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CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY: ELITE PATRONAGE AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLACK MOVEMENT*

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This paper critically evaluates the theory of patronage and professional social movement organizations (SMOs) advanced by McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1975, 1977) and the social control theory advanced by their critics (McAdam, 1982; Wilson, 1983; Haines 1984a, 1984b) in interpreting the development of black insurgency. Drawing on time-series analysis of the patronage of private foundations, structural facilitators, and the changing goals, organization and forms of black insurgency between 1953–1980, we find support for the social control theory insofar as: 1) the black movement was an indigenous challenge with professional SMOs playing a secondary role; 2) elite patronage was reactive and directed at moderate classical SMOs and professional SMOs; 3) this patronage professionalized the movement, strengthening the staff in classical SMOs and creating new professional SMOs; and 4) these processes did not generate movement growth and may have accelerated movement decay. Yet, contrary to the social control theory, we also found that: 1) movement decay had multiple sources, professionalization being secondary to partial success and strategic problems; and 2) professionalization may have weakened the challenge but did not transform movement goals or tactics. "Channeling" may be a more apt metaphor than "control" for analyzing the effects of patronage and professionalization on social movement development.

Resource mobilization theory has rejuvenated the study of social movements, providing new insights into their emergence, organization and outcomes. In their provocative formulation, McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1975, 1977) argued that the general upsurge of social protest during the 1960s and early 1970s was due to the rise of a new form of social movement organization: the professional social movement organization. In contrast with "classical" or mass-based SMOs, professional SMOs had outside leaders, full-time paid staff, non-existent or "paper" memberships, mobilized their resources from external or "conscience" constituencies, and attempted to "speak for" rather than mobilize direct beneficiaries. Almost immediately this interpretation of the new social movements came under attack. Critics argued that external support and the new professional SMOs were derivative, stemming from the mobilization of classical or indigenous movements and elite attempts to control the turbulence of these challenges (Perrow 1979; McAdam 1982; Wilson 1983; Jenkins 1983). Others argued that patronage professionalized the SMOs and channeled them toward moderate goals and institutionalized tactics, diffusing the possibilities of radical dissent (Piven and Cloward 1977; Helfgot 1981; McAdam 1982; Haines 1984a, 1984b; Marger 1984). Yet others were generally supportive of the McCarthy-Zald theory. Some argued that disorganized powerless groups, such as consumers, the general public, the poor and children, would otherwise be unrepresented (Lipsky 1971; Bailis 1974; Berry 1977; Vogel 1978; Mitchell 1985). Others pointed to the technical functions of professional SMOs in legal advocacy and policy research (Carden 1977; Gelb and Palley 1982). And, most significant, several argued that favorable elite intervention was essential for social movement success, providing the legitimacy and leverage for critical victories (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Aveni 1978; Barkan 1984).

This discussion remains inconclusive. The critics (McAdam 1982; Haines 1984a, 1984b) have focused largely on the origins and impact of elite patronage, missing the central concern in the McCarthy-Zald theory: the rise and impact of the professional SMOs. Nor have these critics distinguished between two versions of the social

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control thesis: control as the intention of patrons vs. control as the consequence of patronage. Meanwhile, the students of the professional SMOs (Berry 1977; Vogel 1978; Pertchuk 1982) have largely ignored the social control argument. And, while we have rich case studies of organizational transformation (Helfgot 1981; Marger 1984), no one has assessed the impact of professionalization on an entire social movement. There are also methodological problems. No one has fully tapped the complex range of motives and interests that enter into patronage for social movements. And most of these studies have not dealt with temporal processes, relying instead on cross-sectional data.

We attempt to fill these gaps by offering a systematic analysis of the role of elite patronage and professional SMOs in the rise and development of the black movement. In making this application, we assume that the McCarthy-Zald theory should encompass post-WW II black insurgency. Unfortunately, McCarthy and Zald never clearly specified the particular movements to which their theory applied, asserting simply that: "The professional social movement is *the common form* of recent social movements" (1973, p. 20, emphasis added). Although it is possible that the black movement was atypical of the 1960s/70s movements, it spawned a wide range of movement activity and probably was the most successful challenge of the stormy sixties. Any theory purporting to provide a general interpretation of the social movements of the 1960s/70s should be able to interpret the central movement of this period.

ELITE PATRONAGE AND THE THEORY OF PROFESSIONAL SMOS

The crux of McCarthy and Zald's theory is the contrast between "classical" or indigenous SMOs mobilizing resources from direct beneficiaries, and professional SMOs "which direct resource appeals primarily toward conscience adherents and utilize few constituents for organizational labor" (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1223). Classical SMOs depend largely on the volunteer labor of direct beneficiaries; professional SMOs, on cadre activities supported by outside donations.[1]

Drawing on entrepreneurial theories of organizational formation (Olson 1965; Salisbury 1969) and Moynihan's (1969) thesis of a "professionalization of reform," McCarthy and Zald advanced on entrepreneurial/structural facilitation interpretation of the rise of this new form of SMO. Professional SMOs emerged because of an expanding supply of resources, chiefly political entrepreneurs and discretionary resources. The growth of the welfare state created favorable niches for a growing cadre of critical intellectuals advocating the extension of social welfare programs for the poor and excluded. Professionalization and the expansion of higher education created a growing pool of transitory activists with discretionary time-schedules and income. Economic affluence provided social welfare organizations such as foundations, universities, churches and government agencies with discretionary resources to invest in professional SMOs. A permeable mass media and new mobilization techniques such as direct-mail fundraising and grassroots lobbying gave these entrepreneurs new tools to publicize ideal-real gaps and mobilize otherwise dispersed sympathizers.

Although aware that support for professional SMOs might "diffus(e) the radical possibilities of dissent . . . by applying large amounts of resources . . . in ameliorative directions" (1973, p. 26), McCarthy and Zald's general emphasis upon resources implied that professional SMOs would contribute to social movement development. Although issue-attention cycles might create instability for specific SMOs, the professional SMOs would flourish as long as the structural supply of entrepreneurs and discretionary resources persisted.

The McCarthy-Zald theory, then, rested on five major propositions. (1) The historical tend is towards the dominance of professional SMOs. The new social movements of the 1960s/70s were centered around professional SMOs which, in turn, were the major actors behind the general wave of social protests. (2) The primary motive or interest behind the patronage of outsiders was that of "conscience" or philanthropic concern about the plight of the deprived. Direct or particularistic interests such as social control were not primary concerns. (3) Patronage contributed to social movement development, launching new professional SMOs and furnishing technical resources. (4) This "bureaucratization of social discontent" stemmed from facilitative structural trends (the growth of the welfare state, professionalization, accessible mass media and increasing discretionary resources) and the efforts of the new political entrepreneurs. (5) The professional SMOs had a net beneficial impact on social movement development, performing critical technical functions and insuring the "representation of the unrepresented."

Each of these theses has come under critical

[1] We use McCarthy and Zald's inclusive definition of a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some element of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (1977, pp. 1217–18). SMOs, then, are formal organizations attempting to realize these goals.

challenge (see Table 1). The major controversy has centered on the trend argument. The critics argued that the new social movements were indigenous challenges organized around classical SMOs. Morris (1981, 1984) and McAdam (1982) argued that the civil rights movement was launched by indigenous leadership and primarily mobilized the southern black community. Jenkins (1983; forthcoming) generalized the argument to the entire wave of new movements. Although professional SMOs like the NAACP-Legal Defense Fund and the Environmental Defense Fund did become more prominent, these SMOs were neither central initiators nor the major organizational vehicles for the challenges. While professional cadres supported by patrons were critical in initiating the student and women's movements, they quickly turned towards indigenous organizing (Sale 1973; Carden 1974; Freeman 1975). Several professional SMOs were also created in later stages of movement development as specialized staff auxiliaries of classical SMOs (Costain 1981; Kleidman 1984). In fact, the strongest case for the initiatory role of professional SMOs has been in movements pursuing collective goods for the general public lacking a natural community basis for mobilization, such as consumer rights and environmental protection (in which, strictly speaking, there is no conscience constituency; all citizens are purportedly direct beneficiaries), and challenges advancing the interests of the most disorganized and deprived groups (e.g. the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty and the Children's Defense Fund).

The second point of contention has been the interests behind social movement patronage, especially that of elites. McCarthy and Zald borrowed on Harrington's (1968) portrait of the white liberal sympathizers of the civil rights movement and Lipsky's (1971) theory of protest to argue that patronage stemmed from universalistic public-regarding values or "conscience" pricked by images of social injustice. Conscience constituents were outsiders or third parties who "did not stand to benefit directly from (the movement's) success" (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1222). In contrast, McAdam argued that social control was the paramount consideration for external support: "elite involvement would seem to occur only as a response to the threat posed by the generation of a mass-based social movement" (1982, p. 26). In support of this contention, the critics could point to notable cases, such as the Kennedy administration's solicitation of foundation sponsorship for the voter registration campaigns (Meier and Rudwick 1973, pp. 172–76), which was explicitly aimed at channeling disruptive "direct actions" into more institutionalized actions.

Inferring the interests behind patronage is, however, hazardous. Since most patronage is probably reactive to movement actions, we cannot rely (as McAdam [1982] did) solely on its timing. At the same time, open declarations of intent, typically framed in philanthropic terms, are inherently suspect. Haines' (1984a, 1984b) solution was to analyze the types of patrons and the goals of sponsored organizations, showing that elite patrons (private foundations and government agencies) supported the moderate civil right organizations in response to the "radical flank" threat of the militants, while non-elites (churches, unions and small individual donors) spread their support evenly. Yet Haines did not specifically single out the professional SMOs for analysis. Nor did he provide direct evidence on the motives of

Table 1. Main Theses on Patronage and Professional SMOs

Dimensions	McCarthy & Zald	Their Critics
1. The modal organization of the 1960s/70s movements:	Professional SMOs	Indigenous movements w/classical SMOs
2. The sources of patronage:	Conscience and discretionary resources	Social control
3. The impact of patronage:	Promotion of social movement growth	Professionalization and channeling towards moderate goals & institutional tactics
4. Sources of the emergence of professional SMOs:	Structural facilitation Entrepreneurship	Political instability created by indigenous movements a. radicalization b. unruliness
5. The impact of professional SMOs	Favorable: a. technical functions b. represent the unrepresented c. movement growth	Unfavorable: a. moderate goals b. institutional tactics c. movement decay

patrons. Although we rely primarily upon the same method here, namely, the timing and distribution of patronage, it is important to recognize the indirect nature of this evidence as a basis for imputing motives. In line with this social control argument, we would expect the primary recipients of elite patronage to be professional SMOs, with secondary support going to classical SMOs with moderate goals and institutionalized tactics. If elites are primarily concerned with social control, this patronage should be stimulated by rapid growth in unruliness and radical demands. Finally, we should also entertain the possibility that patrons have multiple or complex interests. The Kennedy administration's interventions on behalf of the civil rights movement were rooted in at least two concerns: controlling volatile protests, and securing black votes. Non-elite concerns have been even more complex. Jewish support for the civil rights movement reflected both universalistic concerns about civil liberties and particularistic concerns about racial discrimination (Pinckney 1968; Marx and Useem 1971). The United Auto Worker Union's sponsored civil rights activists, SDS and the National Organization for Women out of the staff's ideological commitments as well as a political stake in the left-labor political coalition.

How has elite patronage shaped social movement development? Although McCarthy and Zald recognized the possibility of social control effects, their general emphasis on resources is suggested. The critics have raised three major points. First, patronage may be detrimental to the indigenous mobilization of classical SMOs. McAdam (1982, pp. 167–68) argued that elite support for the civil rights movement diverted leaders from indigenous organizing and exacerbated inter-organizational rivalries, thereby promoting movement decay (see also Marger 1985). Second, elites will restructure professional SMOs that become embroiled in protest. Helfgot's (1981) analysis of the Mobilization for Youth Project on New York's Lower East Side and Rose's (1976) assessment of the Community Action Projects showed that elite sponsors transformed professional SMOs into innocuous service agencies as soon as they moved towards indigenous organizing. Third, and most broadly, several critics have argued that elite sponsorship of professional SMOs has restructured the general system for representing political interests (Wolfe 1977, pp. 148–49; Handler 1978; and Wilson 1983). Although the U.S. is a relatively unfavorable context for a fully developed neo-corporatist system, sustained elite-sponsorship of professional SMOs does provide control over the representation of excluded and marginal groups, and might be seen as moving the political interest system in a neo-corporatist direction.

The final[2] point of contention has been the emergence of the professional SMOs. Although all agree that patronage and entrepreneurship are critical to the emergence of professional SMOs, the critics have challenged the McCarthy and Zald thesis by advancing a political interpretation of patronage. The rise of indigenous movements generates political pressures that threaten elites, thereby giving rise to sponsorship for professional SMOs (McAdam 1982). Or, in a more benign formulation, indigenous movements create professional SMOs as temporary organizational fronts to perform specialized technical and coalitional functions (Kleidman 1984). At critical junctures, elites invest in these projects to reestablish political stability.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE BLACK MOVEMENT

The bus boycotts in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in June 1953 and Montgomery, Alabama, in 1955–56 were the opening moves in the development of the first sustained challenge to white supremacy in the South since the installation of Jim Crow in the late 19th century (Sitkoff 1981; McAdam 1982, ch. 5; Morris 1984, ch. 2). Over the next five years, the black insurgency spread rapidly throughout the South, setting off consumer boycotts and attempts to capitalize on the *Brown vs. the Board of Education* victory. Throughout, indigenous support was central, patronage minimal, and the professional SMOs played a secondary support role. "Local movement centers" (Morris 1981) furnished the major impetus: an informal network of local churches, student groups and black social clubs.

The second phase began on February 1, 1960 with a student sit-in at a Woolworth's lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, sparking a lightning wave of sit-ins that spread throughout the South, and culminated in the violently-attacked freedom rides and the multi-faceted mass action campaigns in Albany, Georgia, Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, the March on Washington in April 1963, and the Mississippi Freedom campaign in the summer of 1964. These campaigns eventually cracked the Jim Crow system, pressuring federal courts to desegregate public facilities and inter-state transportation and Congress to pass the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. By 1964,

[2] Mitchell (1985) levelled a fourth criticism, challenging the thesis of an "issue attention cycle" by pointing to the stable funding of the major environmental organizations by isolated adherents.

insurgency spread into the small town backwaters of the deep South with voter registration campaigns, the launching of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and, in response to white economic retaliation, a new set of community economic development projects such as the Mississippi Quilting Coop and the Federation of Southern Cooperatives. White patronage came in several forms, from foundation support of the Voter Education Project, small direct-mail donations, to a massive influx of white clergy and student volunteers. While this outpouring grew steadily, the movement remained indigenous, restructuring around the classical SMOs: the SCLC, NAACP, CORE and SNCC.[3] Professional SMOs, most notably the NAACP-Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Southern Regional Council, provided legal representation and negotiated with southern elites. Yet the impetus remained in the hands of the indigenous groups and classical SMOs, professional SMOs playing a strictly supportive role.

These struggles also marked the movement's apogee. While the movement's decline had multiple sources, virtually all observers agree that three interrelated developments were critical: partial victories that demobilized the moderates; the militant's shift to a new "northern strategy"; and a white backlash that created a restrictive political environment.

The passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 provided the moderate wing of the movement with major victories, signalling that the black civil rights would now be protected by the federal government. For many of the moderates, insurgency was no longer necessary and, in fact, might prove counter-productive by provoking a white backlash. In this view, the movement should shift "from protest to politics" (Rustin 1965) by focusing on the implementation of these gains and using institutional tactics, especially Congressional lobbying and electoral support of the Democratic Party.

Simultaneously, militant leaders adopted a new "northern strategy," redefining the social base of the movement as the black underclass of the northern ghettoes and the major target as the "tangled web of urban racism." In place of non-violent "direct actions" carried out by disciplined cadres, the militants advocated mass protests, the spread of the urban riots and occasional urban guerilla activity. By adopting the rhetoric of "black power," these leaders signalled their shift from integration and civil rights goals to black nationalism and the conquest of political and economic power. This new "northern strategy," however, presented major mobilization obstacles. The black urban underclass possessed much weaker community institutions. Any serious attack on black powerlessness ultimately required a comprehensive redistribution of social power, and hence required a sustained attack on the most powerful and entrenched institutions in the nation—the large corporations, the national political parties, the big city urban machines, and, not least, the white majority.

The strategic shift also weakened the major SMOs. The "direct action" cadre or organizations—CORE and the SNCC—were the most seriously affected, shrinking into small cliques of dedicated militants. Adopting a black nationalist rhetoric, the leadership purged whites from the professional staff and spurned patronage, precipitating an organizational collapse (Meier and Rudwick 1973; Carson 1981). Although the SCLC persisted, the Chicago campaigns of 1967 failed to generate clear victories, King's outspoken criticisms of the Vietnam war alienated former white patrons and, after King's assassination, the organization atrophied amid internal disputes (Oates 1981). In the NAACP, a rump caucus of dissident students and adult chapter leaders disrupted the 1968 convention, pressing for a shift from litigation to "direct action" and a focus on the black underclass (Rudwick and Meier 1970). Shortly afterwards, dissident staff in the NAACP-Legal Defense Fund were forced to resign after protesting the constraints of working through the courts.[4] Yet, as we see, the moderate SMOs emerged with vastly expanded organizational resources, largely attributable to a major increase in elite patronage and political recognition (Aveni 1978; Haines 1984a).

Militancy and radical demands also provoked a political backlash, eventually culminating in a restrictive political environment that discouraged insurgency. Former allies backed away and the federal government launched a campaign of repression, ranging from the violent suppression of the urban riots to the infiltration and sabotage of the COINTEL and Operation Chaos Programs (Marx 1979). By the end of the decade, the political environment had become restrictive.

Despite the decline, the movement succeeded in institutionalizing significant gains during the early 1970s. Blacks became an important voter bloc, participating at higher rates than whites of the same socio-economic status and the number of black office holders rose rapidly (Orum 1966; Lawson 1976). Although the socio-economic

[3] We have treated CORE and SNCC as classical SMOs despite their reliance on cadre labor and external support because they relied primarily on indigenous support.

[4] January 13, 1969, *New York Times*.

gap between blacks and whites remained glaringly wide, significant progress against the most overt forms of racial discrimination in education and employment gradually became evident (Farley 1977; Burstein 1985). Paradoxically, these incremental gains may well have accelerated the insurgent decline, encouraging moderates to believe that insider methods would be more effective.

What role, then, did elite patronage and professional SMOs play in these processes? Past researchers (McAdam 1982; Haines 1984a, 1984b) have shown that elite patrons invested overwhelmingly in the moderate SMOs, strengthening their technical capacities. Since the staff was primarily involved in litigation, lobbying and policy research, this should have strengthened the focus on institutionalized tactics. A new series of professional SMOs also blossomed: Kenneth Clark's Metropolitan Research Corporation (MARC); the Joint Center for Political Studies; Suburban Action; the Martin Luther King Center; the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization; and the National Urban Coalition. The political impact of these new professional SMOs, however, remains unanalyzed. In fact, aside from Burstein (1985), there has been little research on the black movement during the 1970s, the period in which the facilitation of the social control effects of patronage and professional SMOs should have become fully visible.

METHOD AND DATA

The major arguments about the rise and impact of elite patronage and the professional SMOs center on historical changes in the relationships between the movement actors and their patrons. What roles did indigenous groups, classical SMOs and professional SMOs play in the rise of the movement? What spurred the growth in elite patronage? What kinds of SMOs were the primary recipients? What SMOs received patronage during the decline? What role did different actors play in the decay of the movement? In short, we need to know the role of these actors in the different phases of the black movement: the rise of the movement (1953–1960); the period of organizational expansion and mass mobilization (1961–65); the shift in strategy and early decline (1966–70); and the period in which social control effects should have become evident (1971–1980).

To answer these questions, we constructed four sets of annualized time-series: 1) the trends in movement actions, specifically the incidence, goals, organization and tactics of black movement actors during 1948–80; 2) the incidence of black urban riots; 3) the trends in foundation grants supporting the civil rights movement for 1953–80 broken down by type and name of SMO; and 4) indicators of McCarthy-Zald's structural facilitation and entrepreneurial factors. The major propositions can be evaluated by simply inspecting annualized time-series on these dimensions. Where the precise temporal development is central, we used correlation techniques with time-lags. If, for example, McCarthy and Zald are correct that patronage stimulated movement growth, this should be evident from the lead of patronage over movement actions. Or if the critics are correct that the threat of indigenous protest spurred the growth in patronage, the reverse should hold. Similarly, if professional SMOs were the by-product of elite patronage, patronage should lead actions of professional SMOs.

We constructed the major data series by content analysis. The movement action series rested on content analysis of the abstracts of news stories recorded in *The New York Times Annual Index*.[5] Only movement-initiated events were coded. In other words, movement reactions to the controls of local police or courts were not coded unless the movement responded proactively. Each event was coded in terms of the organization of the acting unit and the major issue involved. We distinguished five types of actors: individuals unaffiliated with formal movement groups; crowds; local community organizations (church and student groups, local chapters of national groups and ad-hoc groups); classical SMOs; and professional SMOs. We included proto-movement groups, such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the Black Catholics Association as professional SMOs, although their status is inherently ambiguous. Our primary concerns in defining a movement group were that it not be an institutionalized political actor and its goals concur with the general objectives of the black struggle. In this sense, the proto-movement groups should be viewed as part of the black struggle and their closest organizational surrogate is the professional SMOs. Our primary contrast is between indigenous groups (the first four categories) and the professional SMOs. Although cadre organizations like CORE and SNCC might appear ambiguous since they initially depended on cadre labor, we have treated them as classical SMOs because their primary mobilization focus for the study period was the black community. In coding issues, we emphasized the strategic

[5] Doug McAdam (1982, 1984) generously provided counts of movement actions for 1947–1970 from his research. We coded 1971–80 following his basic coding format. An inter-coder reliability cut-off of 90% agreement between independent coders was used for both series. McAdam used naive coders; we coded the remaining years.

shift from the integration struggle to the attack on black powerlessness by distinguishing: 1) demands for integration (public accommodations, schools, and housing); 2) demands for black power, ranging from voting rights and affirmative action to black nationalism; 3) contests against white racism, including police brutality and lack of due process; 4) scoring the general plight of black Americans; and 5) internal dissent.[6]

There are, of course, methodological limitations to newspaper-derived collective action data. As critics have pointed out (Molotch and Lester 1974; Danzger 1975; Snyder and Kelly 1977), news reportage does not perfectly "mirror" social reality. Reporters have their own interpretive frames. There is an "issue-attention" cycle by which events seen at one point as highly newsworthy are later redefined as insignificant. Yet we think that the content analysis of newspapers provides an adequate map of the macro-processes of social movement development (Gurr, 1972). Significantly, we code events, not the interpretations of these events. In other words, we are not concerned with the coloration or interpretations put on movement events by the reporters or their placement in the newspaper. What is important is that the events occurred and can be reliably coded. The major methodological concern, then, is the representativeness of the coverage. Although Danzger (1975) has documented a bias in news-derived data towards locations with news wire offices and variable sensitivity to different types of events, we think this problem relatively minor given our purposes. As he noted, there is an automatic corrective process built into the competition among the news services. Once a movement has become politically significant, its actions will be covered. In other words, we should expect some underreportage during the initial "take-off" of the movement and the tail of its decline. In addition, we would expect professional SMOs to be more adept at manipulating the media since this is central to their mobilization. If anything, these two biases should work against the conclusions that we draw below about the indigenous bases of the movement and the role of professionalization in movement decay by overstating the role of professional SMOs. In addition, Snyder and Kelly (1977) demonstrated that "hard" events, like national conferences, marches and riots, are reliably covered, while "soft" events, like occasional speeches and internal disputes, receive less consistent coverage. Insofar as the former are more central in interpreting the kinds of processes with which we are concerned, this adds additional confidence to our series. *The New York Times* coverage was also compared against other newspapers and proved a more comprehensive source of news reportage.

Our second series charts the incidence of black urban riots. We used the series compiled by Isaac and Kelly (1981, 1983) by supplementing the Lemberg Center files with the reportage of *The New York Times* and various regional newspapers.[7] The reliability should be quite high, greater than for the general movement action series since the events are "hard" and the series constructed from the cross-checking of multiple news sources.

The most significant and politically intriguing form of elite patronage has been the grants of private foundations going to social movement projects (cf. Goulden 1971; Nielsen 1972; Filer Commission 1977; McIhlany 1980; Silk and Silk 1980, ch. 4). As part of a broader study of foundation support for social movements (Jenkins 1985a), we content analyzed the annual grants of 142 private foundations that contributed to social movement efforts during the years 1953–80. We constructed the sample of foundations from the directory of the National Network of Grant Makers (Shellow 1981), a consortium of foundations promoting social change philanthropy, and extensive snowball interviewing by the senior author. We content analyzed the annual reports and, where unavailable, the IRS 990 forms for these foundations, searching for SMOs and their church and social agency allies. The annual reports provided ample description of grants to code the type of recipient organization and its objectives. As a further reliability check, we constructed a master index of SMOs from *The Encyclopedia of Associations,* Public Citizens' *Directory of Public Interest Organizations,* the Council on Economic Priorities' *Public Interest Directory* and the Public Affairs Council's *Public Interest Profiles*.

Foundation grants to social movements were coded in terms of: 1) the major social constituency targeted; 2) the type of organization; and 3) the major issues involved in the movement project. Although the full study deals with twenty-three movement constituencies, the following analysis is restricted to grants directed at black Americans, which represented 17.4 percent of the total amount of the grants and 18 percent of the grant items. Recipient organizations were coded as classical SMOs, profes-

[6] We tried to code the rise of black separatism but found it impossible to reliably identify.

[7] William Kelly generously provided the annualized riot series from his research with Larry Isaac (1981, 1983).

sional SMOs, or institutionalized actors such as churches and social agencies. Since one of our major objectives was to test the McCarthy-Zald thesis that foundation patronage initiated the new movements, we annualized all grants in which fiscal years departed from calendar years by classifying them as the earlier year. In other words, grants reported in a June 1979–July 1980 fiscal year were recorded as 1979 grants. In that way, the McCarthy-Zald theory, of which we were a priori skeptical, received the benefit of the doubt. To correct for inflation, we adjusted all financial estimates by a consumer-price index deflator. All reported financial figures are based on these deflated estimates.

As indicators of the McCarthy-Zald structural facilitation and entrepreneurship factors, we used annual measures of: 1) total giving of private foundations to all recipients according to the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel's *Giving USA* (1981); 2) changes in personal disposable income (Dept. of Commerce 1984, p. 149); and 3) the number of professional-technical workers in the national labor force (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1982). Changes in foundation contributions[8] and disposable income should tap structural facilitators of professional SMOs. Although professional-technical workers are not the only source of political entrepreneurs, McCarthy and Zald (1975) see them as the major pool of "critical intellectuals" behind the professional SMOs. If the McCarthy-Zald theory is correct, these should have increased in the years leading up to the rise of the challenge and dropped during the movement decline.

RESULTS

The McCarthy-Zald theory is largely undermined by these data. Professional SMOs were not the modal actors at any point in the civil rights movement. Nor did they initiate the challenge, their efforts coming on the heels of indigenous actions. As Morris (1984) has argued, the challenge was initiated by the grassroots groups, especially the churches and student groups. By the early 1960s, the major classical SMOs—the SCLC, CORE, SNCC and NAACP—had become the dominant actors. The professional SMOs became prominent only after the decline of the late 1960s and even then constituted no more than 27 percent of movement actions in any one year. As McAdam (1982) argued, elite patronage was overwhelmingly reactive, spurred by the indigenous upsurge. And, extending Haines' (1984a, 1984b) observations, patronage was largely directed at the moderate classical SMOs, especially the NAACP, and the professional SMOs. Although this does not prove that the motives were social control, it does conform to the critics' prediction of a reactive response directed at moderate and professional SMOs. Private foundations are, after all, institutionalized agencies of the capitalist class and, as such, will generally be politically cautious in their support for social reform. At the minimum, their conscience donations will typically be socially circumscribed by their class interests in political stability and the preservation of capitalist institutions. The net impact of patronage and professional SMOs is more complex but, if we take the incidence of movement activity as a general index of the health of insurgency, the rise of patronage and professional SMOs did not sustain the movement and may actually have accelerated movement decay.

Figure 1 and Table 2 chart the organization of movement actors by indigenous groups (individuals, crowds, local groups and classical SMOs) and professional SMOs. Our four periods of movement development are quite visible. The civil rights movement initially emerged around local church and student groups, shifted to classical SMOs in the early 1960s, began declining in the late 1960s, and, by the 1970s, had become centered around one classical SMO—the NAACP—and a new set of professional SMOs. Overall, the civil rights movement has been indigenously based, individuals, crowds, local groups and classical SMOs making up 6 percent, 26 percent, 18 percent and 34 percent respectively of movement actions.[9] Professional SMOs did not become significant actors until the late 1960s and, even during the relatively quiescent 1970s, peaked at only 27 percent of movement actions. Professional SMOs have clearly been secondary actors.

How has this been linked to foundation patronage? The foundations have been overwhelmingly reactive, lagging considerably behind the movement. Figure 2 traces the incidence of movement actions and riots, the number of foundation grants and the amount of this patronage (in deflated $ millions). Foundation patronage did not become significant until 1961–62, five years after the 1956 take-off of the movement around the Birmingham bus boycott. Significantly, the peak of foundation

[8] Measures of foundation assets would be more accurate but were unavailable so we relied on these giving totals.

[9] These figures undercount the indigenous base during 1955–70. McAdam's coding did not distinguish classical from professional SMOs. We have therefore used his "other SMO" category as an estimate of the professional SMO actions even though it contains some classical SMOs.

Figure 1. Indigenous Groups and Professional SMOs in the Black Movement, 1947–80



patronage came in 1972–73, seven to eight years behind the peak in movement action and three to four years after the 1968 riot peak. Although the significant growth in foundation support in the early 1960s undercuts a simplistic social control thesis centering solely on the urban riots, it is clear that the patronage was overwhelmingly reactive, 59.5 percent of the total funding being concentrated in the eight years between 1967 and 1974. As a confirmation of this, we ran regressions between movement actions, protests and riots and the amount and number of foundation grants with various time-lags. The optimal fit was a five- to seven-year lag for movement actions (r^2 = .410 to .539 compared to −.035 to .269 for 0 to 4-year lags), five to six years for protests (r^2 = .396 to .321 vs. −.027 to .261 for 0 to 4 years), and no lag for the riots (r^2 = .120 vs. −.043 to .040 for 1 to 7 years). The Durbin-Watson statistic also indicated serious auto-correlated disturbances for the weaker regressions. In interviews, foundation executives confirmed that it typically took two to three years before initial moves turned into grants, supporting the interpretation that the foundations were responding to movement initiatives. Clearly, elite patronage did not initiate the civil rights movement. Although increasing political opportunities (e.g. favorable Supreme Court decisions, White House and Congressional civil rights bills) did facilitate the rise of the movement, these were opportunities, not direct patronage. On rise of the movement, McCarthy and Zald are clearly wrong. Both elite

Table 2. Type of Actors in the Black Movement, 1955–80

	1955–60	1961–65	1966–70	1971–80	Total
Indigenous Groups	%(N)	%(N)	%(N)	%(N)	%(N)
Individuals	2 (18)	4 (77)	7 (110)	10 (131)	6 (336)
Crowds	22 (165)	33 (720)	31 (481)	12 (158)	26 (1524)
Local Groups	51 (375)	13 (295)	8 (127)	17 (223)	18 (1020)
National SMOs	22 (162)	43 (938)	36 (549)	34 (447)	36 (2096)
Professional SMOs	3 (23)	8 (169)	18 (270)	27 (355)	14 (817)
Total	100 (743)	101 (2199)	100 (1537)	100 (1314)	100 (5793)

Figure 2. Black Insurgency and Foundation Grants, 1947–80



patronage and professional SMOs were secondary derivative forces.

Why did the foundations become involved in the civil rights movement? The data provide general support for the social control thesis. Not only were the grants reactive but, confirming Haines' (1984a, 1984b) thesis of a "radical flank" effect, they went overwhelmingly to the professional SMOs and the NAACP. The strategic shift in the mid-1960s also spurred the grants. The professional SMOs, which initiated only 14.1 percent of all movement actions, received 57.2 percent of the grants, while classical SMOs, which carried out 36.2 percent of the actions, garnered only 31.9 percent of the grants.[10] Over time, the distribution became even more skewed towards the professional SMOs. During the 1960s, the classical SMOs received 51.5 percent of all grants and the professional SMOs only 24.7 percent; by the 1970s, the classical SMOs garnered only 24.7 percent and the professional SMOs, 69.3 percent. The foundations also made keen discriminations among the classical SMOs, the "direct action" SMOs—SCLC, CORE and SNCC—generating 12.0 percent, 8.3 percent, and 3.8 percent respectively of movement actions during the peak of their activity (1961–1970) yet receiving only 6.6 percent, 2.5 percent and .004 percent respectively of foundation grants. In contrast, the NAACP (excluding local chapters) shunned "direct action" and conducted only 11.6 percent of social movement actions during the 1960s yet received an impressive 14.9 percent of all grants. This became even more pronounced during the 1970s, the NAACP conducting only 15.5 percent of movement actions yet receiving 26.3 percent of all foundation support, making it second only to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in its patronage.

This "radical flank" effect is further visible from the actions and grants of particular SMOs (Figures 3–5). In general, the strategic turn spurred a massive outpouring of foundation patronage for moderate NAACP and the professional SMOs in the late 1960s (Figures 3 and 4). This strategic turn rested on three interrelated developments: the general upsurge in movement activity (Figure 1); the explosion of unruliness, especially the protest peak in 1965 and the riot pinnacle of 1967–69 (Figure 5); and the move towards "black power" issues that peaked at 42 percent of movement actions in 1965 and held steadily through the 1970s (Figure 6). By the late 1960s, national elites had concluded that they confronted a "social cataclysm" that necessitated major and profound social reforms (Moynihan, 1973, p. 103). This perception stemmed, at least in part, from the development of black insurgency: the general upsurge in actions; the growing militancy, especially the urban riots; and the emergence of a political

[10] These figures underestimate professional SMO patronage insofar as we excluded foundation support for the National Urban League. The Urban League was originally a social service agency, not an SMO; but, since it began to function like a professional SMO in the late 1960s, it could have been included.

Figure 3. Foundation Grants to the Classical Civil Rights SMOs, 1948–80



Figure 4. Foundation Grants to Professional SMOs, 1953–80



(VEP = Voter Education Project; NCDH = National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing; LCDC = Lawyers Committee in Defense of the Constitution; LSCR = Law Students Civil Rights Research Council)

rhetoric of empowerment. As Katznelson (1981, p. 3) described the situation:

> The very expressive, often anomic character of the daily challenges to the daily fabric—including attacks on property and police—created a mood of despair at the top of the social order that mirrored the heightened expectations of those at the bottom. The responses that were fashioned ranged from overt repression to attempts at appeasement.

In response, the foundations loosened their purse strings to the NAACP and the professional SMOs.

There is one point, however, that does not bear out the social control interpretation. Although the grants were reactive for all other SMOs, those to the SCLC moved in tandem with SCLC actions. The curves in Figures 3 and 7 indicate that SCLC patrons responded immediately to its protest campaigns, helping to fuel them, while those for the other organizations typically lagged three to four years behind. Lagged regression analysis confirmed this, no lag creating the best fit for the SCLC (r^2 = .556) while the others were either nonsignificant (CORE and SNCC) or significant only with a 2–3 year lag (NAACP; r^2 = .351 and .376). We think this suggests a more complex set of interests than social control, including a universalistic commitment to the battle against racial discrimination. In fact, we think it absurd to argue that the elite donors to the major "direct action" organizations (SCLC, CORE and SNCC), which represented $2.17 million or 12.6 percent of all foundation grants between 1961 and 1970, contributed out of the expectation that this would "control" or tame the militancy of these organizations or their leaders. These patrons must have been sincerely committed to the cause that Martin Luther King and the early leaders of CORE and the SNCC so eloquently proclaimed, in the case of the SCLC responding immediately to protests with financial support. In short, this patronage appears to fit McCarthy and Zald's conscience constituency. Their error lay in assuming that this was the dominant pattern, rather than an exception. We also think this support stemmed partially from the particularistic interests of a Jewish segment of the capitalist class concerned about racial discrimination. While we cannot prove the case, it is suggestive that 23 percent of the principal donors to the foundations in our sample were of Jewish backgrounds. This Jewish upper class has long supported liberal reforms, especially those targeted on removing racial barriers to individual participation in the broader society (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1982). Philanthropic support for the early civil rights movement could be seen as an extension of these views.

What about the factors identified by McCarthy and Zald: structural facilitation and entrepreneurship? Their impact on the movement as a whole does not appear to have been particularly direct or consistent. Figure 8 charts annual fluctuations in the rate of change in the three major indices: total foundation grants, personal disposable income, and the number of professional-technical workers. There were favorable trends in the late 1950s, especially in discretionary resources, which possibly facilitated the patronage of the early 1960s. But the relationship to the rise and decline in movement actions is not close or consistent. However, time-lagged regression analysis using absolute values did reveal consistent links to the activity of professional SMOs: disposable income ranged from r^2 = .323 to .544 for a zero- to five-year lag; foundation contributions, from .495 to .401; and professional employment, from .328 to .504. In other words, the structural facilitators did not shape the movement as a whole but did contribute to the professional SMOs. In general, political processes were more critical for the indigenous challenge and structural facilitators for professionalization.

What then was the net impact of patronage and professionalization on the movement? Judging by the capacity of the movement to sustain a high level collective action, patronage and the professional SMOs did not prevent the decline of the challenge and may well have accelerated movement decay. In either case, the McCarthy-Zald theory fares poorly. As we argued, the decay of the movement had multiple sources, the most important being the demobilization of the moderates, the obstacles confronting the "northern strategy" and the white backlash. In the short run this new strategy provoked a massive outpouring of elite patronage for the NAACP and the new professional SMOs. Yet the greatest increases in this patronage coincided with the steepest descent in movement activity. By the end of the decade, the classical SMOs had collapsed or become moribund. The NAACP dropped below 425,000 members, maintaining its political visibility only by virtue of the massive infusion of elite patronage that boosted the professional staff (Marger, 1984). The major indigenous success was Jesse Jackson's PUSH, a direct extension of King's Chicago campaign in the late 1960s. Signnificantly, PUSH fused an externally funded professional staff with a base in the urban black church. Movement action plunged from an average of 265 actions per year during the 1960s to 83 per year in the 1970s. After 1973, indigenous actors shrank to 73.5 percent of movement activity, compared to 93 percent

Figure 5. Black Unruliness, 1955–80



Figure 6. Major Issues in the Black Movement, 1955–80



Figure 7. Actions by Classical SMOs, 1961–80



during the growth phase of the movement (1955–65). Likewise, crowds fell from 30.5 percent to only 12 percent of movement actions, rioting halted, and protests fell from over 200 per year to 10–20 (Figure 5).

Yet the social control argument also has problems in explaining the persistence of black power issues and unruliness. The professional SMOs apparently took their cue from the indigenous challenge. The shift to empowerment demands held through the 1970s. 34.9 percent of all movement actions focused on the older integration concerns while 30 percent addressed the new problems of powerlessness, 32.2 percent dealt with white racism, and 19.4 percent with the general black condition (Figure 7). Nor did the patronage blunt militancy. Although rioting disappeared, this was due largely to repression and ameliorative reforms. Protests dropped but they remained 23.6 percent of movement actions, virtually identical to the 25.8 percent of the tumultous 1960s. In other words, patronage may have accelerated the overall decline, but it did not restructure the movement's agenda or tactics.

Although the movement continued to score victories in school integration and employment discrimination cases, these were primarily a question of implementing prior victories, a set of tasks for which the professional SMOs were well suited. Black conditions did gradually improve during the 1970s (Farley 1976; Burstein 1985). Yet there were no great institutional innovations on the scale of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 or even the statutory strengthening of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act in 1972. In fact, the reversal of some of these gains in the early 1980s is eloquent testimony to the dangers of social movement professionalization and patronage. An excluded group cannot count on professional SMOs and elite patrons to protect and advance its interests against powerful opponents without sustained indigenous mobilization. If anything, this illustrates the central importance of indigenous organizing in creating elite patronage and initiating social reforms.

The greatest irony was the impact of movement decay on the patronage for the professional SMOs. Between the funding peak in 1973 and 1980, foundation support dropped from over $3.8 million to $1.4 million, a 62 percent decline. Although the shrinkage in foundation assets undoubtedly played a role, total foundation grants falling by 36 percent from 1970 to 1980, almost all the reduction came after 1975, suggesting that the major factor was the decline in indigenous actions. Ironically, the major losers were the professional SMOs, which dropped from $2.87 million in 1973 to $1.14 million in 1980. Over the same period, institutionalized organizations such as churches and universities, which had previously represented no more than 10 percent of movement

Figure 8. Facilitators of Professionalization, 1947–80 (percent change scores)



funding, rose to 20 percent of this shrinking pool. With the decay of the indigenous movement, elites no longer saw fit to support the NAACP or the professional SMOs, gradually tapering their financial commitments.

Despite these trends, insurgency did not collapse entirely. The challenge hit a low point in 1973–74, stabilized in the mid–1970s, and underwent a renewal in 1980. Although it is not clear what generated the renewal, it is clear that patronage and professionalization did not completely snuff out the challenge. And, as we have seen, the black power demands and unruliness persisted despite a general reduction in movement activity.

Might the experience of black insurgency constitute a unique and therefore unrepresentative case for evaluating theories of the social movements of the 1960s/70s? We think not, although the McCarthy-Zald theory would probably fare better by other challenges. In general, the social movements of the 1960s/70s were indigenous challenges (Jenkins 1983; forthcoming). Any theory purporting to stand as a general interpretation of contemporary social movements should be able to deal with such major challenges as the black, student, and women's movements. SMOs confronting the most severe collective goods problems and representing the most deprived and disorganized groups probably come closest to the McCarthy-Zald theory. Significantly, the theory was correct about structural facilitators of professionalization. Yet, in general, indigenous resources and political processes were more central to the black challenge.

These trends might be fruitfully compared to the regulation of urban protest through the expansion of welfare spending in the 1960s (Piven and Cloward 1971, 1977; Button 1978; Jennings 1979; Isaac and Kelly 1981, 1983; Griffin et al. 1981). Many of our foundations were centrally involved in the formulation of national social policy and responded to elite concerns about the riots. However, movement patronage differed from welfare spending. The riots did not apparently shape the amount of patronage, but rather its allocation to professional SMOs. In general, the foundations appeared more responsive to protests while governmental elites responded to riots. The closer parallel was the Community Action Program, which used Federal grants to represent the poor, eventually siphoning off local activists and creating a "symbolic representation of the poor" (Helfgot 1981). Yet, contrary to the regulation thesis, movement patronage did not deflect the movement from its basic goals or completely snuff out insurgency.

THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

Professional SMOs have clearly grown in prominence and yet they have hardly supplanted indigenous groups. Contemporary movements are still rooted in groups who stand to directly benefit by movement successes. Although professional SMOs have become more prominent with the movement decline of the late 1970s, their roots still lie largely in the indigenous movements and the challenge they pose to elites. In the case of black insurgency elite patronage did not become a major resource until the early 1970s, and even then it represented only one resource—financial—that was far more critical to the professional SMOs than to any other section. While McCarthy and Zald correctly pointed to the facilitative effect of discretionary resources on the rise of professional SMOs, this investment was spurred by the indigenous challenge.

Elite patronage had multiple mainsprings, but the primary one appears to have been the challenge of an indigenous movement. Patronage was reactive and directed primarily at the moderate NAACP and the professional SMOs. While this does not directly demonstrate the elite intentions, it conforms to the social control interpretation. And, if we are correct about the Jewish backgrounds of the elite patrons who responded to the SCLC protests, even conscience was heavily shaped by the particularistic concerns of a minority group.

The professional SMOs are complex political actors. Future research needs to distinguish between professional SMOs that are initiated by indigenous movements and those prompted by elite patrons and political entrepreneurs without movement roots. The former are more likely to perceive their role as providing technical support for indigenous challenges, while the latter will likely see themselves as proxies for powerless groups. The legal office of the NAACP that was eventually spun off as the NAACP-Legal Defense Fund was originally launched in 1935 with a grant by the Rosenwald foundation (Kluger 1975) and yet through the early 1960s it depended largely on the NAACP membership. During this period, the Legal Defense Fund provided technical support to the indigenous challenge. Several of the other professional SMOs, however, have been independent, launched by non-movement entrepreneurs and elite patronage. Because they owe little to the civil rights movement or the black community, these professional SMOs have frequently pursued agendas that conflict with those of local black groups and civil rights leaders (Shields and Spector 1972; Danielson 1976 pp. 124–31; Orfield 1978, pp. 268–9). Their representation of the interests of the black community in the absence of strong constituency ties is, to say the least, ambiguous. Although they have followed up on the goals defined by the movement, their attack has centered on measures—school integration, affirmative action and welfare programs—that have contributed little to solving problems of the black underclass. More important, their political victories have been seriously blunted by their lack of constituency ties, making implementation problematic and the gains transitory. The apparent reversal of these gains in the early 1980s could probably not have been carried out had the indigenous black movement still been mobilized at the same pitch as during the 1960s. In short, professional SMOs cannot compensate for the power of an indigenous movement. Insofar as professional SMOs promote symbols of reform without the substance, they may work against the development of powerful indigenous challenges.

Professional SMOs are not, however, inevitably counterproductive. Contrary to the social control theorists, they do not inevitably defuse protests. In the civil rights experience, the professional SMOs have frequently played an effective role by following up on the victories of the indigenous movement. As the women's and environmental movements have demonstrated, litigation, close monitoring of government agencies and professionalized lobbying can be quite effective if allied with an indigenous movement and if there is a clear statutory and administrative basis for implementation (Handler 1978; Gelb and Palley 1982; Mitchell 1985).

But if the goal is bringing an excluded group into the polity, a mass movement is necessary. Antagonists are probably politically entrenched and will use their access to block organizing. The state is an inherently conservative institution, committed to the maintenance of social order. Even neutral bystanders who might benefit from the entry of new groups will oppose the challenge simply because of the spectre of restructuring the polity rules (Tilly 1978, pp. 125–26; McAdam 1982, pp. 28, 41–43; Jenkins 1985a). Well-funded professional SMOs are simply no match for an entrenched antagonist.

Of course, if the alternative is no representation, most groups are probably better off with professional SMOs. No doubt, some groups are sufficiently powerless that there is little alternative to professional representation. Yet, for those with some bases for independent mobilization that can secure gains short of a comprehensive redistribution of social power, indigenous mobilization holds far more promise. Professional SMOs are, after all, agencies of their supporters. Insofar as they are based on

elite patronage, they are not likely to become unruly or make broad demands. And, if the experience of the civil rights movement is indicative, their survival depends on the pressures generated by the protests of the indigenous groups.

We have generally supported the social control theory, yet we not supported the thesis that elite patronage and professionalization snuffed out the potential for radical dissent. The crisis and decline of the civil rights movement was largely internal, rooted in the strategic weaknesses and political obstacles to attacking the problems of the black underclass. Patronage and professionalization did not divert the movement from attacking the problems of poverty, cultural subordination and political exclusion. Nor did they extinguish protests. In fact, the challenge showed remarkable resilience, reviving at the end of the period.

The social control effects of patronage, then, are more subtle and indirect than a simple cooptation thesis would assume. Cooptation arguments have traditionally been posed in terms of the transformation of goals and tactics in exchange for political incorporation. Our evidence, however, indicates no significant change in goals or tactics, but rather a general decline and reorganization around professional SMOs. Patronage may well have accelerated this decline by diverting leaders from indigenous organizing, exacerbating rivalries and creating symbolic gains. Quite clearly, it channeled the movement into professionalization forms. But it did not divert the movement from the black power agenda or unruliness. The most dramatic strategic change was the halt of rioting, but government repression and ameliorative programs were probably more critical than elite patronage. Overall, we think "channeling" is a more apt metaphor for analyzing the impact of elite patronage on social movements than the metaphor of "controlling" or "coopting."

If the rejuvenation of indigenous protest evident in 1980 is indicative, the possibility may exist for renewed insurgency. We have seen this as evidence of a renewed black challenge, most visibly manifest in the recent anti-apartheid campaign and Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign in 1984. Although elite patronage and professional SMOs may play a supportive role, its eventual success will largely depend on indigenous organizing and forming alliances with polity members that provide the leverage to institutionalize significant reforms.

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