



UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA PRESS
JOURNALS + DIGITAL PUBLISHING

World System, Class, and State in Third World Development: Toward an Integrative Framework of Political Economy

Author(s): Hagen Koo

Source: *Sociological Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 33-52

Published by: University of California Press

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1389236>

Accessed: 31/10/2009 14:51

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Sociological Perspectives*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

WORLD SYSTEM, CLASS, AND STATE IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Toward an Integrative Framework of Political Economy

HAGEN KOO

University of Hawaii

The currently popular political economy approach to Third World development is divided in terms of three primary foci of analysis: (1) dependency or the world economic system; (2) the internal class structure and class struggles; and (3) the peripheral capitalist state. This article examines the basic ideas involved in these three approaches and seeks to integrate them into a single framework. The basic assumption of this framework is that the pattern of capital accumulation and socioeconomic change in Third World countries are shaped by world-system, class, and state factors jointly, rather than independently of one another. Only by looking at interactions among these structural factors can concrete ways in which each of them influences the pattern of accumulation be illuminated. Of the three sets of factors, this article highlights the role of the Third World state in linking the world system and class forces to the development process.

Current theoretical writing on Third World development is dominated by what can be called the political economy school. Stimulated by dependency theories about Latin America, and elaborated and broadened by the world system and other neo-Marxist theories, this school has effectively challenged the so-called modernization school and its structural-functional paradigm with the neo-Marxist paradigm. As the modernization school has lost its appeal and gone into deep retreat, however,

AUTHOR'S NOTE: *I would like to thank Fred Deyo, Martin Whyte, Stephan Haggard, Stan Morse, Ben Kerkvliet, Bob Stauffer, Gary Hawes, Mimi Sharma, and Jim Matson for their comments on earlier versions of this article.*

much infighting has occurred within the neo-Marxist school of political economy. Although this may represent a natural intellectual process through which a new theory develops, the current literature is characterized by too much polemics, too much cross-talking and too high a level of abstraction. The literature offers intellectual stimulation but little guidance for empirical research. This is probably why, as Portes and Walton (1981: 13) have observed,

There is at present a manifest disjuncture between general theory, where the world-system perspective has become dominant, and the myriad lower-level focused studies—national, local, and thematic—based on the earlier modernization model.

The main purpose here is to clarify the conceptual ground for fruitful research on the political economy of socioeconomic change in Third World countries. In order to do this, I examine several strands of neo-Marxist theories of development, carefully weigh their assumptions and basic concepts, and seek to integrate them into a coherent framework. The object is not to offer yet another critique of dependency theory or world system theory, nor to advance another novel approach. The intent is rather to find a way to use the ideas offered by these theories in a more systematic and comprehensive way. The assumption underlying this effort is that currently competing theories of the political economy of development are not contradictory but complementary, and that empirical research in this field (especially much-needed comparative studies) will be aided if their interconnections are clearly specified.

It seems reasonable to organize basic ideas in the current literature on development around three approaches that place differential emphasis on: (1) dependency or the world capitalist system, (2) the class structure and class struggle of the peripheral nation, and (3) the structure and the role of the capitalist state. All three phenomena are, of course, intimately connected with one another, and one phenomenon cannot be understood adequately without considering its interrelationships with the others. Never-

theless, theorists are often divided according to which one of these factors they regard as the central explanatory variable. In fact, this seems to be a main cause of the polemical nature of current literature on Third World development.

DEPENDENCY AND WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The dependency perspective has established that development or underdevelopment processes in Third World countries cannot be understood separately from development processes in advanced capitalist countries. The basic thesis of dependency theory is that development and underdevelopment are partial and interdependent structures of one global system. What structures this interlocking development-underdevelopment relationship is dependency, commonly defined as "a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others" (Dos Santos, 1970: 231). Specifically, penetration of core capital into the peripheral economy is believed to have a powerful conditioning effect on the economy, class structure, and ultimately the entire social structure of a dependent peripheral society. It is an important contention in the dependency perspective that core capital does not simply exist "out there," but is internalized within the economy of the peripheral nation by the harmony of interest between external and internal capital.

Dependency students tend to assume that certain negative consequences—or "underdevelopment" in Frank's view (1967)—necessarily follow from external economic dependency. Frequently, however, the dependency notion has been used as a master concept to explain everything wrong and undesirable in less-developed countries (Lall, 1975). Furthermore, the mode of dependency explanations has often tended to be somewhat mechanistic (Palma, 1978), and, even if not, has failed to offer any specific mechanisms through which external dependency obstructs or distorts peripheral development. As O'Brien (1975: 23) notes regarding the dependency mode of explanation, "Everything

is connected to everything else, but how and why, often remains obscure.”

It seems clear by now that external economic dependency produces variable consequences in peripheral countries; if it produces underdevelopment in some countries, it can also promote rapid economic growth in other countries; if it promotes enclave-based export economies, it can also facilitate labor-intensive manufacturing industries. What produces these variable outcomes of dependency seems to be the specific nature or form of dependency as well as historically specific conditions internal to each peripheral nation. External dependency occurs in various forms, and their effects differ accordingly. Thus a good dependency analysis requires a careful examination of the interactions of various forms of external dependency with historically-specific internal conditions (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). After his extensive review of the dependency school of analyses, Palma (1978: 882) concludes that “the most successful analyses are those which resist the temptation to build a formal theory, and focus on ‘concrete situations of dependency.’ ”

It is necessary to examine the contribution of the sister concept of dependency—the world economic system. At a higher level of abstraction, the world economic system theory stresses the independent significance of the world capitalist system and its impact on socioeconomic processes in all nations: core, periphery, or semi-periphery (Wallerstein, 1974). Here, the primary concern is not with the unilateral relations of a peripheral nation with a core nation, as in the case of dependency theory, but with the multinational structure of capitalist relations, or more specifically, with the world-wide division of labor, the movement of advanced capital and the cycles of global capitalism. The primary explanatory variable in this perspective is therefore the world capitalist system. It is the overall character of the world economic system that specifies the ways in which a peripheral economy is integrated into the world economy, and it is the cycle of world capitalism that defines the mobility chances (from periphery to semi-periphery or from semi-periphery to core) for a particular economy within the world system (Wallerstein, 1974; Hopkins

and Wallerstein, 1977; and Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1977). Consequently, much of what goes on in a peripheral nation can be explained by the nature of the world capitalist economy and the specific position that a particular peripheral economy occupies in this world economy. Accordingly, understanding of the contemporary characteristics of the world capitalist system must precede the analysis of the concrete dependency relations or specific development processes in a peripheral country.

World system theorists, however, have tended to carry this point too far and have often proceeded as if internal factors are unimportant for understanding major changes in peripheral nations. Consequently, this perspective tends to commit, as Smith (1979) claims, a "tyranny of the whole over the parts," refusing to grant the part any autonomy or specificity. For example, a leading world system theorist, Amin (1974: 3) claims: "Not a single concrete socio-economic formation of our time can be understood except as part of this world system." A serious methodological error of this kind of approach, Smith (1979: 257) argues, is to "deprive local histories of their integrity and specificity, thereby making local actors little more than the pawns of outside forces." Furthermore, it is also noticed that this overly systemic approach may lead to an error of teleological explanation (Taylor, 1979), that is, explaining specific processes by the presumed needs of a larger system. Petras (1978: 33) has specified this criticism most sharply:

Specific events within the world system are to be explained in terms of the demands of the system as whole. Actors are acting not for their immediate concrete interests but because the system dictates that they act.

It is not clear whether this teleological explanation is inherent in world system theory, but this is an error one can easily commit when preoccupied with the system-level phenomena. While accepting the basic premise of world system theory that the contemporary characteristics of the world capitalist system provide essential elements for the structural understanding of economic processes in a peripheral nation, it is still possible to

avoid both the “tyranny of the whole” and a teleological form of explanation.

Dependency and world-system theories can be regarded as the same theory, sharing the same assumption, the same approach, and the same terminologies. The only meaningful difference between the two is found in their respective vantage points from which they look at the global structure of the center-periphery relationships. One looks at this structure from below, that is, from the standpoint of a particular peripheral nation; while the other looks at the same structure from above, from the standpoint of the capitalist system itself or of core nations. In general, dependency students tend to have a better grasp of the nature of dependency relations characterizing a particular peripheral country but a relatively weak grasp of the nature and the trend of the whole world capitalist system underlying the particular dependency relations; whereas world system writers are generally strong in the latter but weaker in the former. Clearly, this difference is just a matter of focus and not a fundamental one.

CLASS RELATIONS

The most serious weakness Marxist critics see in the world system approach is its failure to anchor analysis in relations of production, and more specifically, in class relations. Instead, world system analysts are primarily concerned with exchange relationships or the flow of surplus value across national boundaries. The world capitalist economy—composed of center, semi-periphery, and periphery—is conceived as a “chain of the transfer of surplus value” through worldwide “unequal exchange” (Wallerstein, 1979: 292). The idea of the “chain-linked metropolis-satellite constellations” through which surplus is extracted from the satellite countries is particularly strong in Frank’s notion of dependency relations (Frank, 1967).

Dependency/world system theorists tend to take spatial metaphors (core-semi-periphery-periphery or metropolis-satellite) too seriously. It can be argued, however, that one spatially

defined unit does not exploit another spatially defined unit; rather, it is a social group or a class that exploits another social group or class (Friedmann and Wayne, 1977). Inequality does exist, of course, between spatial units—between cities and countrysides, between regions, and between nations. But the underlying process that causes spatial inequality is inequality between social groups in the social division of labor. Inequalities between nations or between regions are thus only spatial manifestations of the more fundamental class inequality rooted in the relations of production. Because of the primacy given to relations of exchange rather than relations of production, world system analysts tend to ignore or mystify class relations. This is the common Marxist criticism against the dominant mode of world system analysis. Petras (1978: 37) in particular claims:

Without a clear notion of the antagonistic class interests located in the interior of a social formation, there is a tendency among world system theorists to dissolve the issue into series of abstract development imperatives deduced from a static global stratification system which increasingly resembles the functional requisites and equilibrium models of Parsonian sociology.

It appears unjustified to claim that dependency/world system theorists have ignored class structure in their analyses. On the contrary, their writings are typically full of references to social classes, such as the “national bourgeoisie,” “international capitalists,” “comprador bourgeoisie,” “labor aristocracy,” and so on. Wallerstein (1979: 230), for example, states explicitly that the capitalist world economy must be understood as “the arena of social action” and the “fundamental political reality of that world-economy is a class struggle.” Also, Frank and other students of Latin American dependency have never denied the importance of class and class alliances and, in fact, have been very concerned with the way in which the international system of monopoly capitalism creates a “great polarization” or “the imperialist divide” within the class structure of Latin American societies between those who are tied to international capital and those segregated from it (Cockcroft et al., 1972; Sunkel, 1973).

Their concern with “marginalization” also reflects their interest in the emerging class inequality in dependent economies.

Nevertheless, the world system approach to social class suffers from two kinds of weaknesses. First, because of their primary concern with exchange relations between national units, the world system theorists tend to conceptualize social classes mainly in terms of distributive process. In their formulation, class relations are not placed within the context of exploitation at the point of production but rather in the total flow of surplus value in the world market. The purpose of class struggle is not the elimination of exploitation but is conceptualized as an effort by each class to capture a greater portion of world surplus. From the orthodox Marxists’ standpoint, such an approach betrays the essential Marxist conception of social classes and simply mystifies them. This is certainly a controversial issue that cannot be settled easily. In a sense, the world system theorists’ approach is very much Weberian, because they conceive of class in terms of “market situation.” Following Weber, market situations can be conceived broadly to include the labor market, the consumer market, and the credit market. There is no reason why world system analysts must be concerned only with the distribution process, and in actuality they are not. In any event, it is not possible to determine whether Marx is correct and Weber is wrong, or the other way around. Probably both are correct—at different levels and for different purposes of analysis.

The second problem associated with the world system theorists’ approach to the class structures of peripheral societies is more serious. Because of their general methodological orientation, they take their point of departure from the functioning of the world capitalist system and tend to regard the internal class structure of the peripheral country (and also of the core country) as derivatives of the world system. In this orientation, the class structure tends to appear as a dependent variable to the independent variable of the capitalist world economy. Thus, class interest and political struggles of social classes in a peripheral society find their meanings only in terms of the functioning of the world capitalist

system. This orientation is well reflected in Wallerstein's writing (1979: 25):

Political struggles of ethno-nations or segments of classes within national boundaries of course are the daily bread and butter of local politics. But their significance or consequences can only be fruitfully analyzed if one spells out the implications of their organizational activity or political demands for the functioning of the world-economy.

What seems to be implied in this statement is that we must understand internal class struggles in order to understand the functioning of the world system, rather than the other way around. Here we can see how the primary interests of the theorists operating at the abstract world system level diverge from those who are primarily interested in understanding concrete processes of socioeconomic change in peripheral countries. From the latter's point of view, the purpose for studying the capitalist world economy is to understand what goes on in peripheral societies. Naturally, this is the orientation of dependency theorists. Thus, subscribing to the same general theoretical premise, world system and dependency theorists can diverge in their research orientations. The key point is what one wants to understand: Is it the world system itself or developmental processes in a dependent nation?

Among dependency theorists, Cardoso has taken the class approach most seriously. He assumes that the notion of dependency is vacuous unless it is anchored in class interests and class conflicts. How do external factors of global capitalism affect the internal structure of the peripheral country? This is mainly through the interests and social practices of local classes.

We conceive the relationship between external and internal forces as forming a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere external forms of exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in coincidences of interests between local dominant classes and international ones, and, on the other side, are challenged by local dominated groups and classes (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xvi).

Put differently, the forces of international capitalism do not simply exist "out there," but have become internalized; this is possible through the particular configuration of class relations and class interests within the dependent society. Currently this is a notion of wide consensus among various groups of political economy theorists. There is a tendency among many dependency/world system writers, however, to pay attention only to the internal manifestation of the external influences. The usual consequence is a relative neglect of local histories. In any society, the present class structure is the product of long historical processes of class differentiation and class struggles as well as of ideologies and cultural values surrounding these processes. This, Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 26) clearly recognize when they state: "In developing but dependent countries, social structures reflect the double edge of the economic system: its external links and internal roots."

It is these internal, historical "roots" that are primarily responsible for divergent patterns of development among nations that are subjected to the same force of core capital. These internal forces are rooted not only in the diversity of cultural traditions and natural endowments but also in the ways in which various classes or segments of classes have related to one another (through class conflict and class alliances), have activated their forces for or against foreign interests, and have developed certain ideologies or tried to promote certain policies through the state structure. The internal class forces cannot be viewed simply as a structure shaped by the external factors of the world system, but they must be regarded as an independent social force that gives the form and meaning to this nation's insertion into the capitalist world economy.

The importance of the class structure has been emphasized enough. How to approach it is clear: we must approach it from two angles, from the internal historical perspective and from the world system perspective, because the present class structure is a joint product of the two forces (and, of course, it is also the force that influences these two processes in turn). There should be no contradiction between the world system perspective and the class perspective. Instead, they are so complementary that one cannot render a fully fruitful analysis without the other.

THE STATE

Another body of the relevant literature has brought the state to the center of analytic attention. This theoretical concern has been stimulated by the increasingly important role that the state plays in the economies of both core and peripheral countries. Recent years have seen significant theoretical advances in this area.

Marxist scholars acknowledge that a capitalist state has a certain degree of "relative autonomy": it is free from active control by members of the capitalist class but not free from the general interest of the capitalist class or from the structural requirement of the capitalist economy. Relative autonomy is assumed necessary for the state to act on behalf of the capitalist class as a whole rather than of a particular segment of this class. Thus, a relatively autonomous state is viewed acting as a factor of cohesion for the bourgeoisie and as a facilitator of the bourgeois dominance over the economy and society (Poulantzas, 1973; Offe, 1975; Gold et al., 1975).

Several structural conditions of Third World countries seem to contribute to the autonomy of the peripheral capitalist state. First, the peripheral economies typically contain more than one mode of production: capitalist, precapitalist, and transitional ones. Marxist scholars agree that the state can assume greater autonomy when the mode of production is indeterminate and no one class holds the balance of power (Gold et al., 1975; Trimberger, 1977; Hamilton, 1981). In the case of the Japanese transition to capitalism, for example, Trimberger (1977) suggests that the state apparatus achieved "dynamic autonomy" and actively promoted the capitalist mode of production at the expense of other competing modes of production. In a similar way, most Third World states have created their own capitalist classes (O'Donnell, 1980).

Second, there is a historical condition that is related to a strong state bureaucracy in those Third World countries that had colonial experiences. In these societies, as Alavi (1972) points out, "overdeveloped" state machinery had been created by the metropolitan power to control all the indigenous social classes. With independence, the postcolonial society inherits this overdeveloped state apparatus and its institutionalized practices

through which the operations of the indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled (Ziemann and Lazendorfer, 1977). "The bureaucracy inherits that prestige of state power that is traditional in non-European societies and is strengthened by the experience of the colonial administration's power, which seemed absolute, and by the fact that the petty bourgeoisie from which this bureaucracy stems has a monopoly of modern education and technical skill" (Amin, 1976: 345-346).

Thirdly, a relatively new pattern of dependent development in the periphery of the world capitalist economy has also strengthened the role of the states in peripheral (and semi-peripheral) nations. The most common characteristic of dependent development is a close collaboration of the peripheral state with both international capital and domestic capital—something that Evans (1979) calls a "triple alliance." But since the indigenous capital is ill-developed, the state tends to assume the central role for solving bottleneck problems, developing the infrastructures, formulating favorable institutional frameworks, and bargaining with multinational corporations. Furthermore, the state has now moved into areas traditionally controlled by the private sector and has expanded its ownership of noninfrastructural enterprises. This has resulted in the new notions of the "entrepreneurial state" and "state capitalism" (Petras, 1976; Berberoglu, 1979; Sobhan, 1979; Duvall and Freeman, 1981).

The emergence of an entrepreneurial state usually does not represent an effort to transform social relations of production (toward socialism) but just an effort to correct or overcome inadequacies in the functioning of the private sector. In any event, the rise of the self-consciously interventionist and entrepreneurial states indicates the strengthening of state power in peripheral societies. Based on his analysis of the Brazilian pattern of development, Evans (1979: 11) argues: "If classic dependence was associated with weak states, dependent development is associated with the strengthening of strong states in the 'semi-periphery.' The consolidation of state power may even be considered a prerequisite of dependent development."

While these internal and historical conditions tend to promote the autonomy of the peripheral state, the dependency situations

in which it is imbedded constrain and define the nature of state autonomy. That the postcolonial state was originally created by the metropolitan state has already been noted. But it is also important to note that the formation of the modern state after independence was largely shaped by a new imperialist state through transplantation of the latter's legal and economic institutions, through the so-called leadership trainings, and through the multitude of trade, financial, and technical assistance (Petras, 1978: 51-52).

But perhaps more crucial is the impact of the world capitalist economy itself. If the insertion of the peripheral economy into world capitalism has strengthened the peripheral state power vis-a-vis domestic groups, this very process has also imposed an almost inescapable structural constraint. For, as Evans (1979: 290) notes, "the entire success of the dependent development is predicated on multinationals willing to invest, international bankers willing to extend credit, and other countries willing to consume an ever increasing volume of Brazilian exports." It is thus essential for state managers of dependent nations to maintain a certain level of business confidence or a favorable business climate to attract continuous foreign investment, upon which the health of the domestic economy depends so much (Block, 1978). If the peripheral state ignores this requirement and acts against the interest of international capital, then it is not just the center capitalists but also the center state that will take a certain measure to bring this recalcitrant state back in line. But as long as the peripheral state "knows its position," so to speak, within the capitalist world system and pursues dependent development in cooperation with center capital, this state can expect to draw support from international capitalist organizations and the center state as well. Thus it can be argued that "the dependent state is, in substantial part, a creature of the world system and is sustained by it" (Duvall and Freeman, 1981: 109).

We can see, therefore, that the state in the periphery of the world capitalist economy is a creature of complex social and economic forces, internal and external, historical and contemporary. It is certainly incorrect to caricature the dependent state as a puppet organization set up by an imperial power. Yet it

also seems too naive to believe that a strong government in the periphery can transcend the structural requirement of the world capitalist economy. What seems certain is that the role of the state is increasingly more important in determining the pattern of development and the evolution of social structure in Third World countries. The same argument holds in the case of advanced industrial societies as well, but the impact of the state seems to be especially strong in developing societies (O'Donnell, 1980).

TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK

A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion is that the three primary foci of political economic analysis of Third World development—the world system, the class structure, and the state—must be integrated within a common framework to allow for more comprehensive and at the same time more concrete analyses. Certainly this is not a novel suggestion. In fact, several good empirical studies in the dependency school, such as those of Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Evans (1979), have done this in their analyses. However, it is still true that few studies seem specifically based on clear recognition of this principle and, as has been noted, unnecessary polemics occur because of failure to recognize this.

The basic assumption of the conceptual framework I propose is that the *relationships* among conditions of the world system aspects of internal class structure, and the nature of the state provide the key to analyzing the development process in Third World countries. Each of these three sets of structural conditions enters a complex, interactive, and sometimes contradictory process in which each influences the others and is in turn influenced by them. The development process is largely shaped by this three-pronged interactive process. To put this in more specific terms, the basic proposition of this framework is that each set of these structural variables (world systems, class relations, and state structures) influences the capital accumulation process largely through its *interactions* with the other sets




Figure 1: A Schematic Presentation of the Political Economic Processes of Third World Development

of structural factors rather than independently of them. It consequently follows that examination of just one of these structures is likely to fail to disclose the concrete processes through which each structural factor influences capital accumulation and socioeconomic change in Third World countries.

The basic process of this integrative framework is schematically shown in Figure 1. As outlined above, this framework regards the development process—more specifically, the pattern of capital accumulation and socioeconomic change—as a product of interactions among the three structural forces. It is also assumed that the pattern of development is not only shaped by these political economic forces but in turn shapes all these structural conditions and their interrelationships. The economic development process creates new opportunities and problems, and generates new class relations and class struggles. New conditions of capital accumulation affect the forms of foreign capital penetration and the role that a particular economy may play in the global division of labor. New class forces and other structural changes brought about by these economic changes necessarily influence the structures of Third World states and major state policies.

More empirical studies, especially comparative ones, must be carried out before we can specify the exact nature of relationships

among these three sets of structural conditions and their relationships with the development process. This framework provides only a conceptual map for such investigation. Even in the absence of more concrete studies conducted within this framework, it seems desirable to be somewhat more specific about the basic processes posited in the framework. Among the three structural factors influencing the pattern of development, it can be argued that the state be placed in the center of the analysis of Third World development. This is not to suggest that the state is more important than the other two; rather, what is suggested is that the state is at the intersection of class and world system forces and the development process in Third World countries. In other words, the state is viewed as a crucial connecting link between social and economic relations at both domestic and international levels, and the pattern of development in these countries. The Third World state may thus be accorded a special analytic status and can serve as a strategic focus of analysis.

An increasingly central role played by the state in social and economic transformation has been already noted. Given this important role of the state, the exercise of class power and class struggles are most frequently directed at influencing the internal structure of the state and major state policies in the interests of particular classes. The relationships between class forces and the process of accumulation and distribution are therefore mediated by the state. Similarly, core capital and core state power that have penetrated into a given Third World society have their impacts on the accumulation process not only through internal class alliances but ultimately through the operations of state structures. The effects of state policies and policy implementations on the pattern of capital accumulation and appropriation seem to be direct and immediate, whereas those of social class and international capital, as powerful as they are, tend to express themselves largely through major policies and actions of the state.

Needless to say, state structures and state managers cannot be understood out of the context of class-divided socioeconomic relations in particular societies. The primary utility of the framework proposed here is that it constantly reminds us of the

interrelationships among the state, class relations, and world system influences. In all capitalist societies, state structures and the exercise of state power occur within particular class contexts and under the constraints of international capital and imperialist state power. The degree to which a peripheral state can obtain a relative or dynamic autonomy is also largely, though not entirely, determined by these class and world system conditions.

While accepting this basic proposition, it is nonetheless important to acknowledge that what specific economic policies a Third World state will adopt and how it will implement these policies cannot be simply derived from the interests of the dominant classes, nor from those of foreign capitalist organizations. In order to render our analysis concrete and meaningful, we must move beyond a class reductionist approach and take the state as possibly an autonomous organization with its own integrity (Skocpol, 1979; Block, 1980). This means that we must regard capitalist states as more than analytic aspects of abstractly conceived modes of production, or even as political aspects of concrete class relations. "Any state," Skocpol (1979: 29) argues, "first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations." Thus the social foundation of state power and that of class power do not always overlap. In the relative autonomy formulation of the state, the character of those who control state apparatuses are of little importance, because they are expected ultimately to pursue actions in the general interest of the capitalists. But if we want to take the state more seriously, we must be concerned not only with the class context of the state but also with the character of the internal structures of the state as well as the goals, interests and capabilities of state managers.

In conclusion, the framework proposed here integrates the three major foci of current political economy analyses of Third World development. This framework identifies what categories of variables must be included in the analysis and what relationships must be examined. World system, class, and state structures refer to broad categories of variables, the contents of which must be further specified. It must be noted that arguing that these three

categories of variables influence the political economy of development does not mean that they shape the entire pattern of economic change in a particular country. In order to deal with the latter, we cannot ignore the relevance of cultural factors, which must have important bearings on the political economic relations of development in any society. Future theoretical attempts may be able to articulate the interconnections between these two types of variables, but this is beyond the scope of the present essay.

REFERENCES

- Alavi, H.
 1972 "The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh." *New Left Rev.* 74: 59-81.
- Amin, S.
 1974 *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment.* (2 Vols) New York: Monthly Review.
 1976 *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism.* New York: Monthly Review.
- Berberoglu B.
 1979 "Towards a theory of state capitalist development in the Third World." *Int. Rev. of Modern Sociology* 9: 17-29.
- Block, F.
 1980 "Beyond relative autonomy: state managers as historical subjects," pp. 227-242 in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds.) *The Socialist Register 1980.* London: Merlin Pres.
 1978 "Marxist theories of the state in world system analysis," pp. 27-37 in Barbara Kaplan (ed.) *Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Cardoso, F. H. and E. Faletto
 1979 *Dependency and Development in Latin America.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Chase-Dunn, C. and R. Rubinson
 1977 "Toward a structural perspective on the world-system." *Politics and Society* 7: 453-476.
- Cockcroft, J., A. G. Frank, and D. Johnson
 1972 *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy.* New York: Doubleday.
- Dos Santos, T.
 1970 "The structure of dependence." *Amer. Economic Rev.* 60: 231-236.
- Duvall, R. and J. Freeman
 1981 "The state and dependent capitalism." *Int. Studies Q.* 25: 99-118.

- Evans, P.
1979 *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Frank, A. G.
1967 *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review.
- Friedmann, H. and J. Wayne
1977 "Dependency theory: a critique." *Canadian J. of Sociology* 2: 399-416.
- Gold, D., C. Lo, and E. Wright
1975 "Recent developments in Marxist theories of the capitalist state." *Monthly Review* 27 (November): Parts I (29-43) and II (36-51).
- Hamilton, N.
1981 "State autonomy and dependent capitalism in Latin America." *British J. of Sociology* 32: 305-329.
- Hopkins, T. and I. Wallerstein
1977 "Patterns of development of the modern world-system." *Review* 1 and 2 (Fall): 111-145.
- Jessop, B.
1975 "Recent theories of the capitalist state." *Cambridge J. of Economics* 1: 353-373.
- Lall, S.
1975 "Is 'dependence' a useful concept in analyzing underdevelopment?" *World Development* 3: 799-810.
- O'Brien, P.
1975 "A critique of Latin American theories of dependency," pp. 7-27 in I. Oxaal, T. Barnett and D. Booth (eds.) *Beyond the Sociology Development*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- O'Donnell, G.
1980 "Comparative historical formations of the state apparatus and socio-economic change in the Third World." *Int. Social Science J.* 32: 717-729.
- Offe, C.
1975 "The theory of the capitalist state and the problem of policy formation," in L. Linberg, Alford, Crouch and Offe (eds.) *Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism*. New York: Heath.
- Palma, G.
1978 "Dependency: a formal theory of underdevelopment or a methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of underdevelopment?" *World Development* 6: 881-924.
- Petras, J.
1978 *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World*. New York: Monthly Review.
1976 "State capitalism and the Third World." *J. of Contemporary Asia* 6.
- Portes, A. and J. Walton
1981 *Labor, Class and the International System*. New York: Academic.
- Poulantzas, N.
1973 *Political Power and Social Classes*. London: New Left Books.
- Skocpol, T.
1979 *State and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. New York. Cambridge Univ. Press.

Smith, T.

- 1979 "The underdevelopment of development literature: the case of dependency theory." *World Politics* 31: 247-288.

Sobhan, R.

- 1979 "The nature of the state and its implications for the development of public enterprises in Asia." *J. of Contemporary Asia* 9,4: 410-433.

Sunkel, O.

- 1973 "Transnational capitalism and national disintegration in Latin America." *Social and Economic Studies* 22: 132-176.

Taylor, J. G.

- 1979 *From Modernization to Modes of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Trimberger, K. E.

- 1977 "State power and modes of production: implications of the Japanese transition to capitalism." *Insurgent Sociologist* 7: 85-98.

Wallerstein, I.

- 1979 *The Capitalist World-Economy*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
1974 *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic.

Ziemann, W. and M. Lazendorfer

- 1977 "The state in peripheral societies," pp. 143-177 in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds.) *The Socialist Register 1977*. London: Merlin Press.

Hagen Koo is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Hawaii, Manoa. His main research interests are in economic development and social change in the Third World countries, and social stratification. His recent publications include: "Class and Income Inequality in Korea," American Sociological Review 45 (1980); "Center-Periphery Relations and Marginalization," Development and Change 12 (1981); "Migration, the Urban Informal Sector, and Earnings in the Philippines," Sociological Quarterly 24 (1983); "Capital Accumulation, Women's Work and Informal Economies in Korea," Working Paper Series 21, Women in International Development, Michigan State University.