drawing their support, primarily, from the more conservative segments of Irish America, vehemently objected to the NAIJ's entension of civil rights and anti-imperialist frames to 'the Irish issue.'

Not surprisingly, relations between organization belonging to opposing networks on other issues became acrimonious. During a St. Patrick's Day parade in New York City, AOH parade officials admonished the NAIJ after the band they brought from Ardoyne in North Belfast played the U.S. civil rights anthem "We Shall Overcome" (interview with Edwina Stewart). At a rally in Los Angeles, scuffles broke out between Young Socialists and other audience members wearing the colors of the Irish flag after a skit where a youth gagged with an American flag was forced to take the pledge of allegiance (Arthur 1974). Rather than cooperating in the name of a common cause, each side spent considerable time, money, and effort trying to discredit one another. A CIF Chair, James Heaney, described the NAIJ as communist agitators using Irish issues to promote their own subversive agenda. The NAIJ responded by calling Heaney and the ACIF "reactionary bigots who were blinded to the social realities of Ireland by their hazy, romantic na tionalism" (Wilson 1995:38). Both lost supporters as a consequence. By late 1969, eighteen Irish American organizations forming the Irish Action Committee refused to take part in NAIJ-sponsored events because of its leftist orientation and association with the Black Panther Party (McCluskey 1989). The concept of issue network overlap assisted greatly in the identification of domestic issues that produced intense antagonisms between American organizations participating in the network.

II. Organizational Factors

Insufficient Organizational Capacities. Even at the height of political opportunities in Northern Ireland and internationally, network activity remained low in a number of societies with large populations of Irish ancestry, such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. [19] Two factors contributed to sparse and belated organized support in these societies: their specific patterns of Irish immigration and the absence of widespread protest. When compared to the Republic of Ireland, Britain, and the United States, the sizes of the populations of persons of Irish ancestry in these three societies were smaller, both numerically and as a proportion of the population as a whole (Akenson 1993). The mostly rural locations of persons of Irish descent in Australia and New Zealand limited the kind of close, daily, mass interaction conducive to organization. In the case of Canada, most people of Irish ancestry were Protestant, reducing sympathy for the grievances of the Catholic nationalist minority in Northern Ireland.

Beyond the borders of Northern Ireland, societies experiencing high levels of protest were, ceteris paribus, more likely to have significant organizational representation in the network. New Left student organizations formed the ideological and organizational basis for much of the protest internationally taking place during the period of civil rights mobilization in Northern Ireland (Ross 1988). As Table 1 suggests that among continental West European societies, the one with the highest level of student protest (France) also had the largest number of organizations participating in the network. Five of the seven French groups identified espoused ideologies associated with the New Left (i.e., Maoist, Trotskyist, Guevarist, etc.). Even in countries where Diaspora-based groups played an important role in sustained mobilization, a significant percentage of the support groups had New Left affiliations. In the United States, the Republic of Ireland, and Great Britain, New Left organizations accounted for 21%, 23%, and 14% of the total number of groups involved in the network. [20] Together, these findings suggest that both the patterns of Irish Diaspora and the patterns of protest internationally, significantly impacted the geographic distribution of the level, duration, and timing of network activity.

Weak Ties. While cross-societal variations in organizational capacities help to explain the international distribution of activity in support of civil rights demands in Northern Ireland, these variations do not explain why relationships across borders within the network were harmonious or fractious. The strength of ties among individuals and organizations assists us in understanding these dynamics. Transnational cooperation was highest among organizations with strong ties between members, while cross-societal disputes emerged more often among groups with weak or non-existent ties. For instance, long-standing, frequent, and cordial interaction took place between members of key groups in Britain and Northern Ireland. Two key figures in the network--NICRA Executive member, Betty Sinclair, in Northern Ireland and Connolly Association leader, Desmond Greaves, in England--were associates of many years (interview with Anthony Coughlan). Moreover, Irish emigres belonging to the Connolly Association in London, upon r eturning to the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in the early 1960s, helped plant the seeds for what later became the civil rights movement (Feeney 1974). These ties contributed to well designed, parallel efforts to pressure the British government to intervene on behalf of civil rights demands. By the mid-1960s, the Campaign for Social Justice (Northern Ireland) the Connolly Association (Great Britain), Gerry Fill (Republican Labour Party MP from West Belfast), and British trade unionists began to pressure the British Government to address questions of injustices in Northern Ireland. Activities such as distributing fact-sheets, holding conferences, conducting long marches and town meetings, visiting Members of Parliament (MPs), and issuing press releases, brought these issue to the attention of both the British media and politicians. By the summer of 1965, British Labour party backbenchers formed the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster. In defiance of a longstanding convention, the CDU raised issues of i njustices in Northern Ireland in parliament. Frequent correspondence, telephone calls, conferences, and informal get-togethers involving these various groups, resulted in the formulation of common demands and arguments to justify them. In tandem, they raised the awareness and concern of the British cabinet to the point where it had pressured the Northern Ireland government to make reforms even prior to the highly publicized police assaults on civil rights marchers in (London) Derry on October 5, 1968. [21]

On the other hand, where inter-organizational ties were weak and unbalanced, cooperation seldom occurred. Of the societies with high levels of mobilization, organizations in the United States had the least familiarity with their counterparts in Northern Ireland, U.S. government immigration restrictions, coupled with improving economic conditions in both parts of Ireland, resulted in decreased levels of Irish emigration to the United States during the 1950s and 1960. Akenson (1973:242) explains the consequences: "The lack of sustained interest in Ulster among Irish-Americans actually is not so surprising, for most are now two generations away from direct experience of Irish life, and as a group those of Irish descent are securely assimilated into the American establishment." Moreover, contacts between those who managed to recently immigrate to the United States and Irish American organizations were few and far between (Hanagan 1998). As a result, transatlantic communications and coordination of activities was poor. One republican civil rights activist in London (Derry) only found out through the newspapers about a sit-in at the British Embassy in Philadelphia by a member of a republican support group in the United States (interview with Fionnbarra ODochartaigh). Not surprisingly, misunderstandings abounded. NICRA Secretary, Ann Hope, remembers becoming "indignant" when, at a rally in New York City, Mayor Mario Biaggi claimed, erroneously, that Catholic children in Northern Ireland had to steal bread to survive (interview with Ann Hope). Whereas members of the CDU in Great Britain were well versed in facts on discrimination in Northern Ireland supplied by the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ). American groups rarely read CSJ materials, including publications that they funded like the Plain Truth (interview with Patricia and Conn McCluskey). [22]

Organizational Competition. In addition to weak ties, competition for resources among member organizations contributed to a lack of cooperation within the network. Unlike some transnational issue networks where competition occurs among organizations based in different societies, the focus upon social change in Northern Ireland resulted in competition primarily taking place between groups located in the same society. While external support groups competed with each other for recognition as the voice of the movement in their society, organizations in Northern Ireland argued over whom should receive the spoils of external fundraising. In the process, rival transnational blocs of organizations formed. During a "unity" conference held in New York in late 1969, repeated assertions by the National Association for Irish Justice that it officially represented the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in the United States angered delegates from other organizations. After hearing from American friends who were "very aggrieved" by NAIJ's claims. Campaign for Social Justice leader, Conn McCluskey, raised the matter before NICRA's Executive Committee, resulting in further controversy among groups in Northern Ireland (McCluskey 1989:133-134).

Fear of a coalition being taken over by one of its members is a commonly cited symptom of resource competition (Staggenborg 1986). In March of 1969, four 'moderate' members of NICRA's Executive Committee resigned in protest of the growing influence of the People's Democracy (PD). The dissidents stated: "We have been taken over by people preaching the most extreme form of revolutionary socialism, the sort of politics that have been causing trouble in France, Germany, Japan, and many other parts of the world" (Betty Sinclair, wquoted in Arthur 1974:61). Even PD member, Bernadette Devlin (1969:147) recognized that "the PD influx into the Civil Rights Association (CRA) was seen by existing members as a sinister take over plot."

Fears of a take-over were magnified by cross-societal contact within the network. In early December of 1969, two CSJ members, along with a third member of the NICRA Executive Committee, made a bid to establish themselves as the guardians of the movement. The attempted take-over received encouragement and support from the Chair of the American Congress for Irish Freedom, James Heaney. In justifying their actions, the dissidents stated that People's Democracy delegates to the NAIJ conference in New York "may have antagonised thousands of moderate Irish-Americans" by visiting with members of the Black Panther Party (Arthur 1974:75). In noting these international connections, CSJ leader, Patricia Mccluskey, states: "There was this feeling of being used for an agenda beyond civil rights. You had to watch your corner. We just wanted to make sure that people had their fair share" (interview with the author).

The rest of the Executive rebuked the insurgents. In their newsletter Free Citizen (No. 6; LHPC), the PD responded by accusing their opponents of self-interested behavior:

Dr. McCloskey's main concern with NAIJ is that it is destroying his exclusive and private monopoly of money and support for the North in America, which he has been exercising through the rightwing ACIF. They asked McCloskey to try and raise a stink about who was being sent to the conference from Northern Ireland.

While the PD's allegation regarding the motives behind the attempted takeover may lack merit, their admonition reveals the tensions that existed regarding the distribution of financial resources generated by external support groups.

III. Cultural Factors

Counterculture Backlash. A common ancestry among the majority of persons in the network supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland did not eliminate cultural differences. Along with the rise in international protest, came the cross-societal diffusion and appropriation of ideas and practices emphasizing sexual liberation, individual expression, the question of authority, and a rejection of materialism. The uneven adoption of these counterhegemonic materials produced clashes among network members, both within and across, societies. For example, the New Left student group based out of Queen's University Belfast, People's Democracy, criticized the government of the Republic of Ireland for, among other things, censoring the arts and banning contraception. The introduction of these issues into the context of the civil rights movement received a largely hostile response from network members located in the 95 percent Catholic Republic. Despite the prominence of New Left student groups and the cultural trends sweeping the world in the 1960s, Akenson (1973:153) asserts that not much had changed in the twenty-six counties:

In contrast to the fluctuation in morals and values characteristic of most Western nations in the twentieth century, the southern Irish moral schema remains a rock of stability and, judging from the approval with which most Catholic Irishmen greeted Pope Paul's condemnation of artificial methods of birth control, the average layman accepts both the moral rigor and the conservatism with alacrity.

A PD-sponsored march from Newry, in the north, to Dublin, in the south, in early April of 1969, brought these cultural differences to a head. Rather than demonstrating cross-border unity, the march exposed divisions. At the border, PD member Cyril Torman presented police with copies of two books banned in the Republic--J. P. Donleavy's, The Ginger Man, and Edna O'Brien's, The Girl with Green Eyes. Toman's actions angered students from the Republic, including one organizer of the march, John Feeney. Feeney thought the PD had agreed to refrain from discussing either censorship or birth control (Arthur 1974).

Upon arrival in Dublin, the march proceeded from the General Post Office to the Department of Justice, where protesters burned copies of two pieces of repressive legislation--one from Northern Ireland and the other from the Republic of Ireland. Members of two New Left student organizations--the Dublin branch of Young Socialists and the University College Dublin-based Students for Democratic Action--felt that PD criticisms of the laws of the twenty-six counties were adventuresome and unwarranted. Consequently, despite pleas from PD members, 800 of the estimated 3,000 marchers broke away and held a protest at the British Embassy in Merrion Square. The dispute carried over to Merrion Square where, according to The Sunday News (04/13/69; LHPC): "The stone throwing, name calling confrontation between rival Northern and Southern demonstrators outside the British Embassy in Dublin brought the affair down to the level of back street schoolboy war." Later that evening after the march, a fight broke out between a member of Students for Democratic Action and Toman's brother (Coulter 1988).

That those disagreeing were roughly the same age, held the same occupation (students), and embraced New Left ideologies, suggest a clash between old and new sensibilities or expectations regarding appropriate behavior. Perhaps because of the monolithic prominence of a conservative Catholic Church, the more liberal views and practices of the youth counter-cultures emerging in many societies did not manifest themselves to the same degree in the Republic of Ireland. Conversely, significant Protestant advocacy of contraception, coupled with the desire to attract greater Protestant unionist support, contributed to a willingness among many young Catholic civil rights activists in Northern Ireland to challenge sexually conservative policies in the Republic.

While different levels of counter-culture appropriation among students in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland created tensions, counter-cultural affinities among students in the United States and Northern Ireland reinforced the generation gap existing among U.S. supporters. After Devlin's tour in Chicago, a September 4, 1969 Chicago Tribune editorial remarked: "Instead of aligning herself with the Irish Catholic establishment, she appeared on stages with the barefoot bluejean brigades. Whatever her personal appeal, Miss Devlin has shown herself to be more anti-establishment than pro-Irish." In this way, heightened cultural polarization contributed, not only to tensions within the network, but also to negative publicity for the cause.

Conflicting Identities. Differences in collective identities held by Irish Americans and Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland also led support groups o withhold valuable assistance to civil rights organizations in Northern Ireland. While linked by common ancestry, the different structural positions of Catholic nationalists as an ethnic minority in Northern Ireland, on the one hand, and of Irish Americans as part of a racial majority in the United States on the other, contributed to markedly divergent levels of identification with African Americans. [23] Events bringing together network members from Northern Ireland and the United States threw the spotlight on these contrasting identities. During her speaking tour in August of 1969, Northern Ireland civil rights activist, Bernadette Devlin McAliskey (1988:87), readily related to ethnic minorities in the United States:

I was not very long there until, like water. I found my level. "My people"-the people who knew about oppression, discrimination, prejudice, poverty, and Irustration and despair that they produce--were non Irish Americans. They were Puerto Rican, Chicano. And those who were supposed to be 'my people.' The Irish Americans who knew about English misrule and Famine and support the civil rights movement at home, and knew that Partition and England were the cause of the problem, looked and sounded to me like Orangemen. They said exactly the same things about blacks that the loyalists said about us at home.

Devlin was not alone in this regard. Most of the civil rights activists I interviewed in Northern Ireland expressed a deep identification with the plight of African Americans. In his book, Ulster's White Negroes. Fionnbarra ODochartaigh (1994:14), a co-organizer of the first civil rights march in Derry/Londonderry, states a sentiment shared by many:

Many of us looked to the civil rights struggles in America for our inspiration. We compared ourselves to the poor blacks of the U.S. ghettos and those suffering under the cruel system of apartheid in racist south Africa. Indeed we viewed ourselves as Ulster's white Negroes--a repressed forgotten dispossessed tribe captured within a bigoted partitionist statelt that no Irish elector had cast a vote to create.

These contrasting identities triggered a series of battles. In Detroit, Devlin refused to speak until African Americans were let into the event. During her speech, members of the audience heckled her when she advocated black civil rights. Devlin responded by having the person employed to sing John McCormack songs, sing instead, the U.S. civil rights anthem, "We Shall Overcome" (Devlin McAliskey 1988). A number of Irish American dignitaries seated in the front row, including Catholic clergy, refused to stand for the song when Devlin called upon them to do so. Irish American groups in the area had been prepared to present her a $1 million check. After the event, they sent the money to the Irish Red Cross instead. Devlin received similar receptions throughout the tour. Hundreds of Irish Americans cancelled checks donated prior to hearing Devlin speak (McCluskey 1989). In Boston, audience members again heckled her, chanting: "Niggers out of Boston, Brits out of Belfast" (Devlin McAliskey 1988).

Other activists experienced similar difficulties. During a 1969 speaking tour in the United States, audience members in New York walked out in protest after Austin Currie (from Northern Ireland) and Conor Cruise O'Brien (from the Republic of Ireland) drew parallels between the civil rights struggles in the United States and Northern Ireland (Dooley 1998).

A gap existed between the nationalist identity that Irish activists had previously tapped into, to generate Diaspora support, on the one hand, and the identity emerging from recent social movements throughout the world, on the other. For many Irish Americans, their ethnic identity articulated the cause of Irish independence with the revolutionary republican tradition in the U.S. (Hanagan 1998). The transnational Irish nationalism sown by John Devoy and Michael Collins early in the century remained steadfast within the Irish Diaspora. When organizations in Northern Ireland deliberately avoided discussion of constitutional issues and stressed international solidarity among the oppressed, it did not play well with traditional Irish nationalists. In turn, organizations in Northern Ireland viewed Irish Americans as "more republican than for civil rights" (interview with Patricia and Conn McCluskey). An Irish emigre in America, Brigid Makowski, suggested that a NICRA banner be included in a St. Patrick's Day parad e in Philadelphia. According to Doolcy (1998:79) "the motion was finally adopted, but with the provision that the banner clearly state that Clann-na-Gael was supporting civil rights in Ireland, not black civil rights in the U.S." Ironically, the republicanism that traditionally served as cultural glue now ripped the transnational network apart. Consequently, Northern Ireland activists often deliberately avoided contact with Irish American organizations. Conn McCluskey asserts that, "We were afraid they would harm our social justice cause and present a wrong view campaign to the British people" (interview with the author).

IV. Ideological Factors

Exporting and Amplifying Divisions. Differences in political analyses strained relationships among network participants. Interactions across borders deepend ideological disputes. For example, leading civil rights figures in Northern Ireland, like Nationalist MPs, Austin Currie and John Hume, advocated sticking to questions of promoting equal citizenship for the Catholic nationalist minority. Those who sought to promote full employment and housing, on demand, for both Catholics and Protestants alike, however, viewed this position as creating "an equality of want" (People's Democracy, Feb/March 1971, "Editorial," Northern Star 3:2). For the founder of the Derry Unemployed Action Committee, Eamonn Melaugh, the civil rights movement was about ending "poverty and homelessness; asking for a standard of living for everybody compatible with the rest of the United Kingdom and the twentieth century" (interview with the author).

The debate over promoting social versus economic equality soon developed into name-calling. The People's Democracy labeled the proponents of the social equality perspective as "Green Tories" and puppets of the Dublin (Republic of Ireland) government (NLR 1969:15-16; McCluskey 1989:86). [24] At a rally in Strabane in July of 1969. Eamonn McCann, along with Devlin, chastised Currie and other speakers for not addressing unemployment in both communities. The attacks were strongly rebuked by John Hume, among others (Arthur 1974). Soon the debate spread beyond Northern Ireland. In the same month's edition of the Irish-American Reporter, Heaney responded by asserting that PD member, Kevin Boyle, represented only (Arthur 1974:75) "a very small minority of what really are 'Red Tories'." Similarly, the ACIF leader described another prominent PD personality, Michael Farrell, as a "Red Fascist" (Wilson 1988.31). Heaney privately encouraged Conn McCluskey and other "moderates" to take over the NICRA Executive and purge th e PD. On the other side of the political fence. Trotskyist groups in Great Britain and the United States encouraged their fellow travelers in Northern Ireland to continue efforts to transform the civil rights campaign into a working-class movement (interview with Eamonn McCann). In this way, external moral support turned up the volume of the debate on issues that most deeply divided network members in Northern Ireland. [25]

Conclusion

The transnational network in organizations supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland faced a number of challenges that typically confront domestic coalitions. The closing of political opportunities, an underdeveloped organizational field, weak ties across organizations, resource competition, divergent cultural practices, contrasting identities, and conflicting ideologies--all served to discourage cooperation. Because of the characteristics of Irish immigration and mobilization outside of Northern lacking large urban populations of Irish Catholic ancestry and high levels of protest, generally, did not possess organizational fields sufficiently developed to play important roles throughout the duration of the network. Low levels of communication all but guaranteed weak ties between groups in Northern Ireland and the United States. Increased heterogeneity resulting from the participation of groups from other societies (even those as close as the Republic of Ireland) intensified culture clashed and iden tity conflicts within the network. Cross-societal communication served to pull external organizations into an ideological dispute among groups in Northern Ireland. In the process, disagreements previously confined to Northern Ireland were taken up by groups in the United States and Great Britain. The internationalization of the split, in turn, underscored the differences between organizations in Northern Ireland.

In addition to exacerbating problems encountered by domestic coalitions, the network experienced difficulties that a coalition of groups in Northern Ireland, alone, probably would not have faced. The network brought together organizations in the United States that, otherwise, probably would not have attempted on cooperate because of diametrically opposed positions on domestic issues, such as civil rights for African Americans and U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. Rather than alleviating these tensions, events involving activists from Northern Ireland deepened hostilities by bringing ideologically disparate U.S. support groups into direct contact with one another.

How representative are the findings of this case study? One would argue that transnational networks focusing upon issues other than ethnic claims may be based less on ethnic identities and more on the shared values of their members. Hrycak's (1999) finding that Diaspora groups have actively participated in transnational networks on women's issues in the former Soviet Union, however, suggests that this proposition cannot be assumed. As seen in the case examined here, the contrasting practices, identities, and ideologies of Diaspora and non-Diaspora-based organizations increase the likelihood of antagonisms. Moreover, even in networks consisting primarily of those holding shared values, studies cited in the theory section reveal that these networks often experience the same kinds of difficulties in building and sustaining effective cooperation across borders as ethnic issues networks encounter. Disputes over other issues, increased resource competition, greater cultural misunderstandings, and the amplification of ideological disputes have affected not only transnational networks addressing ethnic issues, but those focusing upon human rights practices, democratization, and rural development as well.

Since the period of the case study, the mass commercialization of other technological innovations such as satellite communications feeds, cable television, the fax, and the Internet has occurred. These changes have coincided with a rapid expansion in the number of organizations working together across borders on political issues. While technological and organizational advances have reduced some impediments to transnational cooperation, they have deepened others. For instance, electronic mail has provided organizations with Internet access the ability to forge strong inter-personal ties even in the absence of frequent face-to-face contact. On the other hand, electronic mailing lists with international memberships have served as venues for heated arguments reflecting cultural differences, conflicting identities, and incongruent ideologies. In this way, e-lists efficiently export and amplify disputes within a transnational issue network. Similarly, the widening and deepening of the transnational organizational field have alleviated certain obstacles, While compounding others. An increasing number of international non-governmental organizations have devoted their resources to building local organizational capacities in Third World countries (Burkey 1993; Sikkink 1993). While making transnational cooperation more feasible, the strengthening of the international organizational field may have intensified inter-organizational competition for resources (Flint 1999). While beyond the scope of this paper, the multiple and contradictory implications of recent technological and organizational advances are worthy of research. Nonetheless, the studies of transnational issue networks operating in the 1980s and 1990s reviewed above suggest that several of the obstacles to transnational cooperation identified in the case study persist in the present.

Consequently, the findings presented here have theoretical implications for transnational issue networks more generally. First, the potentially harmful effects of transnational mobilization during peaks in international cycles of protest must qualify the assumption of political process theory that the introduction of influential allies and support groups constitutes an unproblematic, political opportunity for social movements (Tarrow 1998). While external organizations can exert pressure on behalf of demands for social change, they can also contribute to tensions that reduce levels of resources, organizational capacities, and inter-organizational cooperation.

Second, because of the expanded spatial scope of mobilization, theories of coalition dynamics developed in relation to national-level or local cases, alone, cannot adequately explain the negative inter-organizational dynamics that can emerge within transnational issue networks. Additional concepts and modifications to existing ones are required. The concept of issue network overlap elucidates how the compositions of issue networks vary substantially depending upon whether mobilization is taking place at the national or transnational levels. The concepts of exporting and amplifying ideological divisions emphasize how cross-societal interaction within an issue network worsens sources of tension existing at the national-levels.

Third, understanding an international cycle of protest, in general, as well as in its specific manifestations, requires closer attention to variations across societies in structures of political opportunity, in mobilization structures, and in the appropriation of protest ideas. In contrast to other societies with high levels of network activity, heightened racial polarization in the United States stimulated additional support for the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, but also resulted in network members spending a great deal of their time, money, and effort battling each other. Due to the particular contours of Irish Diaspora and international protest, low organizational capacities existed within Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, limiting the roles played in the network by groups in these societies. The conservatism of the Republic of Ireland meant that counter-cultural ideas and practices were not as readily adopted as in Northern Ireland, leading to clashes during events requiring cross-border c ooperation. These differences, in context, greatly impacted whether and how political mobilization occurred.

While the case study suggests the promise of an approach to understanding the dynamics of transnational issue networks, further research is needed to substantiate the claims made here. Studies comparing different types of issue networks or networks working on the same issue, but experiencing contrasting levels of cooperation and success in achieving their objectives would shed light on the general significance of the factors identified as shaping coalition dynamics. Research examining the relative number, size, composition, and dynamics of transnational issue networks operating in different political contexts, including 'the doldrums' (Rupp and Taylor 1987)--where overall levels of insurgency are relatively low--would enable a more thorough evaluation of the relationship between network dynamics and international cycles of protest. Other case studies involving Ireland provide excellent opportunities to increase our understanding of this relationship. Transnational networks addressing Irish issues are, by no means, recent phenomena, nor are inter-organizational antagonisms arising within them (Dooley 1998). [20]

In pointing out ways that transnational mobilization exacerbates and creates disputes among organizations working on behalf of a common objective, the question arises as to whether networks pursuing social change in their own society are better off without external assistance. My answer is that it depends. If external actors provide benefits (i.e., additional resources, organizational capacities, and opportunities to pressure targeted actors) greater than those they take away from the issue network, then the answer is yes. If not, then the answer must be no. A number of case studies cited above indicate that external intervention can facilitate policy changes by institutional actors on the national and international levels. While negative cases have received little attention in the literature, my own research on indigenous rights networks provides at least one instance where the participation of international non-governmental organizations did not result in a successful campaign to protect indigenous land te nure, cultural recognition, or political autonomy (Maney 1999). In fact, in a number of instances, interventions by outside organizations were counter-productive.

In the case of the transnational network advancing civil rights demands in Northern Ireland, external governmental and non-governmental organizations provided substantial additional resources, organizational capacities, and political opportunities for the movement as evidenced by the positive contributions of British organizations discussed above. In this sense, the network benefited from transnational mobilization. Nonetheless, tensions limited the realization of the potential benefits of international involvement. For instance, Irish American organizations would have contributed far greater sums to civil rights activists in Northern Ireland were it not for the friction caused by disputes over other issues, weak transatlantic ties, resource competition, culture clashes, contrasting identities, and conflicting ideologies. When the structure of political opportunities within Northern Ireland and beyond its borders shifted against the network, the added strains created by transnational mobilization hastened th e network's decline, thereby weakening its ability to generate pressure on behalf of civil rights demands.

Can transnational issue networks avoid the myriad of obstacles to inter-organizational cooperation presented by transnational mobilization? The perception of political opportunities at both the national and international levels serves as an incentive for organizations to join together and seize the moment before it passes. Ongoing vulnerabilities or receptivity of targeted actors to network demands, as reflected in successful campaigns, demonstrate the efficacy of coalition building. Once certain demands are met, however, a network must have the ability to develop a consensus regarding remaining or new demands, as well as a strategy to achieve them. The network examined here could not reach such a consensus, resulting in mass exits from the network and deep splits among those remaining.

Pre-existing organizational capacities in all societies, and especially where the targeted actor is based, are conducive to the reciprocal exchange of information and other forms of assistance. Similarly, strong and balanced ties within and across borders prior to launching a network campaign provide the familiarity and trust essential to conducting well-coordinated and highly strategic activities. Findings, here, that organizations with strong cross-border ties worked better together support conclusions reached in other studies (e.g., Perez-Godoy 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Although they run the risk of exporting divisions and cross-wiring, the utilization of technologies enabling frequent communication, as well as international conferences and meetings, provide opportunities for the development of personal bonds (Smith 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). In terms of networks with substantial Diaspora participation, large and ongoing migrations of affluent individuals from similar backgrounds who maintain regul ar contact with actors in the homeland facilitate external organizational capacities as well as strong ties across borders.

Transnational issue networks with members sharing a common culture (including ideology) are less likely to suffer from the disputes that often plague their more diverse counterparts. Regardless of membership composition, frequent, ongoing interactions assist in the development of shared understandings. "Global" mass communications and the development of international political institutions, promote the emergence of international norms and identities that can serve as a basis for unity (Kriesberg 1997). With shared understandings, networks can construct master frames that integrate, or conveniently downplay, differences in beliefs (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Rothman and Oliver 1999). Master frames that, using Snow and Benford's (1992) terminology, resonate widely and deeply with international public opinion galvanize network participants while placing symbolic pressure upon targeted actors. With the exception of the United States, where a civil rights movement had deeply divided public opinion, the civil rights frame initially deployed by organizations in Northern Ireland, largely achieved these purposes. The increasing deployment of revolutionary socialist and Irish nationalist frames from 1969 onwards, on the other had, did not. Where strong ties and commonly adhered to master frames do not exist, networks are best served by avoiding situations where members with contrasting cultures are brought into close contact with one another. After 1969, Northern Ireland civil rights activists exercised far more discretion in selecting American groups to assist in organizing speaking tours in the United States (interview with Ivan Cooper). That participants in transnational issue networks have learned from negative experiences bodes well for future cooperation across borders.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1998 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association held in San Francisco. Research for, and the writing of this article were made possible through grams from the Irish American Cultural Institute, the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the United States Institute of Peace. In addition, I thank all those interviewed (Appendix 1); Jody Cardinal, David S. Meyer, Liam O'Dowed, and Pamela E. Oliver, and the anonymous reviewers at Social Problems for their helpful comments: Yvonne Murphy and Claran Crossey at the Linen Hall Library, Martin Melaugh of the Conflict Archive on the Internet. Ann McVelgh at the Public Records Office Northern Ireland and everyone at the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at Queen's University of Belfast for their invaluable research assistance. The views expressed here are solely the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the granting agencies. Direct correspondence to: Greg Maney, Department of Sociolog y, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 8128 Social Sciences Building. Observatory Drive, Madison. WI 53706, E-mail: gmaney@ssc.wisc.edu.

(1.) I use the concept of issue networks instead of social movements for three reasons. First, as generally defined, social movements are limited to non-governmental organizations. Yet often, contention over issues involves alliances of public and private organizations (Fisher 1993, Sikkink 1993; Smith 1995). Second, social movements often include organizations active on related but different issues. Consequently, the term is too broad for an analysis of relationships among organizations pursuing explicit objectives on a single issue. Third, describing organized opposition to a set of demands for social change using the language of social movements requires reference to "counter-movements." Given the difficulties often involved in ascertaining which side mobilized first the use of such terminology may incorrectly specify the relationship between political adversaries. The concept of issue networks avoids all three pitfalls. Moreover, given the paper's focus upon coalitions. I prefer using a concept emphasizi ng the characteristics and interactions of a set of actors.

(2.) Under the Government of Ireland Act passed by British parliament in 1920 and through force of arms, the Protestant population in the North of Ireland established a state. The ongoing union of six of the thirty-two counties of Ireland with Great Britain was formally agreed to in the Treaty ending the Anglo-Irish War in 1921. The remaining twenty-six counties were given dominion status and, by 1937, had declared their collective status as a sovereign,

independent republic.

(3.) As defined here, transnational mobilization entails collective action in more than one society by one or more organizations belonging to a transnational issue network. Using this definition, transnational mobilization need not necessarily entail collective action involving actors from more than one society as long as actors in more than one society are engaging in collective action with the purpose of achieving a common explicit objective on an issue of mutual concern.

(4.) For the purposes of this article, ideology entails a formal set of beliefs about how the social world does and should operate. As such, ideology represents a facet of culture--pervasive ways of thinking, speaking, and behaving manifested in every day life. Ideologies may reinforce culture, challenge it, or leave it unquestioned. The categorical separation of culture and ideology as factors in coalition dynamics, therefore, is not done for heuristic reasons, but rather, in deference to the convention in the coalition-building literature to discuss some cultural factors like identities without discussing ideology (and vice-versa).

(5.) While less frequent, such incongruities can occur within the context of domestic politics. See Balser's (1997) discussion of Earth First!

(6.) Gerhards and Rucht (1992:558) conceptualize mesomobilization as "the process that enabled the bloc recruitment of groups and organizations." The process involves the coordination and integration of micromobilization groups by bridging organizations.

(7.) Given that social movements in the United States initiated the international ware of protest in the 1960s, the fact that American groups were involved in a disproportionate number of disputes arising within the network conforms to theoretical expectations. As a result, the majority (but certainly not all) of the examples of obstacles to sustaining effective transnational collations will make reference to U.S. organizations.

(8.) A number of organizations were active on the same issues years before a mass movement emerged. As far back as 1962, the Connolly Association launched a series of civil rights marches in Britain to highlight the injustices faced by Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland. Other organizations laying the groundwork for the movement included the Campaign for Social Justice, the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster, the Communist Party, the Derry Unemployed Action Committee, the Derry Housing Action Committee, the Derry Labour Party, the Homeless Citizens League, Movement for Colonial Freedom, the National Council for Civil Liberties, Wolle Tone Societies, and Young Socialists.

(9.) Although most of the groups participating in the network were non-governmental organizations, a few governmental organizations were involved. These included a caucus of members of British parllament known as the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster, the cabinet and certain agencies of the government of the Republic of Ireland, and the foreign affairs ministry of the Ugandan government.

(10.) While the large number of British organizations partly reflects the grassroots mobilization of local trade union branches, it is also partly a methodological artifact. One document, "The Irish Question: Challenge to Democratic Britain," discovered in the Hibernica collection at Queen's University Belfast provided a detailed list of all organizations attending a conference in Britain sponsored by the Connolly Association. Comparable materials were not found for any other society except Northern Ireland. Excluding groups whose activities are only known through the document, 42 British organizations were identified as supporting civil rights demands in Northern Ireland between 1967 and 1972. This is slightly over one-hall of the figure arrived at when information from the document is included. Nonetheless, even when taking this into account, groups outside of Northern Ireland still accounted for almost three quarters of the total number of organizations in the network.

(11.) The terms "branch" and "chapter" are used interchangeably. Organizations without known branches are treated as having one branch. To avoid double counting in cases where the only known chapter is actually the entire group, organizations with one known chapter are treated as having one chapter. Only chapters based inside of the society in question are counted. Youth groups are treated as separate organizations, while university branches are considered chapters.

(12.) Instances of assistance include donating money to civil rights organizations in Northern Ireland, holding and attending protest events, publicizing campaigns by producing newsletters and prophets, and lobbying politicians. Mention of an organization or chapter by two or more interview subjects is treated as being equivalent to two or more activities recorded.

(13.) "Republicans" generally support the reunification of Ireland, if necessary, through force of arms and without the consent of the unionist population in Northern Ireland.

(14.) While deliberately maintaining a low profile, Republicans, including the leadership of Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army, played key roles in launching the civil rights movements. This support reflected disillusionment with traditional military tactics after the failed IRA Border Campaign of the 1950s, as well as the growing popularity of the idea that agitation on basic social and economic issues would reconnect the republican movement with its grossroots constituency. See, Ior instance, Feeney (1974) and Adams (1988).

(15.) NICRA survived through the late 1970s, in large part, because of the efforts of its office staff.

(16.) Small rumps of the American Congress for Irish Freedom and the National Association for Irish Justice continued on as the National Council of Irish Americans and the National Association for Irish Freedom respectively.

(17.) I believe questions of civil rights for any communal group to be the same issue in principle. However, the differing composition of networks formed around the rights of different communal groups suggest that in practice, civil rights for different groups are separate issues, Issues network overlap can be problematic precisely because of the possibility of various constructions of an issue (such as civil rights) among participants in the network under investigation.

(18.) A white identity pervades the Irish Diaspora, not just in the United States. See Akenson (1973:274).

(19.) The relatively high levels of funding supplied by groups in Australia and New Zealand to NICRA in 1972 reflect their increasing involvement in the later years of the network when overall participation was in decline.

(20.) Cold War politics and the transnational network of communists involved in the civil rights network explain activity in a number of Warsaw Pact countries (interview with Edwina Stewart). The long-standing concern of Nordic countries about human rights violations contributed to activity in Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. The Ugandan government used information supplied by NICRA to deflect criticism of its own human rights practices in the United Nations (ibid.).

(21.) Prior to the (London) Derry march. British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, met with the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Terence O'Neill, on August 5, 1966 and January 12, 1967. On both occasions, Wilson urged O'Neill to implement reforms of the types advocated by the CSJ and CDU. The main arguments used by the British Labour government for intervening in Northern Ireland affairs were virtually identical to those used by these groups. See Wilson (1971) and Callaghan (1973).

(22.) Transatlantic ties remained strongest among Irish Americans with traditional republican sympathies (Hanagan 1998). Like their counterparts in Northern Ireland, these individuals either eschewed the civil rights movement as a distraction from the goal of reunification, or abandoned the network in early 1970 to support the armed struggle.

(23.) While many with large populations of Irish ancestry in other societies also identified themselves with racial majorities, the absence of large-scale civil rights movements meant that race was less of a polarizing issue than in the United States during the time period in question.

(24.) To his credit. Melaugh was not involved in any of the mudslinging pertaining to this issue.

(25.) Other divisive issues included whether: 1) to engage tin events likely to result in loyalist violence; 2) to use lorce in sell-delense; 3) to demand on end to partition; and 4) to pursue the reform of the Northern Ireland parliament.

(26.) At first glance, it does appear that transnational issue networks addressing Irish issues have primarily emerged during periods of heightened protest internationally. At least some of these networks experienced tensions similar to those endured by the network examined here. For instance, for a discussion of disputes over slavery in the transnational issue network supporting Daniel O Connell's movement for Catholic emancipation In Ireland. see Dooley (1998).

References