From Passionate Politics

Chapter Five

Emotions and Political Identity: Mobilizing Affection for the Polity

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Inventing Belonging in New and Old Political Spaces

The collapse of postwar political arrangements in Eastern, and to some extent Western, Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia in the past decade has re-mapped geopolitical space and challenged social science to find new ways to conceptualize cultural and social transformation. The fall of long-established regimes coupled with vast shifts in migration flows have catapulted political identity, with its concomitant issues of nationalism, ethnicity, and citizenship, to the forefront of social scientific research.[1]

I argue that political identities are inherently problematic as they are the least "natural" of all possible identities that individuals or groups might possess. I use the term "natural" not to posit an essentialist view of identity but to suggest that subjective political identities are, except in times of political crises such as wars, distant from the concerns of "ordinary life."[2] We experience a range of identities from the public to the private as "hierarchies"—simply put, some are more important to us than others. Political identities are public identities. They frequently take second place to more deeply felt private identities. Political identities tread a difficult line as they require that individuals feel that something exists outside the private self—the party, the state—that is worth dying for. "Feeling" political identity requires a reordering of the "hierarchies"

of identity—as such, political identities must be part of ongoing national cultural, or identity, projects.

Macrosociological interest in political identity tends to focus principally upon the legal institution of citizenship, the problem of immigration, and juridical issues of membership and group rights.[3] My essay recasts citizenship as a cultural as well as legal mode of political incorporation and underscores the symbolic and emotional practices that nation-states marshal to mobilize affection for the polity. Wedding emotion and citizenship expands the concept of membership to include the felt experience of national belonging.

I take up these issues in three interrelated segments. The first is analytic and conceptual. It discusses political identity as a category of felt experience, examines the role of the nation-state as mobilizer of political emotion, and explores the relation between liberalism and the denial of emotion. The second is empirical and draws on my research on Fascist Italy. Political ritual is the focus. Public political rituals serve as arenas where ritual actors, both participants and observers, blur the boundary between self and other, self and nation-state. These temporary arenas, "communities of feeling," dramatize political identity or felt membership in the national polity. The third section draws out the implications of my work for future theorizing about identity, emotion, and political belonging.

Political Identity—Who Are We?

Identity is inextricable from the understanding of the self and is central to participation in meaningful patterns of social and political action.[4] We all have identities independently of how narrowly or broadly we construct them. Self and other, subject and object—the recognition of difference begins from earliest life.[5] Identity is an inescapable dimension of social life. Political philosopher William Connolly (1991: 158) argues: "each individual needs an identity; every stable way of life invokes claims to collective identity."

Identity suggests first and foremost similarity, and it demands acknowledgment of what Charles Taylor (1989: 36) terms a "defining community." The social construction of identities involves the recognition of and participation in a web of social relations or communities that envelop the self and through which individuals feel themselves as identical with others. Identities are neither essential nor purely constructed; they are multiple but not schizophrenic (Calhoun 1993b). Individuals relate to and derive meaning from many communities of similar selves. We all

possess both public and private identities. Public identities principally include citizenship and work identities that are institutionally buttressed by the legal organizations of the modern nation-state and market. Interest and rationality govern these identities. Private identities originate in their purist forms as kinship relations. Tradition as well as emotion inform these identities.

Cultural identities—religious, national, regional, and ethnic identities—are more fluid and may be either public or private depending upon historical context. Democracy tends to legislate religious, regional, and ethnic identities out of the public sphere and to invoke selectively the affective dimensions of nationalism to support the nation-state.[6] Cultural identities are based upon meanings—the meanings of religious practice, homeland, and group affiliation. They have the capacity to generate and have generated powerful public emotions and militancy. Patriotism, ethnic nationalism, and racism, for example, embody the semipermeable line between love and hate in the political sphere.

The multiplicity of available identities does not suggest that they carry equal meaning to those who participate in them. To borrow from Connolly (1991: 173), many identities are "contingent," that is, circumstantial. Identities belong to a category that Charles Taylor (1989: 63) has described as "hypergoods"—objects that are of relatively more value to us than others. We experience some identities as "hypergoods," and some we experience as essentially "contingent" (Berezin 1997: 19–30; 1998).[7] I use the term "hierarchy of felt identity" to conceptualize the emotional categorizing of which we individually and collectively partake.

Political identities are particularly vulnerable to contingency. David Laitin (1998: 24, 31–32) even goes so far as to argue that the "conglomerate identities" that emerge in times of national recalibration resemble what rational-choice theorists describe as a "tipping game." Political identities fractionate into local, regional, and national identities (Agnew and Brusa 1999) as well as ideological identities (Cohen 1985; Berezin 1997). Identity has two dualities built into it which prove confounding when it is used in political analysis. Identity is noun and verb; singular and plural. What is it; whom do I identify with? Who am I; who are we? Personal identity and political identity differ. Who am I becomes who are we? Who is one of us and who is not? In addition, identity has an ontological and epistemological status (Somers 1994). It describes a state of being as well as a category of social knowledge and classification. In an ideal universe, political identities merge emotional attachment and institutional categories. "I am French" and "we are French" would be both ontological and epistemological statements.

Nation-States: Vehicles of Political Emotion

Modern nation-states serve as vehicles of political emotion. Patriotism and nationalism, political love and political hate, define friends and enemies. Nation-states move the epistemological—citizenship as category—towards the ontological—citizen as felt identity. To borrow Benedict Anderson's now familiar formulation (1991: 7), the modern nation-state is an "imagined community" that in turn creates a spirit of "fraternity" that generates a feeling of "attachment" to the state in the form of "love for the nation" (Anderson 1991: 141, 143). Nation-state is a two-pronged institutional and conceptual entity. The state is in the "business of rule" and focuses upon bureaucratic efficiency and territorial claims; the nation is in the business of creating emotional attachment to the state or "noncontingent" identities.[8] Recent discussions of nationalism suggest that scholars are beginning to pay more attention to the distinction between nation and state. For example, Brubaker, in his institutionalist account of nationalism, implicitly acknowledges the importance of drawing distinctions between state and nation when he argues that "the analytical task at hand . . . is to think about nationalism without nations" (1996: 21). Miller (1995: 18) argues that the "confusion of 'nation' and 'state' obfuscates discussions of nationality."

The nation side of the nation-state dyad, while it appears as the product of natural emotions, is highly constructed. The success of individual nation-state projects in the nineteenth century lay in the strength of constructed emotion, and some nation-state projects were more successful than others. Historical and theoretical accounts demonstrate that nineteenth-century nation-states did not just come together as a result of the elective affinity of compatriots. They were forged from wars, the reorganization of cultural institutions, principally education, and the standardization of language. National cultures were created at the expense of local and regional cultures. Modern nation-states require a cultural infrastructure to ensure that commitment to a national polity is salient among the "hierarchy" of felt identities. All political regimes engage in some form of symbolic politics. National languages and literatures and education systems as well as museums, monuments, and music serve to keep the spirit of national belonging alive (for example, Mukerji 1997; Corse 1997; Bonnell 1997; Spillman 1997).

"Imagined" community was a novel concept when it first appeared in 1983. Its principal battle has been won, and scholars generally accept the constructed dimension of "nation-ness." However, scholars have either glossed over or simply assumed "political love" without delving into what sociologist Robert Connell (1990: 526) has described as the "structure of cathexis" or the "patterning of emotional attachments" to the polity.[9] This lacuna is problematic in all accounts of nation-state making, and particularly problematic in the case of anti-liberal states where attachment is assumed to be a product of coercion.[10] Attachment to the nation-state forms in the space between shared social meanings and formal organization. Culture (nation) and rationality (state) fuse to create the nation-state.

Liberalism and the Repression of Political Emotion

"Making" political love, or "reordering the hierarchies of identity," is a form of state action derived from the repertoire of available emotive cultural symbols and practices. In her analysis of the "family romance" of the French Revolution, Hunt (1992: 196) suggests that the emotional metaphor of family and all that it implies is vacuous if it is not situated in a specific cultural and historical context. Distinct political regimes where ideology and practice merge in institutional form, in this instance the modern nation-state, provide a context for excavating the cultural cues that generate "political love."

Liberalism, as ideal and as political organization, institutionalized the central cultural chasm of modernity: the division of collective and individual into public and private selves.[11] Public and private as a broad categorization schema captures all possible identities. In general, I advocate a slightly less conventional use of this distinction as a convenient shorthand for what we would term private or "ordinary" life: family, gender, love, religion—arenas of deeply felt identities that are beyond the purview of the liberal democratic state.[12] Liberalism and, by extension, democracy relegate emotion to the private sphere.

Identity is an issue of modernity that is connected to an ideological conception of individualism (Calhoun 1995a: 194–95). Democratic contractualism which upholds the integrity of individualism and multiple identities sometimes has a political effect that diverges from its theoretical intent. Lefort (1986) in his discussion of totalitarianism suggests the alienating potential of democracy when he notes that "number breaks down unity, destroys identity" (303). He locates the weakness of democracy in its desacralization of politics represented in its rejection of a sacred center which the monarchy symbolizes in preliberal forms of government. Democracy leaves an empty symbolic space which totalitarian forms might fill: "Democracy inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be said to be sovereign, of

course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent" (303–304).

Lefort's analysis suggests that the split between public and private selves is the historical exception rather than the historical norm—and that the democratic public sphere is continually vulnerable to the reinsertion of the private, or the resacralization of politics. The denial of emotion embodied in democracy's refusal to incorporate the sacred into its institutions is the subterranean fault line that threatens to derail democratic ideals. Modernity and its concomitant commitment to individualism and the separation of public and private is a caesura—not an ongoing march into the future.[13] The alienating effects of democracy create the void that anti-liberalism attempts to fill when it rejects the liberal separation of public and private and, ultimately, the democratic state.

Theorizing about political identity tends to assume a modern democratic nation-state and to presuppose a single mode of participating in the polity. These assumptions prove inelastic in the face of alternative visions of political belonging and organization.[14] Modern (post-1900) anti-liberal states are predicated upon the fiction of novelty, in that they claim to create new political cultures and identities.[15] Their claim to novelty places their identity strategies in bold relief—strategies that are less transparent in established nation-states.

Resacralizing Politics and Mobilizing Affection: Examples from Fascist Italy

In liberal and social democratic nation-states, symbolic political practices are expressive phenomena that temporarily objectify the state; in anti-liberal nation-states, symbolic politics, particularly ritual actions, attempt to obliterate the distinction between self and other, i.e., nation and state, private and public.[16] My work on fascist Italy (Berezin 1997, 1998, 1999a) shows how anti-liberal nation-states relied on public political rituals to reorder the hierarchies of felt identity.

Ritual shares certain formal properties with identity. Rituals, repeated actions in public spaces, are representational and performative; categorical and experiential; or epistemological and ontological. In the course of twenty-two years, the Italian fascist regime staged thousands of public political events—large and small, in the center and on the periphery. For example, in the relatively small Italian city of Verona, the fascist regime staged 727 ritual events between 1922 and 1942 (Berezin 1997: 169–73). At the level of representation or cultural cognition, these

events frequently played with deeply held private Italian identities, rescripting them in the language of fascism.

Italian fascist nation-state builders imagined political identity as a fusion of public and private conceptions of the self. Fascist conceptions of identity diverged sharply from the style in which Italian citizens constructed their identities. "Noncontingent" Italian identities tended to be private and tied to family, local and tied to place, and religious and tied to the Catholic Church. Family, region, and religion were the cultural communities that provided the cultural repertoires, modes of thought, and behaviors that were the sources of the Italian self, the loci of emotional attachment. The fascist identity project could not be cut from whole cloth and had to be patched together from remnants of existing identities.

The "popular culture of Roman Catholicism" and the "cult of the mother" were the emotional tropes represented in fascist public ritual. Catholicism evoked the solidarity of shared religious heritage, and motherhood embodied the sentiment of familial love. Roman Catholic doctrine was functionally irrelevant to its practice in a semi-literate country such as early-twentieth-century Italy, where a battery of cyclical liturgical rituals obliterated whatever nuances of Church doctrine seeped into popular consciousness. The popular practices of Roman Catholicism, engraved in the mental frames of even the fascists, provided an opportunity for cultural transposition.

The first anniversary commemorations of the "March on Rome," the melange of events that brought fascism to power, provides an example of how the Italian fascist regime appropriated the Roman Catholic Mass and its liturgy. A Mass celebrated in the Piazza Siena in Rome, and simultaneously in every part of Italy, was a symbolic enactment of the new national unity that fascism had brought ("La Messa al campo Piazza di Siena," *La Tribuna,* October 30, 1923).[17] The "rite" that exerted a "mystical fascination" upon the crowd was an intricate blending of Roman Catholic and fascist practice. The use of the term "rite" instead of liturgy, the more appropriate term for variations on the staging of a Roman Catholic Mass, is in itself a clue to the subtle shifts in consciousness that the newspaper representation was trying to encourage for those who could not attend.

The elevation of the Eucharist, at which point the priest recites the words that change ordinary bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, is the center of the Catholic Mass. This action is such a central part of Catholic liturgy and doctrine that it would be a rare Italian Catho-

lic who did not understand its significance. The Mass inserted fascist ritual practice into the most sacred part of the liturgy. At the moment that the priest raised the Eucharist and turned to the audience, a trombone sounded, the troops presented arms, and the fascists raised their arms in a Roman and fascist salute.

As the priest consecrated the Eucharist, the fascists consecrated themselves and blurred the distinction between what was sacred and what was secular—what was Church and what was State. This fascist imposition upon Catholic ritual suggested that one could be both fascist and Catholic. Of course, the Eucharistic transformation is an article of faith—which one believes or does not believe. The bread remains bread, and every one knows that it is not the body of Christ. So too the fascist "revolution" was in 1923 more an object of belief among devoted adherents than a felt popular experience.

The fascist "cult of the mother" appropriated a visceral Italian feeling about the nature of motherhood that sprang from a deep cultural well. The union of family and nation was not unique to fascism. A fascist grammar-school text taught that according to Giuseppe Mazzini, the intellectual architect of Italian unification, "the first cell of the organism of the Patria is composed of the Family," and that the mother was the "angel of the family" (Biloni 1933: 243). The people's *adunate* that began in 1935, the year the regime invaded Ethiopia, brought together nation and family by wedding maternal to military representations.

The *adunate* were huge rallies that brought masses of persons into public squares throughout Italy to demonstrate solidarity with the regime's imperialist ventures. The pictures of these events in *Popolo d'Italia,* the National Fascist party's daily newspaper, are blurry, suggesting a raw mass of living bodies giving consent to the regime. The newspaper headlines shout the imperial aspirations of a regime that was inventing colonies and imagining empire. There were six national *adunate* in Rome from 1935 to 1937. Four of them focused on the war in Ethiopia and the founding of the fascist empire; Italian women were the focus of the other two.

To celebrate the "victory" in Ethiopia, Mussolini ordered an *adunata* in Rome of 500,000 persons where he proclaimed in the language of colonial conquest, "Ethiopia is Italian: Italian in fact, because it is occupied by our victorious armies; Italian in law, because of the Roman gladiators and the civility that triumphs over barbarism, the justice that triumphs over arbitrary cruelty, the redemption of miseries that triumphs over a millennium of slavery" (*Il Popolo d'Italia,* May 6, 1936). The crowds gathered in all the piazzas of Italy and bells pealed from the

church towers and public buildings of the medieval landscape. The streets of central Rome from the Via del Impero to Corso Umberto were filled with cheering Italians. Three days later, on May 9, 1936, Mussolini declared Italy an "Empire."

The *Rivista Illustrata del Popolo d'Italia,* the four-color photographic weekly appendage to the *Popolo d'Italia,* prepared a special commemorative issue in honor of the new empire. A photomontage from this edition of the review captured the multiple cultural schemas upon which the Italian fascist project drew as it aimed to create the fascist nation-state and empire. The forefront image is of Romulus and Remus nursing at the breast of the wolf. According to popular legend, Romulus and Remus founded Rome after the wolf saved them from starvation. The first backdrop features banners with fascist eagles waving. The image clearly comes from a rally. The background is a stone monument depicting a map of Mediterranean Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Italy and the colonies of the new fascist empire—Libya and Ethiopia—are in bold relief.

This monument was, and is, on the Via del Impero, now renamed, but it is still visible in Rome and tourists on the road to the Coliseum, then and now, may stop to look at it. The words at the bottom of the photomontage are: "Rome ought to appear marvelous to all people of the world: vast, organized, powerful as it was in the time of the first emperor Augustus" (Agnelli and Starace 1937). The image combines the myth of the founding of Rome with the emerging myth of empire. The image is also one of maternity, albeit the rather fierce maternity contained in the wolf's body, against the backdrop of empire.

In the period of increasing militarization in the mid-1930s, we might expect that the "cult of the mother" would retreat before the "cult of militarism." Yet, women became more prominent in fascist spectacle and narrative as the regime marched forward. Why would the regime emphasize women in a period of intense mobilization? The display of women and family in the service of the regime and the appropriation of marriage and motherhood were central to the regime's social and political mission. In a regime that expected to endure, women, as the producers of new fascist bodies, were important. Despite the demographic campaign and the cultural importance of the family, the empirical evidence does not suggest that Italian women were all that enthusiastic about becoming mothers—and Italian fertility declined during the fascist period.

The public display of women was the center of two *adunate.* The "day of faith" occurred on December 18, 1935, and the "woman's mobilization" in Rome occurred on May 8, 1936—three days after Mussolini

announced victory in Ethiopia and two days before the declaration of empire. While the latter event simply featured the raw display of masses of women's bodies in the service of the regime, the "wedding ring campaign," as the former event is known, speaks directly to the symbolic weight accorded to family and motherhood. After three months of fighting, the Ethiopian campaign was rapidly emptying state coffers. The regime needed gold, and Mussolini asked Italian women to sacrifice their wedding rings to the glory of the nation. There were ceremonies in all of Italy to donate wedding rings. The main ceremony occurred in Rome on the steps of the monument to Victor Emanuel. The queen of Italy led Italian mothers and wives to the "Altar of the Patria," where they donated their wedding rings to the nation. "Fourteen years of national education" mobilized Italian women to sacrifice their wedding rings to a cause "even more sacred than the family and the effects of the family" ("La Memorabile giornata a Roma," *Il Popolo d'Italia*, December 1935).

The Italian culture of the family was put on the line for the troops on the line, and *Il Popolo d'Italia* made explicit reference to the appropriation of the family: "This People which has a cult of the family and its traditions could not but fully and profoundly understand the significance of offering nuptial faith for a grander faith." The queen, who rarely spoke publicly in Italy, gave a brief oration on the day of the ceremony. Standing at the foot of the monument to Victor Emanuel, she said:

> In climbing the steps to the sanctuary of the Vittoriano, united, the proud mothers and wives of our dear Italy leave their wedding rings, symbol of our first joys and deepest renunciation on the altar of the Unknown Hero. In this purest offering of dedication to the Patria, bowing to the earth, almost merging our spirits with our glorious Fallen of the Great War . . . united, we invoke them, and to God, the "Vittoria."

Communities of Feeling

Religion and family, the popular culture of Roman Catholicism and the "cult of the mother," were the representational aspects of fascist public ritual. The vantage point of history permits discursive readings of these emotional tropes. They provide a window to the regime's cultural intentions. As Geertz (1973: 449) argues in his discussion of the Balinese cockfight, ritual display serves as a kind of "sentimental education" in its use of "emotion" for "cognitive ends": "What the cockfight says it says in a vocabulary of sentiment—the thrill of risk, the despair of loss, the pleasure of triumph. Yet what it says is not merely that risk is exciting, loss depressing, or triumph gratifying, banal tautologies of affect, but that it is of these emotions, thus exampled, that society is built and individuals are put together."

Geertz's analysis, while pointing to the cognitive ends of emotion, elides the question of ritual outcome. Ritual is performative as well as representational, and we attenuate its political significance if we move no further than the cognitive. Discursive ritual knowledge is, I shall argue, ultimately indeterminate. But how does ritual mean if not discursively; and how does it contribute to a politics of identity, if it conveys no narrative knowledge? Public political ritual is performance; and performance, whether it occurs in the tightly bounded world of the theater or the more permeable social space of a public piazza, is a highly elusive entity because its effects are experiential. The experiential, or performative, nature of ritual points in the direction of action. Ritual is a form of action, as well as representation, and it derives much of its distinction as a cultural entity from its formal characteristics.[18]

Public political rituals serve as arenas of identity, bounded spaces, where collective national selfhood is enacted. Ritual action communicates familiarity with form, and this familiarity may be as simple as the recognition that one is required to be present at an event. Familiarity and identity are coterminous. The repeated experience of ritual participation produces a feeling of solidarity—"we *are* all here together, we *must* share something"; and lastly, it produces collective memory—"we *were* all there together." What is experienced and what is remembered is the act of participating in the ritual event in the name of the polity.

Emotion is the pivot upon which political ritual turns. It is a vehicle of political learning that has the capacity to create new identities. Emotion can make the difficult and unnatural appear easy and natural. Emotion is the antithesis of modern political organization except when it is rigidly codified in the nation side of the nation-state dyad. Emotion is nonrational but it is not irrational. Emotion obliterates prior identities. It fuses self and other, subject and object, the ontological and epistemological.

Public political rituals create "communities of feeling"—my adaptation of Raymond Williams's (1977: 132) concept, "structure of feeling." According to Williams, "structures of feeling" are "social experiences *in solution*." He is trying to articulate the nondiscursive elements of aesthetic emotion. Williams contrasts "feeling" to discursive elements such as "worldview" and "ideology" which are linguistic and textual in their import. His analysis diverges from Geertz, in that it suggests the

indeterminacy of emotional politics: "we are concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs are in practice variable (including historically variable), over a range from formal assent with private dissent to the more nuanced interaction between selected and interpreted beliefs and acted and justified experiences" (Williams 1977: 133).

Rousseau in his *Letter to D'Alembert* argues that the grouping of persons in public space is the purest articulation of political equality, and by extension, democracy (Taylor 1994: 47–48). Rousseau was only partially correct. Ritual eliminates indeterminacy in social space through the carefully staged crowding of bodies in public spaces, but this does not presume that ritual eliminates indeterminacy as to meaning. Ritual, by acting out emotion, includes indeterminacy. Public political ritual, as Lefort argued with respect to democracy, is a double-edged sword as it creates an open interpretive space. Solidarities and memories—the identities of subjects who have gathered under similar circumstances—may be extremely fluid. Emotion may obliterate the old self, but there is no guarantee as to what form the new self or identity might assume. "We *are* all here together" may as easily become, "Here we go again."

Identity and Belonging: The Political Logic of Emotion

Emotion is frequently absent from, or underemphasized in, discussions of political identity. Identity formation under conditions of antiliberalism provides an extreme case that allows us to place more standard conceptions of political identity formation under the microscope. Regimes that began with the fiction of novelty and relied upon public political rituals bring into sharp focus the relation between emotion and political identity obscured by discussions of political identity which assume democratic practices.

I am not suggesting that we are about to witness a resurgence of anti-liberal regimes similar to those of the early twentieth century, nor am I suggesting a resurgence of public ritual as a way of political life. History and context *do* matter: this is 1999 and *not* 1929. Indeed other technologies of political communication, from television to the internet, compete with ritual. However, I do argue that an analysis of the formal properties of ritual and anti-liberalism has much to contribute to current theoretical discussions of identity as well as to the formulation of hypotheses regarding the emergence of new or unstable political identities. Geographically bounded territories where established regimes have collapsed and long-established nation-states confronted with a flow of immigrants both face an attenuation of shared national meanings and culture. The weakening of established political identities forces nation-states to rewrite the rules of national belonging as well as to rebuild or to amend the formal institutions of governance and membership.[19]

In conclusion, I will spell out more concretely how the general claims which I advance in this chapter might contribute to a reframing of discussions of the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and the emotions (not to mention carnage) it has generated, as well as the problems of identity that influxes of immigrants have posed to long-established nation states (for summaries, see Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Calhoun 1997). I will focus on the key concepts of this chapter: emotion, ritual, and "hierarchies of identity."

To structure my discussion of these concepts, I shall return to the issue of citizenship that I raised at the beginning of this chapter. As I noted, citizenship has become the vehicle for current sociological discussions of political identity. Rather than engaging this literature directly, my purpose here is to borrow from its prominent exponents to draw out the contemporary implications of my argument. Broadly conceived, citizenship emphasizes the legal relation between an individual and a national state—as such, it is an intrinsically modern phenomenon linked in time and space to the formation of national states. Soysal (1994) in her discussion of guestworkers in contemporary Europe decouples citizenship from space; whereas, Somers (1993, 1995) in her work on the development of popular political rights in England decouples citizenship from time.[20] If both of these arguments are correct, then they bear powerfully on the issues that I have raised in this article.

First, if we accept Soysal's (1994) claim that a form of "postnational" citizenship is emerging that divorces rights from territory, then the feeling of national belonging takes precedence to whatever territory one happens to inhabit. One may "feel" Turkish or Algerian, even if one spends one's entire life in France or Germany. These are more than simply abstract feelings, as anti-immigrant violence and the resistance to cultural incorporation are salient in both cases. Brubaker's (1992) discussion of the anti-immigrant sentiments of French nationalists indirectly corroborates Soysal's argument. The citation that he offers from a French nationalist supports the relation between "feeling" and citizenship: "It's detestable. Many sons of Algerians found themselves French without having asked for it: one made them citizens by force. These people don't necessarily share our values. If they don't *feel* [emphasis added] French, well, we don't want them either!" (Brubaker 1992: 147). Soysal's work underscores the emotional dimension of political identity—the fusing of self

and other captured in the notion of community. Both Soysal and Brubaker suggest how difficult it is to create and maintain political identity even in long-established nation states.

The decoupling of citizenship and space legitimates my claim to the emotional dimension of political identity; Somers's (1993, 1995) decoupling of citizenship from time legitimates my choice of anti-liberal states as objects of political participation. Somers's location of activities that look very much like democratic participation in a public sphere in fourteenth century England suggests that institutions, or mechanisms, of political participation do not have to follow the development of nation states or democratic practices. During the period which Somers discusses England was hardly democratic. Her argument is similar to Putnam's (1993) research that links institutional effectiveness in late-twentieth-century Italy to practices of cooperation and trust that developed in the early fourteenth century. Scholars have criticized Putnam (particularly chapter 5) for the historicism of his argument. What his critics have failed to note is that the areas which Putnam associates with deep civic traditions were also the areas where the fascist party was strong. Traditions and practices of cooperation and organization need not lead to democracy.

If Somers and Putnam are correct, then the form of the state is not always congruent with the political practices of its members. Democratic states may incorporate nondemocratic sentiments. Conversely, anti-liberal states may orchestrate alternative modes of political participation, i.e., the reliance on emotional politics and public ritual, that are decidedly nondemocratic and antirational in spirit. This is congruent with Lefort's discussion of democracy as an open interpretive space which I discuss in an earlier part of this chapter, and it calls into question Habermas's linking of a public sphere to democratic practice. Amassing bodies in public space creates an alternative public sphere aimed at creating new feelings of belonging to a polity. The outcome of this public fusion of self and other is as indeterminate as the type of politics that cooperation and trust produce.

If identity, as I suggest, is the recognition of multiple communities of similar selves, then any national identity project must become part of a repertoire of communities of selves to which individuals feel belonging. In contrast to other discussions of politics and identity, I emphasize that individuals do not experience identities as equivalent. Exclusively private identities, such as kinship identities, are salient, as well as identities such as those involving religion and localism, which veer toward the private on the public/private continuum. Political identity requires the reordering

of the felt "hierarchies of identity" so that feelings of national belonging are as salient as other forms of identity.

The state, democratic or antidemocratic, is the central institutional actor in the creation of national identities. But it is not the only actor, and it exists in sharp competition with the institutions which organize other forms of identity. When the state collapses as it did in the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe it is not surprising that the feelings of ethnic nationalism—a strongly felt cultural identity tied to place—would emerge to fill the void. The dissolution of the state leaves a free field where members find communities of similar selves and reorder their own identities. In these, increasingly less rare, instances, deeply felt identities gain ascendance. But more importantly, the logic of my argument suggests that emotion as the basis of identity and political practice is neither primordial nor irrational but represents an alternative political logic.

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Endnotes

1. Identity qua identity is a relatively novel preoccupation of macrosociology, and as an analytical concept, its dimensions are inchoate. For a summary of the social science approaches to identity, see Cerulo 1997; for a summary of recent writing on the subject, see the essays in Calhoun 1993c.

2. I borrow the phrase from Charles Taylor (1989: 211).

3. For an analytic argument, somewhat consonant with the one I offer here, that covers the salient themes in the literature, see Offe 1998.

4. This section appears in fuller form in Berezin 1999b.

5. Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes 1985 surveys theories of selfhood.

6. See the emerging literature on nationalism, particularly Brubaker 1996, Calhoun 1997, and Smith 1998.

7. Gould's (1995) conception of "participation identity," focused on collective action, shares my emphasis on the "contingent" nature of identity.

8. I borrow "business of rule" from Poggi 1978.

9. Recent theoretical and empirical work (Verdery 1994; Borneman 1992; Hunt 1992), such as Connell's, that weds notions of gender to concepts of state formation can serve as useful analytic starting points. In a similar vein, Goodwin (1997) explores the relation between "libidinal" energy and social movement commitment.

10. For fuller discussion of what follows, see Berezin 1999a.

11. Public and private are terms used with more frequency than precision. For an overview of recent uses of the terms, see Weintraub 1995: 280–319 and the essays in Kumar and Weintraub 1997.

12. For a discussion of public and private that is consonant with my use of the terms, see Brewer 1995.

13. One has only to remember that both Hitler and Mussolini came to political power through essentially parliamentary and legal means. The retreat to ethnic identities and the contemporary resurgence of nationalism as well as racist violence in Europe may be interpreted as a retreat to private identities. Whether these emerging phenomena will result in a resacralization of politics is a separate and historically contingent issue.

14. In her analysis of the genesis of Anglo-American citizenship theory as a political concept, Somers (1995) argues that its historical specificity vitiates its analytic power in the face of new political arrangements in the former Eastern Europe.

15. It is highly unlikely that the men and women who were the objects of these identity projects, or their designers, would have used the term "identity." "Identity" is historically specific, but this in no way obviates its use if we are cautious as to how we employ it and recognize when we are using it either transculturally or transhistorically. On the transcultural use of the term, see Handler 1994. On the analytic use of historically specific terms, see Calhoun 1993b.

16. Anti-liberal states, states based upon the blurring of the boundary between public and private, are frequently, but not necessarily, antidemocratic. They range from totalitarian, to colonial, to forms of patrimonialism. I am using the standard Weberian conception of patrimonialism here (Weber 1978: 1006–69)—although it is rarely compared to the nondemocratic state forms of the early twentieth century.

17. The narratives in this section are drawn from Italian newspaper accounts.

18. For fuller discussion, see Berezin 1994: 1279–80; Berezin 1997: 30–35, 245–51.

19. Perez-Diaz (1998: 211–21) offers an argument similar to the one that I am advancing.

20. Somers (1993) also makes an argument about space, but in my view her originality lies in her discussion of timing.

Chapter Six

A Revolution of the Soul: Transformative Experiences and Immediate Abolition

Michael P. Young

During the 1830s, organized efforts to abolish slavery in the United States experienced a sea change. In this decade not only did antislavery activism become both contentious and popular; but in addition, its fundamental character was transformed. From 1832 to 1838 an estimated one hundred twenty thousand Northerners rallied around calls for the immediate emancipation of slaves and rejected schemes for the gradual abolition of slavery. This movement challenged the arguments of Protestant benevolent societies that African-Americans should be colonized in Liberia, and it demanded a commitment to racial equality within the United States. Why did this radical shift in antislavery occur in the 1830s? After all, antislavery sentiments and organized opposition to the South's "peculiar institution" were not new. Why did the uncompromising message of *immediate* abolition gain the following of a vocal and committed minority at this time? In this chapter, I argue that this change in the course of antislavery, and its timing, cannot be faithfully tracked by standard social movement theories. The dramatic conversion of activists to radical and immediate abolitionism requires an appreciation of the emotional resonance of a tight set of moral claims that triggered personal transformations and motivated bold collective action. It requires explaining how slavery managed to shock evangelicals in the 1830s in the ways it did and also how it could not just a generation earlier. I argue that this explanation must account for the development of a historically