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|---|---|
| TYPE: | Article CC:CCL |
| JOURNAL TITLE: | Research in social movements, conflicts and change |
| USER JOURNAL TITLE: | Research in social movements, conflicts and change |
| ARTICLE TITLE: | Antecedents of Coalition: Frame Alignment and Utilitarian Unity in the Catalan Anti-Francoist Opposition |
| ARTICLE AUTHOR: | Johnston, Hank |
| VOLUME: | 13 |
| ISSUE: | |
| MONTH: | |
| YEAR: | 1991-01-01 |
| PAGES: | 241-259 |
| ISSN: | 0163-786X |
| OCLC #: | |

Processed by RapidX: 9/19/2022 2:51:06 PM

# ANTECEDENTS OF COALITION:
## FRAME ALIGNMENT AND UTILITARIAN UNITY IN THE CATALAN ANTI-FRANCOIST OPPOSITION

Hank Johnston

## INTRODUCTION

Catalonia lies in the northeast corner of Spain. Its five and one-half million inhabitants have a culture and a language that are distinct from the rest of the peninsula. The Catalan tongue is a romance language. It is similar to Castilian Spanish, but sufficiently differentiated in terms of its grammar and a well developed literary tradition that Catalans vigorously defend it, although most Catalans today are bilingual. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the region was an independent kingdom with a trading empire that extended into the Mediterranean. Its metropole of Barcelona rivaled Venice and Genoa. However, with the rise of Spanish power in the sixteenth century, the region increasingly fell under Castilian dominance, and in 1714 was forcibly incorporated into a centralized Spanish state dominated by Madrid.

**Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change,**
**Volume 13, pages 241-259.**

**ISBN: 1-55938-239-2**

Catalans responded to their political subordination with entrepreneurial zeal. Catalonia was the first region in Spain to industrialize, and for a long time enjoyed the highest per capita income in the country. Its economic power stimulated the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century that twice wrested a modicum of political autonomy from Madrid. The first instance was the limited administrative devolution under the Catalan *Mancomunitat* (Commonwealth) between 1914 and 1923. The second was a more extensive regional government (called the *Generalitat*) from 1932 to 1938. In both cases, political autonomy was abrogated by military uprisings: General Primo de Rivera's coup ended the *Mancomunitat*, and General Francisco Franco's uprising heralded three years of civil war (1936-1939). Franco's victory commenced 40 years of a repressive, corporatist state that allowed no political or nationalist opposition.

This study analyzes the regeneration of Catalan national opposition under Francoism. When Franco's troops entered Barcelona, a brutal campaign was begun against the Catalan language, culture, and autonomous political institutions. All public expressions of cultural distinctiveness, the language, book publication, Catalan plays, songs, and dances, and Catalan educational institutions were banned. No traces of the Catalan political parties that existed under the Second Republic were permitted; nor were any social and cultural organizations allowed to function outside of state control. The opposition was forced into highly secretive underground networks that out of war-weariness and fear did not enjoy wide popular support.

During the 1960s, the Spanish economy boomed and tentative liberalizing steps were taken. Beginning in 1966, student unrest increased, and later, a spontaneous working-class movement appeared. In Catalonia, these sectors of the opposition mobilized in the context of a distinct national identity that united them under a canopy of national symbols. Umbrella organizations appeared in Catalonia six years before comparable ones on the state level. On the eve of Franco's death in 1975, the Catalan national opposition, in spite of illegality and police repression, represented the strongest, best organized, and most unified anti-Francoist front in all of Spain.

During the Spanish democratic transition from 1975-1977, all clandestine parties in Catalonia (except a radical minority) supported national autonomy and cultural freedoms. In contrast to Basque nationalism, Catalan nationalism was unified in its moderation, seeking autonomy within the Spanish state as opposed to independence. In 1979, all parties agreed on the fundamental points during the drafting the Statute of Autonomy (González Casanova 1979, pp. 194-195). The Statute mandated devolution of limited political authority to a Catalan parliament and executive offices, while defense and important economic, judicial and welfare functions remained centralized. The Statute was approved by 80 percent in a referendum in the fall of 1979, and while the final form fell short of what more extreme nationalists would have wanted, in the

context of the political and economic constraints of the period, it can only be considered as the successful culmination of the nationalist movement. The Catalan *Generalitat* has been functioning as the legitimate government of Catalonia for a full decade, not without controversies and conflicts characteristic of pluralist politics, but also without the violence that has been typical of multiethnic politics elsewhere.

This success was achieved despite formidable structural barriers. As a region with a long history of class conflict (see Brenan 1978), the nationalists had to come to terms with a strong working-class movement, and vice versa. Antagonism between Catalan nationalism (defined as petty bourgeoisie and middle-class) and the Left, dates to the turn of the century. This became particularly aggravated during the Second Republic (1932-36), when the Anarchist workers opposed the nationalist Republican Left Party; and during the Civil War (1936-39), when the Communist central government infringed upon Catalan autonomy. To compound this cleavage, the working class in Catalonia is largely composed of non-Catalan immigrants from other Spanish regions. In Barcelona, the non-Catalan population approaches 60 percent (Rebagliato 1978, p. 260). To accommodate immigrant aspirations, the nationalist opposition shifted its platform leftward, and supported workers' demands. For their part, many immigrants embraced nationalist demands. This resulted in the anomalous support by a non-indigenous proletariat of Catalan autonomy and cultural liberties.

The strength of the Catalan opposition in large part derived from this extraordinary bridging of the potentially dangerous cleavage between Catalans and immigrant workers. It was expressed in a clear left-nationalist orientation that was apparent in the general elections of 1977 (the first in 41 years) when the home-grown Socialist and Communist parties won a total of 46 percent of the vote in Catalonia. (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986, pp. 323-341; Linz 1985, pp. 203-217; DiGiacomo 1985, pp. 84-108; Guillamet 1977). Even the platform of the center-nationalist *Convergència i Unió* party was progressive in comparison to the Spanish centrist parties. State-wide, the center-right UCD of Adolfo Suárez dominated, but in Catalonia the UCD received only 18 percent of the vote. The result was a conservative government for Spain while parties of the Left dominated in Catalonia. It might be said that the highly developed opposition in Catalonia obviated the need for the centrist transitional government that was electorally expressed elsewhere in Spain. The Socialist's dominance in Catalonia was a foretaste of what was to come later throughout all Spain, when in October 1982, the Socialists soundly defeated the center and right parties.

This report will trace the roots of this left-nationalist unity, and will draw some contrasts with oppositions elsewhere in Spain to suggest how the transition to democracy and regional autonomy was facilitated by the organization of the opposition. Moreover, in contrast to the theoretically

dominant focus in the field, I suggest that the processes by which this extraordinary unity was achieved were primarily cultural and symbolic.

## INTERPRETATION AND CALCULATION

In an authoritarian state, an oppositional front is, by definition, characterized by different sectors unifying in order to bring down the regime. In 1989, this was dramatically apparent in the opposition fronts in Rumania, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia; and presently, in the nationalist fronts in several Soviet minority-national republics. For the most part, these grand oppositional coalitions seem fully comprehensible within resource-related and structural perspectives (Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978; Zald and McCarthy 1979; Jenkins 1983). In this view, a broad oppositional front is the best way to challenge state hegemony if no oppositional sector has sufficient resources by itself. Pooling resources makes a viable challenge possible, and increases the likelihood of success. On the level of the movement adherents, participation in demonstrations and front organizations is explained by a calculus of benefits and costs.

A key element in all these assessments is the level of force that the state can apply. Tilly (1978) and Skocpol (1977) have emphasized that reduced social control is the sine qua non of mobilization because it reduces the costs of action. Changes in state policy such as the quasi-liberalization of Spain in the 1960s, or *glasnost* and *perestrioka* in the USSR, are sufficient to change the equation so that at least some oppositional activity will appear. Furthermore, these small voices of opposition are inevitable because there are always groups with demands on the state. Success, however, depends on how well movement organizations play their cards of resources and power, not the fervor of their beliefs or the justness of their demands.

This de-emphasis on grievances and ideology perhaps represents the most radical shift fostered by the resource mobilization perspective. In the marketplace of contention, grievances are said to be cheap commodities. Because every group has some, it is argued that levels of resources and power better explain movement development. Implied is the notion that movement ideology, rather than a reflection of member grievances, is better understood in terms of the relative power of competing groups and their ability to influence the drafting of ideological platforms.

It has been observed that while the assumptions of rational calculation and grievance ubiquity apply well to conditions of pluralist political competition, with respect to other contexts of mobilization, some qualifications may be warranted. In particular, several factors seem to mitigate their usefulness under authoritarian conditions: the group solidarity of high-risk militancy, for example; or how the long-time frame of mobilization and hegemonic state

power may render calculations of costs and benefits less practicable. An ethnic-national context also may mitigate rationality by introducing a strong emotive element. While it would be incorrect to dismiss resource-related approaches in these circumstances, a similar exclusion of factors relating to meaning and solidarity may skew our understanding of these kinds of movements even more.

Recently, there has been renewed interest in interpretative and interactionally-grounded approaches that reclaim something of the collective behavior tradition of analysis (Turner 1969, 1981, 1983; Turner and Killian 1972, 1987). A renewed emphasis on the collective life of a movement has taken the form of examining the role of friendship networks and interpersonal ties in recruitment. Second, and central to my analysis, interpretative processes have recently been reintroduced into theoretical debate under the conceptual guise of "framing activities."

Beginning with Goffman's analysis of social ritual, Gamson, Fireman and Rytina explored the micro-processes that facilitate group mobilization. They were interested in how an "injustice frame" emerged in which "the shared moral principles of the participants" are violated (1982, p. 123). In positing frame realignment as a fundamental component of mobilization, the authors imply social processes in the interactionist tradition of social movement analysis, most specifically Turner and Killian's concept of emergent norm (1987, pp. 242-245, 267-268).

Recently, David Snow and several of his colleagues (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986, pp. 546-481; Snow and Benford 1988a, 1988b) have extended the concepts of Goffman's frame analysis (1972) to social movements. There are two central concepts in their approach:

1. *The master collective behavior frame.* This refers to "an interpretative schemata" that allows individuals to locate, perceive, identify, simplify, and label personal events and experiences in terms of participation in a social movement (Snow and Benford 1988a, p. 9). It is a shared, higher-level cognitive structure that orients interpretations concerning movement participation: what collective behavior actions are appropriate, who are appropriate allies, what can be articulated as demands, what must be left ambiguous, and how are the actions of the regime to be interpreted. Master frames are phenomena that are individually held, and are therefore partially idiosyncratic, especially in their sub-schemata as they evolve from unique experiences of individual and group life. But the higher-level nodes, those general concepts that group and give shape to the immense diversity of individual experience, are inherently social.

The concept was introduced as a partial explanation of collective action repertoires (Tilly 1979) and cycles of protest (Tarrow 1983). It suggests external and non-organizational influences on the framing process. As Snow and Benford recognize (1988a, p. 1), the idea is close to Blumer's earlier concept of a general social movement (1955, pp. 219-280), where large-scale social

currents can generate new meanings and interpretations that give impetus to specific movements and organizations. This suggests the common sense notion of "an idea whose time has come" because of its fit with existing social structure and culture (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 17).

2. *Frame alignment.* This refers to processes by which movement organizations mobilize participants by, to coin a phrase, mobilizing meanings (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986, pp. 467-476). Social movement organizations promote new ways of interpreting one's position with respect to one's life situation and the movement in order to provide rationales for participation. Frame alignment can be a consciously chosen strategy by the movement organization to increase membership. This can be accomplished in several ways: establishing a linkage between two separate frames; clarifying and amplifying an existing frame to more clearly articulate already-held values and beliefs; and extending a frame to reach other potential constituents (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986, pp. 469-472).

While Snow and colleagues emphasize organizational strategy in frame alignment, similar processes at the more informal interpersonal levels suggest Turner and Killian's concept of an emergent norm. This is a concept that is particularly useful in analyzing mobilization in the long run. As Fireman and Gamson (1979, p. 13) point out, if one looks at a population at time t1 in order to predict who will be mobilized later in t2, it may be that the many of the organizations, demands, and forms of contention did not exist at t1. In Catalonia, the unity of the opposition in 1977 could not have been predicted from its organizational form or structural context in 1960, but as will be shown, as a normative system its development is quite clear.

Several propositions lie at the heart of this report: First, the elaboration of a master collective behavior frame was the key to Catalan unity. Second, this had important effects on the transition to democracy. The presence of an overarching and shared definition of the movement, its allies, its demands, and its enemies, imparted a stability to the Catalan opposition that was absent elsewhere. Third, I suggest that coalitions that have time to establish a broadly shared master oppositional frame may be more stable than ones built more exclusively on utilitarian considerations and relative resource levels. This has immediate relevance to the rapidly developing events in Eastern Europe and Soviet Republics. In situations where the regime rapidly deteriorates, such as in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, the oppositional fronts that step (or are forced) into the resulting political vacuum may be highly unstable because of insufficient time to establish a master collective behavior frame. This is suggested by the deterioration of national fronts in East Germany and Romania as soon as competition between parties commenced (and even before). In contrast, the master frame in Catalonia continued to influence events several years into democratic politics.

# FRAMES OF INTERPRETATION IN THE CATALAN OPPOSITION

This section traces the emergence of a new master frame through outside "general movement" influences, and internal frame alignment processes among different oppositional sectors. The following section, draws contrasts and comparisons relevant to the tentative propositions listed above.

In Catalonia, the development of the master frame occurred roughly between 1958 and 1968. In the 1950s the Franco regime sought to improve its international image by loosening its totalitarian grip, although by liberal democratic standards, Spain was still extremely repressive. A decade later, Catalan students, workers, anti-Francoists, and nationalists alike were more openly voicing their opposition to the regime. Simultaneously, they were developing common ideational threads and interpersonal contacts in four analytically distinct patterns. I identify these as four separate processes of frame alignment that ultimately resulted in the unitary master frame.

The first alignment occurred as a result of the implantation and diffusion of a general movement of Marxist criticism. In the beginning this occurred among middle-class youth, often through their affiliation in Catholic youth groups, and represented the first step in reconciling the Catalan middle class with the immigrant working class. The second aspect of frame alignment was a similar turn to the Left on the part of Catalan nationalist groups. This too facilitated reconciliation between working class and middle-class nationalists via the parties of the left. Third, Catalan nationalism was transformed from a relatively mild form of opposition into a militant foe of the regime. By this process, nationalist groups, and the middle class in general, proved their oppositional mettle to the Left and the working class, and facilitated their redefinition as acceptable partners in the opposition. Finally, the developing working-class movement came to adopt the claims of the nationalist opposition as legitimate, and the militants as compatriots in common struggle. Ethnic and class differences render this the weakest link in the frame alignment process, but at the same time, their transcendence represents an extraordinary ideational reconciliation of what elsewhere have proven to be intractable structural barriers.

## Marxism and the Catalan Church

Marxist parties had a long tradition in Catalonia prior to 1939, but after the war, these parties were destroyed by severe repression and the exile of militants. Many of those who remained behind (and survived) foreswore politics, while others took their politics deeply underground into secretive groups. When Marxist politics reappeared, it did not grow from these dormant seeds but rather swept in from abroad and found root first among middle-

class students who, ironically, often met in groups under the auspices of the Catholic Church.

The irony of the church's role is compounded by the alignments of the Spanish Civil War. The Left was militantly anti-clerical, and the Spanish Church defined Franco's uprising as a holy crusade against atheism (Payne 1961). For the Marxist social critique to be discussed in church groups, for priests to be in contact with the communists, for the organizational resources of the church to be placed at the disposal of grass roots unions—as they were in the late 1960s, it was necessary for a drastic redefinition of these earlier perceptions to occur. While the reconciliation of Catholicism and Marxism was neither church policy nor did it diffuse widely, the dialogue was sufficiently well-known to change perceptions among many for whom truck with Communists or Socialists had earlier been unthinkable.

There were specific intellectual influences during the early years. France was an intellectual beacon where books, newspapers and word of current events could be obtained and smuggled back. Respondents reported that French writers and Catholic philosophers such as Jacques Maritain, Charles Peguy, Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Georges Bernanos were frequently mentioned as early intellectual influences. These authors wrote of democracy, nationalism, socialism, and existential Catholicism—heretical themes by the standards of the Francoist university and the traditionalist Catholic hierarchy. France also pioneered the way for these Catalan youth by emphasizing the church's concern for social problems. In the 1940s and 1950s, worker-priests supported progressive issues and leftist politics. The international scope of the Roman Catholic Church provided a conduit for these ideas and alignments, despite attempts by the hierarchy of the Spanish church to insulate younger clergy.

Although most of the middle-class respondents reported that the church was an important influence, this was not necessarily a result of fervent religious conviction. Rather, in the repressive and authoritarian atmosphere of Spanish society, there was little else available outside of state control (Johnston 1989). The church in Catalonia was more liberal than elsewhere in Spain, and priests permitted discussion of social issues in ostensibly religious groups, such as sections of the Marian Congregations. Other groups that fell under this category were Catholic Action, Workers Brotherhood of Catholic Action, Catholic Student Youth, Young Catholic Workers, and Pax Cristi. Some affiliated groups promoted catechism classes among the working-class children. For several middle-class respondents, this was a powerful and radicalizing experience.

I offer these observations only for one sector of youth at the university. There were some not connected with Catholic groups at all, while others (a much smaller number) exclusively belonged to youth wings of the clandestine parties. Nevertheless, in the balance, interviews indicate that the Catholic organizations

were instrumental as forums for the diffusion of the leftist critique that was fundamental to the Catalan master frame. Also, these groups provided a linkage between Catholics from different social backgrounds, and a point of contact for nationalist and working-class youth. Several respondents mentioned that the archdiocese offices in downtown Barcelona provided a forum where members of these different groups could meet and interact. Respondents also frequently spoke of acquaintances and friendships with militants of other parties that were established during these years. Later under the impetus of the Second Vatican Council, progressive priests, known as *Conciliarios*, became active in the student movement and in the incipient grass roots workers organizations called Workers' Commissions. There was even contact between the some of these priests and the Catalan Communist Party (PSUC).

## Left Catalanism

The second aligning process was the embrace of Marxism by elements within the nationalist sector of the opposition. In the mid- to late-1960s, some clandestine political parties shifted to the Left under pressure from youthful militants, others because militants found the "social question" to be more pressing than the national one. These transformations are all the more remarkable in light of the less than harmonious historical relationship between nationalism and the Left. The first Catalanist organizations, the *Lliga Regionalista* and the *Lliga Catalana* bore the stamp of the bourgeoisie and haute bourgeoisie (Riquer 1979; Molas 1972; Tuñon de Lara 1967, p. 42). While there had been several indigenous Marxist parties—the socialist *Partit Socialista de Catalunya*, and the Trotskyist POUM, the majority party of the Catalan *Generalitat* under the Second Republic, the nationalist *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (the Republican Left of Catalonia), was in practice moderate. Conflict with the anarchists, and during the war, with the Communist's attempts to centralize what was left of the Republic, were bitter experiences for the nationalists. After the war, distrust festered underground in clandestine groups. That these attitudes could be changed (for some, not all by any means) suggests the momentum that Marxist frame had gathered.

This can be seen in the transformation of the oldest of the nationalist-separatist opposition parties, the FNC (*Front Nacional de Catalunya*). Through the early 1960s, the FNC's actions were limited to symbolic acts such as hanging Catalan flags, painting slogans, and distributing leaflets. This "testimonial work," as one respondent called it, continued until the university section took up the social question on their own and established contact with illegal union organizations called Workers' Commissions. As the number of young militants increased, attracted by the combination of nationalism and socialism in the mold of the Basque nationalist ETA, so too did the pressure to define the FNC in a more specifically Marxist way.

Older members were progressive, but not Marxist. They however saw the value of the young militants—whom they called the "shock troops"—and made allowances. The FNC declared for Socialism in 1964. In November, the phrase, "For a Free and Socialist Catalonia" appeared on the masthead of the clandestine newsletter.[2] For their part, the younger members waved the banner of revolutionary Marxism and Catalan independence, and saw the "men with the pipes," as the students called the leadership, hopelessly out of touch. In 1968, the organization split down generational lines. A new party was formed called the Socialist Party of National Liberation (*Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional*, or PSAN).

The leit motif of the PSAN was the combination of the nationalist struggle against centralizing authoritarianism with the working-class struggle, or "national oppression and class oppression," in the words of a respondent. It represents the prototypical frame realignment between nationalism and Marxism that was accomplished by other parties and opposition groups in varying forms and intensity. The Communists echoed it in their leaflets that conspicuously displayed nationalist symbols. The Catalan Socialist Party used to it justify their demands for cultural and political rights with socialism. Another nationalist group called CC (variously interpreted as *Cristian Catalans* or *Comunitat Catalana*) fissured over the issue. The majority of the members formed a Marxist party called *Forces Socialistes Federals*, and kept their nationalist activities as a sideline.

## Catalanism as a Total Opposition

Frame alignment of Catalan nationalism as a legitimate means to oppose the Francoist regime occurred on two levels. First, public assertions of nationalist demands had to be redefined as appropriate behavior for the large Catalan middle class. Up until that time, their quiescence had by default been a source of legitimation for the regime. Second, Catalan nationalism had to be rendered acceptable to the large proportion of non-Catalans living in the region. At least to gain an ear for their program of political and cultural autonomy, nationalists had to prove their oppositional credentials, so to speak, at the front line of anti-Francoist militancy.

Between 1958 and 1965 dual forces of change pressed in from outside the borders of Catalonia: (1) a legitimization of national rights emanating from the Second Vatican Council; and (2) the demonstration effect of minority-national activism in the Basque region, although there was little contact, and elsewhere in Quebec, Scotland, Wales, and Brittany. The result was an escalation of nationalist protests and the increasing politicization of Catalan "high culture"—poetry, literature, and the plastic arts.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a series of events crystallized the anti-Francoist militancy of the middle-class nationalist sector. During 1959 and

1960, Pope John XXIII's defense of minority cultural rights legitimated the defense of Catalan language and culture at the highest levels of the church. Underground flyers from illegal Catalanist groups commonly referred to statements by the Pope. For example, from a document titled "The Regime in not Christian" dated 1960,

> A fundamental cause of unrest in our day is the systematic oppression of cultural and linguistic characteristics of national minorities (John XXIII—Christmas message, 12/23/59) [CEHI, F/B 1960].

With the encouragement of some Aurelio clerics, most notably the Abbot of the Montserrat Monastery, Dom Maria Escarré, many middle-class Catholics were nudged out of the security of their household to voice their nationalist sentiments. In March 1959, several thousand laymen, mostly youths, traveled to Montserrat to affirm their adhesion to the Pope's position of linguistic rights. The prohibited "Hymn to the Catalan Flag" was sung during the public ceremony, leading to several arrests.

In mid-1959, an important Francoist, Luis Galinsoga, editor of the major newspaper in Barcelona, *La Vanguardia*, rose during a Sunday mass to protest the use of Catalan. He stormed out of the church exclaiming that, "All Catalans are shit." This ethnic slur by a loyal Francoist, taken in the context of the debate of linguistic rights, led to a massive campaign demanding Galinsoga's dismissal. Numerous flyers, most of which were reproduced on typewriters using carbon paper, were distributed urging the boycott of *La Vanguardia*. One such flyer read:

> Do Not Buy La Vanguardia
>
> For personal dignity, stop buying La Vanguardia while Galinsoga is director. If you are a subscriber, don't pick it up from the ground when it is delivered (CEHI, F/B 1959).

Other notices directed people to gather at specific locations, and *en masse* tear up copies of *La Vanguardia*. It was reported that streets and bars were littered with newspapers and leaflets. In one week, advertising revenue fell by ten thousand dollars. Sales at newsstands had virtually stopped. The campaign continued through December and January, and on February 5 1960, Galinsoga was removed as editor (see Fabre, Huertas, Ribas 1978, pp. 237-253 for a fuller account).

Later that year, twenty young Catalans were arrested for leading an illegal nationalist song at a public concert. Some were beaten and tortured, including Jordi Pujol, later elected President of the *Generalitat* in 1980 (see Wirth 1981, pp. 87-111; and Crexell 1982, pp. 77-106). The significance of this event was that Pujol and his associates were not communists, anarchists, or immigrant workers on strike, but young, middle-class, Catholic Catalans who had gone

further in their activism than most other members of their class. While earlier demonstrations at Montserrat, the Galinsoga campaign, and the concert itself were expressions of middle-class discontent, these arrests represented an unprecedented assault (through their children) on a class whose quiescence the government had taken for granted.

The indignation felt when some of their own had been arrested and tortured is apparent in the subsequent events (Crexell 1982, pp. 107-130). An estimated two thousand people gathered at the residence of the bishop of Barcelona, singing hymns and praying for the release of the prisoners. Participants presented a letter describing the tortures to provoke the bishop's intervention. Masses were held each night from the time of Pujol's arrest to the court-martial. When Pujol was sentenced to prison, a protest campaign was organized.

During the same period, Catalan intellectual and cultural elites became increasingly politicized, and took greater risks on behalf of the opposition. Since the end of the Civil War, they had clandestinely organized to protect and promote the culture in the face of anti-Catalan policies (Triadú 1978; Guardiola 1980), but as restrictions were relaxed in the 1960s, intellectuals assumed increasingly political postures, using the media of signed letters and manifestos. One of the first surfaced at the university in 1960, addressed "to all the professors and all persons interested in the diffusion of culture." The letter was signed by one-hundred Catalanists, several whom were well known poets, writers, professors and educators. In 1962, one hundred eighty-five Catalan intellectuals signed a letter protesting the repression of the Asturias strike and calling for "complete liberty" for all of Spain's national minorities. Here nationalist and working-class concerns were mixed, as they frequently were in later documents (see Guardiola 1980, for a chronology of cultural protests).

## Nationalism and the Immigrant Working Class

The alignment of working-class demands with the nationalist movement is perhaps the most fragile of four components of the master frame. While triple cleavages of class, culture and language posed continual threats to reconciliation, and while respondents reported linguistic misunderstandings in meetings, it is a testimony to the constraining influence of the master frame that the opposition held together as it did.[3]

While working-class support of the nationalist platform was widely recognized, it was typically dismissed in terms of the utilitarian calculus. The reasoning was as follows: the Franco regime prohibited collective bargaining and treated strikes as insurrection. Working class militants were commonly arrested and tortured in Francoist jails, and in several instances workers were killed during illegal strikes. In a democratic context, rights to organize and to strike would be guaranteed, and progressive social programs achievable

through pluralist competition. An anti-Francoist front therefore must include the entire democratic opposition, including the Catalan nationalists, to confront the regime as strongly as possible.

While it is well documented that the illegal Catalan Communist Party and the grass roots unions called the Workers' Commissions officially supported the nationalist platform, and even encouraged participation at nationalist rallies, support by the immigrant working class cannot be understood by a strategic and utilitarian rationale alone. At least one survey shows that organizational discipline was not a factor in working class participation in one large nationalist demonstration (Solé 1981, p. 245). Moreover, immigrant workers were ordered by their unions to demonstrate at nationalist rallies tells us little about why they enthusiastically sang songs in Catalan, applauded militant poems in Catalan (that they barely understood), or why they dressed their children in T-shirts with the Catalan colors.

To explain this, rational strategy at the organizational level must be understood in terms of a complex set of interpretations at the level of the individual. Social movement frames are, after all, cognitive schemata, and here the inherently ambivalent experience of immigration to Catolonia comprised the base from which costs and benefits were calculated. During the boom of the 1960s, Catalonia was the proverbial land of opportunity for many immigrants. Earlier waves of immigraion had been successfully assimilated, both linguistically and culturally (Candel 1964). Woolard (1989) points out that learning Catalan opened doors to occupational advancement for immigrants. Conflict was present in that assimilation was interpreted by other immigrants as a betrayal one's roots and as a measure of pretensions of upward mobility. Thus, there were strong solidarity factors that worked against assimilation into Catalan culture, while at the same time aspirations for upward mobility, as modest as they were, had been what motivated immigration in the first place. To complicate the conflict further, through the lens of the Marxist frame, this land of opportunity was also the bastion of capitalist oppression. These paradoxes were nicely reflected in one interview with an immigrant worker who had been a union organizer and a militant in a Marxist party. His responses vacillated between reflection of working-class identity and his appreciation of new found opportunities in Catalonia. In the end, he boasted that he spoke Catalan, and that his son did too; and that indeed his son, "is Catalan, as it should be."

This conflict between working-class solidarity and immigrant aspirations imparted a certain "elastic" and situational quality to immigrant support of Catalan nationalism. The point is that while rational calculation certainly played a role for some, without an understanding of what Catalonia meant to many immigrants, one is at a loss to explain the enthusiasm they sometimes demonstrated in nationalist support.[4]

This is poignantly demonstrated by an event that occurred at the height of mobilization in 1975. As a show of solidarity with the working class, Catalan intellectuals organized the First People's Festival of Catalan Poetry. Seventy-nine Catalan poets read to an audience of about four thousand working-class immigrants. While all the poetry was recited in Catalan, by conservative estimate only about half the audience spoke Catalan. Several accounts describe "tremendous communication" with the audience, and "eerie silences" during the readings, followed by thunderous applause and cries of "Liberty and Amnesty." Above all, this must be understood in terms of how the audience defined it. Respondents reported low bloc attendance, which moderates explanations of party discipline and calls for participation by unions. Nor does class interest explain why immigrants sat through two hours of Catalan poetry that most did not understand. Rather, interviews suggest that answers are to be found in the more personal aspects of frame alignment as they pertain to aspirations for the future in Catalonia, for oneself and for one's family. The "eerie silence" can be said to reflect both this and a respectful recognition of the anti-Francoist legacy of the nationalist opposition.

## THE MASTER FRAME AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The master frame of the Catalan opposition sets it apart from the opposition in the rest of Spain, and especially from its sister movement in the Basque region. Clark (1979, p. 247) characterizes the major problem of the Basque opposition as the failure to reconcile class and ethnicity. Like Catalonia, the Basque region has a large immigrant population, but it is apparent that no frame alignment occurred between immigrants and nationalists. In 1967, Basque Workers' Commissions refused to support the nationalist platform. This cleavage was reflected a decade later in the first parliamentary elections in 1977 when Basque returns were fragmented along the political spectrum.[5] The Basque Nationalist Party received 24 percent of the vote in the four Basque provinces, as against 36 percent for the state-wide parties of the left. Only 11 percent went for the various nationalist-left parties, and 28 percent for the Spanish center-right parties. In the regional elections of March 1980, political fragmentation reached unprecedented levels. No less than six parties obtained 6 percent or more of the popular vote. Moreover, political moderation suffered as the pro-ETA Herri Batasuna increased its share of votes from 16 percent to 38 percent. As Newton (1983, p. 116) observes, "25% of all voters who consider themselves to be Basques pure and simply [as opposed to both Spanish and Basque] are to be found in . . . Herri Batasuna." This is opposed to 4 percent in the inconsequential radical separatist party in Catalonia.[6]

Failure to rework ideological divisions also condemned the Basque opposition to organizational structure that was strongly linked to the past. The Basque government-in-exile continued to play an important role in the opposition (Clark 1979, pp. 116-121, 259). While a Catalan government-in-exile also existed throughout the 40 years of Francoism, it remained unreconciled to the emergent unitary frame, and as a result was left behind as new oppositional organizations emerged.[7] However, the most outstanding difference between the two regions is the role of the terrorist ETA in the Basque region. The lack of reconciliation between the left and nationalist oppositions can be said to have opened the way for the ETA to dominate the Basque opposition.[8]

The unitary master frame in Catalonia also contrasts with the rest of Spain where competition between parties broke out in full force early on. It would be incorrect to say that a shared sense of unity did not exist at all in national politics, but it was short-lived and usually tied to specific events in the democratic transition. For example, two months of unity were apparent after the first democratic elections on June 15, 1977. Also, the failed coup attempt of February 23, 1981 rallied the parties in support of democracy. In contrast, the first unitary organization created in Catalonia occurred in 1969, later followed by a broader umbrella group called the Assembly of Catalonia in 1971 (Colomer i Calsina 1976). It was not until July 1974 that a state-wide unitary group, the Democratic Junta, was formed, but even so the Socialists, Christian Democrats, and several other parties remained outside (Carr and Fusi 1979, p. 201). In June 1975 an alternative organization called Democratic Convergence was formed. It was dominated by the Spanish Socialists, but the Christian Democrats remained aloof. Finally, five years after the Assembly of Catalonia, the two competing organizations joined to form the Democratic Coordination (popularly known as the "*platajunta*") on March 26, 1976.

As Preston (1986, p. 85) observed, the "Platajunta's" unity was achieved by weighing the strategies for transition in light of several factors: the strength of the government, the strength of the working-class, and threats of military intervention. It appears that coalition formation in Spain as a whole proceeded much more according to rational calculation than it did in Catalonia. Moreover, judging from the Spanish case, the ties that bound self-interested parties seemed weaker than those predicated on a master frame. As early as a month after the formation of the "Platajunta," the democratic opposition showed signs of thinking beyond their new-founded coalition and began "staking out precise positions for a possible democratic future" and full-blown competition between parties (Preston 1986, p. 86).[9]

In sum, nationalist oppositions and pluralist politics comprise entirely different contexts for action in which not only frames of interpretation change but also the more objective considerations of power and resources come into play. Neither master frames nor resources by themselves explain the shape and

development of mobilization, but as has been argued regarding the Catalan case, there are circumstances where interpretative processes have significant effects, not only on mobilization but on the events that follow. The master frame of the Catalan opposition persisted into the 1980s, well after more utilitarian politics emerged elsewhere in Spain. Catalan parties could have played politics with much more force and disregard for the unitarian norms of but a few years before, but the point is that they did not. Despite overlapping class, ethnic and linguistic cleavages, politics did not fragment like the Basque region, or worse, completely breakdown like Ulster or Beirut.

## NOTES

1. This study is based on archival research and eighty-two interviews with nationalist and working-class militants. interviews were conducted in Catalonia throughout 1981. The sample was purposive to achieve a distribution of ages, political orientation, and membership in the important organizations. Clandestine leaflets, flyers, bulletins and newsletters were also an important data source. They are filed at the archives of Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacionals (CEHI), at the University of Barcelona. References in the text are presented as (CEHI F/B, 1960). This refers to the "Fulls i Butlletins" section, file for 1960.

2. The press in 1964 was still subject to strict censorship. It was not until 1967 that a press law was instituted that did away with the need to submit all materials to prior censorship (although post hoc censorship, inconsistently applied, continued). However, publications by illegal political parties advocating independence and socialism were not only prohibited in 1964, but subject to military prosecution.

3. The first serious fissures in the master frane occurred along these lines in 1981 when heated debate over linguistics policies of the Generalitat occurred, but this was more than three years after pluralist political competition commenced.

4. In addition to working-class identity, immigrants often brought ethnic identity from other minority ethnic regions of Spain such as Galicia and Andalusia. Also, while Catalonia represented a way out of rural poverty for many, immigrants also experienced the kind of prejudice typical to entry at the bottom of the occupational ladder. For a fuller treatment of these issues, see Johnston, forthcoming, chapter seven.

5. Although the state-wide Socialist Party, the PSOE, supported restoration of the Basque 1936 Statute of Autonomy in its 1977 campaign, unlike Catalonia, it has been observed that this fell short of the kind of support Basque nationalists would have wanted in the areas of cultural and linguistic programs (Clark 1979, p. 337).

6. I refer to the *Bloc d'Esquerres per l'Alliberament Nacional*, or Leftist Bloc for National Liberation. Another indication of the fragmentation of Basue politics was when, in response to the mindless ETA violence of 1980, the Basque parties formed the Front for Peace. The PNV, uncomfortable with participation of the center parties pulled out. Herri Batasuna, fresh from an ominous second place showing in the municipal elections the previous year, did not participate. Indeed, HB militants had blocked and stoned an all-party peace march through San Sebastian on November 9, 1980.

7. In 1979, the 78-year-old President of the *Generalitat* in exile, Josep Tarradellas was rehabilitated by the Madrid government led by Adolfo Suárez. In a politically astute maneuver, Suárez brought Tarradellas to Madrid and gained concessions in return for the immediate reinstitution of the *Generalitat* under Tarradellas's leadership. The move actually played upon the unitary frame in Catalonia, for no one could deny the heroic (and quixotic) nationalism and

anti-Francoism of Tarradellas, but it also undercut the strength of left-national parties in Catalonia that had a mandate to pursue their own agenda for autonomy, a prospect not agreeable to Suárez.

8. The issue of the ETA dominated relations betweent he Basque region and Madrid during the Suárez's interregnum. In the late 1960s, there was extensive implicit Basque support for the ETA. Reasons for this are complex, but in part derived from ETA's Robin Hood-like opposition to the regime. After Franco's death, amnesty for ETA militants, many of whom were guilty of "crimes of blood," was a burning issue in the Basque region, even though the great majority of the Basque population could not identify with the increasingly violent tactics of the group. Amensty for imprisoned ETA militants was widely supported, and pursued by the PNV and amnesty groups almost blindly with respect to political effects in Spain as a whole. In the Basque region, it might be said that the post-Franco political vacuum was partly filled by the amnesty issue in the absence of a better organized and unitary national and working-class opposition.

9. Clearly this was the case regarding the self-destruction of majority party UCD after 1979. Its success in 1977 was as much a result of the division among the moderate opposition, and of opposition leaders' inability to come to terms, as it was an endorsement of its reforms and political platform (Carr and Fusi 1979, p. 230). In 1980, however, challenged by mounting deaths from ETA terrorism, by rumors of a military coup, and by the deteriorating economic situation (one and one-half million unemployed at the end of 1980), the UCD coalition began to fall apart. This is not the place to trace out the politics of the UCD except to note that defections and conflict continued until its massive defeat at the hands of the Socialists on October 28, 1982. It is incorrect to attribute the party's demise wholly to the weakness of utilitarian bonds and absence of a master frame. By the same token, the lack of a moral basis for the coalition certainly did not help preserve it.

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# RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE

*A Research Annual*

*Series Editor:* LOUIS KRIESBERG
*Department of Sociology*
*Syracuse University*

*Volume Editor:* METTA SPENCER
*Department of Sociology*
*University of Toronto*

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VOLUME 13 • 1991


JAI PRESS INC.

*Greenwich, Connecticut* *London, England*

*55 Old Post Road, No. 2*
*Greenwich, Connecticut 06830*

*JAI PRESS LTD.*
*118 Pentonville Road*
*London N1 9JN*
*England*



*ISBN: 1-55938-239-2*

*Manufactured in the United States of America*

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