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Pragmatism, Bourdieu, and collective emotions in contentious politics

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Abstract. We aim to show how collective emotions can be incorporated into the study of episodes of political contention. In a critical vein, we systematically explore the weaknesses in extant models of collective action, showing what has been lost through a neglect or faulty conceptualization of collective emotional configurations. We structure this discussion in terms of a review of several "pernicious postulates" in the literature, assumptions that have been held, we argue, by classical social-movement theorists and by social-structural and cultural critics alike. In a reconstructive vein, however, we also lay out the foundations of a more satisfactory theoretical framework. We take each succeeding critique of a pernicious postulate as the occasion for more positive theory-building. Drawing upon the work of the classical American pragmatists–especially Peirce, Dewey, and Mead–as well as aspects of Bourdieu's sociology, we construct, step by step, the foundations of a more adequate theorization of social movements and collective action. Accordingly, the negative and positive threads of our discussion are woven closely together: the dismantling of pernicious postulates and the development of a more useful analytical strategy.

We are concerned here with the role of collective emotions in episodes of political contention. We set forth new ways of conceptualizing and analyzing these emotional configurations and propose an agenda for future empirical research. The literatures that we address concern social movements and collective action. For reasons of space, we do not systematically discuss other closely related work–for example, the study of revolutions, ethnic mobilizations, democratization, or nationalism – but consider our ideas to have significant implications for these literatures as well and occasionally refer to substantive writings from them in developing our theoretical arguments. It is because social movements never occur simply within a vacuum but always engage with a wide range of other institutional and extra-institutional forces that we use the phrase "episodes of political contention" to denote the focus of our analysis. As we conceive it, political contention is "episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of

claims and others, is recognized by those others as bearing on their interests, and [typically] brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant" (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2001, p. 5). (We add the word "typically" here because otherwise this highly state-centered conceptualization would rule out political contention aimed at transforming civil society [Emirbayer and Sheller 1999].) Frequently, of course, we deploy more conventional terms such as "social movements" and "collective action" to denote the objects of our study. We use the latter term somewhat loosely here, since in its classic definition, it merely signifies "people's acting together in pursuit of common interests" (Tilly 1978, p. 7), but even then, we always have in mind dynamic complexes or configurations of transactions among multiple social actors. It is our contention that such transactions, which include social movements as well as the various institutional and extra-institutional forces with which they engage, always unfold within a context of transpersonal emotional investments, a *collective-psychological context of action*, which potentially constrains and enables action no less than do the social-structural and cultural contexts upon which analytic attention has heretofore more typically been focused.

Our subject matter was not always so thoroughly neglected by students of social movements. Classical theories in the early- to mid-twentieth century continually invoked the emotions. It was these classical theories that were roundly criticized, with good reason, by theorists with a more social-structural orientation. Within the sociological literature on political contention, resource mobilization theory and the political process model sought to explain social movements through either an increase in available resources or a restructuring of existing power relationships. These approaches emphasized social and political determinants but largely neglected the symbolic dimension of collective action. Culturalist theories sought to correct this social-structural bias by focusing upon collective identities or cultural framings. In revealing the weaknesses of older classical models, these culturalist theories, as well as social-structural perspectives, rejected all further attempts to integrate collective psychology into social movement theory. In this essay, we do not aim to revive the classical theories; rather, we seek to show how collective psychology can be reincorporated into studies of episodes of political contention in more useful and innovative ways.

In this respect, we see ourselves as building upon and contributing to an emerging project to rethink and reevaluate the significance of emotions in contentious politics.[1] Our work is indebted to this recent

"emotional turn," particularly its critique of older models of collective action. This critique has pointed to the false dichotomy of reason and emotion while indicating the various ways in which older models of collective action presuppose but do not theorize emotion. We elaborate and extend these criticisms while developing new ones as well. At the same time, because our work seeks to contribute to and not merely build upon this emotional turn, we also engage in some constructive criticism of the direction this turn has taken. First, most contributors to the recent emotional turn rely heavily upon a cultural and social-constructionist view of emotions (inspired especially by Hochschild's pioneering research: see Aminzade and McAdam 2001, p. 24; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001a, p. 12). We do not reject social constructionism, but we do point out and seek to avoid certain dualisms associated with it, including the separation of emotion managers from the managed and of statics from dynamics. Second, within the prevailing cultural and social-constructionist approach, theorists tend to conceptualize emotions either as nouns, "distinct entities each with its own coherence and behavioral implications," or as adverbs, "a quality of an action or identity" (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001a, pp. 13–14). In contrast, we reject the substantialist assumptions underlying both of these alternatives, which reify emotion as an attribute of individuals or their actions. Instead, we conceptualize emotions in terms of relationships, not substances. Third and finally, our work contributes to the recent emotional turn in social movement theory by explicitly theorizing the relation of emotions to the social-structural and cultural contexts of action. In this way, it seeks to move beyond the renewed attention to emotion itself to a broader understanding of how emotions shape collective action in conjunction with both social structure and culture.

As the preceding remarks suggest, our work has both critical and reconstructive aims. In a critical vein, we systematically explore the weaknesses in extant models of collective action, focusing upon three broad approaches and upon the authors and texts that have been most important in developing or propounding them: (1) *classical theories*, including models of mass society, status inconsistency, and collective behavior; (2) *social-structural theories*, including resource mobilization and political process approaches; and (3) *culturalist theories*, including collective identity (or new social movement) theory and what we call the new culturalism (or work based upon the idea of framing).[2] We structure our critical discussion in terms of a review of three "pernicious postulates" (cf. Tilly 1984) in the literature, assumptions that have been held, we argue, by classical social movement theorists and their critics alike.

This article highlight not the "missing variables" that these various literatures have neglected, but rather, the logical difficulties inherent in their reasoning, difficulties that have prevented them from "getting the connections right" even in the accounts that they themselves have given. In a reconstructive vein, however, we take each succeeding critique of a pernicious postulate as an occasion for positive theory-building on our own part. In so doing, we seek ultimately to raise new kinds of questions about social movements, to open fruitful new areas of research that had previously been closed by alternative perspectives. We do not attempt to answer all these empirical research questions here, nor could we hope to do so within the scope of a single article. But the aim is to provide researchers with the theoretical leverage that would make it easier to ask such questions in the first place. Nor do we seek to furnish a new and distinctive theory of contentious politics that can be appropriated and applied ready-made. Rather, we seek to paint in bold strokes, reorienting conventional thinking in a more general and suggestive way. While the negative threads of the discussion (the dismantling of pernicious postulates) and the positive threads (the development of a more useful analytical strategy) are presented separately, they remain closely related. Step by step, this critique seeks to build up a more satisfactory and useful conceptual framework.

One important aspect to this endeavor is an engagement with issues of a philosophical and social-theoretical nature, beginning with the very nature of emotion itself (in its relation to reason) and ending with the ontological structure of collective-psychological configurations. (Although much of the essay is devoted to addressing precisely such issues, let us briefly assay here a working definition of this central concept: By collective emotions, we mean (1) complexes of processes-in-relations that are (2) transpersonal in scope and that consist in (3) psychical investments, engagements, or cathexes, where these encompass (4) embodied perceptions and judgments as well as bodily states, forces, energies, or sensations. Configurations of such collective emotions may be organized in terms of internal logics that are irreducible to those of social-structural or cultural formations.) We do not attempt a comprehensive survey here of the sociology of the emotions, many of whose debates have little or no direct linkage to social movements and collective action. But this article does discuss certain ideas from that literature, insofar as they bear potentially upon political contention. More useful here are the classical American pragmatists, Peirce, Dewey, and Mead, as well as the sociology of Bourdieu, aspects of which, as he himself acknowledges (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 122), bear

strikingly close affinities to pragmatism. We return again and again to these thinkers for philosophical and social-theoretical guidance: many of our pernicious postulates, in fact, trace back to misguided notions that they were (and are) highly effective in criticizing and recasting. By drawing upon these various theoretical resources, we are better able to elaborate a comprehensive framework that allows us to understand what collective emotions are and how best to analyze contentious episodes in terms of them. As Dewey would have put it, this is a task calling for both philosophical and social-theoretical reconstruction.

Pernicious postulate #1: Reason and emotion are mutually exclusive

Specifying the postulate

The first of our pernicious postulates–and perhaps still the deepest impediment to a proper understanding of the collective psychology of episodes of contention, is the dichotomy between reason and emotion. Surely as old as the Western tradition itself, this division was first articulated systematically by the ancient Greeks, as part of an even more fundamental opposition between theory and practice. As Dewey observes, ancient Greek thought gives "the depreciation of practice . . . a philosophic, an ontological, justification. . . . Because ultimate Being or reality [is seen as] fixed, permanent, admitting of no change or variation, it [can] be grasped by rational intuition and set forth in rational, that is, universal and necessary, demonstration." Change, by contrast–the domain of practical action–is seen as "a realm inferior in value as in Being . . . the source from which comes all our uncertainties and woes" (Dewey 1988 [1929], p. 16). Only belief or opinion, as opposed to rational knowledge, can be cultivated in respect to it. Drawing explicitly upon the pragmatists, Bourdieu, too, discerns in this framework of thought, one "philosophically consecrated by Plato," the roots of what he terms the "scholastic point of view," a perspective "which inclines its possessors to suspend the demands of the situation, the constraints of economic and social necessity, and the urgencies it imposes or the ends it proposes" in favor of a "distant, lofty gaze" trained upon matters unsullied by the mundane, ephemeral, and illusory (Bourdieu 2000 [1997], pp. 13, 12, 22). Emotions occupy a distinctly unenviable position within this framework. They are denigrated, seen as irrational, precisely because they accord too much importance to changing and uncertain things; persons in the grip of emotions are seen as every bit as unstable as the natural, material world itself. Of

course, ancient Greek metaphysics is no longer with us today. But the fundamental structure of thought and the conceptual oppositions that it presupposes, false "epistemological couplets," as Bourdieu so often describes them, remain encoded within our everyday discourses and practices: the binaries of theoretical/practical; spiritual/natural; ordered/chaotic; intentional/spontaneous; certain/uncertain; intellectual/passional, mental/bodily, and male/female.[3]

Much past and present research in the area of contentious politics has been marred precisely by a tendency, no less consequential for being so largely unself-conscious, to draw upon and to reinforce these dichotomies. Such a tendency is particularly evident, notoriously so, in classical theories of collective action, with their equation of the passional aspects of social movements with irrationality, impulsiveness, and psychopathology.[4] In one of the earliest works of this tradition, in fact, Le Bon associates collective action explicitly with crowd behavior and sees it, by contrast to the rational conduct of individuals, as irresponsible, unrestrained, and "at the mercy of external exciting causes": "[Its] powerlessness to reason aright prevents [it] from being capable of discerning truth from error, or of forming a precise judgment on any matter" (Le Bon 1960 [1895], pp. 36, 67). Later theorists differ from Le Bon in the subtlety of their analyses but not in the basic assumptions to which they adhere. Gusfield, for example, notes that "most movements, and most political acts, contain a mixture of instrumental, expressive, and symbolic elements," but he goes on to concretize this distinction by arguing that only one of those elements predominates in any given movement. More troubling still, he associates movements having a preponderance of instrumental and symbolic elements with strategic rationality, while he depicts more expressive movements as entailing "goalless behavior," misguided displacement of emotions, and a "projection of 'irrational' impulses" (Gusfield 1970, pp. 180, 23, 177). Gusfield's arguments are but one instance of a general trend in the classical literature. Relevant also here is A. Zolberg's (1972) analysis of "moments of madness within political struggles," so reminiscent of Durkheim's (1995 [1912]) suggestion that social life alternates between periods of collective effervescence and long stretches of ordinary, mundane, and routinized time.

Resource mobilization and political process theories dispute the classical perspective's sharp tendency to pathologize social movements. Yet they, too, fail to question the dichotomy between reason and emotion, choosing merely to accentuate the other end of the polarity, that

of strategic rational action. These writings helpfully affirm that social protesters often evince the very qualities of thoughtfulness and logical reasoning previously denied them by fiat, but they share in the assumption that such qualities are antithetical to a passional response to situations. The upshot is a severe denigration of the emotions in their portrayals of social movement participants and in their causal analyses of movement emergence, development, and decline. Thus, Oberschall writes that an instance of collective action "might be characterized as non-rational if one could show that it is an inappropriate means to obtaining group goals and that other channels . . . are available and are more effective." In strategic rational action, by contrast, "individuals who are faced with resource management decisions make rational choices based on the pursuit of their selfish interests in an enlightened manner. They weigh the rewards and sanctions, costs and benefits, that alternative courses of action represent for them" (Oberschall 1973, pp. 177, 29). Tilly (1978, 1984) develops a similar point of view, stressing the usefulness of a rationalist approach that centers around actors' interests, decision rules, and cost/benefit analyses, to the apparent exclusion of "non-rational" considerations. And McAdam (1982, pp. 16–19) argues that social movements are a "political phenomenon," a form of "rational group-action in pursuit of a substantive political goal," rather than an irrational "psychological phenomenon" characterized by "emotional fervor." Such an orientation has persisted to this day in the political process literature.

The idea of a reason/emotion dichotomy remains pervasive even among culturalist analyses of political life, which stand well outside the aforementioned paradigms. One case in point is new social movement theory. Cohen speaks for this approach in challenging the narrowly strategic models of action prevalent in dominant paradigms. Following Habermas (1987 [1981]), she holds that group formation and solidarity, especially the more reflexive forms found in modern civil society, can only be explained if one expands the idea of rationality itself to include action oriented toward reaching mutual understanding. Despite this call for a broader view of rationality, however, Cohen herself continues to oppose rationality to emotion. She faults social-structural theorists for throwing out "the baby" of "values, norms, ideologies, projects, culture, and identity" with "the bath water" of "irrational and emotional-expressive outbursts" (Cohen 1985, p. 688). Presumably, the emotions can be relegated to the bathwater of social movement theory once actors are deemed capable of communicative argumentation and

rationality. Yet another case in point is the new culturalist perspective. Here reason assumes the form of cognition; culture is defined cognitivistically, to the implicit exclusion of the emotions. The latter appear only around the edges of cultural formations, if they appear at all.

This opposition between reason and emotion, shared by all three of the major approaches in social movement theory, has assumed myriad forms and guises, profoundly shaping how theorists think about virtually every aspect of contentious collective action. We shall confine ourselves to just two of the most notable expressions of this dichotomy. The first is the division of social movement participants into two broad types or classes of actors: those who are driven by strategic considerations and those who are driven impulsively by their passions. The former are characterized as the leadership, the latter as the rank-and-file of social movements. In a theoretical move as old as Western thought itself, two types of activity are distinguished and linked by homology to two categories of actors who are seen to correspond to the reason/emotion opposition. (This opposition between rational leaders and their emotional followers, by the way, need not rest upon the assumption that the capacity for rational action is inherent in [certain] individuals. Allison and Zelikow [1999], for example, see the capacity for rational calculation as based upon social position or organizational location. However, while they provide a different explanation to account for this dichotomy, they do not call the dichotomy itself into question.) As suggested earlier, one can find the basis for such dualist thinking in ancient Greek philosophy, which demarcates theory and practice as two fundamentally different modes or walks of life (Dewey 1988 [1929]): types of life-activity oriented toward deeper truths and types of life-activity preoccupied with ordinary affairs in the material world and with need-relative pursuits. The former is associated with an elite, the latter with a broader population of citizens; the former is socially and intellectually superior, the latter subordinate and inferior. This structure of thought, which as Bourdieu would have pointed out is the very hallmark and distinguishing feature of the scholastic attitude, has, despite outward changes, persisted across the ages. Among the classics of political sociology, for example, it is found in Michels's seminal work (1962 [1911]), where party leaders are seen as rational maximizers of power while rank-and-file party members are portrayed as deeply constrained in their capacity for rational action by their emotional dependence upon leaders and by their longing for authority. And Lenin's (1975 [1902]) theory of the vanguard, which assumes a

fundamental divide between a strategic rational elite of revolutionaries and an impulse-driven irrational mass of followers, also unfolds within such a conceptual framework.

In the classical theories of social movements, this opposition between rational leaders and emotional followers is recast as a division between those engaged in conventional politics and those involved in spontaneous eruptive protests. The reason/emotion division only enters into the study of social movements per se, however, as an internal differentiation among types of participants, in later social-structural theories. These theories associate strategic rationality with movement activists, "social movement entrepreneurs," while they assign a proneness to emotional modes of reaction to the rank-and-file of the movement. Leaders and activists are non-emotional calculators who manage the emotions of *others* in pursuit of ends that seem not to be influenced or shaped by emotion. Thus, as McCarthy and Zald argue, in a classic work of resource mobilization theory, "grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1215). And political process theorists Aminzade and McAdam, too, suggest that effective movement leaders are able "to assess emotional climates, induce mobilizing emotions that motivate followers by altering definitions of the situation, create/reconfigure emotion vocabularies, and transform emotion beliefs and feeling rules into moral obligations" (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, p. 35). Theories of collective identity are not quite so instrumentalist, despite certain Leninist (in this specific respect) overtones in the work of Touraine, for instance, but new culturalist approaches have long suffered from such tendencies.[5]

The opposition between reason and emotion has not only been linked by homology to different types or classes of actors; it has also assumed the guise of a division between the rationality of established institutions and the irrationality of emergent phenomena such as social movements. Although the structures and processes that make up institutions are seen as non-emotional in their very nature, social movements and collective action are regarded as passional through and through. All the major approaches to explaining social movements at least implicitly assume the emotional neutrality of established institutions. Perhaps this is most apparent in the classical approach to social movements: Blumer (1939), for example, distinguishes between "institutional" and "collective" behavior, linking the former to orderliness and reason and the latter to susceptibility to manipulation and a lack of understood objectives, while

Lipset and Raab (1970) decry the extremism, paranoia, and despair of "the politics of unreason," contrasting it pejoratively to the calm stability and reasonableness of political pluralism (other writings that might be included within this category are Arendt 1951; Bell 1960 and Hofstadter 1966). Matters are less clear-cut in the case of social-structural perspectives, which surely take the emotional neutrality of conventional politics for granted, but contrast it less sharply (if at all) with passional collective action. At least these perspectives agree that the prosaic and matter-of-fact quality of established politics leaves little room for emotional dynamics; theirs is a thoroughly rationalist approach to political analysis. Much of the collective identity approach shares in this rationalism, too, particularly those contributors to it (e.g., Cohen 1985; Cohen and Arato 1992) who are linked to Habermasian critical theory, while the new culturalists, such as Gamson (1992), see "hot cognitions," the concept in their theory that comes closest to collective emotions, as operating solely on the social movement end of political contention, as opposed to the context of established political systems.

Why pernicious?

The dichotomy between reason and emotion is problematic, regardless of what guise it takes, not only because it entails a misconceptualization of the emotions, but also because it distorts our understanding of rationality itself, one of the central categories in many extant theories of collective action. It prevents those theories, to begin with, from grasping the substantive irrationality of what contemporary psychologists term "cold rationality," or rationality that is disconnected from the emotions and therefore is itself ineffective or distorted (Griffiths 1997; Goldie 2000; Reddy 2001; for a closely related discussion of Weber, see Emirbayer 2005). It also leads them "to misunderstand the causal mechanisms by which their own key concepts" operate (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000, p. 71): in other words, to fail to "get the connections right." Concepts such as political opportunity structure, cognitive liberation, mobilizing structures and networks, collective identity formation, and framing processes are understood in predominantly rationalistic terms, even though the "causal impact of [these] factors depends heavily on emotional dimensions that have rarely been recognized or theorized" (Jasper 1998, p. 408). To take but two examples, political opportunity structures are said to encourage or discourage people to act collectively by "affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow 1994, p. 85).

However, such structures "shape protest activity through emotional as well as cognitive means by fostering (or quashing) hope or urgency . . . or by reducing (or heightening) fear" (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000, p. 79). Cognitive liberation, too, defined as shifts in attribution wherein people come to define their situation as unjust and subject to change through collective action, is portrayed as depending entirely upon "a set of cognitive cues" (McAdam 1982, p. 49). This formulation renders as "cold rationality" a process that actually entails, by its very nature, a complex synthesis of strategic reasoning and passional assessment.

Consider also the division of movement participants into rational leaders and emotional followers, insofar as this claim assumes the status more of a theoretical assumption than of an empirical assertion. This division is subject to a number of logical criticisms. First, to paraphrase Marx (1978 [1845], p. 144), "who manages the emotions of the emotion managers?" Activists are not quasi-divine unmoved movers; they, too, are formed within the flow of emotional engagement and located inside the very configurations of passion that they seek to manipulate and control. (Interestingly enough, this opposition between rational elites and emotionally manipulated followers can even be found in some contemporary work in the sociology of the emotions; even Hochschild's [1983] groundbreaking work on emotion management in the airline industry assumes that corporate executives stand outside the emotional constraints that they impose upon their flight attendant employees and that they are driven only by the strategic rational pursuit of profit.) Second, much of the emotion management that movement leaders perform is itself a "practical accomplishment" (Garfinkel 1967) that necessarily remains hidden to those engaged in it; emotion labor appears spontaneous and unintended despite the fact that actors must work to make it so. This kind of practical accomplishment is elided when researchers look only for conscious and strategic forms of emotion management. Third, assessments of movement outcomes become necessarily distorted when emotional change is regarded by definition as a means to extrinsic political ends (such as policy change) rather than also, potentially, as an intrinsic goal of mobilization as such. Members of stigmatized groups, for example, while being emotionally enabled and constrained themselves, often seek to transform the feelings of others in the group–e.g., feelings of shame into pride or a sense of dignity – but such aspirations fall out of view when the former are seen merely in instrumentalist terms, as manipulating the emotions of the latter in pursuit of non-emotional ends.

Much as the opposition between reason and emotion elides significant aspects of non-institutionalized politics, it also limits our understanding of the relation between oppositional movements and the more established institutions against which they struggle. For one thing, we are led to the faulty assumption that the emotions of social protest are typically evanescent and unstructured, in contrast to the long-lived and enduring nature of institutionalized rationality. Such a contrast merely recapitulates the divisions that we discussed above between being and becoming, stability and instability, permanence and change. For another thing (and more to the point), we are left unable to understand properly the nature of the institutions themselves and the effects that they might have. Institutions are relevant to our understanding of collective action in a variety of ways: they structure opportunities for protest and defiance, mold "discontent into specific grievances against specific targets," shape "the collectivity out of which protest can arise," and even shape the form that protest takes (Piven and Cloward 1979 [1977], pp. 20–21). However, as with other determinants often stressed by social movement theorists, the causal impact of institutions upon collective action depends heavily upon their emotional dimensions, which are left untheorized. Since these institutions are just as much a party to the transactions in which we are interested as are oppositional movements – our key unit, after all, is contentious episodes that involve not only social movements and other oppositional actors, but also these more established structures – no analysis of those transactions will be complete if emotional structures and processes are assigned to the one and not the other. Again, we are left unable to ask, let alone to answer, important questions.

A better alternative

All the major extant approaches to explaining social movements and collective action, then, despite their differences, posit a highly problematic opposition between reason and emotion. Is there a better alternative, or must we always remain trapped within such a dichotomy? We argue that a more satisfactory theoretical framework does already exist and that, in fact, the foundations for it can partly be found (ironically) within ancient Greek philosophy itself. (Of course, this tradition, like much of the rest of Western philosophy, has far less to say about collective psychology than it does about the emotions at an individual level. But for present purposes, we follow it along individual lines regardless, for even this will prove useful, and reserve the discussion of collective and transpersonal emotions for a later section.) Despite

insisting upon the irrationality of the emotions, in the sense discussed above, the Greek tradition is virtually of one voice in maintaining that, in yet another sense (one largely unrecognized by scholarly work on contentious episodes) the emotions do at least manifest a complex intentional structure. Most philosophers in this tradition hold that the emotions are hardly "blind forces," as one classicist puts it, "that have nothing (or nothing much) to do with reasoning," like "gusts of wind or the swelling currents of the sea [that] push agents around [and] surd unthinking energies"; on the contrary, they "contain within themselves a directedness toward an object, and within the emotion the object is viewed under an intentional description. . . . Emotions, in short, whatever else they are, are at least in part ways of perceiving" or interpreting the world. The Greeks also maintain that the emotions are "connected with certain beliefs about their object" (Nussbaum 1995, pp. 56, 60–61; cf. Nussbaum 2001). In this respect, as Aristotle argues perhaps most persuasively (see, e.g., *Rhetoric* II. 2), the emotions encompass, in some deep constitutive sense, not only perception but also intellectual judgment. (For most philosophers in this tradition, the trouble with the emotions is precisely that the judgments they do entail, as mentioned above, are prone to be false judgments and hence irrational, because of their overvaluation of transitory, unstable, undependable things. It is not a matter of the emotions being somehow irrational in the narrower sense of unthinking or non-intentional.)

Even more insightful and illuminating, however, among philosophers concerned with reason and the emotions, are certain thinkers from within the pragmatist tradition. These thinkers seek to overcome altogether the classical dichotomy between theory and practice (and between rationality and the emotions), a dichotomy within which the ancient Greeks, for all their conceptual subtlety, are ultimately caught up.[6] The pragmatists insist upon the possibility of what they term "intelligence"–"a way of knowing in a world without certainty" (Westbrook 1991, p. 357)–and stress as well that such intelligence can encompass not only reason but also emotion: they envision, in other words, the cultivation of "intelligent emotions" or of "emotionally guided intelligence."[7] For Dewey especially, it is no longer a matter of denigrating the emotions or of extirpating them from collective action or the public sphere, but rather, one of cultivating the passional dimension in life and of distinguishing among more or less intelligent ways of engaging emotionally with life-contexts. "Affections, desires, purposes, choices," writes Dewey, "are going to endure as long as man is man. . .. But these expressions of our nature need *direction*. . . . When

they are informed by knowledge, they . . . constitute, in their directed activity, intelligence in operation" (Dewey 1988 [1929], p. 238). More recently than the classical pragmatists, but in similar ways, contemporary philosophers of the emotions (Solomon 1976; de Sousa 1987; for an important forebear, see Sartre 1948) also develop such themes, under the banner of "rational emotions." Feminist and race theorists, too, criticize the reason/emotion dichotomy for its social and historical as well as epistemological implications. A vast body of literature has emerged that seeks to subvert this dichotomy and to transcend the limitations it entails, offering in its stead ideas highly reminiscent of the Deweyan notion of intelligence in emotion, ideas such as embodied passional reasoning or "appropriate emotions" (Jagger 1989).

Finally, we can discern in the sociological writings of Bourdieu yet another approach to the emotions that also stresses their theoretical inseparability from reason and that opens up space for inquiring into their degree and manner of "fit" with objective situations. Bourdieu sees emotions as integral aspects of what he terms "strategies," or modes of response to and action within the world that are grounded in, and given shape and direction by, systems of enduring dispositions (cognitive but also affectual) which he terms "habitus." He writes: "Habitus being the social embodied, it is 'at home' in the field it inhabits, it perceives it immediately as endowed with meaning and interest. The practical knowledge it procures may be described by analogy with Aristotle's *phronesis* or, better, with the *orthe doxa* of which Plato talks in *Meno*: just as the 'right opinion' 'falls right,' in a sense, without knowing how or why, likewise the coincidence . . . between the 'sense of the game' and the game explains that the agent does what he or she 'has to do' without posing it explicitly as a goal, below the level of calculation and even consciousness, beneath discourse and representation" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 128). Emotions are a fundamental feature of such modes of engagement, such that those actors whose passional responses embody poor judgment – the Kabyle man, for example, who, in a social context where strategies of honor require level-headedness, seemliness, and prudence, displays instead a lack of self-control and "exposes his inner self, with all its passions and weaknesses" (Bourdieu 1979, p. 112) – are deemed by others to be unskilled players lacking a proper feel for the game. This does not, however, mean that passional responses always or even typically embody poor judgment. On the contrary, "habitus adjusts aspirations and expectations according to the objective probabilities for success or failure. . . . The dispositions of

habitus predispose actors to select forms of conduct that are most likely to succeed in light of their resources and past experience" (Swartz 1997, pp. 105–106). When passional responses do embody poor judgment, this usually indicates a structural lag–or "hysteresis effect"–between aspirations and changing opportunities. Yet even in this case, inappropriate passional responses are not necessarily irrational, for it is precisely this poor fit between habits and their environment that opens the door to the reconstruction of habits, adjustment (in Dewey's [1922] sense of "an adaptation of the environment to the individual's needs and ends, rather than vice versa"), and social change.

These insights from Bourdieu's theory of practices and the pragmatist tradition make possible the integration into social movement theory of a new perspective on episodes of contention in political life. No longer do such episodes need to be studied through the narrow prism of rationality and irrationality; rather, they can be investigated in the different and more revealing light of the qualities of intelligence and emotional appropriateness that actors within those episodes manifest. Such a perspective, in fact, opens a whole new range of empirical research questions, including questions about social movement processes and outcomes. For example, it allows one to inquire into the emotional judgments embodied in such features of collective action as cognitive liberation and movement strategies and tactics. If rationality is inseparable from emotion, then we should expect even cognitive liberation to depend in part upon emotional ties and investments. This may help to explain, in fact, why groups sometimes fail to mobilize despite all the "necessary cognitions" – or why (inversely) they mobilize in the absence of such cognitive cues. Moreover, we should expect choices in strategies and tactics also to be heavily influenced by emotional commitments, such that changes in the former will be unlikely to take place without corresponding changes in the latter. Empirical variations in those strategies and tactics will also be better analyzed within the conceptual framework of emotional intelligence than within that of the paired opposites of strategic rationality and blind passional response. This is not to say that emotional intelligence is by definition practical wisdom (as the example of the unskilled Kablye clearly attests) or that it precludes incorrect choices or errors in strategies and tactics. It is only to suggest that emotional intelligence provides a more useful scale for assessing collective action than alternative scales that separate strategic reasoning from all considerations of emotional appropriateness to the situation.

A broadened perspective upon reason and emotion also allows us to raise new questions about the specific decisions and actions of movement leaders or followers. It leads us to ask how efforts by emotion managers are enabled or constrained by their own (changing) emotional ties to others; when emotion management is most likely to become explicit or self-conscious; and how such reflexivity alters emotion work. Moreover, rather than have us see emotion work as simply a means to purportedly non-emotional ends such as policy change, it allows us to ask to what extent movement participants (leaders or followers) are concerned to bring about changes of a broader sort, including the creation of a more open-minded, tolerant, and democratic emotional disposition among their fellows. The ideas of the classical American pragmatists, as well as of more recent social thinkers–particularly their insights into the educability of the emotions and into the role of intelligence in emotional life–thus help to broaden and advance social movement theory. "The difficulty is to get ourselves to recognize the other and wider interests," as Mead (1934, p. 388) once affirmed, and the contributions of movement members to such a task can be occluded when all that is attributed to them by fiat is a strategic rational intent. It is more useful to be able to highlight the "innovations in democratic praxis" whereby emotional "capacities to communicate, listen, understand, and learn" are cultivated, such that movement participants, for example, "can argue, fight, laugh, and sometimes even agree in the knowledge that the situation is safe enough for relationships to endure while feelings are expressed" (Hoggett and Thompson 2002, pp. 107, 121). It is also important to highlight the processes whereby, as Bourdieu would have it, "the relation of complicity that the victims of symbolic domination grant to the dominant can [itself] be broken," a task that (as we show in greater detail below) requires radically transforming the "dispositions that lead the dominated to take the point of view of the dominant on the dominant and on themselves" and that is absolutely necessary if the "symbolic revolutions" sought by emancipatory movements are ultimately to succeed (Bourdieu 2001 [1998], pp. 41–42).

Such a normative vision of emotional democracy would be incomplete if we restricted it implicitly to social movements and denied it to everyday political institutions – as Dewey, Mead, and Bourdieu themselves would never have done. In our view, institutions are best conceived of as bounded sets of iterational practices, ordered or channeled through overlapping social-structural, cultural, *and* collective-psychological matrices.[8] Aspects of this conceptualization are hardly

novel, such as the notion that institutions can be analyzed in terms of the patterns of social relations that they encompass or in terms of cultural or discursive patternings (although the latter idea is perhaps not accepted across the board). But parallel arguments in terms of matrices of emotional transactions are much less common, at least in explicit and systematic form (for prominent exceptions in sociology and organizational analysis, see Hochschild 1983; Taylor 1995; Albrow 1997; Flam 2002; see also Emirbayer and Goodwin 1996; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999). It is our contention, nevertheless, that even established, institutionalized bundles of (political) practices include a constitutive emotional dimension, that they incorporate the latter very much into their own makeup and cannot be adequately understood in abstraction from it. Any institution, or institutional sector such as the polity, is in part structured and constituted by collective emotions, by relatively long-lasting and durable matrices of attachment or emotional solidarity, as well as by negatively toned currents of hostility or aggression (we elaborate upon these ideas in the subsequent two sections). The former, more positive emotions include trust, idealization of leadership, and psychical investments in hierarchy, while the latter, more negative emotions include those that fuel institutional divisions and rivalries, patriarchal and racial separations, and enmities against outsiders and alien elements. It is difficult to imagine an adequate theory of the institutions against which protest movements often struggle that does not include some insights into these crucial collective-psychological features. The emotional dimension of (political) institutions is especially important because these institutions create opportunities for challenges by insurgent groups and help to shape the very nature of those groups themselves: their form and character, organization, strategies and tactics, and core emotional dynamics. Like their organizational forms, for example (Clemens 1996), the emotional structures of political institutions and of the protest movements directed against them may be more or less isomorphic, and this may have significant implications for how they interact.

Pernicious postulate #2: Emotions are individual states of mind

Specifying the postulate

A second pernicious tendency in social movement theory is to think of emotions, whatever may be their status vis-à-vis reason, as individual-level phenomena only, rather than (also) as qualities of

transpersonal ties, bonds, or relations. The assumption here is that emotions arise exclusively inside of people's heads or hearts, rather than (also) between actors and their situations (which include other actors). An extension of this postulate holds that the emotions are, actually, present in situations, but only as the attributes or aspects of action. Thus, Barker (2001, p. 176) speaks of the emotions as "qualities of action, speech, and thought"; he conceptualizes emotion as a "tone" or "accent" of action.[9] In either case, relational configurations of emotion are not even raised as a theoretical possibility. Instead, the emotions are seen as located within the sphere of subjectivity alone, within an experiencing or feeling subject that confronts the conditions of its objective situation from without, as it were, or from a separate realm of existence; and inside this private internal domain, they are seen to subsist as individualized "states of mind." The antecedents to such a view, which rigidly demarcates subjects from objects, are to be found once again in Western philosophy. Its origins, as Dewey points out, are "in the philosophical situation that generated the traditional 'metaphysical' problem of the relations of mind and matter" (Dewey 1985 [1912], p. 34), the same context of detachment and world-distance that gave rise to what Bourdieu has called the scholastic point of view. Ultimately, such a perspective, that of traditional Western epistemology, has important implications for collective action theory. It pre-casts the whole question as to whether the study of the emotions should begin with an emphasis upon transactions or with a focus upon individualistic psychic states; at stake is the issue of whether emotions can serve as the basis for an intrinsic bond among individuals or merely provide an extrinsic aggregative linkage.

Within the study of collective action, the latter emphasis is most readily apparent in classical models of social movements. In such models, the (putatively irrational) states of mind of protestors are key; these include feelings of "dissatisfaction, restlessness, and tension" (Blumer 1995 [1951]); "alienation and anxiety" (Kornhauser 1959); "anxiety, fantasy, hostility" (Smelser 1962); and "cognitive dissonance," "an upsetting state [that] produce[s] tension for the individual" (Geschwender 1971, p. 12). The significant point here is that these are the states of mind of *individual* protestors. Social-structural theorists do not conceive of the emotions differently; the latter remain for them individual states of mind that do not admit of a relational conceptualization. These theorists, in fact, relegate the passional dimension of political life to the domain of "subjective factors," to the "individual level of analysis" (Klandermans 1984), and thereby render it inferior in status to a whole

host of other factors, well outside the most significant arena (for them) of causal determination. They reduce collective psychology, in other words–the study of emotions *between* persons (or emotional matrices or configurations)–to the study of emotions *within* persons (the emotional perceptions, attitudes, or orientations of individual actors as the primary unit of analysis). A case in point is (again) the important category of processes of cognitive liberation. In McAdam's own work, at least, such processes are defined in highly subjectivistic fashion: "objective structural changes," he suggests, "have subjective referents as well"; on the one side is "objective condition," on the other side, "subjective perception" (McAdam 1982, pp. 48, 35). Yet again, we are in the realm of (aggregated) individual states of mind.

Much the same holds true for culturalist approaches to the study of collective action. Melucci's major work (1996a, 1996b), published in two volumes, serves here as a useful illustration of the conceptual ambivalences that persist at the heart of new social movement theory. Melucci offers tantalizing leads for a study of the emotions in his initial volume on collective action. "[A] certain degree of *emotional investment*," he writes, "is required in the definition of a collective identity, which enables individuals to feel themselves part of a common unity. Passions and feelings, love and hate, faith and fear are all part of a body acting collectively." This analytical level of "emotional dynamics," of "*collective experience*," he goes on, "is a complementary dimension which must be kept distinct from 'structural' analysis, but which nevertheless forms a constituent part of any analysis which takes seriously the task to understand 'action,' not merely behavior" (Melucci 1996a, pp. 71, 80–81; emphases in original). Only in his companion volume (1996b), however, which treats of matters of "the self," does Melucci actually explore emotional phenomena in any sustained or searching way; these are relegated to the domain of individual-level factors rather than of collective psychology. New culturalist theories fare little better in this respect: they distinguish implicitly between transpersonal phenomena, on the one hand (such as frames), and putatively personal phenomena, on the other (emotional states of mind). The latter are rarely studied in their dynamic relations with one another, in the sense (as Melucci would have it) of mutual emotional investments. (The one contrary example that we were able to find in this literature is Gamson's [1992] aforementioned use of the idea of "hot cognitions," but unfortunately, it falls prey to still other mistaken assumptions in respect to the emotions, as this article explores further below.)

Why pernicious?

Conceptualizing emotions as individual states of mind leads to two kinds of problems. The first is a logical problem of coordination, first underscored by social-structural theorists in criticism of classical models of collective action. Individual discontent (however defined), the former argue, is given by the latter as "the immediate cause of movement emergence. . .. When severe enough, when some aggregate 'boiling point' or threshold is reached, [this discontent is said to] trigger social insurgency" (McAdam 1982, p. 9). Collective action is thus said to occur when intrasubjective states of mind somehow aggregate to produce an intersubjective process; the logic of the argument flows from personal to systemic levels. The logical difficulty here, of course, is that the coordinating mechanism that translates individual-level into collective-level phenomena remains unspecified: a crucial omission, since "the phenomena to be explained involve interdependence of individuals' actions, not merely aggregated individual behavior" (Coleman 1990, p. 22). Ironically, a similar argument can now be made as well regarding the social-structural theorists who advanced it (and, for that matter, culturalist theorists as well): they, too, conceptualize the emotions as individual states of mind. Transpersonal phenomena that figure importantly in their accounts – solidarity, trust, hope, loyalty, identification, enmity, and so forth – all clearly entail collective emotional processes that, however, cannot be theorized upon the basis of an individualistic understanding of the emotions. All the major extant approaches, then, find themselves unable to analyze important interactions among the (emotional) states of mind of different actors or to explain the processes by which such interactions affect the episodes of political contention that they seek to understand.

A further logical problem for students of collective action that arises from conceptualizing emotions as individual states of mind is that it necessarily distorts their understanding of the nature of power, a key concern for all analyses of contentious politics. While power is frequently seen as relational or structural (Schwartz 1976; Piven and Cloward 1979 [1977]; McAdam 1982, pp. 29–31, 36–40), the emotions are often understood as somehow external to actual power relations. The latter, that is, are typically distinguished from the emotional forces that encourage insurgency and are described as "structural/political," in contrast to emotion, which is described as merely subjective (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, pp. 32–33). Such an assumption about the emotions reinforces the tendency to relegate collective psychology to the

backwaters of social movement theory: if the emotions are not "where the power is," then why study them? Specifically, this assumption discourages researchers from inquiring into possible *emotional* sources of power, both within social movements and between those movements and other actors and institutions; it simply assumes that such sources of power do not exist. For example, if power entails being able to withdraw a crucial contribution upon which others depend, as in a strike, where workers withdraw their labor power (Piven and Cloward 1979 [1977]), then researchers are deprived of tools needed to grasp the emotional processes that are involved in activating such power. Withdrawal is effective only if collective and coordinated, an eventuality that requires horizontal ties of solidarity and trust among workers, ties based not only upon their shared interests, but also upon their emotional investments (as Freud pointed out long ago, [1959 (1922), p. 43], the utilitarian logic of rational self-interest cannot by itself explain group formation). Horizontal ties are made possible in turn by vertical responses of anger and indignation against the employer; they require workers as well to overcome their own fear. Without theorization of such emotional phenomena, one is unable properly to conceptualize power itself, to see how it is arrayed and operates during contentious episodes, or to see how actors contest or seek to re-channel it. This is especially troublesome for those guided by a normative vision of emotional democracy, as alluded to above, for such a vision requires knowing precisely how power is organized and how it might be *re*-organized in the future.

A better alternative

How are these difficulties and limitations to be overcome? The most effective plan of attack is to address them at their underlying conceptual foundations. Here, as before, the insights of the pragmatists prove to be most illuminating. As Dewey notes, emotion always implies a disposition toward certain modes of *engagement* with persons or things; emotion is always *toward* some object, a passional mode of relation or linkage. "The preposition '*of,*'" he writes, "in the phrase '*state of mind*'," does not denote "that there is a mind or consciousness or soul as its subject." The very dichotomy of subject and object must be questioned if we are to escape the individualistic tendencies of much of the current thinking about the emotions. This is not to deny, of course, that a self exists (or that its internal dynamics have importance), but only to affirm that selves or subjects cannot be the point of departure for a theory interested in the emotions. Ultimately, "the [very] distinction of an emotional attitude of an agent, a person, and of a thing is derived,

not original, in experience. What exists in its own right is a situation . . . in which a distinctive qualitative reaction towards a distinctively qualitatively toned environment occurs; these two descriptions being but different ways of analytically naming one and the same fact" (Dewey 1985 [1912], pp. 31–32). The subject-object dichotomy is a constructed one; what is primary is the situation: "The 'state or frame of mind' has no independent existence" (Dewey 1985 [1912], p. 38).

Such philosophic subtleties are easiest to grasp when one recalls that other actors, too, other subjects, belong to the environment of objects to which Dewey refers. Actors are always implicated in relations with other actors, and emotions cannot be extricated from those relations or seen as the properties of some disengaged or disembedded subjectivity. Not the subject (or object) alone, but rather, transactions among two or more actors (or other elements of a situation) must be deemed the proper unit of analysis for the study of the emotions. As Dewey puts it, "Emotion in its ordinary sense is something called out *by* objects, physical and personal; it is response *to* an objective situation. . .. Emotion is an indication of intimate participation, in a more or less excited way in some scene of nature or life" (Dewey 1988 [1925], p. 292). Or as Bourdieu suggests in his own distinctive language, the habitus "adjusts itself to a probable [social] future which it anticipates and helps to bring about because it reads it directly in the present of the presumed world, the only one it can ever know. [And] emotion, the extreme case of such anticipation, is a hallucinatory 'presenting' of [that] impending future, which, as bodily reactions identical to those of the real situation bear witness, leads a person to live a still suspended future as already present, or even already past, and therefore necessary and inevitable" (Bourdieu 1990 [1980], pp. 64, 292fn.12). This "anticipated future" might well involve political contention, where emotions call forth other emotions in an ongoing (albeit conflictual) dialogue or conversation. (There is more on such dialogic possibilities in the final section of this article.) The substantive problems noted above, involving the move from individual to collective levels, vanish once one accords theoretical primacy to such emotional transactions. One is, as it were, *always already* at the collective or situational level. Of course, the study of individual psychological dynamics still potentially contributes to an understanding of contentious episodes as well, one theoretical level "down," so to speak, from that of collective (transpersonal) psychology. But even here (to stretch ourselves a bit), we can imagine transactional insights at work, as in Mead's (1934) account of the relational constitution and dynamics of the self. The primary

lesson, at any rate, is that the study of the emotions in collective action cannot move forward if the emotions continue to be assigned to the domain of the self; it can only flourish on the basis of a thoroughly relational re-conceptualization of emotional phenomena themselves.[10]

One further advantage of conceptualizing emotions in transpersonal and relational terms is that it provides new insights into the sources of power. Again, the contributions of the classical American pragmatists help us to rethink this difficult issue. Dewey and Bentley speak of a perspective of "*trans-action*," "where systems of description and naming are employed . . . without final attribution to 'elements' or other presumptively detachable or independent 'entities,' essences,' or 'realities,' and without isolation of presumptively detachable 'relations' from such detachable 'elements'" (Dewey and Bentley 1991 [1949], p. 108). This transactional perspective means, for instance, that power is itself not a substance or a possession to be "seized" or "held" (an "element," in their terminology), but rather, an outgrowth or effect of the relative positions that actors occupy within one or more networks. Power is unthinkable outside matrices of force relations; it emerges out of the very ways in which dynamic configurations of relations are patterned and operate. Bourdieu has such a notion in mind as well when, in explicitly transactional fashion, he defines social spaces as "network[s] or configuration[s] of objective relations between positions" and suggests that dominance within those spaces accrues to those actors occupying particularly privileged locations within them. Such an idea could certainly be applied to the social-structural context of action, or the "space of positions," as Bourdieu would term it. The ways in which social networks are configured plays a critical role in determining which actor(s) will be privileged in relation to others. "The insurgent potential of excluded groups," as McAdam points out, is not simply a function of resources, but also "comes from the 'structural power' that their location in various politico-economic structures affords them" (McAdam 1982, p. 37). Similarly, Piven suggests that "power derives from the patterns of interdependency that characterize all social life, and from the leverage that inheres in interdependent relations" (Piven 1981, p. 501). However, if the cultural and collective-psychological contexts of action are to be understood in relational terms, there is no reason to confine the sources of power to the social-structural context alone. Power can also be found, for example, within the cultural context of action, flowing from occupancy of certain privileged positions or nodes within symbolic configurations. As Furet suggests in his study of the French Revolution, "Power was a matter of establishing just *who*

represented the people: victory was in the hands of those who were capable of occupying and keeping that symbolic position" (Furet 1981 [1978], p. 48). If culture is a multiplicity of competing matrices of symbolic elements, then power also derives from a capacity to identify with or to "speak in the name of" especially highly valued ideals within such configurations. (Bourdieu speaks in this regard of "the mystery of ministry," the processes of "delegation" whereby a collectivity authorizes a set of actors to represent it, to speak on its behalf, indeed, to help constitute it as a collectivity in the first place.)

Analogously (and more to the point), the same can also be true of the collective-psychological context of action: as transpersonal structures that constrain and enable action, emotional ties, too, are a potential source of "structural power" in their own right. Actors can enjoy emotional power without possessing significant resources or occupying a privileged social-structural or cultural position. Here, too, power is a matter of location within flows and investments of (psychical) energy; it depends upon positioning within networks (of emotional cathexis, identification, or trust: Freud made much the same point in his formal modeling of group structures, as we shall see). With such a conceptualization of power, we can investigate how actors, individual as well as collective, acquire their power positions within historically specific configurations of emotional ties; we can also inquire into the historically changing forms of social control that they employ to maintain emotional structures that are in their own interests, and which have been the most effective. Bourdieu leads the way here through his analyses of symbolic violence. Actors often enjoy a certain emotional power over others, he argues, and this is facilitated by the fact that the latter's very dispositions and habitus are often constituted in such a way as to "predestine" them to modes of emotional engagement and response that leave them complicit in that domination. Thus, masculine domination, for example, perpetuates itself "invisibly and insidiously" through the cultivation of feminine submissiveness, which often "take[s] the form of *bodily emotions*– shame, humiliation, timidity, anxiety, guilt–or *passions* and *sentiments*–love, admiration, respect. These emotions are all the more powerful when they are betrayed in visible manifestations such as blushing, stuttering, clumsiness, trembling, anger, or impotent rage, so many ways of submitting, even despite oneself and 'against the grain,' to the dominant judgment" (Bourdieu 2001 [1998], pp. 38–39; emphases in original). Bourdieu does not depict such submissiveness as irrational, nor does he "blame the victim." "If it is fitting to recall," he notes, "that the dominated always contribute to their own domination,

it is at once necessary to recall that the dispositions that incline them toward this complicity are themselves the effect, embodied, of domination" (Bourdieu 1996 [1989], p. 4). Of course, when symbolic violence unfolds between political leaders and their followers, it greatly enhances the former's power and leverage, while severely constraining the latter's possibilities for insurgency and resistance (Selznick 1970, p. 269).

Disruption of such emotional complicities through a withdrawal of psychical investments can pose a serious threat to a collective-psychological power structure. The ambivalence in emotional ties (for example, the presence within solidaristic ties of repressed undercurrents of aversion and hostility) can make them especially susceptible to such a disruption (Freud 1959 [1922], pp. 41–42, 47, 67). So, too, can the existence of cross-cutting libidinal ties to spouses and families; these severely threaten emotional ties to a movement, leaders, or "greedy institutions" (Slater 1963; Selznick 1970; Coser 1974; Goodwin 1997). We need to inquire into the mechanisms that lead to disruption of emotional ties and the withdrawal of psychical investments. In addition, struggles to subvert patterns of psychical dependence can become fully explicit and deliberate and marked by conscious reflexivity. Typically, success in such a venture will not come easily: the dispositions of the dominated habitus, as Bourdieu observes, "are not of the kind that can be suspended by a simple effort of will, founded on a liberatory awakening of consciousness" (Bourdieu 2001 [1998], p. 39). Hence the radical naiveté of all emancipatory programs that expect an undoing of symbolic violence "from a simple 'conversion of minds'. . . produced by rational preaching and education, or, as *maitres a penser* sometimes like to think, from a vast collective logotherapy which it falls to the intellectuals to organize. . .. [P]assions and drives . . . remain totally indifferent to the injunctions or condemnations of humanistic universalism (itself, moreover, rooted in dispositions. . .)" (Bourdieu 2000 [1997], p. 180). Indeed, what is most often required is not only a transformation of habitus themselves through a perhaps arduous retraining, but also transformation of the very conditions, emotional and otherwise, of the production and reproduction of those habitus. But by making possible a more multilayered understanding of how emotional power is deployed or contested in collective action, by making visible bases of power and of symbolic violence that are elided by conventional understandings of emotion, a relational approach can at least significantly deepen our appreciation of how such power and symbolic violence are resisted and how they might be overturned.

Pernicious postulate #3: Collective emotions lack analytical autonomy

Specifying the postulate

A third pernicious postulate regarding the collective-psychological context of action holds that this domain lacks analytical autonomy, that collective emotions ought to be seen as derivative of either social relations or of cultural formations. All too often, the study of collective psychology proceeds within this implicit framework of a "sociology of the emotions." By this, we do not mean the sub-field of sociology that calls itself by that name, but rather (and more broadly), a specific kind of perspective upon the emotional realm. In such a perspective, as Alexander says of "the sociology of culture," emotions are "something to be explained . . . by something else, something that is itself entirely separated from [collective psychology]." To paraphrase Alexander, "If we allow this separate thing to be called 'sociology,' then we define our field as the study of substructures, bases, morphologies, 'real' things, and 'hard' variables, and we reduce [collective psychology] to superstructures . . . sentiments, 'unreal' [passions] and 'soft' dependent variables" (Alexander 1996, p. 3). Schwartz provides us with a succinct formulation of just such a standpoint. While admitting that social protest is often highly emotionally charged, he maintains that the emotions themselves are mere "adjuncts. . .. The role of the 'non-rational' factors is derivative, they correlate with and reflect the logic of the situation and the beliefs that arise from it" (Schwartz 1976, pp. 141, 148).

The tendency to reduce the emotional dimension of contentious politics to social relations is a defining feature of many of the most influential approaches to social movements. Classical theories, for example, all posit a social-structural cause of protest; depending upon the theory, this is specified as chronic social isolation or atomization; status inconsistency; or any type of disruption brought about by far-reaching social change, such as urbanization, industrialization, or a downturn in the economy. Structural strain is said to produce social-psychological disturbances, which in turn, as we have seen, yield a social movement once a certain aggregate threshold of discontent is reached. Individual discontent, strictly speaking, is a derivative phenomenon, with the underlying cause being social-structural; emotional dynamics are thus denied any independent causal significance. More recent social-structural approaches fare little better in this respect. Resource

mobilization theories stress social-structural elements such as the organizational framework of the movement; linkages to external support groups (typically elite sponsors); and the availability of material and other resources. Political process theories emphasize the structure of political opportunities and the strength of indigenous organizations and social networks. Culturalist approaches, of course, seek to avoid the above difficulties, but even they sometimes deny to the emotions full analytical autonomy. Thus, much of new social movement theory posits social-structural changes as the source of changes in collective action, and new culturalist theory does the same with framing processes.

Collective psychology is neglected or dismissed not only through social-structural reductionism, but also through cultural reductionism or, more specifically, a reductionism to cognition. The emotions are seen to matter perhaps a great deal in collective action, but only as derivative aspects of cognitive structures or processes. Such reductionism is to be found in certain theories of new social movements, where collective identities, although heavily invested with emotion, are still seen as matters ultimately of cognitive self-understanding (tellingly, one of the key texts in this literature, Eyerman and Jamison [1991], is subtitled, "A Cognitive Approach"). New culturalist approaches similarly reduce emotions to cognitions (as in framing theory), and even the partial exception of Gamson's invocation of "hot," emotion-laden "cognitions," putatively a necessary component of collective action frames, provides us with little insight into how such hot cognitions are internally structured, enacted, or produced. One final example that does not fit very easily into the above categories, but that captures clearly the difficulties in cultural reductionism, is Goldhagen's work on the Nazi Revolution (1996). Goldhagen presents there the most gut-wrenching and unforgettable examples of the gratuitous sadistic cruelty of many Germans toward the Jews, deriving from what he calls the former's "hallucinatory fantastical" construction of the latter, often with highly sexualized associations and pervaded by an unprecedented level of hatred. Yet the theory that he offers to make sense of it all is a declaredly "cognitive" theory, or more precisely, one in terms of "cognitions and values," that has little or nothing to say about collectively shared emotions (notice the absence here of "expressivity," a term that otherwise often appears, as part of the conventional Kantian triad, alongside terms designating cognition and morality). The remarkable cruelty that the book documents is to be explained merely by what ordinary Germans conceived to be true about the Jews: that the Jews are evil, that they are a threat, that they deserve to suffer, and so forth.

The theory pales next to the empirical phenomena that it purports to explain.[11]

Why pernicious?

The tendency to relegate emotional configurations (the transpersonal engagements of which Dewey speaks) to a causal status secondary to that of social structure or culture has two problematic implications, both of which can be highlighted by considering arguments by Sewell (1999) in respect to the analytical autonomy of culture. The first difficulty entails denial of the fact that contentious episodes are always already emotionally constituted. Sewell writes that "culture has a semiotic structuring principle that is different from the [other social] structuring principles that also inform practice. Hence, even if an action were almost entirely determined by, say, overwhelming disparities in economic resources, those disparities would still have to be rendered meaningful in action according to a semiotic logic. . .. For example, [in accepting a job offer, an impoverished worker would not simply be] submitting to the employer but entering into a culturally defined relation as a wageworker" (Sewell 1999, p. 48). Cultural definitions of the employer/wageworker relation, in other words, are constitutive of that relation itself, such that "working for a wage" would literally make no sense, would not exist as the practice that it is, apart from certain cultural structures or languages within which that category had meaning. Now, a similar point can be made in respect to emotional logics. In accepting that job offer, the impoverished worker also enters into an emotionally defined relation, into a tie with a benevolent father figure, for example, or a bond of cooperation with a fellow team player, or a struggle with a hated and feared adversary. Each such alternative emotional logic *constitutes* the engagement between the two individuals in a highly unique fashion, irreducible to the "structuring principles" of social relations or of culture. Episodes of contention, too, are incomprehensible without some understanding of such collective-psychological structures and of the different ways in which they channel action. From a theoretical point of view, perspectives upon collective action that do not acknowledge this insight produce a distorted understanding of the very transactions that they set out to study.

The second logical difficulty with reductionist approaches has to do with their unwarranted assumption of isomorphy among the three relational contexts of action. Sewell notes that "the cultural dimension is also autonomous in the sense that the meanings that make it up,

although influenced by the context in which they are employed, are shaped and reshaped by a multitude of other contexts. . .. Thus, our worker enters into a relationship of 'wageworker' that carries certain recognized meanings, of deference, but also of independence from the employer and perhaps of solidarity with other wageworkers. These meanings are carried over from the other contexts in which the meaning of wage work is determined–not only from other instances of hirings but from statutes, legal arguments, strikes, socialist tracts, and economic treatises." Sewell adds that such additional meanings "enter importantly" into the determination of action. "This fact," he concludes, "is what . . . virtually guarantees . . . that the cultural dimension of practice will have a certain autonomy" (Sewell 1999, pp. 48–49). Now, collective-psychological configurations, too, are shaped in ways that are not necessarily isomorphic with the social-structural or even cultural formations with which they are intertwined; one cannot map the one unproblematically onto the others. Emotional logics (e.g., filial attachment, teamwork, or rivalry) not only develop within the specific work relation noted above, but are also "subject to redefinition by dynamics entirely foreign to that institutional domain or spatial location" (e.g., by the dynamics of political relations or of family life, the latter often serving, as Lakoff [1996] especially has emphasized, as a template for politics). Such redefinitions can have a measurable impact upon action, "in this case perhaps granting the worker greater power to resist the employer than the local circumstances alone would have dictated" (Sewell 1999, p. 49). These are important lessons for students of collective action. However, the latter have all too often remained wedded to the logically flawed assumption of isomorphy, thereby restricting their vision of the full range of possibilities and constraints within which contentious episodes unfold.

A better alternative

We argue, then, that not only social-structural and cultural, but also emotional organization, libidinal economy, as it were (Goodwin 1997), must be investigated and analyzed in its own right. To invoke Alexander again, we need an "emotional sociology" and not a mere sociology of the emotions, one that devotes careful and sustained attention to how matrices of emotional ties or transactions are ordered, how they are put together from within, and how they operate. We do not aim here to provide such a study, which would clearly be beyond the scope of a single article. Our point, rather, is that these questions cannot be raised, let alone answered, so long as collective emotions are seen as merely

epiphenomenal. What alternative approach would in fact allow us to raise and to investigate these kinds of research questions? Again, we think that a relational perspective, drawn from the classical American pragmatist tradition as well as from the writings of Bourdieu, provides us with useful guidance here. As we have seen, in the simplest of cases (as discussed by Dewey), emotional transactions occur between a single subject and a single object. However, in more complicated cases, they involve a potentially far greater number of actors, tied to one another in sometimes intricate patterns of emotional investments. These configurations of passion can be systematically mapped and charted, as with social-structural or cultural structures. And the mappings that result can give us a fuller picture of the relational contexts within which action, including collective action, unfolds. Episodes of political contention can thereby be seen as the complex emotional interactions that they are, without reducing that level of insight to a mere reflection of other sorts of patternings or dynamics. Now, to be sure, like all transpersonal matrices, those of emotion become sites and objects of sometimes intense contestation; collective emotions are selectively drawn upon in attempts to reconfigure the psychical landscape. What requires emphasis here, however, is precisely the opposite dynamic: no less than other types of structures, emotional configurations not only enable, but also constrain action.

How then to proceed in developing our relational approach? First, let us begin with a few examples, classical as well as contemporary, to illustrate in preliminary fashion where we want to go. The first example goes back to Freud's pioneering work on emotional dynamics. Freud insists upon the analytical autonomy of the fantasy life: "*psychical* reality," he avers, "is a particular form of existence not to be confused with *material* reality" (Freud 1965 [1919]; emphases in original). In his study of group psychology, he argues that "highly organized, lasting, and artificial groups" (Freud 1959 [1922], p. 32), e.g., institutions such as churches and armies, are constituted in part through emotional ties or "libidinal cathexes" of two kinds: horizontal ties to other group members and vertical ties to the group leader. The horizontal tie is a relation of *identification*, whereas the vertical tie is a relation of sublimated (aim-inhibited) *object choice*. Freud notes that the nature of an object can vary: if not a concrete leader, it can be an abstract idea, ideal, value, or even "a common tendency, a wish" (Freud 1959 [1922], pp. 40–41). In later writings (e.g., Freud 1961 [1929], 1967 [1939]), he also speaks in greater depth of the role of aggressive impulses and fantasies in collective life. Overall, Freud's contribution is formally



Figure 1. Freud's group psychology. (*Source*: Freud 1959 [1922], p. 61.)

to model the psychical constitution (a partially unconscious one) of groups and institutions, in a way that is analogous to modelings of social or cultural structures. It is striking, in fact, to what degree his diagram of the ties linking leaders and followers, and of the bonds of identification among followers themselves, resembles the sociograms of today's social network theory, with the nodes marking neither positions nor symbols (as in studies of social structure or culture), but rather, objects: that is, whole persons, aspects of persons, or fantasized substitutes for persons (see accompanying Figure 1 on "Freud's Group Psychology"). It is also striking how much that diagram is a mapping of power relations in the collective-psychological context. Followers of Freud such as Bion (1994 [1961]) have further developed these theoretical insights, typically through experimental studies of small-group behavior (for an example of social movement work in this vein, see Brown and Ellithorp 1970). Others, such as Sagan (1991) and Hunt (1992), have extended these ideas into macro-historical terrain, exploring such topics as the "paranoid structure" of ancient Athens and the "family romance" of the French Revolution. To be sure, some of these applications are reminiscent of the classical paradigm of social movement studies, where psychoanalytic influences are pervasive (e.g., Hofstadter 1966; Smelser 1968; Loewenberg 1971; Platt 1980). But they do not necessarily share in that perspective's assumptions of irrationalism or subjectivism.

Present-day cultural studies is also a rich source of insights into how collective-psychological configurations enable and constrain action. Often drawing upon as well as recasting Freudian theory, it offers highly intriguing work on transpersonal psychical dynamics (of desire, hatred, the erotic, co-mingled with aggression) in political life and collective action. (Indeed, one can almost say that "cultural studies" is a misnomer

and that what is most interesting and unique about it is, in fact, the study of emotional, not cultural, structures and processes.) Take, for example, the work of R. W. Connell: he contends that associated with the modern state is a particular kind of "'gender regime,' defined as the historically produced state of play in gender relations within an institution." A key feature of this gender regime is "the *structure of cathexis*" that it encompasses, "the gender patterning of emotional attachments" (Connell 1990, pp. 523, 526; emphases in original). This concept helps us to understand such problems as the emotional complexities of workplace relations within the state apparatus; gender-specific modes of attachment to political leaders; and the gender politics of nationalism. Another example is the work of Berezin, who draws (in part) upon Connell to analyze Italian fascists' political project to build a deeper emotional attachment to the Italian polity, a kind of "political love." Her work shows how fascists set about "to channel emotion" away from the Italian family and religion and to "project it onto the [Italian fascist] nation/state" (Berezin 1999, pp. 366; see also Berezin 2001). Although this work may suffer from some of the problems we noted above in our discussion of emotion management, it usefully shows how important the structures of cathexis can become in political life. Similarly, M. Jacqui Alexander (1997) directs close attention to the erotics of state power, focusing upon the fraught history of women's political struggles in the Bahamas against a "heteropatriarchal" state. By "elaborating the processes of heterosexualization at work within the state apparatus and charting the ways in which they are constitutively paradoxical: that is, how heterosexuality is at once necessary to the state's ability to constitute and imagine itself, while simultaneously marking a site of its own instability" (M. Alexander 1997, p. 65), she shows how the official collective psychology of the Bahamian nation/state, and the constraints it involved, were contested by a feminist movement in pursuit of "erotic autonomy."[12]

Freudian group psychology and cultural studies, then, point the way toward an alternative conceptualization of the emotions, one that avoids the theoretical pitfalls of reductionism. But now we encounter a second and very different sort of challenge: given the analytical autonomy of each of the three contexts of action, how are we to conceptualize the empirical interrelations among them? A clue is given in the following quotation by Taylor (1985), a statement that concerns the relation between culture and social relations but that has implications for our tripartite model as well: "The vocabulary of a given social dimension is grounded in the shape of social practice in this dimension; that is,

the vocabulary would not make sense, could not be applied sensibly, where this range of practices did not prevail. And yet this range of practices could not exist without the prevalence of this or some related vocabulary. We can speak of mutual dependence if we like, but really what this points up is the artificiality of the distinction between social reality and . . . language. . .. To separate the two . . . is forever to miss the point" (Taylor 1985, 33–34). What this quotation so elegantly captures is the idea of *mutual constitution*, the insight that each class of elements (or, in our case, each context of action) is ordered or constituted through its pattern of interrelations with the other two. How might this idea be pursued empirically? One way to develop it is by means of the mathematical techniques of Galois lattice analysis, a close cousin to the network-analytic approaches that we have invoked above. These techniques display graphically the co-constitution of networks of ties from two or more analytically distinct orders of social phenomena; they present those networks in single line diagrams, showing how each network is structured *in-and-through* its relations with all the others. "Galois lattice analysis makes possible a simultaneous graphical representation of both the 'between set' and 'within set' relations implied by a [multi]-mode data array" (Mische and Pattison 2000, p. 170). By providing such visual representations, this technique nicely illustrates the idea of mutual constitution and serves as a model for how to bring together the three relational contexts that we have taken pains to distinguish analytically from one another.[13]

But now, with this reference to Galois lattice analysis, a third problem becomes evident that requires a final step in our argument. The difficulty is that even the imageries that we have provisionally endorsed above, those of crystalline patterns of linkages among leaders and followers, of static structures of cathexes, or of lattice-like networks of psychical (and other) ties, while useful for certain purposes, fail ultimately to capture the highly dynamic and dialogic nature of emotional transactions. They depict psychical formations, in other words, in reified fashion, as fixed or static, thereby capturing only half of the complex notion denoted in White's (1997, p. 60) evocative phrase, "processes-in-relations," and at most allow us to juxtapose their evolution across distinct historical periods or moments in the manner of a succession of "snapshots," without systematically theorizing the processes whereby these formations transmutate over time. Typically, this problem is confronted by positing a dialectic of structure and action: that is, by adding an element of processuality or performativity to the element already present of structural stability, of conceiving of

structures as crystallized substances and yet also "subsequently" setting those structures into motion. Such an approach both accepts the divisions themselves *and* seeks to "conceptualize the[ir] articulation" (Sewell 1999, p. 47). In the study of cultural as opposed to collective-psychological structures, this is precisely the analytical strategy that has been pursued by Sewell (1992) himself, as well as by Alexander (2004) and like-minded scholars in the tradition of semiotic structuralism. Although no one has as yet extended their specific ideas onto emotional terrain, one does find in Hochschild's (1979, 1983) work, which has enjoyed a considerable influence in recent social movement research, the strategy of complementing a concept of "feeling rules" with a more processual concept of "emotion work": the former are "guidelines for the assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation," while the latter involve acts "of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling . . . an active stance vis-à-vis feeling . . . in obeisance to [feeling] rules" (Hochschild 1979, pp. 566, 561, 563). Collective-psychological formations (feeling rules) are by this formulation rigid self-standing frameworks that are analytically separable from but linked to the agentic efforts (emotion work) they channel, much as the analytical domain of statics is distinct from (but linked to) the analytical domain of dynamics. (The hot cognitions also conceptualized by Gamson in reified fashion are similarly set in motion subsequently, as it were, through what Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986, in their seminal work on frame analysis, term "framing processes.")

The general limitations of such a theoretical approach may perhaps best be understood by contextualizing it within an even broader tradition of structuralist analysis, one that goes back to the early decades of the twentieth century. Durkheim, as we noted earlier, distinguishes periods of profane social existence from episodes of ritualized action, the latter being not only reproductive but sometimes also transformative of established structures (Durkheim 1995 [1912]; see also Mauss 1921). A contemporary of Durkheim's, Saussure, also distinguishes the "synchrony" of language states from the "diachrony" of linguistic evolution, noting that "all notions associated with one or the other" are "mutually irreconcilable" (Saussure 1959 [1916], pp. 91). Such dualisms of statics and dynamics have been incorporated for close to a century into the very logic of structuralist thought; unfortunately, however, they have also brought in their train significant omissions and elisions. Most importantly for our purposes, they have presented students of collective emotions with intrinsic difficulties insofar as theorizing change is

concerned, and change is precisely what analysts of contentious politics most want to be able to understand. For one thing, transformations in emotional configurations that the structuralist framework portrays as motionless and thing-like have not been easy to conceptualize. While it might be possible to study the inner logic or organization of feeling rules, hot cognitions, and so forth, from a synchronic perspective, one cannot explain where this patterning comes from or how it is put "at risk," so to speak, or rendered vulnerable to change, in each new enactment that it undergoes: "It is possible to explain reproduction as a phenomenon sometimes produced by perpetual change; it is not possible to explain change as a phenomenon sometimes produced by perpetual stasis" (Abbott 1997, p. 98). For another thing, if emotional structures are to be conceived of as inert entities, one cannot ask (let alone explain) how these configurations emerge, are consolidated, and are transformed *in dialogue with* other such configurations (or with other aspects of situations). That is, one loses all sense of emotional formations as in dynamic engagement with one another and with the rest of social life.

Is there a better alternative to such conceptual divisions, whereby process can be incorporated into the very heart of structure and vice-versa? Here as well, we find in the pragmatist tradition some useful insights. Specifically, it is important to recall that at the very same time as Saussure (and Durkheim), Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, was elaborating an alternative theory of signs, one that depicts semiosis as an ongoing, open-ended, and temporal dynamic. Saussure had taken his dualistic cast of mind into the very definition of the sign itself, conceptualizing it as a combination of "signifier" (sound-image) and "signified" (concept). Not only had he assigned to this "double entity" a bifurcated structure, but he had also depicted it as static and inert, for signifiers, while "arbitrarily" related to signifieds, were in his view "fixed, not free, with respect to the linguistic community that uses [them]" (Saussure 1959 [1916], p. 71). Peirce diverges sharply from such a synchronic approach, steps outside the framework of Saussurean structuralism altogether, as it were, by taking as his unit of analysis not dyadic structures, but rather, a triadic process of "sign," "object," and "interpretant." "A sign," he maintains, "is something which stands to somebody for something.... It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign," in an unending chain or succession of interpretations (Peirce 1980, p. 228) (see accompanying Figure 2 on "Peirce's Theory of Signs"). In one commentator's gloss, "As a sign, the interpretant



Figure 2. Pierce's theory of signs. (*Source*: Sheriff 1989, p. 60.)

refers to another interpretant which as a sign refers, in its turn, to still another interpretant and so forth. . . . This is the Peircean principle of unlimited semiosis, of the unending succession of interpretants. . . . Signs are not things, but processes" (Ponzio 1990, pp. 257, 260). Significantly, in Peirce's view, emotions, too, are signs, and therefore transactional flows rather than reified entities (Savan 1981). Building upon these insights, G. H. Mead (1934), another pragmatist, also develops a triadic theory of symbolically mediated communication that conceives of structure in processual fashion; in his triadic theory as well, one finds useful leads for reconceptualizing collective emotions in a non-reified and dialogic manner. Neither theory implies, of course, that all structures are processual or unfolding as a matter of empirical fact. Rather, both present this idea only as an ontological and theoretical point of departure.[14]

One other source of theoretical inspiration for interrelating statics and dynamics, structure and process, and stability and change can be found in Bourdieu's ideas regarding cultural semiosis. Bourdieu claims (e.g., in Bourdieu 1996 [1992]; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) that all actors within the space of positions distinguish themselves from others

by means of symbolically meaningful "position-takings" – works, arguments, and products – that derive their own semiotic significance in relational and transactional fashion from their difference vis-à-vis other such stances within a "space of position-takings." Bourdieu's perspective here has as much to do with action as it does with structure (for position-takings are dynamic moves in a game); it is eminently dialogic (for actors' positions are always "taken" in reference to the position-takings of others); it situates the space of position-takings against a background of social relations (for the structure of the field of positions always restricts the [actual and potential] position-takings available to specific actors within it); and it sees the space of position-takings as shaping and constituting social relations in turn (for the structure of that space effectively permits only certain kinds of actors to assume certain cultural stances: hence an argument for the relative autonomy of culture).[15] Bourdieu, of course, speaks only of the two spaces of positions and of position-takings. But his ideas can be given a "generative" reading and extended into the domain of collective psychology by positing something like a third "space of (collective) emotion-takings," interdependent with but relatively autonomous from the other two. Consider, for example, how in the 1930s the emotions of anti-fascist fraternity bound together Communists and non-Communists in the Workers Alliance of America, a movement of unemployed workers in the United States. This shared hostility toward fascism was more than symbolically meaningful position-taking ("fascism is not for us"); it was also an emotional stance within the space of emotion-takings. Just as symbolic position-takings are meaningful only in relation to other such position-takings, so, too, the emotions of anti-fascist fraternity were a response to others' hatred and fear of democracy and socialism in a complicated, three-way dialogue among democrats, Communists, and fascists. Moreover, like symbolic position-takings, the emotional investments of Workers Alliance activists were dynamic moves that changed in response to the shifting emotional stances of others. Following the 1939 non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, Communists took a strongly antiwar position that required a measure of emotional detachment toward fascism or at least some moderation of the Alliance's previous hostility. This stance angered and alienated many non-Communist members who, remaining committed to a vigorous struggle against fascism, felt deeply betrayed. As the emotional ties between Communists and their erstwhile fascist enemies changed, so, too, did the emotional ties between Communists and their non-Communist allies. Finally, like symbolic distinctions and classifications in the space of position-takings, emotional investments

shaped collective identity and provided a basis for the mobilization or demobilization of groups. While the space of emotion-takings was constrained by the space of positions and the space of position-takings, it reacted back upon them in turn. In this case, as the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact reconfigured the space of emotion-takings, the Workers Alliance lost its cohesion, became mired in internal struggles over its collective identity, and ultimately dissolved (Goldberg 2003).[16]

Supplemented by the insights of Pierce and Mead, this generative reading of Bourdieu allows for more effective handling of the substantive problems briefly surveyed above. As the example indicates, emotional configurations often transmutate in ways that are difficult to grasp through synchronic imageries. When studying contentious episodes, it becomes particularly important to understand such processes of change in collective emotions. Bourdieu's idea of an ongoing semiotic process of emotion-takings provides us with a considerably enhanced analytic purchase upon that problem. In addition, emotional configurations are often multiple: that is to say, frequently more than one is to be found in any given contentious episode. The internal emotional life of a protest movement, for example, might be organized around logics quite at variance with those of the institutions against which it struggles; or, in yet another example, different elements in a protest coalition might each display a different emotional makeup, pattern, or profile. But each of these distinct logics might also have been shaped or structured in dialogic response to those of the others; the emotional tendencies of one group, for instance (e.g., rigid idealization of leaders, fraternal solidarism, or a paranoid style) might possibly have taken shape in (unconscious) imitation of those of its opponents or allies, or even possibly in (unconscious) reaction against these other patternings. (Actors, of course–individual and collective–drive these various processes: leaders and followers, to be sure, but also authorities, officials, coalition partners, and citizens.) The dialogism in Bourdieu's ideas helps to reveal the subtle relations among this multiplicity of emotional formations, allowing one to see how apparently unitary, self-subsistent emotional structures are actually constituted through and through by their engagement with other such structures–an engagement, moreover, that often changes and evolves with the passage of time.[17]

Conclusion

What important lessons are to be gained from all these considerations? We could certainly rehearse the various conclusions at which

we have arrived as conclusions about what *not* to assume regarding the emotions in political life. But perhaps it will be more useful here to restate our ideas in a more positive and theory-building fashion. Here, then, are some of our conclusions, expressed in the form of injunctions. When studying episodes of political contention, look for the intentional structure in the various parties' emotions, whether they are social movements, established institutions, or third parties, and evaluate their perceptions and judgments on the basis of the intelligence and emotional appropriateness that they manifest. Expect to find emotional influences powerfully at work upon the leaders of movements as well as upon their followers, and inquire into the passional cultivation and education that might lead both toward greater collective emotional intelligence. And expect to find such collective-psychological dynamics not only inside movements, but also within the established institutions against which they struggle. Think relationally and transactionally in respect to such emotional phenomena; seek out the emotions not solely inside the heads and hearts of individuals (as "states of mind"), but also *between* individuals, as complexes of psychical investment, engagement, or cathexis. See these emotional ties and investments as a potential source of power in their own right, alongside social-structural and cultural sources of power, and ask how each relational context, including the collective-psychological, not only generates but also organizes and channels flows of power. Explore the internal logic and organization of these emotional formations; rather than seeing them as reflections of social or cultural structures, examine them in their own right and determine their own principles of coherence and contradiction. Consider these formations and social and cultural matrices to be mutually constitutive of one another, as in a lattice diagram, and imagine that the passage from one to another of these relational contexts is like a passage between distinct but interdependent worlds. And finally, see these matrices as dynamic, ongoing, dialogic processes-in-relations, and ask how these configurations change and how they all mutually condition one another.

Although this set of injunctions is not meant to be exhaustive, it does indicate the kind of broad empirical research program that our theoretical reorientation suggests. It allows us also to conclude just as we began: with the vision of a new frontier for substantive research, albeit one that extends well beyond that of the cultural turn. This is an agenda that opens potentially fruitful new areas of inquiry, one that, in a pragmatist as well as Bourdieuian spirit, creates new challenges

for empirical problem-solving. However, before drawing altogether to a close, we need to ask one final question: If the theory-building efforts undertaken above are to guide our research, then will they be sufficient to fulfill all the requirements of a collective-psychological approach to political life? Now, regrettably, at the end of this article we must admit that we are still only partway toward such a goal. The reason is that this article has been exclusively concerned with what we might term *mappings*, as opposed to *mechanisms*. As we define them, mappings refer to the topologies of the three relational contexts of action and their mutual orderings, while mechanisms are "recurrent causal sequences of general scope" (Tilly 1998, p. 7): for example, collective-psychological processes that can be found to operate in a diversity of empirical cases. Thus far, we have had nothing to say about causal mechanisms. Why are they so very important? Our answer is that if we are to generalize across instances of collective action and across contentious episodes, then we must build up an inventory of such causal sequences to draw upon and systematically deploy. Once we do, it will be possible to draw "deep analogies" (Stinchcombe 1978) between cases and to show within them the workings, singly or in concatenation, of such recurrent causal processes.

Now, how do mappings and mechanisms relate to one another, if at all? We contend that they are mutually constitutive and interdependent: *mappings without mechanisms are empty, while mechanisms without mappings are blind*. (This formulation helps to overcome the artificial and misleading tendency in sociological theory to distinguish rigidly between "sensitizing concepts" and "causal analysis.") Indeed, each such element inherently presupposes the other. For example, our discussion above of emotional topologies and networks led in the end to an assertion of their intrinsically processual nature, thereby opening the way to a future exploration of emotional sequences and mechanisms. And a discussion, yet to come, of these emotional mechanisms will correspondingly show how they cannot be isolated, delineated, and specified without a prior mapping of the relational terrain. This, in summary, is our vision for theory-building in the domain of collective-psychological analysis. A great deal of work clearly remains to be done. The full elaboration of this vision now awaits a careful typologizing of emotional processes and sequences and a consideration of how they can be invoked in the study of empirical cases. We invite others to join in the work that we have started by taking up that crucial and complementary endeavor.

Acknowledgments

Long in the making, this article has been the object of a wide range of reactions and emotional engagements. We wish to thank those who offered useful suggestions and constructive criticism.

Notes

1. For recent theoretical statements, see Albrow 1997; Barbalet 1998; Calhoun 2001; Collins 2004; Jasper 1997, 1998; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000, 2001a; Hunt 1992; see also Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Elster 1999; Katz 1999; Scheff 1997. For recent substantive studies, see Adams 1999; Alexander 1997; Berezin 1999, 2001; Connell 1990; Goldhagen 1996; Goodwin 1997; Hunt 1992; Kane 2001; Sagan 1991; Scheff 1994; see also the essays in Barbalet 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001b. For an overview of the sociology of the emotions, see Thoits 1989. For work in philosophy and anthropology, see de Sousa 1987; Jagger 1989; Lloyd 1993 [1984]; Lutz 1988; Nussbaum 1995, 2001. An interesting question for the sociology of ideas is why there has been this upsurge of interest in the emotions in so many different fields simultaneously.
2. One cautionary note: The boundary-lines separating these several traditions are at times indistinct. In recent years, for example, political process theory has absorbed into itself many of the key ideas (and proponents) of resource mobilization theory, as well as of new social movement theory and the new culturalism. Even a brief inspection of the co-editorship and contents of the standard collection by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) would make this abundantly clear. In what follows, then, we employ these distinctions for heuristic purposes only. For examples of the classical perspective, see Arendt 1951; Bell 1960; Blumer 1939, 1995 [1951]; Geschwender 1971; Gusfield 1970; Kornhauser 1959; Le Bon 1960 [1895]; Lipset and Raab 1970; Selznick 1970; Smelser 1962, 1968; Turner and Killian 1957. For examples of resource mobilization theory, see Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973. For examples of the political process model, see McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978, 1984; see also the latest formulation in McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001. For examples of collective identity (or new social movement) theory, see Cohen 1985; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Cohen and Arato 1992; Melucci 1996a,b; Touraine 1983 [1982], 1985, 1988. For examples of new culturalist theory, see Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Johnston 1995; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; see also the volume co-edited by Morris and Mueller (1992), which is heavily oriented toward new culturalist theory. One final note: a number of the scholars whom we mention or cite in the more reconstructive passages of our essay (e.g., Berezin 1999, 2001; Sewell 1996; Steinberg 1999; Kane 2001) have also contributed to the study of culture and social movements, but in ways very distinct from (and often in opposition to) the new culturalism mentioned above.
3. See Lutz (1988) for an ethnopsychology of ”Western discourses on feeling.” Lutz makes the useful point that even when these paired concepts are reversed in valuation, with the irrational, for example, elevated above the rational, or the passional above the intellectual (as in nineteenth-century Romanticism), the fundamental

oppositions to which they refer are nevertheless retained and not overcome. This certainly holds true for scholarly work on episodes of contention, as we shall see below.

4. We hasten to add, however – and this is another manifestation of the danger of assuming textbook-like uniformities – that not all social movement theorists commonly categorized as "classical" accept the dichotomy between reason and emotion. Turner and Killian (1957, p. 17), most notably, affirm that "emotion and reason today are not regarded as irreconcilables." These exceptions, nonetheless, do prove our rule in another respect, for Turner and Killian are perhaps the theorists in this intellectual tradition who are most directly and pervasively influenced by pragmatist philosophy, a fact whose significance will become ever clearer as our arguments unfold.
5. See, for example, Touraine 1983 [1982], 1985, 1988 [1984]. Touraine's approach to the study of social movements, which he terms "sociological intervention," represents a novel twist upon our theme, insofar as it depicts the sociological researcher as a rational clear-eyed analyst who, in contrast to leaders, followers, and "organic intellectuals" alike, is capable of determining, even against their "strong resistance," "the highest possible signification of their action." Ultimately, this Leninist-style figure participates in the political struggle as well, for if successful in drawing "both the praxis [of the participants] and its interpretation to the highest level," he or she empowers them to "return to action," (Touraine 1988 [1984], pp. 94-95), ideally with a clearer sense of their proper historical mission, which for Touraine entails (ideally) a struggle against technocratic domination.
6. James (1920 [1884]), the other great pragmatist who wrote extensively on the emotions, held to a somewhat different theory of the emotions that actually retained this dualistic conceptual framework in important respects. It should be noted that writers in the phenomenological tradition also sought to transcend the subject/object dichotomy, most notably Merleau-Ponty (1968).
7. Strictly speaking, reason and intelligence did not mean precisely the same thing for the pragmatists. As Dewey explains it, reason "designates both an inherent immutable order of nature, superempirical in character, and the organ of mind by which this universal order is grasped. In both respects, reason is with respect to changing things the ultimate fixed standard, the law physical phenomena obey, the norm human action should obey." Intelligence, by contrast, is "associated with *judgment*; that is, with selection and arrangement of means to effect consequences and with choice of what we take as our ends. A man is intelligent not in virtue of having reason which grasps first and indemonstrable truths about fixed principles, in order to reason deductively from them to the particulars which they govern, but in virtue of his capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with his estimate. In the large sense of the term, intelligence is as practical as reason is theoretical" (Dewey 1988 [1929], p. 170; emphases in original).
8. Here we place ourselves within a lengthy tradition of thought that goes back at least to Parsons (Parsons and Shils 1951) and whose most significant contemporary representative is Alexander (1988). However, we also diverge from both Parsons and Alexander in not conceptualizing the third of our three contexts of action in individualistic or even social-psychological terms, as a domain of "personality" or "the self." The term originally used by the first author of this essay to refer to collective psychology, "the social-psychological context of action" (Emirbayer and

Goodwin 1996; Emirbayer 1998; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999), was unfortunately less than sufficiently clear in signaling this divergence.

9. Since we shall not probe any further into this latter line of reasoning, a sort of corollary to our main postulate, let us briefly mention here (departing from the overall logic of our presentation) the major shortcoming that we feel it exemplifies: Emotional structures, like all structures, are indeed an outcome of action and are sustained and reproduced, or transformed, through action. But when emotion is viewed so one-sidedly as a feature of action (or of selves or of persons' mental states), then structure is collapsed unhelpfully into agency, and into individual agency at that.
10. In the contemporary sociology of the emotions, one finds this theme of the relational nature of emotional phenomena elaborated most extensively in the work of Scheff [1994, 1997]; on relational thinking more generally, see Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Somers 1998; Tilly 1998.
11. A slightly different formulation of this postulate avoids such epiphenomenalism, but only at the cost of collapsing into one another the relational contexts of action, social structural, cultural, and collective-psychological, that we have been at pains to keep analytically distinct (thereby leaving important research questions unasked and unanswered). Following Archer (1988), we refer to this slightly different variant, the end result of which is similarly to deny the analytical autonomy of collective emotions, as "central conflation." While not yet directly associated with any specific approach in social movement theory, it does appear in a few studies (e.g., Adams 1999) that take the emotions seriously but regard them as an (analytically indistinguishable) feature of culture.
12. Another very different tradition of cultural studies ought also to be mentioned here, one that extends the idea of the habitus (in all its emotional dimensions) to the level of the collectivity or the nation. Early writings in this tradition include Paz (1961 [1950]) on Mexico and Elias (1996 [1989]) on Germany; for more recent contributions, see Stearns and Lewis (1998) on the United States. Following Scheff's (1997) lead, Kane (2001) seeks to bring ideas from this line of work directly to bear upon collective action studies, simultaneously also invoking Bourdieu as a parallel inspiration.
13. For a related discussion of tripartite structural analysis, see Fararo and Doreian 1984. Among classical sociologists, it was Simmel (1955 [1922], p. 150) who first elaborated the idea of the co-constitution of distinct orders of social phenomena. The idea of dual ordering was later developed methodologically by Breiger (1974). Wasserman and Faust (1994) have usefully termed this the problem of studying *multi-mode* (as opposed to one-mode) social-network data.
14. Several decades after both Peirce and Mead, one other (non-pragmatist) theorist of semiosis, Bakhtin, also rejected Saussurean semiology and its static vision of closed, immutable linguistic systems, arched (as he put it) like "stationary rainbows" over the stream of actual communication (Bakhtin/Volosinov 1993 [1929], p. 52; see also Ponzio 1990). Instead, he suggested, in terms that resonate with those of the pragmatists and help further to illuminate what they had in mind, that all semiotic (and by extension, emotional) configurations are inherently dialogic in nature, that they are *enacted* always in dynamic response to other enactments, making ongoing reference to addressees and interlocutors in an ever-unfolding stream of utterances, and that in fact they often define themselves in contradistinction to one another, such that it is impossible to speak of any one of them

alone, in static isolation. Concrete utterances for Bakhtin only made sense in relation to other such utterances within ongoing flows of semiotic transactions: "The utterance is filled with *dialogic overtones*. . .Each individual utterance is a link in the chain of speech communication" (Bakhtin 1986 [1979], pp. 92–93). The idea of "addressivity" is important here, much as that of the interpretant is crucial to Peirce's own definition of the sign: "The word," wrote Bakhtin, "is oriented toward an addressee. . .. As word, it is precisely *the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee*. . .. A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another" (Volosinov 1993 [1929], pp. 85–86; emphasis in original). (In Bakhtin's conceptual schema, "word" and "utterance" refer not always to single isolated words or sentences, but sometimes to far more extended and complex engagements in a dialogue. Thus, it is possible to imagine the formation of an entire emotional configuration as a single utterance.) For sociological work on collective action that draws heavily upon Bakhtin, see Steinberg 1999. Yet another thinker with highly similar ideas about processuality was Elias (1978 [1970]), whose perspective is summed up in his well-known concept of "figurations."

15. It should be pointed out, however, that Bourdieu is not always consistent on this score and that he vacillates between a perspective that affirms the full analytical independence of the cultural context and one that takes the space of positions as primary. In this respect, Alexander's (1988) arguments are much more persuasive and Bourdieu's in need of reconstruction.
16. We can see in Collins's (2001, 2004) work on interaction rituals a similar development of the idea of spaces of position- and emotion-takings, through his analyses of the mutual engagements of rival movements and organizations in shared "social attention space."
17. One final approach that bears mentioning here is that of Reddy (2001), who relies only peripherally upon the pragmatists (by way of Quine) and hardly at all upon Bourdieu but who presents a semiotic and processual approach to "emotional regimes" (and their transformation in the direction of a fuller "emotional liberty") that is nonetheless very similar to the one we advocate in this essay.

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