

***Changing Politics of Property in Urban Land:
A Case Study of Istanbul***

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For the people of Ayazma and Basibuyuk

ABSTRACT

In the past few years, major cities of Turkey, especially Istanbul, have experienced state mediated urban redevelopment through projects known as “squatter settlement clearance projects”. According to the authorities, the projects were intended to evict squatter settlements, rehouse the squatter population in modern, decent houses and save them from unhealthy, ‘dirty’ and crime-ridden squatter life. This dissertation uses qualitative data based on two case studies, in Istanbul, to analyse these projects, their objectives, outcomes, and implementation, the response of the squatters along with the relations between the state and squatters –the dynamics of persuasion and contention- during the process of implementation. This analysis is undertaken through the framework of theories of world city, rent gap and gentrification. It is found that the projects are implemented with the motivation of making Istanbul a world city and are targeted at those squatter neighbourhoods with a large rent gap; that they prompt the displacement of squatter populations and result in uneven outcomes amongst this population based upon their ownership status. The projects ensure the enforcement of the ‘property rights system’ through the eviction of squatters on state land and their resettlement in flats. They have a chance to *own* the flats if they can meet their payments. Therefore, the projects connote the institutionalization of new rules and relations in urban land. The study at hand, as such, designates the constitution of a new property regime and unearths a process of capitalist urban redevelopment, albeit one realised by the state.

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
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Figure 1: Map of Istanbul, Turkey



Source: Google Earth

Figure 2: Squatter settlements deemed for clearance in Istanbul (yellow zones)



Source: Imece, 2009

INTRODUCTION

The last decade has witnessed a shift in the attitude and policy of the Turkish state towards its squatter settlements. The ambivalent, yet generally favourable, attitude of state authorities towards squatter settlements was abandoned for a more definite and undisputable aim: their permanent eviction. This objective was realised through the implementation of “squatter¹ settlement clearance projects”², directed and implemented by a state institution – the Housing Administration of Turkey.³ According to the Housing Administration, the projects were principally intended to provide the squatter population with a decent life in modern houses: “Citizens, who previously used to live in these unhealthy places, are given the chance to live in modern and planned residential areas with their completed infrastructure and facilities required for social life” (TOKI, 2007, p. 14).

This shift in the attitude and policy of the state was clearly reflected in the agenda, acts and policies of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) that has been in power since 2002. The 2003 ‘Urgent Action Plan’ of the 58th government formed by the JDP mirrored this change: “the power and authority of the municipalities will be aggrandized in order to prevent the proliferation of new squatter settlements and to evict the existing ones for achieving *modern-looking cities*” (SPO, 2003, p. 105). The goal of eviction and prevention was reaffirmed in the program of the 59th government, publicised in March 2003 (BYEGM):

¹ According to the U.N. HABITAT report (2003, p. 82), *The Challenge of Slums*, squatter settlements are “settlements established by people who have illegally occupied an area of land and built their houses upon it, usually through self-help processes”. The characteristic of illegality and land occupation lends the term useful and suitable for understanding Turkish squatter settlements, or *gecekondus*, which literally mean ‘set up overnight’ (Davis, 2007, p. 38).¹ While today “one of every three city dwellers, a billion people, sixth of the world’s population” (UNFPA, 2007, p. 16) live in slums, and it is expected to reach 4 billion by 2020 (UN-HABITAT, 2006), Turkey’s slum growth –which really implies squatters- shows a stabilizing pattern. Despite the increase in absolute numbers, in 2005, percentage of slum population declined to 16.3 percent from its 1990’s figure of 23.3 percent (UN-HABITAT, 2006, p. 28). This decline is further consolidated with the clearance projects, undertaken in a determinate manner during the 2000s.

² Throughout the dissertation, “squatter settlement clearance projects” will be referred as “clearance projects” or simply as “projects”.

³ For the subsequent chapters, “Housing Administration of Turkey” will be referred as “Housing Administration” or “Administration”.

“one of the fundamental priorities of our government will be to transform cities into liveable places by inhibiting unhealthy and unpleasant urbanization. Cheap houses will be constructed, targeted at people who live in squatter settlements.”⁴

The aim of this dissertation is to construe this policy shift through a dialectical understanding of the current world economy, accompanied by the neoliberal restructuring of the cities therein and the local power dynamics. Designating clearance projects as a process whereby new rights over urban land are redefined and institutionalized, this study will prioritize, as its nexus of analysis, property relations in urban land. Property relations are consequential, since they determine who has a right over land, and therefore who will be excluded. In other words, constituting a new property regime⁵ in urban land, clearance projects arbitrate who gain and lose, who has access to land and who does not. During this transition, this study analyses the processes whereby new rights over land are contested or resettled. It unearths the dynamics of persuasion and contention between the state and squatters as “property becomes a site of social contestation” (D. Mitchell & Staeheli, 2006, p. 152), as well an arena of divergent claims. More broadly, this dissertation seeks to illuminate the politics of urban land redevelopment and how various local actors promote, respond and resist large scale urban redevelopment and entrepreneurial place making strategies in Istanbul.

This study principally seeks answers to the following four sets of questions: [1]: What kind of urban land use policies were employed in the last decade in Istanbul and what were the motivating and legitimating forces behind them? [2] What were the effects of this ‘new’

⁴ The term of office for the 58th government formed by the JDP was only four months. Subsequently, the 59th government returned to power in March 2003 and stayed in power for four years.

⁵ The term property regime “implies a relatively settled, fairly consistent, set of practices, ideologies, and social relations. A regime can be –at least metaphorically- mapped. Its contours can be drawn.” (D. Mitchell & Staeheli, 2006, p. 151).

urban policy? Did it really benefit squatters? [3]: What kind of politics did this policy derive from? How was it different from the clientelistic urban land politics of the developmentalist era of Turkey? Following Coats (1972) and Fox-Genovese (1973), was it accurate to conceptualise this change as a shift from “traditional paternalism” to “liberal moral philosophy”? [4]: What was the response of squatters? How were the clearance projects negotiated between the authorities and squatters or alternatively contested by the latter? What could be the important factors that triggered resistance to the projects? Or alternatively, what enabled their smooth implementation?

This dissertation is organised into six chapters. The first outlines the research methodology to be employed, proposes a case study led qualitative approach and outlines the hypotheses. The second chapter illustrates the theoretical framework, focusing on the world city hypothesis, gentrification and rent gap theory. The third discusses the motivating and legitimating forces behind clearance projects, juxtaposing the policy of clearance with the state’s previous policy towards squatter settlements. The fourth succinctly delineates the process of the implementation of projects. The fifth focuses on two case studies in Istanbul, to discover whether they benefit squatters. Relying on the two case studies and the different local outcomes thereof, the sixth chapter alludes to the dynamics of contention and persuasion. Finally, in the concluding chapter, the research findings are consolidated and an argument for a just society, and squatters’ “right to the city” (Lefebvre, 2003) is made.

METHODOLOGY

This study employs qualitative methodology, due to its appropriateness and effectiveness in providing an in-depth investigation (Ragin, 1994, p. 91; Silverman, 2000, p. 43) into the politics of Istanbul's redevelopment. The qualitative approach fulfils the goal of yielding 'thick descriptions', portraying diverse interest groups, and giving voice to squatters (Mason, 1996, p. 91; Mehan, 1979; Ragin, 1994).

The study is based on case study research, which is not merely "a data-gathering technique, but a methodological approach" (Berg, 2001; Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993; Yin, 1994).⁶ It is befitting because it generates extremely rich, detailed and in-depth data regarding the questions of the nature of "how" and why" (Yin, 1994, p. 4). Schramm's point (1971), furthermore, provides a justification for the adoption of this approach: "the essence of a case study ... is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result." Therefore, it perfectly suits the aim of understanding why and how clearance projects were implemented.

Case selection

The study employs a multiple-case design, where the unit of analysis is the neighbourhood. To this end, two squatter neighbourhoods in Istanbul were chosen that had been targeted for clearance. In comparison to single case studies, use of multiple cases reduces the problem of generalizability, and eases 'analytical generalizations' (Bryman, 1992; J. C. Mitchell, 1983; Yin, 1994). The logic of generalizability herein is not one pertaining to the statistical sampling

⁶ Stake opposes this view, arguing that "case study is not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied" (Stake, 1998, p. 86).

logic, which links generalizability to sample size, but one pertaining to the “replication logic”. The latter allows for generalizations to theoretical propositions rather than to populations and utilises a previously developed theory as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study (Yin, 1994, p. 31).

Becker (1958) proposes that a case study researcher is more prone to seeking cases that substantiate a preconceived position, resulting in problems of validity of findings. To mitigate this problem, two different cases were chosen.⁷ The two cases are different in many respects: the history of their neighbourhoods, the social fabric of squatter community, the order of precedence of the implementation of the project and whether implementation has been successful. Accordingly, for contrast, one of the cases, Basibuyuk has been selected to represent a lack of success in implementation, while the other case, Ayazma represents successful implementation. Since the project was implemented in Ayazma, an evaluation of the project’s outcomes can be made.

The selection of two different cases enables an analysis of the dynamics behind the success and failure of implementation in the neighbourhoods (the absence and presence of resistance), and the repercussions of their diversity on such outcomes. Yet, it is imperative to underscore two points. Firstly, because the study investigates absence/presence of resistance *ex post*, it has to rely on personal accounts, histories and construction of the past. This, as is known, is a potential source of bias. Secondly, the qualitative approach adopted in this study, primarily in the attempt to “study commonalities” in the two cases, has limitations in delineating the causal

⁷ The selection of two different cases is also beneficial where ‘typical cases’ (Woods, 1979, p. 268) are selected. Each case will not only be *de facto* different due to the specificity of its neighbourhood, dwellers, location and timing of the project, but most importantly they will be different because the Housing Administration, despite the blueprint for clearance projects, generally modifies and adapts the blueprint to the neighbourhood at hand. This is done solely for pragmatic purposes with the aim to implement the projects successfully.

mechanisms behind resistance and/or acquiescence. In other words, it fails to ascertain the presence of causality between the diversity of neighbourhoods, and the potential of resistance and/or acquiescence. Such a task would necessitate the use of a comparative method, which would allow for the identification of “causal links –how different configurations of causes produce different outcomes across the range of cases in a study” (Ragin, 1994, p. 114).⁸ It would also require, at a minimum, extensive data on independent variables such as the population structure, socio-economic makeup, and the social relations of each neighbourhood. In the face of an absence of such data,⁹ this study exclusively investigates the process of implementation, divergent outcomes, and the pivotal factors that played a role in each case. This is achieved by relying on the interviews conducted.

It should be noted, however, that the selection of two different cases does not preclude the possibility that they are sufficiently similar to be representative of the phenomenon at hand. Representativeness in this context does not pertain to population. Rather, in consonance with the theoretical sampling approach, it denotes “selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to... research questions... [and to the] theoretical position” (Mason, 1996, pp. 93-94). This would permit analytical generalizations as well as the depiction of common processes affecting both localities.

⁸ However, Lieberman (1992) advances a very insightful comment on the use of “small N studies” to study causality. He demonstrates that when the number of cases is small, the possibility of formulating causal links that are both general and reasonable is greatly diminished. He contends that Mill’s “method of agreement” and “method of difference” “cannot be applied to small-N studies (Lieberman, 1992, p. 117).

⁹ Logically, the first place to search for data is official statistics that could “be used to good effect in sociological research” (Bulmer, 1984, p. 149). Despite this potential, there are no official statistics or any other source of data for the neighbourhoods. Regarding this problem, the second option could be to conduct cross-sectional surveys, which however is unattainable given the time constraint. There is only one survey for Ayazma conducted by the local municipality, but there are no surveys for Basibuyuk. Yet, the study on Ayazma also has two problems: Firstly, the data on Ayazma is incorporated into the data on two neighbourhoods, namely Ayazma and its adjacent neighbourhood Tepeustu. Secondly, the prominence of informal transactions in the neighbourhood (i.e. rent, employment etc.) makes data collection arduous.

Finally, a few words need to be said about why Istanbul was chosen as the site of inquiry. Istanbul has been the centre of rural-urban migration and mushrooming squatter settlements since the 1950s. A plethora of changes in the post-1980 period occurred resulting from a shift in the orientation of the Turkish economy, marshalled by the IMF-led stabilization and structural adjustment programs. Through the policies of deregulation, privatisation, fiscal austerity and liberalisation, the economy became more global, finance and services oriented and pro-capital, in contrast to its national developmentalist era. These policies were accompanied by efforts to make Istanbul a centre of finance capital in, and attractiveness to, the world economy, directed by the world city aspirations of the elites. Today, Istanbul stands as an inspiring global city of the region.

Methods of Data Collection

A major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity to utilise many different sources of evidence (Hagan, 1993; Yin, 1994, p. 91). Accordingly, the research design employs three methods of data collection: interviews, direct observation and documentation. Regarding the first method, 42 interviews were conducted in total, with three different groups, namely 11 interviews with state elites, 25 with ‘key informants’ in squatter neighbourhoods and 6 with political observers, scholars, and professionals.

Interviews

Interviews are “superior to any other way of discovering what [elites] believe and do” (Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987, p. 18). Elite interviewing especially yields valuable information on past histories and future plans (Marshall & Rossman, 1995, p. 83). In order to unearth the motivating forces behind clearance projects and its proposed aims, semi-structured interviews

with the elites in the Housing Administration, the Istanbul metropolitan municipality and two local municipalities that govern Ayazma and Basibuyuk were conducted.

The rationale behind semi-structured interviews is threefold. Firstly, even though the interviewer asks the questions on the interview guide, semi-structured interviews permit questions that are not included in the guide to be asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by interviewees (Bryman, 2004, p. 321). Secondly, semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to focus on specific issues within a broad topic (ibid, p. 323). Thirdly, they grant the interviewer the flexibility, in time, to rephrase questions and change the order in which they are asked to fit the characteristics of each interviewee (Denzin, 1989, p. 105).

When inquiring of ‘sensitive issues’, which may engender vexation with the elites, the ‘funnel method’ is adopted, where more general questions are posed prior to specific ones. Due to the importance of trust between the interviewee and the interviewer, as a way to elicit the former’s responses more openly (Dexter, 2006; Oppenheim, 1968), effort has to be made to establish rapport by being explicit about the research (Dooley, 2001, p. 134).

To overcome the barriers of reaching elites, personal channels and ‘pre-existing relations of trust’ were exploited, as it is frequently underlined that “the best entrée to elite individuals for interviews is provided by their gate-keepers” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002, p. 307). Having ensured first access, interviewees were selected via snowball sampling, which is the most common sampling technique in interviewing elites. However, the bias introduced by this non-probability sampling method is acknowledged since it may hamper the representativeness of the sample (Black, 1993, p. 50). A way to minimise this bias was to make use of official publications of the Administration and the municipalities such as their brochures and websites.

To include the interest group from the opposite side, interviews were conducted with ‘key informants’ in the two case neighbourhoods. Key informants not only provide “detailed data on a particular research setting, but also provide the researcher with introductions to other informants and to other institutions” (R. G. Burgess, 1982, p. 77). Unstructured interviews were preferred to procure the experiences held by the real-life members of participants, their reflexive understandings, and explanations (Johnson, 2002, p. 106). This turns out to be especially important when analyzing the dwellers’ attitude towards the projects. Yet, unstructured interviews also require reflexivity on the part of the researcher, since the neutral and unbiased image of the researcher who records and reports data is erroneous (Chase, 1998, p. 69; Marshall & Rossman, 1995, p. 87).

Key informants were selected according to their level of involvement in community matters (Spradley, 1996). Hence neighbourhood associations were the primary locales for finding them. The snowball sampling technique was employed. Despite its drawbacks, it is the most convenient strategy to deploy in the study of squatters (Lee, 1993) since the closed social structure of squatter communities and their vulnerability with respect to the rest of population erect barriers to random sampling. For the researcher, being in the neighbourhood, directly observing it, and conducting interviews pose difficulties unless the consent of ‘the gate keepers’ of the community is granted.¹⁰

Because of the ongoing hostility between the elites and the squatters, key informants form the “counter-elite” or “defensive elite” who “are often reluctant to co-operate because they are

¹⁰ Their relative vulnerability would also raise ethical concerns. In particular, in-depth interviewing is more problematical because of the personalized and detailed nature of the information it exacts. Two ethical principles were followed: “telling the truth” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002, p. 116) and paying ample attention to the issues of privacy as the information may very well be used by the parties with opposite interests as to their own.

cynical about the value of academic research” (Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987, p. 187). Members of the defensive elite see themselves as guardians of the neighbourhood interest and as bulwarks against threatening, or unscrupulous, intruders such as media personnel, town hall officials, academics, researchers, and would be ‘do-gooders’ (ibid, p.186). Their importance as constituting a reactive group of informants required the establishment of trust relationships and full disclosure, on the part of the researcher, about the research being undertaken.

The relative ease of access to public spaces, such as coffeehouses and neighbourhood associations, necessarily yields interviews in multi-person situations. This has the advantage of securing the validity of data as it is less likely for people to lie (Goffman, 2002, p. 152), though such advantage is tempered by the social structure of the squatter neighbourhoods in which those present in public spaces are predominantly male. This difficulty, however, was overcome by conducting interviews at the dwellers’ homes, in which those women chosen as key informants could be interviewed.¹¹

Lastly, a couple of semi-structured interviews were held with political observers, scholars, and professionals at professional associations. A purposive sampling technique was employed; erudite professionals with competence in the history of squatting, housing and land use policies, were selected. Though purposive sampling lacks wide generalizability (Berg, 2001, p. 32), these interviews of “private memory” are fit for purpose as they complement “public presentations”, which are to be found in the official documents, statistics and newspapers (Jacobs, 2001, p. 132).

¹¹ Moreover, these interviews were not dominated by the ‘head of each household’, as men generally did not stay at home during day time. Even those unemployed tended to be outside of the ‘domestic sphere’ and socialize with other men in coffeehouses, local associations and other community locations.

Direct Observation

Making a field visit to squatter settlements, in order to conduct interviews, also provides the opportunity to observe the neighbourhood and the dwellers *in situ* (Hughes, 2002, p. 139). It is especially useful as the narratives about poverty and uneven outcomes of the projects gathered through interviews are enriched, checked and verified against the data from direct observation. Observation renders a different account than the interview data and reifies it because “encounter with local meanings and practices is not mediated by our respondents’ personal judgments regarding what should and should not be discussed” (Weinberg, 2002, p. 135). Observation also reveals the differentiation among squatters, which may be lost in the interview data, as discourses utilised by the dwellers at times pertain to the entire community; therefore they undermine the differences amongst them. Furthermore, on site photographs were taken for illustrative purposes. Pictorial evidence assists readers of this study to visualise squatter neighbourhoods, and the sites of resettlement (Dabbs, 1982).

Documentation

This study used newspapers, official publications by the Housing Administration, journals, maps, planning documents and a survey conducted on Ayazma by the local municipality as sources of secondary data. These documents corroborate and augment evidence from interviews and direct observation (Yin, 1994, p. 81). Despite several benefits of secondary data analysis,¹² secondary data are a ‘potential source of bias’ as they are bound by the interests, concerns and reality of those who produce them (Denzin, 1989, p. 251; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 256; McNeill, 1994, p. 103). To overcome this bias, each document has been

¹² With regard to the practical benefits, the secondary analyst “economizes on money, time and personnel” (Hyman, 1972, p. 6).

evaluated against the political stance of its source. This was especially crucial when referencing Turkish newspapers.

Similarly, potential error is an especially salient issue when considering the survey of Ayazma as conducted by the local municipality. As this survey is “a produced data set” (Dale, Arber, & Procter, 1988, p. 17), the difficulty remains of differentiating the potential errors made in the original survey (Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985, pp. 12-13). To surmount this problem, the data it contains have been cross-checked with data provided by dwellers, accepting that such data is often personally approximated and may vary by interviewee. Thus, issues of bias cannot be completely obviated.

Processes of validation

With regard to the analysis and use of data, there exists the problem of ‘anecdotalism’ (Have, 1998; Silverman, 1989, 1993). Bryman (1992, p. 77) defines the problem of ‘anecdotalism’ as “an approach to the use of data in relation to conclusions or explanations in qualitative research”, which results in the use of data for the justification of preconceived results. Anecdotalism threatens the validity of research.¹³ One of the best ways to overcome this problem would be to transcribe each interview and directly reference line numbers that would present the reader the entire material. However, due to insufficient resources, especially time, this could not be undertaken. Instead, the approach adopted in the study to surmount the problem of anecdotalism is data triangulation.

¹³ The other solution to the problem is “comprehensive data treatment” (Mehan, 1979). Comprehensive data treatment requires that “all cases of data [are] incorporated in the analysis (ibid, p.21). If nearly all data support the hypotheses, validity is ensured. Despite this could be a viable solution, it could not be exploited fully due to the brevity of this work.

Triangulation of data, in other words triangulation of documents, direct observation and interview data enhances confidence (Fielding & Fielding, 1986, p. 24) and internal validity of the research (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996, p. 206; Jick, 1983; Knafl & Breitmayer, 1989; Leedy, 1993; E. S. Mitchell, 1986; Sohler, 1988; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest, & Grove, 1981). Documentation and direct observation are useful in assessing informant reliability and the internal consistency of interview data. Nonetheless, as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) disagree that triangulation will “overcome any problems of bias” (Burgess, 1984, p. 146), there still remain sources of bias in this study. Two instances that have been discussed above are the municipality survey of Ayazma and the snowball sampling technique utilised for interviewees.

The semi- and unstructured interviews with the elites and counter-elites propagate “elite bias” as they ignore ‘non-elites’.¹⁴ To correct this bias, surveys could be designed with the aim of incorporating the accounts of non-elites into the study that would verify the generalizability and validity of the interpretations derived from the interviews with counter-elites. However, time constraints have rendered this impossible. In the face of this shortcoming, the strategy was to gain entry into the field, after the consent of key informants was secured, and to conduct as many in-depth interviews as possible with randomly chosen dwellers (Dooley, 2001, p. 257). These interviews, in general, took place in coffeehouses and on streets.

Analysis of data

In analyzing the data, tape-recording is extremely useful since no data is lost or modified, and it allows the interviewer to focus on the interviewee. It also contributes to the validity of

¹⁴ Elite bias refers to a situation where the researcher adopts the elites’ look and their evaluations, “giving greater weight to their viewpoints” (R. G. Burgess, 1982, p. 185).

interview data as it “eliminates a major source of interviewer bias” (Fielding, 2003, p. 4). To seize these benefits, tape-recording was used in all but very few of the interviews with some squatters when it has been declined at the interviewee’s request. Other dwellers, however, were very comfortable talking in its presence.¹⁵ Each interview was conducted by the researcher in Turkish language. The entire interview data used in this work was then translated into English by the author to ensure its accuracy.¹⁶

The theoretical perspective adopted and developed in this study is closely aligned with the literature on world cities, gentrification, rent gap theory, urban redevelopment and ‘the neoliberalization of the city’. Thus, this study derives its conceptions, propositions and theoretical framework from the prevailing literature. The theoretical propositions initially act as a template, a framework against which the case study data can be compared. At a later stage, fieldwork helps to develop new insights into the existing theories and their enrichment with new case studies. In this sense, cases are “instrumental” in providing insights into the theories (Stake, 1998).

Hypotheses

This study has three guiding hypotheses. The first is concerned with the shift in the policy of the state toward squatter settlements: this shift in policy derives from the transformation of the Turkish economy in the post-1980 period and its reorientation to the new world economy, characterised by the hyper-mobility of capital, the hegemonic role of finance and speculative investments and the emergence of cities in this process as not only as nodes of ‘command and

¹⁵ Tape recordings also increase the reliability of the research as these could be transcribed at a later stage and guaranteed public access to enable an insight into the procedure (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 144-161).

¹⁶ Potential problems related to the selective interpretation of data cannot be rejected since there were insufficient resources to verify the accuracy of translations. However, diligent attention was paid to translate the information with regard to its context and on the basis of the meaning it conveyed.

control' for the new global economy but also as triggers of economic growth and avenues of 'creative destruction' for new modes of crisis displacement (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 374). The new policy follows the strategy of urban place-making and derives from an entrepreneurial approach to the city for the sake of improving its competitiveness amongst other 'wannabe world cities' (Short, 1999, p. 43) and making it attractive to inward investment. The second hypothesis concerns the location of the neighbourhoods chosen for clearance: Those neighbourhoods that have a large rent gap are the primary targets of clearance projects in Istanbul. As such, the projects follow the logic of capitalist urban development, albeit one mediated by the state. The third concerns the outcomes of the projects: The outcomes of the projects are uneven amongst squatters, primarily determined by their ownership status prior to the implementation of the project. Those without any ownership claims are the most disadvantaged. In direct contrast to the propitious accounts of the authorities, projects deepen the disparities and inequalities between squatters, and result in the displacement and loss of homes for the majority. These outcomes are to be explicated in relation to the new property regime that is being 'settled' by the projects. In the light of these hypotheses, data will be collected and analysed.

Having presented the hypotheses, the next chapter will set the theoretical framework that will be operationalized in the analysis of fieldwork data.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Making of a World City

The last three decades have witnessed the decline of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism in the first world and national developmentalism in the third world. This decline has given way to the rise of “casino capitalism” (Strange, 1986). This capitalism is characterised by the unfettered circulation of capital, the speculative nature of transactions and the integration of nation states into a closely knit global economy, all of which are upheld by the ideology of free markets and perfect competition.¹⁷ Under this new regime of capital accumulation, the rise of an informational and truly global economy, spurred and facilitated by the developments in communication and transportation, led many scholars to conceptualise certain cities as “world cities” (R. B. Cohen, 1981; Friedmann, 1986, 1995; Friedmann & Wolff, 1982; P. L. Knox, 1995; P. L. Knox & Taylor, 1995; Pryke, 1999; Sassen-Koob, 1986; Sassen, 1991, 1994, 2000; Short & Kim, 1999; D. A. Smith & Timberlake, 1995; Taylor, 2003).

The idea of the emergence of world cities originates from ‘the world city hypothesis’. This hypothesis purports that certain cities, termed as world or global cities, are integrated into the world economy, and function as “basing points in the spatial organisation and articulation of production and markets” (Friedmann, 1986, p. 71). These cities are “major sites for the concentration and accumulation of international capital” (ibid, p.73). They perform global control functions of the world economy (Friedmann, 1986; King, 1990, p. 26; Sassen, 1991, 1994) and therefore concentrate infrastructure and the services that produce such capability (Sassen, 1995, p. 63).

¹⁷ The belief in the ‘invisible hand’ and other ideological bulwarks of neoliberalism have recently been challenged by a crisis primarily originating in world financial markets and impacting the world economy.

Derived from Wallerstein's 'world systems theory' (1974), the world city hypothesis proposes that the economic, social, spatial and political structures of a city are determined by the mode of world system integration of that city along with the form and strength of this integration (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982, p. 313). Therefore, because world cities operate as the organizing nodes of the world economy, their economic structure mainly comprises those finance facilities and advanced services that enable that mode of integration (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982, p. 320; Sassen, 1994, p. 19).

On another front, presuming that there is a single world system, which is spatially articulated through these cities, the paradigm assumes that "the global economy is superimposed upon an international system of states" (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982, p. 312). Depicting the state as a passive entity, subject to the overwhelming forces of the world economy, the world city hypothesis connotes to the decline of the nation state, the interests of which are antithetical to 'the interests of transnational capital' (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982, p. 312). At the expense of the decline of the nation state, it highlights the growing importance of cities in the world economy.

This account, which Hill and Kim (2000) call the "globalist world city paradigm", ascribes the transformation in the functions of major cities under the new global economy mainly to advancements in information and transportation technologies.¹⁸ As such, accompanying its proposition of the decline of the nation state, the globalist paradigm also naturalises the world city status of certain developed country cities and overlooks the explicit and intentional use of

¹⁸ As an example, Castells (1994) contends that the new international and inter-regional division of labour ushered in by the "informational society" leads to "the reinforcement of the metropolitan hierarchy exercised throughout the world by the main existing nodal centres, that use their informational potential and the new communication technologies to extend and deepen their global reach". Likewise, Sassen attributes the gravity of major cities to transactions of finance and specialized services to be "*located in cities*" (Sassen, 1994, p. 9, emphasis mine), which necessitates advanced communication and transportation networks.

public policy by the state and other local political actors in order to reshape the urban environments of their own cities into those of a world city. Douglass (2000, p. 2318) contends:

“the tendency in this literature has been...to underplay the very real need for the construction of a built environment to host global functions, provide for elite lifestyle, and create road, rail and airport linkages”.

Thus, the making of a world city becomes pivotal. The neoliberal orthodoxy asserts that the world city status is an achievable aim if ‘right policies’ are implemented. Against the backdrop of reduction in transportation costs and spatial barriers to the movement of goods, people, and information, but most importantly to capital, the ‘right policies’ implies neoliberal local land-use and economic policies that create the most favourable, namely the most profitable, investment conditions for global capital (Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Mayer, 1994; Oktem, 2005; Rodriguez, Moulaert, & Swyngedouw, 2003).

For the developing world, the creation of competitive cities becomes the gateway for reaping “the benefits of worldwide growth” (WorldBank, 1999, p. 3), justified by the idea that “being globally connected [has] significant future payoffs and trickle down benefits” (Beauregard & Pierre, 2000, p. 474). Therefore the global city analytic becomes “no longer simply a device for understanding the role that a limited number of cities play in the management of the global economy” (Weinstein, 2005, p. 5) but one, which developing countries also aspire to achieve. This growth-oriented “urban entrepreneurialism” rests on inter-urban competition (Harvey, 1989, p. 10), wherein local actors compete with one another for promoting the competitive position of their respective space in the spatial division of production and consumption (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1997a, pp. 8-9; Rutheiser, 1996; Short, 1999, p. 44).

Within this framework, elite place-making becomes the principal means of restructuring urban space in consonance with the aspirations of growth and world city ideal (Fainstein,

2001; Fainstein & Campbell, 1996; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Machimura, 1992; Swanstrom, 1985; Thornley, 1999; Ward, 1998; White, 1998).¹⁹ Of the strategies employed by the elites, civic boosterism, in which an identity is created for the city, or the “imagineering” of it (Rutheiser, 1996), yields fruitful insights for the study at hand.

The creation of an attractive urban imagery is fundamental for the “selling of the city as a location for activity” (Harvey, 1989, p. 13) as the imagery conveys meanings and is suggestive of its desirability. In this sense, the imagery of ‘entrepreneurial city’ not only gives “meaning to current problems by construing them in terms of past failures and future possibilities” (Jessop, 1997b, p. 30) but it also represents the city as pro-business and a place of ‘culture’. It is through these acts of representation that “space is turned into place” (Short, 1999, p. 39). Nevertheless, these representations also predetermine who has a right to inhabit the city in keeping with its new image, in other words, they assert ‘whose the city [it] is’ (Zukin, 1996, p. 43), by excluding certain groups from this promoted imagery, often accompanied by their stigmatisation and criminalisation.

¹⁹ There is controversy in the wider literature with regard to the conceptualization and analysis of urban political power, mainly organised around three streams of thought: pluralist conception, structuralists and regime theory. The classic pluralist studies such as Banfield’s “Political Influence”, Dahl’s “Who Governs?” or Sayre and Kaufman’s “Governing New York City” treated politics within the vernacular of coalition building (Mollenkopf, 2000, p. 221) and, individual preferences and choice as the basis of political action. Politics was treated as an autonomous realm, which ended up blurring inequalities and class dimension of power. ‘Structuralists’ (Harvey, Gordon, Castells in his early works), on the other hand, gives primacy to economic relations in determining social action while they emphasize the state actors’ dependence on private capital investment to reproduce and expand the urban environment, resulting in a bias toward capital (Fainstein, 2001, p. 13). Recently, neo-Marxist arguments have tried to surpass certain deterministic arguments and have empirically investigated the systemic and cumulative inequality of political capacity (Mollenkopf, 2000, p. 223). Lastly, the regime theory (Stone, Fainstein& Fainstein, Jones and Bachelor, Elkin) straddles the boundary between the two formulations above. Urban decision makers are invested with relative autonomy. The theory accepts individual choice as the basis of political action. With regard to urban renewal programs, “whereas pluralists assume that public support for urban renewal programs reflects the interests of the populace, regime theorists point to the role of the governing regime in shaping those preferences” (Fainstein, 2001, p. 14). The major weakness of the theory is its narrow applicability to US. Moreover, its focus on political analysis avoids explicit theoretical linkages with economic structures (ibid, p.14).

The world city discourse acts as an inspiring and motivating force for the wannabe world cities. It is a social construct (M. P. Smith, 1998) that not only inspires the local actors to restructure their cities to conform to this ideal, but it also serves to naturalise and silence the negative outcomes of urban restructuring projects undertaken to this end. As such, this discourse is not only instrumental in explaining the shift in Turkish state policy towards squatter settlements but also in understanding how it legitimises the outcomes of such policies.

Gentrification

The classical definition of gentrification, formulated by Glass (1964), marks a process whereby disinvested inner city neighbourhoods are upgraded by pioneer gentrifiers and which results in the displacement of indigenous residents. This study, however, employs a definition of gentrification, which transcends its classical one. Smith (1996, p. 39) elaborates on a broader definition of the concept:

“How... are we to distinguish adequately between the rehabilitation of nineteenth-century housing, the construction of new condominium towers, the opening of festival markets...? Gentrification is no longer about a narrow and quixotic oddity in the housing market but has become the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavour: the class remake of the central urban landscape.”²⁰

In a similar manner, Clark’s (2005, p. 258) definition also disentangles the concept from its traditional notions of middle class gentrifiers, and permits a discussion of the possible role of the state in the process:

“Gentrification is a process involving a change in the population of land-users such that the new users are of a higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital.”

²⁰ While authors such as Smith (ibid), Uitermark, Duyvendak, Kleinhans (2007) accept this definition, Lambert & Boddy (2002), Boddy (2007), Buzar, Hall and Ogden (2007) do not agree that inner-city new-build developments are a form of gentrification. On the other hand, Ley (1996, p. 34) has argued for a broader definition of gentrification that included “renovation and redevelopment on both residential and non-residential sites.”

The ‘contemporary’ gentrification is characterised by the changing nature of its agents as the process is increasingly undertaken by “governmental, corporate, or corporate-governmental partnerships” and becomes “scrupulously planned” and “increasingly systemized” (N. Smith, 2002, p. 439). The role of the state,²¹ and local authorities that engage in, direct and control the gentrification process has been highlighted by various authors who have empirically dealt with this kind of ‘mediated’ gentrification (Badyina & Golubchikov, 2005; Cameron, 2003; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Lees, Slater, & Wyly, 2008; N. Smith, 2002; Weber, 2002).²²

Nevertheless, it is not only the nature of the actors involved that change but also the geographical locations to which gentrification has extended. Smith (2002, p. 439) contends that “gentrification as a process has rapidly descended down the urban hierarchy.” Thus, gentrification is no longer the preserve of developed cities but is deployed to Third world cities (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Bridge, 2003; Dutton, 2005; N. Smith, 2002). With the expanded definition, in terms of its actors and geography, more recent gentrification literature provides an appropriate discursive frame within which the displacement of Istanbul squatters, and their confrontation with the state-directed clearance projects, can be encapsulated.

Rent Gap Theory

The rent gap, which is defined by Smith as “the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use” (1979, p. 545), is

²¹ The nature of this intervention adheres to Peck’s insight about neoliberal states. He proposes that “a neoliberal state is not necessarily a less interventionist state; rather it organizes and rationalizes its interventions in different ways” (2001, p. 447).

²² Cameron (2003) portrays how public policy is employed to create ‘urban regeneration’ in UK cities, while Badyina and Golubchikov (2005) give an account of the gentrification in central Moscow, displaying the pro-development role of the city administration. They argue that gentrification was “the deliberate choice of a revolutionary neoliberal rebuilding” (ibid, p.126), given that proactive governmental role made “the large scale displacement of old inhabitants possible by delegating administrative tools to developers and empowering them vis-à-vis the residents” (ibid, p.126).

fundamental to the production of gentrified landscapes. Accordingly, “only when this gap emerges can gentrification be expected” (ibid, p.545).²³

The rent gap, which directs reinvestment and redevelopment of urban land, is itself embedded in the capitalist accumulation process, just as the process of capital accumulation is always articulated in place, territory and space specific forms (Harvey, 1989; Massey, 1985; N. Smith, 1984). Harvey (1977, 1982) explains investment in urban space as a stage of the cyclical process of capital accumulation, whereby declining rates of profit and over-accumulation in the productive sphere lead to a shift of investment into the “second circuit of capital”. In this sense, “production of space” (Lefebvre, 1991) ensures the long-term survival of capitalism.

The rent gap is the outcome of an ongoing process of uneven geographical development (Harvey, 1973; 1982; 2003; N. Smith, 1982, 1984), where “the development of one area creates barriers to further development, thus leading to underdevelopment, and that underdevelopment of that area creates opportunities for a new phase of development” (N. Smith, 1982, p. 151). Through this process, landscapes, which have been disinvested, become new avenues of potential investment in the search of capital’s ‘new institutional fix’. The cyclical process of investment and disinvestment, this “locational seesaw” (ibid, p.151) is a geographical premise of capitalist development that leads to a conception of space wherein space can no longer be treated as an inert black canvas but as an integral process to capitalist development (N. Smith, 1984, p. 85).

²³ There is a controversy in the literature regarding the conceptualization of rent gap. While Duncan and Ley (1982) totally rejected the concept, authors such as Hamnett (1984), Rose (1984), Williams (1984) and Beauregard (1986) drew attention to the limitations of the concept and necessary complements it required.

The rent gap theory is useful to explain the paradox of why poor people live on valuable land at the heart of large, vibrant cities (Alonso, 1964; Harvey, 1973; P. Knox & McCarthy, 2005, pp. 132-135) as well as why certain ‘low rent’, dilapidated or illegal neighbourhoods in the heart of cities are subject to urban regeneration, redevelopment or eviction strategies. This theory enables the contextualisation of the actors of urban land development –be these either individual land market actors or the state as in the Turkish case- in relation to collective social relations. As such, rent gap analysis, as a comparable measurement with all other things being equal, may explain why certain inner-city squatter neighbourhoods are targeted for clearance, while others under similar conditions are exempt from it. Weber (2002, p. 523) demonstrates the logic in the context of private real-estate market:

“If the building in question is located in an area of concentrated poverty, it may become marginalized as ‘long-turnover’ because the short-term gap is not sufficiently wide to warrant rehabilitation.”

Nevertheless, there are two important points that need to be raised here, especially in relation to redevelopment in Istanbul. First of all, in contrast to Weber’s insight, clearance projects in Turkey, which are *de facto* urban redevelopment projects, are solely implemented by the state. Decisions regarding which squatter neighbourhoods are to be cleared, and to which use land would be put after clearance, are exclusively taken by state authorities. Secondly, the process of “the creative destruction of [the] urban built environment”, under neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 374), is never a singularly market-determined and disembodied process. State and non-state institutions induce, and at times create, the value in the built environment, and hence affect the decisions of actors in the first place. This second point is significant since it contests a conception of rent gap theory that is intrinsically an over-deterministic philosophical adherent to ‘capital logic’. Similarly, Smith and Williams (1986, pp. 33-34) themselves assert that the emphasis on the role of the logic of accumulation in urban restructuring -which also pertains to the rent gap theory- does not presuppose determinism but rather accentuates class struggle.

Having discussed the theoretical framework, the next chapter will illuminate the rationale behind clearance projects, amalgamating these theoretical arguments with examples from Istanbul. However, this chapter will begin with a brief discussion outlining the history of squatting and previous state policy.

UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE BEHIND CLEARANCE PROJECTS IN ISTANBUL²⁴

History of Squatting in Turkey and Prior Policies of the State

Clearance projects represent an atypical development in the history of how squatters have been dealt with by the Turkish state. In line with many other developing countries, Turkey faced massive migration into urban areas, which began in the 1950s. Migration was mainly the outcome of an amalgamation of factors such as industrialisation, rising living standards in urban areas, low productivity, low incomes and gradual mechanization in agriculture, and regional disparities (Danielson & Keles, 1985, pp. 34-39; Kongar, 1976).

The state did not have a housing policy for the immigrants. This was reflected in the lack of provision or inadequate supply of low cost housing by the state. This shortage was further exacerbated by high prices in the ‘legal housing market’, engendered by unmet excessive demand. Under these circumstances, “squatter housing became the major avenue of escape both for the low income urbanites and the migrants” (Metin Heper, 1977, p. 13). It is widely agreed in the literature (Bugra, 1998; Oncu, 1988; Senyapili, 1992; Tekeli, 1996; Yonder, 1998) that squatting, which predominantly took place on public –state- lands, was a spontaneous response to the need for low income housing.

Given its inability or unwillingness to deal with the problem through the provision of legal, low cost housing, the state’s attitude towards squatter settlements has been one of sporadic

²⁴ It should be noted that squatter neighbourhoods may include dwellings with a title deed to land, granted either through the politics of patronage or in some cases they might be purchased legally. These neighbourhoods might also have “unauthorized buildings”. These are dwellings built on land, owned by the dweller himself/herself; yet they violate zoning regulations, municipal ordinances or they are built disregarding the proper inspection and permits (Keyder, 2005b). These are what the U.N. report “The Challenge of the Slums” (2003) names as illegal settlements and are characterised by one or more of the following: low standard of services or infrastructure, breaches of land zoning, lack of planning and building permits, irregular nature of the land subdivision (ibid, p.83).

legalisation and regularisation mainly through amnesty laws, and the provision of basic infrastructural services to squatter settlements. Between 1948 and 1984, ten laws that included amnesty clauses for *gecekondu* were issued (Tekeli, 1996; Uzel, 1987). In 1984, a comprehensive Amnesty Law, No. 2981 (TBMM, 1984a) was introduced, which extended amnesty to those dwellings not built on state land and at a strike legalized all the dwellings that had been excluded from previous amnesty laws.²⁵

Occasionally, amnesty laws were followed up by the distribution of title deeds to squatters, through which the owners of *gecekondu* “became members of the propertied urban middle class with enduring ties to their original villages” (Karpat, 2004, p. 7). The granting of property rights over land, through the distribution of title deeds, served as a distributive and redistributive mechanism for the state during this era; nevertheless, its importance seems to be overemphasized for the pre-1984 period, before the code No. 2981 was issued. By way of example, “by 1980, only about 10 percent of the *gecekondu*s in Istanbul had received full title to their land” (Yonder, 1998, p. 62). Even if the legalisation of squatter neighbourhoods did not always result in the ownership of land, the policy of sporadic legalisation served to buttress the haphazard urban sprawl on unserviced public and private land (ibid, p.63).²⁶

The process of legalisation, regularisation and provision of services operated through clientelistic relations²⁷ between squatters and local municipalities (Bugra, 1998; Keyder,

²⁵ Amendments have been made to this amnesty law in the years following 1984 so gradually there was an expansion in its scope. It served to legalize many more buildings than was originally intended to in 1984.

²⁶ The state’s ‘tolerance’ toward squatter settlements has generally been explained with regard to the industrialisation policy of the state under national developmentalism. It is alleged that illegal mode of housing serves in keeping the cost of reproduction of labour low, which is required by the industrial sector (Tekeli, 1991). In other accounts, squatters are tolerated because squatters create the internal demand for consumer goods produced by the domestic import substituting industry (Keyder, 1987). This theory was advanced because new migrants were not landless poor (Kartal, 1992); especially given that squatting for the urban poor constituted a gate of access to political processes, social security and “participation in urban rent” (Keyder, 2005a, p. 126).

²⁷ Clientelism is defined as “a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an inferior and superior, commanding unequal resources” (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972, p. 151). More specifically, political clientelism

1999b; Keyder & Oncu, 1993; Neuwirth, 2005; Oncu, 1988; Sayari, 1977; Yonder, 1987, 1998). It was mainly party politics at the local level that granted security of tenure, title deeds and the provision of basic services in return for votes. Yet, given the sheer scale of immigration, paucity of investment in infrastructure and most importantly, the absence of a substantial influx of resources from the central government, it was mainly the potency of non-material resources such as the non-exercise of legal controls, or the selective implementation of regulatory powers, that ensured and sustained the clientelistic relations since neither had immediate monetary costs (Oncu, 1988, p. 44).

The precursor of contemporary clearance projects can be traced back to urban renewal projects undertaken under Istanbul's metropolitan mayor Dalan, beginning in 1983. The renewal projects that targeted at clearing large tracts of nineteenth century inner city neighbourhoods and relocating various industries from within the city to its periphery (Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 13) can be defined as the first attempt to create an entrepreneurial city.²⁸ As such, they constituted a dimension of Dalan's entrepreneurial remaking of Istanbul, which aimed to increase the accumulation potential of the city through enhancing its global image (Keyder & Oncu, 1993, p. 23). His projects supplied the impetus, and created the framework for the transformation of Istanbul from "a national primate city ravaged by rapid immigration into a newly imagined world city" (Keyder, 1999a, p. 16) as Istanbul was already going through a globalization-induced physical transformation

denotes "a more or less personalized, effective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships" (ibid, pp.4-5).

²⁸ This entrepreneurial role has been eased by the new municipality law, enacted in 1984. The 1984 law brought a two-tier system, consisting of the metropolitan and district municipalities; the mayors at each level are elected. This law has introduced new financial resources for the local governments, resulting in the enhancement of the administrative and financial resources of the mayor's office. While the law had initially conceived the metropolitan municipality as responsible for the coordination of all municipal services, Heper (1989, p. 76) demonstrates how it elevated itself to a position of authority; as such, district municipalities needed to get approval from the metropolitan mayor (Esmer, 1989, p. 61) The increase in its authority and its command of resources led to the emergence of an entrepreneurial local government acting as a market facilitator (Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 12).

throughout the 1980s and was slowly positioning itself into a city ready for tourist consumption (Oncu, 1997).

Keyder (1999a, p. 17) proposes that the subsequent mayors after Dalan, namely Sozen and Erdogan who were elected respectively in 1991 and 1994, could not effectively engage in Dalan-type urban entrepreneurship, despite Istanbul's historical and geo-political adequacy to become a world city (Keyder & Oncu, 1993, p. 13). This was because of the constraints imposed by the political sphere, namely the continuation of populist policies and the reluctance to institute a liberal framework at the national level, coupled to a lack of coherent and unifying entrepreneurial vision at the local level (Keyder, 1999a, p. 23).

During Dalan's mayoralty, not only were squatter settlements never evicted but with the 1984 Amnesty Law, issued during the tenure of Motherland Party government (Dalan was from this party), a plethora of squatter settlements were legalized. As might have been anticipated, this law prompted a construction bonanza as squatter neighbourhoods proliferated with the dwellers' expectation of securing title deeds. It also engendered a transformation in the nature of dwellings as the conversion of single-storey *gecekondus* into multi-storey apartment buildings was permitted. This, in turn, provided owners of dwellings with the opportunity to rent out their redundant flats. In other words, this law became the pinnacle of the gradual commercialisation of squatter settlements as dwellers increasingly partook in rising urban rents (Bugra, 1998; Koksak, 1990; Oncu, 1988). This favourable stance toward squatter settlements, during Dalan's tenure, was sustained during the subsequent mayoralties of Sozen and Erdogan, up until the 2000s.

2000s: Motivating and Legitimizing Forces behind Clearance Projects

The 2000s signify the beginning of an era of the full integration of the Turkish economy into the world. This epoch represents the consolidation of the policies of liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, and fiscal austerity enforced through the 1980s IMF-led liberalization and structural adjustment programs. The consolidation of the economy's speculative-led, deregularized, and liberal nature and the prospect of integration with the European Union served to catalyse efforts to improve the competitiveness of the country in the global arena (Keyman & Onis, 2007). In the political sphere, these developments were accompanied by the election of the Justice and Development Party –JDP- with its liberal economic stance to power several times.²⁹

Despite some disruption during the 1990s, Istanbul continued along its trajectory to become a world city. However, the 2000s have witnessed an expedited deployment of the entrepreneurial task of making Istanbul more so. Even at a glimpse, it has manifest itself in 5,000 hotels, 47 shopping malls and 16 business plazas that were built in Istanbul since 2000 (Imece, 2009, p. 10). The following commentary by the Istanbul metropolitan mayor, Topbas also explicitly demonstrates the attitude of the JDP to this entrepreneurial task:

“Istanbul should no longer be an industrial city. We have to evacuate the industrial population of Istanbul. We should make Istanbul a center of attraction for the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East. This will bring back to Istanbul its old function of being a finance center. Due to its geographical location, it is a city that draws a lot of attention” (“Merkez'in tasınması dogru, para Ankara'ya degil Istanbul'a gelir,” 16 January 2008).

²⁹ The Justice and Development Party (JDP) that currently rules Turkey was founded in 2001. They party won four subsequent elections, two general elections in 2002 and 2007 and two local elections in 2004 and 2009. The party has a center right conservative stance. Because of their members' past connections with the Islamic Welfare Party (as it is evident in its leader, Erdogan) the JDP came to be known amongst the public as the Islamic party of Turkey. While the 2000s brought victories to the JDP, Ozal's Motherland Party, of which Dalan was a member, founded in 1983, gradually lost popular support from the public. Though the party is still active, it has not been elected into the parliament since 2002. It is to be noted that the Motherland party had played a prominent role in the neoliberal transition of the country during the 1980s and it had come to power alone in the general elections of 1983 and 1987.

Consonantly, an interviewee, the real estate director from the Housing Administration's Istanbul division, Karaoglu formulated the Administration's 'vision':

"We have to make Istanbul a brand. It can no longer be an industrial city where people migrate to find employment. Unless we achieve these goals, it cannot be the capital of history or culture."

The new image of Istanbul is depicted as one devoid of industry but one which hosts financial and service sectors, foreign investment and cultural spectacles. This image represents Istanbul as the world city of the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, and is the product of the place-making strategy of the state elite, especially a product of civic boosterism.

Nevertheless, the new representation of Istanbul is also one which excludes squatters and their settlements. An official at the Istanbul metropolitan municipality, Uysal, tellingly described how squatter settlements 'bemire' Istanbul's world city image:

"Foreigners are visiting Istanbul. On one side, they see skyscrapers, luxurious houses, on the other side, they see squatter settlements. The settlements are all over the place. This city should look beautiful."

Within this context, the objective of transforming Istanbul into a world city comes to the fore as the major source of motivation and legitimation for the clearance projects. Istanbul is to be turned into an "aesthetized commodity" –that is, making it attractive to foreign capital and marketable to a global audience- (Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 13). In this spirit, squatter settlements come to represent an 'obstacle'; a technical formality that decreases the competitiveness of the city, and even "the country's prestige in the world", as it is stated in a book by the chair of the Administration, Bayraktar (2007, p. 41). The reasons behind clearance projects are also specified explicitly by an interviewee, the consultant to the chair of the Administration, Kahraman:

"There is the issue of integration with the EU and the globe and attracting foreign capital. You try to make your cities important... and people are also becoming modern."

The ideology of neoliberal urbanism, and its new imagery, is internalised by the elite. This internalisation manifests itself blatantly in the shift in political attitudes “away from populism and toward the acceptance of the market as the arbiter of allocation” of urban land use (Keyder, 2005a, p. 130). The rupture with the municipality’s past political attitude toward squatters is underlined by an interviewee, Kocamese, from the Istanbul metropolitan municipality:

“As the metropolitan municipality, we are struggling to change our image as one, which distributes title deeds to squatters... We believe that the mentality of distributing title deeds has to change. Instead of that, we promote the clearance of squatter settlements, yet simultaneously solving their need for shelter.”

This shift in public policy toward squatter settlements is supplemented by a transformation in the conception of migrants, hitherto regarded as poor people without the resources to find adequate shelter. Migrants are treated as invaders of public property, and beneficiaries of unfair privilege and ‘undeserved’ urban rent. This discourse has its roots in “the legalistic centrist perception of society in which law and social relations mirror each other so that ‘illegal’ urban settlements are seen as violations of the legitimate property rights system established by state law” (Goluksuz, 2002, p. 463). An interviewee from the Administration,

Deliktas explains:

“We perceive this [squating] to be the invasion of public space. When I say ‘invader’, the other party [squatters] regard this as an insult. They argue that they are defenders of the right to live. That is absurd for me. There is no such concept for me. For me, it is the law where I look.”

The perception of squatters as violators of the state law is further revealed in a speech delivered by the Prime Minister, Erdogan, in April 2006:

*“There are people who try to arouse pity when illegal houses are being demolished. Why should they be victims? There, it is not a matter of citizenship right but it is violation. S/he should go and buy a legal house paying it in instalments of 200 Turkish liras. To eradicate the *gecekondu* order, which covers the city like a *tumour*, was our greatest ideal. We have to fulfil this goal all around Turkey”*(Bastakar, 9 April 2006).

Additionally, squatters are also depicted as the source of crime in the city. The criminalizing and “stigmatizing topographic lexicon” (Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 18), the “talk of

crime” (Caldeira, 2000) is translated into a naturalised category in terms of the urban spaces and groups to which it refers, and in return, justifies clearance projects. The chair of the Housing Administration, Bayraktar posits the following in a speech:

“It is obvious that the source of terror, drugs, inappropriate perception of the state, lack of education, psychological drawbacks and health problems is squatter regions. We cannot prohibit immigration. Yet, some measures to inhibit the condensation of the poor in Istanbul have to be taken. We can realise urban transformation by overcoming the problem of security and preventing the arrival of people in Istanbul, who aim for illegal ways” (Bas, 13 Kasim 2007).

Kahraman reiterates the potential threat of crime:

“First of all, those places are not decent physically. The mental state of the residents is not healthy due to the physical conditions they are in. There are structures that pave the way for illegal formations. There is a perspective, which is at odds with the state. There is also the problem of integration with the city, of the demarcation between the slum and the city.”

Concomitant with their criminalisation, which is treated as a natural phenomenon and its solution thereof in the squatters’ ‘clearance’, there is also a prevalent discourse around natural disasters, one that is especially focused on earthquakes. The earthquake in 1999, which took 57,000 lives, had immense economic costs for the country and it continues to be an issue of public concern and debate. As such, the earthquake was a recurring theme in the interviews, serving to depoliticize the projects by conveying a humanitarian concern for the safety of the dwellers. Almost all the elites with whom an interview was conducted listed elimination of the threat of earthquake and less importantly, of other natural disasters as one of the main underlying objectives of clearance projects.³⁰

Reinvestment in urban land to actualize the potential ground rent and reap its benefits characterises one facet of the clearance projects; a process which Smith (1979) calls “back to the city movement of capital”. Notwithstanding the fact that ‘the movement’ in Turkey is directed and mediated by the state rather than private developers, rent gap surfaces as a

³⁰ The question regarding whether this threat is real, is beyond the scope of this study.

principal motivating force behind the projects. By way of example, regarding the location of projects, Bayraktar (2007, p. 47) posits the following in his book:

“It is the locations with *high urban land value, yet whose construction quality is low* that are the targets of transformation projects. These locations are also incompatible with urban identity.”

Squatter settlements, which are characterised by “high urban land value but low construction quality”, denote the presence of the rent gap.³¹

Although the rent gap concept will be demonstrated thoroughly in the next chapter, the objective of the creation, appropriation and redistribution of urban rent is overtly admitted by an urban planner interviewee at the Housing Administration, Demistas, who was critical of the projects:

“Let us assume, for instance, that there is a squatter neighbourhood in Bebek or in Etiler [very high income neighbourhoods of Istanbul]. Why would we want to transform this place? *We could want to transform it because of its very high rent. I don't think this [the project] is for the common good.* If squatter settlements are demolished but new houses are constructed in the same neighbourhood, this cannot be for the common good. *These are commercial things, definitely rent.*”

A professional, Ozden, from the Chamber of Urban Planners confirms this point:

“There are actually no sensible criteria to declare a region ‘urban transformation zone’. The law stipulates that it has to be at least 50,000 m². There are no other criteria other than that. *Actually, when you analyse the physical implementations and the areas chosen, then there is of course a criterion, which is rent.*”

Similarly, a professor of urban and regional planning, Keskinok also alludes to the logic of rent as the guiding force in the selection of the location of projects:

“It is not an isolated squatter neighbourhood that we are talking about. *Transformation problem comes on the agenda in localities which surround a serious development area.*”

Squatter neighbourhoods, which are ‘close to development areas’, suggests that those localities targeted for clearance and redevelopment are not only the inner city squatter

³¹ The potential land rent of a neighbourhood depends on its location in the city. This is important because initially, squatter settlements in Istanbul were built on public lands located in the outskirts of the city. However, due to the sheer level of immigration and the gradual expansion of the city borders since the 1950s, many squatter settlements became inner city neighbourhoods. In other words, they came to occupy the precious inner city land.

settlements with large rent gaps, but also the ones for which a large rent gap will arise after the projected investments by the state are undertaken. Hence, it is not only the exploitation of an already existing rent gap but an unrealised future one, yet to be created by speculative investment (Logan & Molotch, 1987). An interviewee from the Chamber of Architects, Yapici mentions:

“When you look at the location of a squatter neighbourhood in the city, you have to take into consideration some [future] huge transportation projects. For instance, the northern part of the 3rd Bosphorus bridge project in Istanbul [this bridge is yet to be constructed]. They tell people [squatters] that they will remove them from that region.”

The third Bosphorus bridge project, like other investment projects by authorities in the urban area, creates the potential ground rent itself in the first place. This, though, can only be exploited through the redevelopment of the surrounding area, in other words, through the redevelopment of the land occupied by surrounding squatter settlements.

Lastly, the most preponderant discourse, frequently utilised by the Housing Administration to legitimise the demolition of squatter settlements, pertains to the premises of social policy. Clearance projects are declared to pave the way for ‘a decent life’ in ‘modern houses’ for squatters and to diminish social and spatial disparities (Bayraktar, 2006, p. 237). The following excerpt from the brochure of the Administration reveals the claimed rationale of the projects:

“On the one hand, the projects transform the previous squatter neighbourhoods into *exemplary areas of residence and recreation*. On the other hand, our *citizens, who previously used to live in these unhealthy places, are given the chance to live in modern and planned residential areas with their completed infrastructure and facilities required for social life*” (TOKI, 2007, p. 14).

Projects are regarded as a tool of social policy, whereby the urban poor are given the chance to *own* a modern, decent and legal house, which complies with the health and construction

standards. The transition to ‘modern, decent and legal dwellings’ is furthermore expected to integrate squatters into society, lower crime rates, and improve health conditions.³²

Whether the outcomes of projects comply with these social policy premises is questioned in the fifth chapter. The following chapter will outline the process of implementing the projects.

³² These justifications are referenced to the Turkish constitution, which includes the clause 57 regarding the responsibilities of the ‘welfare state’ with respect to housing: “The state is obliged to take the measures to meet the demand for housing within a plan that does take into consideration environmental conditions and characteristics of different cities. The state also supports mass housing enterprises” (TOKI, 2007, p. 9).

CLEARANCE PROJECTS- PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Role of the Housing Administration and the Municipalities

In the last decade, the Housing Administration emerged as the chief actor in developing and implementing clearance projects. Founded in 1984 initially as an institution with the aim of dealing with the housing problems of lower-middle and middle income groups, the Administration's power and authority have expanded profoundly in the last decade.³³ Its authority to develop and implement clearance projects has been consolidated through a plethora of legal codes.³⁴ Between January 2003 and March 2009, the Housing Administration constructed 353,144 dwellings in Turkey, 37,806 of which were targeted at rehousing squatters after the demolition of their homes (TOKI, 2009).

Regarding the clearance projects, the Housing Administration is invested with powers to decide on *gecekondu* neighbourhoods for clearance, to undertake construction and financial arrangements in these neighbourhoods, to determine the value of real estate entitled to 'right holders', to ascertain the price of dwellings constructed for resettling squatters below its cost of production, to make zoning plans of any scale and kind, to take over state urban land at no cost with the approval of the prime minister and the president, and lastly to expropriate the land where clearance project is undertaken.

³³ Amongst its powers are forming partnerships with private construction companies and involvement in the construction and selling of houses for profit; being able to take over state urban land at no cost with the approval of the prime ministry and the president's office; making of zoning plans of every scale and category; expropriation of urban land to construct housing projects; and developing and implementing *gecekondu* transformation projects (Bayraktar, 2007, pp. 20-21).

³⁴ These powers were granted through the laws No.4966 (TBMM, 2003) and No.5162 (TBMM, 2004), which made amendments to the Mass Housing Law, No.2985 (TBMM, 1984b), through the Law for the Protection of Dilapidated Historical and Cultural Real Estate Through the Protection by Renewal, No.5366 (TBMM, 2005a), through the Law No.5609 (TBMM, 2007) and lastly through Law No.5793, which brought changes to the Law No.5366 (TBMM, 2008).

Despite the Administration's wide range of executive powers, it implements clearance projects in cooperation with the metropolitan and district municipalities. Municipalities are authorized to partake in the projects with the Municipality Law issued in 2005, in which their role is to ascertain the tenure situation of squatters, to work with the Administration in determining the value of the to-be-demolished buildings, to provide municipal services to the settlement after redevelopment, to take part in the demolition of dwellings and most importantly to negotiate with the squatters (TBMM, 2005b).

Regarding the selection of neighbourhoods for clearance, the administration is the authority to finalize these decisions; municipalities mainly act as facilitators and supporters in the process of implementing the projects. However, mutual agreement and consensus between the administration and municipalities is generally the norm:

“The selection [of the neighbourhood] generally comes to us via the channels of municipalities. They suggest the neighbourhoods within their district borders that should be subject to clearance. *Then we take these decisions in a dialogue with the local administrators.*” (Interviewee at the Administration, Konyalioglu)

The *preference* of the Administration in cooperating with the municipalities is further asserted by Demistas in an interview:

“The Housing Administration has the authority to develop these projects [by itself]. *The administration ‘can lay eyes on’ a good area, conclude that clearance to be carried out there is rational and then may want to transform that area by itself. However, because municipalities are the decision-makers and implementers in the process as well, the administration would also want collaboration with them.* Thus, we, the administration, would prefer to work with local actors.”

In other words, the Housing Administration, upon taking the decision to implement the project in a specific neighbourhood generally collaborates with municipalities since they are responsible *legally* for publicizing the clearance decision. They also possess authority for local-level urban planning, and adjuvant to the successful implementation of the project through negotiating with the dwellers. As has been outlined, both at the level of the

Administration and the municipality, no participation of the squatters is sought in the decision making process.

Location of Resettlement

Clearance projects mainly aim to demolish squatter settlements on public land³⁵ and resettle dwellers to mass housing complexes built by the Housing Administration. The location of these complexes, or resettlement, can either be in the squatter neighbourhood itself after the settlements are cleared, or in another part of the city. The rationale, which prevails in the choice of the location of resettlement, is revealed by Deliktas in an interview:

“Some squatter settlements are anyways located in hazardous environments. When these types of settlements are cleared, we resettle the dwellers in another location. Or alternatively, if the neighbourhood is located in a very central area or at the intersection of transportation networks or the area has a tremendous capacity to attract investment, the area becomes a central business zone. It could attract tourism investment, hotel investment, any other kind of investment other than residence. In these cases, the administration takes advantage of the opportunities.”

The hazardous environment, which renders the land unsuitable for resettlement, is posited as one of the reasons behind resettling dwellers in another neighbourhood –albeit always one with a lower potential ground rent-. In addition, the ‘strategic location’ of the neighbourhood and its capacity to attract investment also necessitate the displacement of the squatter population; both factors refer to the potential ground rent of the settlement. As such, the choice about the location of resettlement is much related to the logic of rent as it is in determining which neighbourhoods are to be cleared.

Projects, therefore, not only operate as a mechanism for the creation of urban rent through investment and redevelopment -as mentioned in the previous chapter- but also for its

³⁵ Preferably, the projects are targeted at those neighbourhoods where the numbers of dwellers with title deeds to land are low. Many elite interviewees contended that projects were implemented relatively without difficulty if dwellers were the “invaders of public land.”

redistribution through the transfer of ownership of land. They function as a mechanism of rent redistribution because in cases where the squatters are resettled to a different neighbourhood than their own, the ‘cleared’ area is redeveloped into private residences, or business zones, through luxurious dwellings and plazas, which in turn are purchased by third parties other than the indigenous squatter population.³⁶ As such, per Clark’s definition of gentrification, displacement and a change in the population of land-users to a higher socio-economic group become one outcome of redevelopment.

Compensation and Resettlement Schemes

In the projects, squatters are differentiated according to their ownership status in land and dwellings. That is, they are classified into three groups: [1] those who have a title deed to land and own the dwelling on it –title deeds to land could be granted through the clientelistic politics or in some cases, purchased through a legal transaction-; [2] those who do not have a title deed but own the dwelling; and [3] tenants who neither have a title deed to land, nor own the dwelling they reside in. Projects treat the exclusive ownership of property as the sole criterion of deciding whether dwellers are ‘right holders’. Being a ‘right holder’ ensures that a dweller will be compensated with a certain sum of money and provided the choice of either taking this compensation as cash, or accepting to be resettled in a mass housing complex. In the latter case, the compensation is treated as a down-payment for new flats.

Owners of land and dwellings are paid the market value of their properties. Owners of a building without title deeds to land are given “a wreckage payment” (Bayraktar, 2006, p. 243) –the compensation-, which depends on the age, type, size and construction style of the

³⁶ It is important to note that certain squatter neighbourhoods are kept as public spaces or redeveloped into public facilities, although these cases are more prevalent outside of Istanbul, in globally less integrated cities of the country.

building in question (Bayraktar, 2007, p. 48). The amount of wreckage payment is determined by an ‘appraisal committee’ that uses fixed figures specified by the ministry of public works. However, some dwellers within this group possess a document entitled “title deed allocation paper” that were initially issued by local municipalities after the Amnesty Law (TBMM, 1984a) in 1984. The document guaranteed that its holders would be given their title deeds once the municipality completed zoning plans for the neighbourhood. Such neighbourhoods lacked zoning plans (Keles, 2006, p. 617) since land was illegally occupied by squatters. To obtain this document, the dwellers were required to pay a fee for the application process and for the price of land they occupied. The paper represented the first stage of granting ownership rights to squatters by the state. In clearance projects, dwellers with “title deed allocation papers” are furnished with more cash compensation than the ones who do not.³⁷ On the other hand, as they do not own any assets, tenants are not compensated and are in principle excluded from the resettlement scheme.³⁸

Nonetheless, the resettlement scheme does not guarantee each ‘right holder’ a free flat in return for their squatter dwelling; on the contrary, the mass housing complexes are *sold* to the squatters and the debt to be incurred by each dweller is calculated on the basis of the value of their available assets. In cases where the value of assets –especially for the owners of land and dwelling- exceeds the value of a single flat in mass housing complexes, they are either given the surplus amount as cash or offered a second flat with any shortfall creating a new debt obligation to be paid by the dweller.

³⁷ “Title deed allocation papers” have led many squatters to assume that the papers were indeed title deeds. This was mostly due to the low education level amongst dwellers and possibly because these papers represented the first stage in the process of obtaining title deeds.

³⁸ In what follows, the case of Ayazma will demonstrate how in certain situations, authorities divert from this principle and comply with other standards for political and pragmatic reasons.

The criterion to determine the beneficiary households in the projects is a purely political question (Duran-Lasserve & Royston, 2002, p. 252) that in turn determines who will be included in the compensation and resettlement schemes, the amount of compensation offered and how much debt dwellers will incur. This ownership-based criterion results in diverse outcomes amongst dwellers, and consequently, arbitrates who are to lose and who are to gain, at least relatively, from the projects.

The compensation scheme of clearance projects, predicated on the “ownership model” (Blomley, 2004, p. 2; Singer, 2000), defines only “two classes of ownership” –private or state- (Geisler, 2000, p. 65) and differentiates squatters on either pole of this axis. By this, it reinforces the demarcation between private and public ownership, which in reality do not constitute clearly bounded fixtures (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973, p. 18; Geisler, 2000; Lund, 2008, p. 19; Moore, 2000, p. 1; C. M. Rose, 1994), and it delegitimizes other relations of property and claims over land. It naturalises private property, overlooking its historically constituted character. Furthermore, it reproduces the private-public dichotomy where public - or state- property is defined by a failure in the constitution of the private. In the next chapter, the projects will be discussed in the context of the two case studies, Ayazma and Basibuyuk.

THE TWO CASE STUDIES: AYAZMA AND BASIBUYUK

The Case Study of Ayazma

Ayazma is a *gecekondu* settlement in the district Kucukcekmece and was established in the late 1980s, mainly by Kurdish migrants from the eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey. Kurds comprise approximately half of the population (Bayraktar, 2006, p. 126). 47 percent of the buildings in the neighbourhood were built between 1993 and 1998 (ibid, p.127), which signifies that squatters are overall economically more disadvantaged than the earlier migrants.³⁹ According to the survey conducted by the local municipality (Kucukcekmece municipality) in March 2005, 23 percent of the population were employed as workers in the private sector; students and housewives each comprised 21 percent of the population. The unemployment rate in the neighbourhood was 12 percent, and 63 percent of the population was not entitled to any kind of social security (ibid, p.127-8).

Table 1: The population and number of buildings in Ayazma


Number of buildings	Number of independent units	Population	Parcel Area (hectares)
1,245	1,755	8,775	120

Source: (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2008, p. 17)

³⁹ Being a late migrant signifies that this group was unable to reap the benefits of the increase in urban land prices, thereof of rising rents during the 1980s. In that sense, their chance of being a squatter landlord in the commercialized informal land market is comparably low. Unless they squat, they become tenants in the settlements of squatter landlords (Keyder, 2005a, p. 132).

Of the 1,245 buildings, single-storey buildings comprise 71.3 percent. This indicates the recent establishment of the neighbourhood and its relatively low degree of commercialisation, reflecting that the squatting is primarily for shelter.

Figure 3: Ownership status in Ayazma



Key:	
	Private property
	State property
	No legal owner

Source: Kucukcekmece Municipality, 2008

According to the municipality survey, 50 percent of the land in Ayazma is private property; the majority of the rest is state land, specifically ‘treasury land’ (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2008, p. 34). The number of people with a title deed to land is 1,065 (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2009a, p. 51). Nevertheless this figure includes all land under private property, including private land without buildings (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2008, p. 45). The number of buildings on the same land is 658, which could roughly indicate the number of owner families.

Table 2: Distribution of area of parcel, buildings and households in Ayazma

Property	Area of parcel (m ²)	Number of shareholders	Number of buildings	Number of households
Treasury	558,728	-	582	618
Housing Administration	250	-	0	0
Outside of registration	5,357	-	2	1
Waqf	2,740	-	-	-
Special Provincial Administration	760	-	2	2
TEDAS	169	-	-	-
Cooperative	-	-	-	-
Individual	603,457	1,071	658	1,269
Total	1,171,461	1,071	1,244	1,890


Source: (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2008)

The number of home owners on state land could also be approximately inferred from the number of buildings (582), while the number of households (618) would reflect overcrowding rather than tenancy as would be expected for the dwellers with a title deed. Out of this group, only 4 dwellers have applied for ‘title deed allocation papers’, yet they have not paid for the land they have occupied (interview, Castas, Kucukcekmece municipality). According to the municipality figures referenced by Bayraktar (2006, p. 127), the ratio of tenants to the whole

population is 25 percent, which contradicts the figure (120) found by an activist tenant in the neighbourhood (interview, anonymous M).

Ayazma is located across from the Olympic stadium, constructed in 2002, and Turkey's largest organised industrial zone. It is close to the Ataturk airport, and the main road links including the transit European motorway and the E5 highway to its south. According to the Kucukcekmece municipality, the proximity of the stadium and the industrial zone to Ayazma "constitute the most important dynamics for the 'urban regeneration project to be implemented in the region'" (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2008, p. 17). In other words, Ayazma's location, given its surroundings, points to its high potential ground rent, and it is this potential rent which the 'urban regeneration project' aims to materialize.

Figure 4: Map of Ayazma



Source: Kucukcekmece Municipality, 2008

Figure 5: Ayazma (after demolition with the Olympic stadium at the back)



Source: Imece, 2009

Recent studies on civic boosterism, and particularly its role in commodifying and selling a place, highlight history, youth culture, diversity and entrepreneurship as the strategies elites employ to attract capital and people to the region (Chatterton & Hollands, 2003; Hoffman, 2003; Jessop & Sum, 2000). Most importantly, the hosting of world events such as the Olympic games has largely been identified as a strategy for promoting a place in the world market and establishing it as a global city (Hiller, 2000; Owen, 2002; Short, 1999; Whitelegg, 2000). Short (1999, p. 44) mentions that “[the] Olympic games are not just an opportunity to be the site of a global spectacle, and hence international name recognition, [but] they also provide an opportunity for business, real estate deals; they act as a giant urban development opportunity.” It is this urban development opportunity, which the Kucukcekmece municipality aspires to realise through its entrepreneurial place-making strategies.

The municipality declares its ‘vision’ as making Kucukcekmece “the home for happy people and a centre of attraction for the world, having completed its urban transformation projects” and able “to host the Olympics, with its lake, sea, forest and all sorts of social utilities” (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2009b). In determination to realise this ‘vision’, the future of Ayazma as a neighbourhood, located next to the Olympic stadium, has been settled, as is described in the municipality brochure:

“Ayazma is a region, which will be transformed via ‘*cleaning*’ and afterwards it will be *developed as a residential area in a modern quarter concept, to the east of the Olympic stadium, changing its users* and taking into consideration its environmental functions” (Turgut, Ceylan, & Akin, 2008, p. 35).

Ayazma’s clearance project and *changing of its users*, which overtly means the displacement of its original population, is justified by the discourses on Kucukcekmece’s advantageous location in Istanbul and how the district will assist Istanbul prepare to be a world city. In supporting this, Ayazma is to be cleared and its population is to be displaced as the city is aestheticized and commodified for tourist consumption. The point one of the Kurdish squatters (anonymous M) raised is interesting in this sense:

“The Olympic stadium was the reason for what Ayazma went through. During that time, Ayazma was hosting foreign games and matches. Whenever their fans were here, Ayazma’s electricity would be cut off so that the foreign people wouldn’t see Ayazma.”

The head of the urban transformation division, Babaoglu at the Kucukcekmece Municipality notes that the project started in 2004 and was implemented in stages, where the building owners on public land were firstly targeted and negotiation and persuasion tactics brought to bear. The owners of land were dealt with in the later stages of the project since they possessed a legal right to defend ‘their property’ and could therefore pursue legal proceedings to thwart the project.

The squatters without a title deed to land were offered a wreckage payment of 10,000 Turkish liras –TL- (4,050 GBP) for their dwellings and in return, they were resettled in mass housing complexes, each home being 90.48 m² in size (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2008, p. 60), in a neighbourhood called Bezirganbahce. Bezirganbahce is a public housing project of 55 11-storey buildings with a total of 2,640 apartments in the Kucukcekmece district. Currently, all dwelling-owner squatters without deeds to land have been resettled in Bezirganbahce.

The price for a single flat in the Bezirganbahce buildings is 51,405 TL (20,817 GBP).⁴⁰ Given the 10,000 TL wreckage payment, dwellers of Ayazma without a title deed to land have to incur a sizeable debt of 41,500 TL (16, 806 GBP) and are obliged to repay back this amount over 180 months.⁴¹ The owners of buildings with a deed to land were provided with three options. While they could realise the value of their land and buildings as cash, they could also choose to be resettled either in Bezirganbahce or in more luxurious buildings constructed for them in a neighbourhood named Cakmak (part of Ayazma).⁴² Currently, out of 1,065 land owners, 676 have signed contracts with the municipality (Kucukcekmece-Municipality, 2009a, p. 51); of this group 294 dwellers decided to be resettled in Ayazma and 200 of them in Bezirganbahce (interview, Babaoglu). The rest took the market value of their assets in cash. Many of those who have not signed contracts still reside in Ayazma.

The tenants, who were not even considered in the compensation scheme in the early stages of the project, are currently awaiting resettlement in low quality, inexpensive mass housing

⁴⁰ An interviewee at the Chamber of Urban Planners posits this figure to be well above the cost of production, especially given the fact that the Housing Administration expropriates the land with no cost and uses ‘tunnel formwork’ for construction; two major factors that reduce the costs.

⁴¹ This result was the outcome of a long process of negotiation between dwellers and authorities. Initially the dwellers were also required to pay an advance payment, 10 percent of the price of new flats. Later on, this payment was annulled. Babaoglu attributes this outcome to the ‘good participation of dwellers’ in the project. At the same time, it conceals the fact that the dwellers would not be able to pay this advance payment if it was not annulled anyways.

⁴² The buildings in Cakmak are 11-storey dwellings, where each flat is 138 m² and costs approximately 225,000 TL (91,116 GBP) (interview, anonymous P).

complexes in a neighbourhood called Kayabasi in Kucukcekmece. They are expected to pay for the flats over 180 months without an advance payment. This outcome was partly influenced by media publicity surrounding 18 tenant families that were the most disadvantaged and poorest tenant group in the neighbourhood. Following their eviction and the demolition of their homes in 2007, these families were unable to afford rent another flat elsewhere and had no other option than to live in tents in Ayazma (Burultay, 19 November 2008; Celen, 18 February 2008; Dastan, 23 January 2009; Lodos & Zeytin, 13 November 2007; Yarkadas, 22 February 2008; Yildiral, 1 January 2008).⁴³

Figure 6: A tenant from the 18 families living in tents



Source: Imece, 2009

⁴³ Their tents have been torn down three times between February 2007 and November 2008 by the local municipality. Most of these families have small children who are not at a working age. They have mentioned how the tenant families who could leave Ayazma after demolition had working children, who could contribute to the household income. A middle aged woman (anonymous O) noted how her husband who was previously employed lost his job after they started living in the tent. Every time there was a threat of demolition of their tent, she would call her husband to leave his workplace and come home. The children of all these families had problems with progress at school. A 34 year old woman (anonymous N) explained how her 11- year old daughter was successful at school before they were thrown out of their house. A 6- year old girl had bronchitis because of the cold in tent, which caused a permanent damage to her lungs. Two women, both middle aged, also had serious health problems with their lungs after experiencing tent life. A woman, mother of 4 children and who gave birth to a child in their tent, described how all her hair had turned to grey because of the despair and difficulties they have encountered. Many of the children of these families had psychological trauma due the fear they encountered when 1,500 policemen came for demolition in November 2007. One of them even started crying and shouting out “police! police!”, thinking that the author was from the police.

After the eviction of all the squatters, the region will be developed into a ‘residential area in a modern quarter concept.’ Squatter settlements are to be replaced with expensive, luxurious upper middle class dwellings. Redevelopment and upgrading of the area for high income groups are further confirmed by Karaoglu in an interview:

“We developed a new plan for the evacuated area, we’ll build houses there. We build them as part of a revenue generation project⁴⁴, having considered the environmental potentials. There is an organised industrial zone next to the evacuated area. There are 30,000 workplaces, every day the owners of these 30,000 workplaces commute between certain locations in Istanbul. We undertake a luxurious housing project there, thinking that we have to devise such a concept, such a design, such a project that it will be attractive for the owners of these workplaces.”

In the last few years, Ayazma continued to be a ‘dilapidated’, low investment squatter neighbourhood while its surroundings flourished and attracted investment. Upon clearance, new investment will lead to an increase in the capitalised ground rent and result in gentrification. Ayazma’s poor dwellers would be replaced by middle and upper-middle income groups. As the story of Ayazma’s clearance project conforms to the rent gap and gentrification theories, the outcomes of the project are urban segregation, social polarization and exclusion (Andersen, 2003; Caldeira, 2000; Fainstein, Gordon, & Harloe, 1992; Massey & Denton, 1993). The urban poor is marginalised to the outskirts of the city and made invisible. Bezirganbahce, which is analysed subsequently, adumbrates these already.

Bezirganbahce: A happy home for squatters?

Far from being ‘the home of happy people in modern decent houses’ as propagated by the Kucukcekmece municipality and the Housing Administration, Bezirganbahce represents “an urban captivity” (Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 19), where poverty wanders about the already

⁴⁴ It is significant to note here that the Housing Administration does not get any sources from the central budget. The administration is designed to fund itself through creating its own resources in order to be able to undertake its projects. One of the mechanisms through which it funds itself is the revenue generation projects. By this, we mean that the administration undertakes housing projects directed at middle, upper middle income groups and makes a profit out of them.

derelict 11-storey buildings⁴⁵ with fallen plaster, fading paint, shabby construction work, neglected gardens and playgrounds.

Figure 7: 3 year old dilapidated apartments in Bezirganbahce



Source: Imece, 2009

⁴⁵ The construction of the buildings was completed in 2006; as such they are only 3 year-old buildings.

Figure 8: Bezirganbahce



Source: Fieldwork

Bezirganbahce amalgamates and consolidates the material and spatial dimensions of poverty. The worsening of income distribution and increasing poverty in Turkey in the post-1980 period, due to the neoliberal policies and IMF-led structural adjustment programs have been documented extensively (Boratav, 1990; Kose, Boratav, & Yeldan, 2001; Onis, 1998; Yeldan, 1995, 2005). Having witnessed this era, poverty and social exclusion are not new to the squatters of Ayazma. What is new is that Bezirganbahce has worsened this situation and aggravated the disparities and inequalities between them.

Figure 9: Part of Bezirganbahce (buildings were newly painted because of the coming local elections in March 2009)



Source: Fieldwork

Bezirganbahce reflects the formalisation of land use and ownership rights between the state and squatters, in other words, the formalisation of property relations. This formalisation, proclaimed as a policy of “enabling the poor to own a home” necessitates that dwellers make monthly payments to the Housing Administration. Upon completion of the full repayment of their debt, they are to own a flat in Bezirganbahce and, in principle, to receive a title deed confirming their ownership. Whilst the Administration claims that the monthly payments it seeks are affordable, analogous to paying rent, its treatment of those experiencing repayment difficulties is unambiguous. Residents who are unable to meet two consecutive payments have their houses confiscated.

Additionally, the provision of municipal services such as natural gas, electricity and water is also formalised, which results in residents having to make regular monthly payments. In Ayazma, dwellers were able to obtain these services “through their negotiations with the local municipality or through informal means” (Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 22). This implies that many dwellers did not receive regular bills for any such municipal services or, infrequently for those that did. By contrast, the new residents of Bezirganbahce are obliged to meet monthly payments of these commodified services alongside repaying the debt incurred on future homes.

In this framework, Bezirganbahce represents a process of market making, where essential needs and land use have been formalised and commodified. This process of marketisation ‘privatises’ access to them, through the establishment of the means of access on ‘the principle of market exchange’ (Polanyi, 1957). Dwellers become wholly incorporated into the domain of markets. As a result, it necessarily creates new lines of demarcation between squatters who can pay for such services and those who cannot.

This demarcation is easily discernable in Bezirganbahce since many residents have great difficulty in meeting these regularized expenses. The average monthly payment for the apartments is 220-250 TL (89- 101 GBP) and the monthly maintenance fee required by the administration of the housing project is 40 TL (16 GBP). Coupled with the municipal services bills, a minimum of approximately 350 TL (142 GBP) is required to meet basic monthly expenses, while the monthly household income of residents of Bezirganbahce ranges from 400 [162 GBP] to 1000 TL [405 GBP]” (Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 22).⁴⁶ Under these circumstances, residents who previously owned their *gecekondu*s in Ayazma, run the risk of

⁴⁶ According to a study conducted by the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions, the food poverty line for a family of four as of April 2009 is 837 TL (339 GBP). The complete poverty line that includes both food and non-food expenses for a household of four is 2,325 TL (942 GBP) (Memur-Sen, 2009).

losing their new homes as is evident by the fact that many have already been compelled to sell their apartments, leave Bezirganbahce and transfer the accumulated debt to subsequent owner. Those families, who still reside in Bezirganbahce, are able to do so owing to the presence of at least one employed member in the family. Otherwise, receiving intermittent financial support from relatives, or friends, to meet the total monthly expenses is a very prevalent coping strategy. Regarding the differentiation between the squatters of Ayazma in meeting these payments, an interviewee (anonymous R) contends the following:

“Most of the people have already left. Regarding those who stayed behind... It is because they either own a car or a minibus. They carry textile products to earn their living, and their 2-3 sons work as well. That is how they maintain their lives. Some of the people I knew went to Tekirdag [another city] or somewhere around Caglayan [a district in Istanbul].”

A middle-aged Kurdish man (anonymous U) confirms this point:

“They have ‘screwed up’ people. Most of the people who came from Ayazma sold their apartments and went away. Why? The man is ‘alone’ [working] whereas he is indebted to 10 different places. What can he do? He has the monthly maintenance fee, which he cannot pay. He has monthly payments of the house, amounting to 220-240 TL [89-97 GBP]. There are also utilities like electricity, natural gas, etc. Plus, there are no jobs. They end up obliged to sell the house. They either go to Cerkezkoy [a district in another city] or to their hometowns in the eastern part [of Turkey].”

Regarding those who went to Tekirdag and Cerkezkoy, a middle-aged woman (anonymous S) notes that they will become squatters again in that city.

The regularisation of expenses is further exacerbated by the unemployment or irregular employment of the Bezirganbahce residents, the consequences of which are modest sporadic income flows to the households, perpetuating their insecurity (Castells & Portes, 1989; Ozdemir & Yücesan-Özdemir, 2004). Most of the residents have precarious jobs and frequently rely on financial support from their children, local government or NGOs (Candan

& Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 22). Those who are regularly employed are predominantly industrial workers, having to accede to the minimum wage.⁴⁷

Yet, apart from the irregular and informal nature of their employment, resettlement in Bezirganbahce aggravated the residents' *chances* of employment, because of their loss of proximity to the organised industrial zone that was located next to Ayazma, and therefore to many workplaces where many residents were previously employed. A 36 year old man (anonymous M) notes:

“Ayazma was close to the industry, to work. It was in the center of Istanbul. There was a garment industry; you would go there in 10 minutes. There was Masko [furniture industry], you would reach there in 10 minutes. Now, the employers want to hire people who live close by, since they do not provide transportation service. Now, it is far away... people ended up unemployed. People work for the minimum wage there, you cannot transport from here, solely the cost of going there is 100-150 TL [41-61 GBP] every month” (Kasım abi)

The residents' reduced chance of employment is engendered by the location of Bezirganbahce, which, compared to Ayazma, is situated at the outskirts of the city, in a relatively remote neighbourhood. Limited employment prospects are further compounded by the lack of transportation options in Bezirganbahce. For example, it is an arduous task to find a bus or minibus to travel to the inner-city. An older Kurdish woman (anonymous T) explains:

“There are no vehicles here. There are only the Kucukcekmece minibus, Sefakoy municipality vehicle and buses to Sirinevler. You wait an hour for the bus to go to Bakirkoy [a very central place in Istanbul].”

In other words, poverty of the residents, combined with their economic and social exclusion, is further exacerbated by this spatial exclusion (Adaman & Keyder, 2006).

Uneven outcomes of the Ayazma project amongst squatters

The Ayazma project delineates that the ownership status of squatters is pivotal in creating and aggrandizing the disparities between them since it defines who is a right holder is and

⁴⁷ For the year 2009, the minimum wage in Turkey is net 527.13 TL [213.47 GBP] per month ("Asgari ücret yüzde 4.3 arttı, brut 666 YTL oldu," 26 December 2008).

therefore is to receive compensation. It engenders differentiation between squatters on the basis of their 'accumulated' assets and results in uneven outcomes amongst them.

Tenants end up as the most disadvantaged group in the projects as they are not defined as a right holder. The outcomes for tenants are bleaker and may result in homelessness or having to seek tenancy in another neighbourhood, usually at greatest cost and only if they can afford it.

Dwelling-owner squatters without a title deed to land are also differentiated amongst themselves. Those who are capable of meeting the monthly expenses remain in Bezirganbahce, while the others revert to squatting in another city, or a different part of Istanbul, or end up becoming tenants. This outcome is consistent with the literature, which forecasts that tenure legalisation would result in absentee land-lordism and the continuing occupation of new public and private land (Amis, 1984; Angel, 1983b; Carroll, 1980; Connolly, 1982; Gilbert & Healey, 1985). Those that continue to remain in Bezirganbahce are also worse-off. They are indebted, risk losing their apartments and have to meet their monthly expenses. This places a tremendous burden upon families with meagre and irregular incomes.

Dwellers with a title deed to land secure large compensation due to their assets and bargaining power. They bargain with the municipality in order to be able to sell their assets for a higher price; therefore the conflict between them and the municipality is in reality a negotiation. The confrontation is not about the project itself but its terms. A land owning dweller who still resides in Ayazma because of the continuing negotiations with the municipality (anonymous P) mentions:

"Now, we are waiting. We just want our right to be restored reasonably. This is my place. I will not get out of here. I have waited until now, hopefully the result will be 'delicious'".

Figure 10: A household with a title deed to land in Ayazma



Source: Fieldwork

The Ayazma project displays the outcome of clearance projects in all its different facets. Instead of ‘providing the poor with a decent life in modern houses’ –as is most evident in the very low quality of Bezirganbahce apartment buildings- and ‘saving them from the squatter life’, the projects seem to exacerbate, concentrate and displace the poverty of squatters to enclosed spaces like Bezirganbahce, and recreate urban marginality (Wacquant, 1999). As many residents of Bezirganbahce are incapable of meeting their monthly payments, they are displaced from this ‘urban captivity’ as well. As such, for some squatters their experience of the project concludes in their having been doubly displaced; from their original homes and then from the new apartment buildings. The displacement of dwellers from Ayazma and the

new luxurious housing project to be developed in the region, nevertheless, tell a story of gentrification, albeit one undertaken and directed by the state.

The Case Study of Basibuyuk

Basibuyuk is a *gecekondu* settlement in the district Maltepe on the Asian side of Istanbul. It has a different development trajectory than many other squatter neighbourhoods. Initially it was a village located outside of Istanbul. It developed into a squatter neighbourhood as immigrants squatted on public lands surrounding the village. There are no surveys conducted by the Maltepe municipality and so accurate data concerning the neighbourhood's population, the number of buildings and property structure is nonexistent. According to the head of the Basibuyuk neighbourhood association, Kaya, there are 6,800 buildings in the area and the population is approximately 26,000 (Interview).

The paucity of official data (existing data, as it exists, is unreliable due to a plethora of forged documents) is underlined by conflicting views on the tenure structure in Basibuyuk. The lawyer of the neighbourhood, Celik provides his own estimates: those who own a title deed to land constitute approximately 5 percent of the dwellers; those who do not have a deed to land –including those who have ‘title deed allocation papers’- are in a majority. Yet, the local headman, Karpuz who represents the state in the neighbourhood, and is elected regularly, contends the percentage of dwellers with a deed to land to be approximately 40 percent with the remainder categorised as squatters on state land. All the buildings in the neighbourhood are alleged to violate the planning and zoning regulations. In addition to these figures, Kaya reports the number of tenants to be around 800.


Figure 11: Basibuyuk (with its beautiful panorama)



Source: Imece, 2009

Basibuyuk is located on a hill with a beautiful panorama and surrounded by forests. It has a stable geological foundation, and so, in light of the earthquake threat, is a desirable location in Istanbul. To its south lies the E5 highway, a crucial transportation route, which connects the European and Asian sides of Istanbul. Nearby the neighbourhood, there are two luxurious, upper-middle income housing projects, Kiptas Maltepe Houses and Nar City; and 5 kilometres to its north there is the newly-built private Maltepe University (Kuyucu & Atayurt, 2008, p. 23). Given its surroundings, comparable to Ayazma, Basibuyuk represents a potential area for redevelopment because its potential ground rent transcends its capitalised rent considerably.

Figure 12: Map of Basibuyuk




Source: Google Earth

The clearance project for Basibuyuk was given approval in 2006. Its aim was popularized as “enabling the people of Basibuyuk to live in a modern, planned, and healthy environment with high urban utilities standards” (Maltepe-Municipality, 2006, p. 13). Accompanying this social policy goal, the project was further advocated by the ‘necessity [and urgency] of implementing urban transformation projects in Istanbul’, whereby Istanbul “prepares for *the new competitive environment*, adapting to the economic, political, social and cultural changes in the world” (ibid, p.2). The entrepreneurial goal of making Istanbul a world city is clear.

Analogous to the Ayazma project, the Basibuyuk project would also be implemented in stages. The first stage would consist of negotiations with squatters without a deed to land who

are settled on an area of 400 decares.⁴⁸ Negotiations with dwellers with a deed would commence subsequently. Tenants of Basibuyuk, on the other hand, would not be considered right holders, and therefore they would be excluded from the resettlement and compensation schemes. Being “the poor of the poor” (Mitlin, 1997; UNCHS, 1993), this would exacerbate their vulnerability.

Figure 13: The First Stage of the Basibuyuk Project, Details of the Resettlement Area in Basibuyuk



Source: Maltepe Municipality, 2006

The initial goal was to resettle squatters in a near-by neighbourhood called Keçi Yatagi in Maltepe (Istanbul-Metropolitan-Municipality, Maltepe-Municipality, & Administration, 2006, p. 1); however the plan failed as the location chosen for mass housing complexes had “the status of military zone and greenbelt”, making it illegal for settlement (Chamber-of-Urban-

⁴⁸ The first stage of the project, an area of 400 decares, consisted of 1,142 buildings, 53.3 percent of which was single-storey (Maltepe-Municipality, 2006, p. 10).

Planners, 2009, p. 3). This necessitated that the squatter population be resettled in their own neighbourhood. Consequently, the Housing Administration undertook the construction of six 15-storey apartment buildings –a total of 300 flats- on land situated in Basibuyuk that was the property of the Maltepe municipality. Squatters without a title deed to land whose dwellings would be demolished, as part of the first stage of the project, would be resettled in these 15-storey apartment buildings.

Figure 14: Six 15-storey apartment buildings in Basibuyuk



Source: Fieldwork

Squatters assert that the geological foundations under these six buildings are not suitable for settlement, particularly multi-storey apartment buildings. If true, this would contradict one of

the main reasons argued for the construction of such buildings –namely fears for the safety of the squatters, as their self-constructed dwellings were more susceptible to damage from earthquakes. A construction worker in Basibuyuk (anonymous F) notes:

“This is ‘loose ground’, ground is not good. They will ‘bury’ the first two floors of these buildings [six 15-storey apartment buildings]. If they do not, they won’t be able to get authorization.”

A middle-aged man fortifies (anonymous C) this argument:

“Allah forbid! I hope the ground along with these buildings slump. Beneath it, water flows as if there is a stream. And they built these buildings there! Did they do an investigation of ground conditions? You will put us there, upper part of the neighbourhood has hard ground. You will give that part to the rich!”

Figure 15: Buildings constructed on loose ground in Basibuyuk (three of the six are shown below)



Source: Fieldwork

Each flat in these buildings is 65 m² in size and costs 52,000 TL (21,058 GBP). Dwellers reiterate that the flats of this size do not conform to the needs of their extended families. An activist squatter (anonymous A) underlines:

“Those houses are 65 m², here families have at least of 6-7 members; there is no household with less than 5 people. They put us in those 65 m² places. How will that happen?”

The head of an extended household (anonymous H) appends:

“I have given a flat to each one of my children [i.e. in an apartment building with a few floors]. Now, all of them have different flats. We cannot live in there all together.”

As with the Ayazma project, should the squatters be unable to meet consecutive monthly payments, in this case three months, their apartments would be confiscated (Maltepe-Municipality, 2008, p. 8). Despite the existence of documents from the Maltepe municipality that appears to overstate the compensation to be paid to squatters,⁴⁹ Kaya asserts that the wreckage payments on average range between 10,000 and 12,000 TL (4,050- 4,869 GBP), with dwellers who have ‘title deed allocation papers’ receiving a little more. This means that squatters take occupation of their flat with a debt of 40,000-42,000 TL (16,198- 17,008 GBP), to be paid in monthly instalments over 10 years. In respect of dwellers with a deed to land, because the Housing Administration and the Maltepe municipality had left negotiations with them to a later stage of the project, the options to be offered to this group has not been publicized.

Notwithstanding the absence of exact figures on the income level of Basibuyuk’s squatters, poverty is a prominent reality of everyday life. This is apparent in the conversations with the

⁴⁹ For copies of these documents, see Appendix B. These documents include two figures: “total sum” and “difference amount.” The documents propound that the squatters are granted the amount of “total sum.” However, according to legal codes, squatters are only eligible to receive the wreckage payment, in other words, the difference between “total sum” and “difference amount.” Many interviewees including the professionals have posited that these documents were prepared by the Maltepe municipality in order to convince people to partake in the project despite the fact that they were legally invalid. The existent legal codes seem to confirm this assertion.

squatters interviewed. There is a sporadic lack of basic dietary goods such as sugar, cheese and milk. The unemployment rate is high, and those employed are frequently in irregular, low paid jobs. Given their income levels, most of the dwellers would be unable to meet the monthly payments if the project could be implemented. A middle-aged woman (anonymous K) articulates the difficulty squatters would face if the project had been ‘successful’:

“Now you come and demolish my house. Then you put me under debt. With what money would I be able to pay that? If you can’t pay for three [consecutive] months, then you’re thrown out. How would I meet the expenses of natural gas, monthly maintenance fee and monthly instalments of the house? In the worst case, now, at least I have a home, I have no debt. My husband is ill, there are no jobs. My son has come from the military service, he cannot work, no jobs. How would I pay all that?”

A retired man (anonymous B) also notes:

“I cannot pay the amount of debt even in 60 years with my pension worth of 600 TL [243 GBP]. If you cannot pay, your house is gone, you’re gone!”

Celik, being acquainted with the Basibuyuk residents, confirms these accounts:

“There will be the monthly maintenance fee and expense of natural gas. There is no chance for people to pay that money with their current incomes. Even though the man stayed there for 40 years, he still wouldn’t be able to pay that money. He is forced to steal, there is no other way! How many of the children there have protein based diets? How many people are employed? There is real, serious poverty there, really serious! No one asks about these issues. The level of education is very low. You say to these people that you will own a house with monthly instalments worth of 300-400 TL [122-162 GBP]. This is not realistic! This is an economic discrimination. A deportation.”

The symbolic deportation, the squatters of Basibuyuk would endure, is comparable to the displacement that some of the residents of Bezirganbahce are currently undergoing as their houses are confiscated. Both exemplify the outcome of the legalisation of tenure in land, which induces an increase in the cost of living and services (Balamir & Payne, 2001; R. Burgess, 1982; Krueckeberg & Paulsen, 2002, pp. 235-236; Yonder, 1998).

The project that would be developed in Basibuyuk by the Administration, if the clearance project could be implemented, is still unknown. Given its surroundings, squatters anticipate that a luxurious upper-middle income housing project similar to Kiptas Maltepe Houses or Nar City would replace their settlements.

Unlike the Ayazma project, the authorities could not execute the Basibuyuk clearance project because of the resistance of the squatters. At the end of March 2009, the candidate mayor of the JDP who had been in power since 2004, lost the district municipality election to his opponent from the Republican People's Party (RPP).⁵⁰ This party is known for its more egalitarian stance and favourable disposition towards squatters. Under these new circumstances, whether the RPP will oppose the Housing Administration, and if it does, how it will affect the outcome of the project is yet to be seen.

Following on from the detailed analysis of the two case studies, the next chapter investigates the dynamics of contention, the mechanisms of persuasion, and the different ways of claim making over land.

⁵⁰ For the municipality of Maltepe, the RPP got 51.4 percent of the votes in Maltepe while the JDP only got 37.9 percent (Radikal, 2009). For the previous local elections, these figures were 43 percent for the JDP and 33.9 percent for the RPP. (Radikal, 2004).

DIFFERENT LOCAL OUTCOMES: CONTENTION AND PERSUASION

Clearance Projects: constitution of a new property regime

So far, the outcomes of clearance projects have largely been discussed in relation to the displacement of squatters and gentrification. Yet, clearance projects are at the same time a mechanism, whereby “property rights in land”⁵¹ replace differing ‘property-based social relations’. In this respect, they constitute a new property regime in land by enforcing the rules of the property rights system through the eviction of squatters and the allocation of property titles to them. Nevertheless, titles deeds are not granted to the existing squatter settlements of households but to their new flats in mass housing complexes. This process results in the provision of freehold titles, albeit *de facto* to those who can meet the monthly instalments.

The distribution of title deeds to squatter settlements has generally been discussed in the literature with regard to the security of tenure for the urban poor. One approach has been market centric that emphasizes the provision of property titles as a way to combat the poverty of urban poor, enhance their integration into society, stimulate investment in housing consolidation (M. Cohen & Sheema, 1992; de-Soto, 1989, 2000, p. 44; Dowall & Giles, 1991; Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002, p. 13; Linn, 1983; WorldBank, 1991) and ensure their access to credit through increases in land and housing values (Dowall & Clarke, 1996; Dowall & Leaf, 1991; Friedman, Jimenez, & Mayo, 1988; Jimenez, 1983, 1984; Struyk & Lynn, 1983). Tenure legalisation, as such, has constituted the major policy in the World Bank’s (1993) strategy of “enabling markets to work” (Jones & Ward, 1994).

⁵¹ Property is “a social relation that defines the property holder with respect to something of value... against all others” (Bromley, 1991, p. 2). “Property right”, on the other hand, is “a relationship that is enforceable (or at least supposed to be enforced) by the state” (Razzaz, 1993, p. 341). Razzaz (ibid) distinguishes between the two, property and property right, indicating that the latter is just one form of property.

Another approach largely reverses this argument, criticizing the monodic way of treating private property as the path to the alleviation of poverty, and stimulation of investment into settlements. It highlights that tenure legalisation is not a prerequisite for the security of tenure, and investments in housing are undertaken if there is *de facto* security of tenure (Angel, 1983a; Azuela & Duhau, 1998a, p. 163; Fourie, 2000; Martin, 1983; Payne, 1997, 1999; Razzaz, 1993; Varley, 1987, 2002).

The above paradigm, including its adherents as well as its opponents, encapsulates the discussion within the vernacular of social policy. This discourse disregards the fact that tenure legalisation, achieved through the allocation of title deeds, establishes private property in land, resulting in its commodification and the creation of new lines of demarcation and inequality between settlers.

Razzaz (1993, p. 342) mentions that the land illegally occupied by squatters is generally “the subject of competing or even conflicting claims”. In this respect, tenure legalisation serves to resolve the conflict –at best the disparity- between the property rights system in land, defined by legal centralism,⁵² and property claims based on “different forms of legitimation” (Azuela, 1987) as this disparity has been addressed frequently in the literature (Azuela, 1987; Azuela & Duhau, 1998b; Durand-Lasserve, 1998; Fernandes & Varley, 1998; Leaf, 1994; Lund, 2008; Manji, 2006; Razzaz, 1994, 1998; Santos, 1977). It totalizes the plurality of these competing claims over land under the property rights system enforced by the state, the consequences of

⁵² Legal centralism is based on the idea that state law is all-encompassing of social behaviour and that other normative orderings are, and should be, subordinate to the state. The current orthodoxy assumes that as societies develop modern capitalist economies, non-state legal orders give way neatly to state law and that, in relation to property rights, informal tenure arrangements are superseded by formalisation (Manji, 2006, p. 151). Within such a framework, property relations would reflect (or at least tend to reflect) legal property rights; similarly, changes in property relations would be reflected in changes in property rights and vice versa (O.M Razzaz, 1993, pp.341-342).

which serve to delegitimize the claims to land held by squatters and bar them from any legal recourse in order to defend these claims.

Likewise, clearance projects are a form of tenure legalisation, a mechanism by which the property rights system is enforced by the state. The projects epitomize the resolution of the conflict between the property rights system and differing property-based social relations, delegitimizing the latter. This point has also been affirmed by Deliktas at the Administration:

“This is in fact the resolution of the problem of property. The user of the building, the owner of the building and the owner of land are all different people. It is because the property problem is not resolved that private developers cannot function.”

In this sense, the projects signify a transition from a moral economy to “the moral neutrality of market exchange which takes place between formally equal trading partners” (Bugra, 1998, p. 303). The era dominated by the politics of clientelism and continuous negotiation between the state and squatters, which provided the latter with the opportunity to squat and obtain municipal services, is defined by Bugra (ibid) as a moral economy of urban land use. Similar to Thompson’s (1991, p. 188) depiction of “the moral economy of the poor”, this moral economy was grounded upon “a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties in the community.” Accordingly, it shielded squatters from the ‘objective, non-discriminatory’ rules of the market economy.

Clearance projects of the new era, in contrast, constitute the market as the arbitrator of urban land use. The projects formalize the land use and ownership rights and enabling the commodification and marketisation of public land -which had used to be held by the public authority and kept *extra commercium* (Keyder, 2005a, p. 130). This brings to an end the secret consensus between the state and the users of its urban land (Erder, 2007, p. 273). In this

respect, projects designate a shift from “traditional paternalism” to “liberal moral philosophy” (Coats, 1972; Fox-Genovese, 1973).

The new property regime organized around the property rights system, which is enforced by the state, is an ‘a-moral’ one. Only those with ownership claims have access to land use. As the epitome of this new regime, clearance projects, convert the right of possession into an ownership right, albeit to be granted only to those who can repay their debt in full. It is the ‘a-morality’ of this new regime, which has engendered grievance, anger and resistance amongst squatters.

Differing Local Outcomes: Basibuyuk and Ayazma

Table 3: Comparison between Basibuyuk and Ayazma

	Basibuyuk	Ayazma
Presence of neighbourhood association	Yes	No
Order of precedence of neighbourhood (the 2000s)	about 5 th in Istanbul	1 st in Istanbul
Awareness of other neighbourhood clearance experiences	Yes	No

Basibuyuk

Property relations, rather than being fixed, are an ongoing contest. What follows will be a narrative of this contentious politics⁵³ in Basibuyuk. It seeks to demonstrate the difficulty of “transform[ing] the social relations that are property into the space that is property” (Staehele & Mitchell, 2008, p. 45).

⁵³ I adopt the definition of contentious politics as it is defined by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001, p. 5), meaning “episodic, public, collective interaction amongst makers of claims and their objects when a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and b) the claims would, if realised, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”

Basibuyuk has been the paragon of contention and has successfully thwarted its clearance. As yet, only very few -3 or 4- dwellers have signed contracts with the former JDP municipality; the rest of the community perseveres to resist the project. The neighbourhood was the scene of violent protests for the last two years; only recently it attained some tranquillity, mainly due to the March, 2009 local elections.

With the elections in March, 2009, the Basibuyuk community displaced its former local headman, Kapruz, who was accused of colluding with the Maltepe municipality in supporting the clearance project. The elections also revealed the decline of support for the JDP (Ogunc, 17 May 2008; Yarkadas, 19 September 2008) whose electoral fortunes had come to be viewed as inextricably bound the development and launching of the project.⁵⁴

“The repertoires of contention” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 15) in Basibuyuk is based on alternative claims over land. It is grounded on different understandings and systems of property, and challenges the state’s property rights system. The community asserts their right over the land based on a model of property, which “vests title in those who labour upon the land” (Bromley, 1991, p. 62) and provides “a perfect justification for squatters” (Corr, 1999, p. 58). An elderly woman (anonymous I), who has been living in Basibuyuk for 36 years, supports this claim:

“I’ve been here since 1973. *I dug a well; I gave water to everyone from that well for 6 years.* No one has been through what I’ve been through. *This house was not built easily on top of this hill.* I won’t give my place to anyone.”

Similarly, an elderly man (anonymous A) claims Basibuyuk to be their own:

“All these people you see, they were young men when they came to here, now look at what they have become. *Three generations have lived here, we are the third generation.* I’ve come here when I was twelve, now I have

⁵⁴ As Basibuyuk is a neighbourhood in Maltepe rather than being a district itself, there are no statistics on Basibuyuk regarding the elections. However, interviews with the squatters and newspaper articles affirm the decline of support for the JDP.

grandchildren. *Before, nobody was interested in Basibuyuk. It was all mud, there were wolves. Now that it has become beautiful, they try to take it away from us.*"

Claims legitimized on the basis of labour are accompanied by significant sacrifices squatters have made in the process of settling and building their homes. Persistent health problems and the low education attainment of children are listed prominently by the Basibuyuk community:

"First of all, all our women in the neighbourhood have back problems. Why? They have carried its brick, its water, its soil, its cement on their backs. They have carried them all. One part of our bodies doesn't function. Now they come and tell us 'go away'! Let the rich tycoons come and live in villas here." (Anonymous B)

A daughter of one of the squatters (anonymous J) who could not go to school narrates:

"We have laboured all this much. We'll be put in those tiny apartments built on loose ground while this place will be 'made a present' to others. My mum has raised 5 children, she didn't, she couldn't send them to school in order to hold on to here. Its expenses, its costs..."

The relationship between state law and property-led social relations is not an independent one. Razzaz (1994) defines this relationship as one of legal plurality, a mutual interaction, where a plurality of 'property claims' defined by different institutions interact and influence one another. Santos (1977) treats this relationship as an unequal one, where state law remains the dominant legal system. In contrast to Razzaz and Santos, Azuela (1987) departs from a conception of legal plurality and "argues that illegal settlement processes are conditioned by state law" (Goluksuz, 2002, p. 2). While different 'forms of legitimation' may contravene and substitute for state law, they can never be independent from it and, indeed, they derive part of their legitimacy from it. This yields a fruitful framework to analyse how the Basibuyuk community complies with state law in order to gain and reinforce the legitimacy of their claims over the land.

For example, a strategy that the squatters have employed is to pay real-estate taxes for the land for which they have no official title deeds. Similarly, dwellers have also paid their local government fees and municipal services expenses, which they obtained through political

patronage. Despite the apparent idiosyncrasy of such practices, they constitute the basis of the squatters' property claims. They are upheld by the community as a showcase of their obedience to state law and henceforth, as a symbol of the legitimacy of their buildings (Yonder, 1987, p. 6), as explained by a squatter (anonymous A):

“The local municipality says ‘this place is not your right. It is our right’. We say ‘no, it is not yours.’ *We have paid our taxes since 1971 and the tax penalties. We have given money to the municipality when we were building our houses [meaning bribes].*”⁵⁵

Given the potential threat to losing their homes, ‘the mobilizing structure’ that has enabled the community -or in McAdam et.al’s (2001, p. 12) words ‘subjects’⁵⁶- to organize activism in Basibuyuk is the neighbourhood association. The association was founded at the end of 2006, after the dwellers learned that a clearance project would be undertaken. Many dwellers have underlined the importance of the association in informing them about the project and mobilizing their community against eviction. Kaya, who is himself a squatter without a deed to land, posits the enlightenment of people as the main goal of the association. This was confirmed by the interviewees who regarded the association as “the principal agent of raising awareness in the neighbourhood.”

Even though the neighbourhood association was the major mobilizing force amongst the community, “challengers”⁵⁷ (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 12) such as the Chamber of Architects, the Chamber of Urban Planners and other NGOs have also contributed to, and reinforced the resistance by informing the community about the implications of the proposed project and their legal rights:

⁵⁵ These practices, which pertain to the paradigm of state law, were also employed under the era of the moral economy of housing in Turkey. They were part of the negotiation process between squatters and the state, which generally resulted in amnesty laws and whereby the former legitimized its claims. Under the new property regime, the Basibuyuk community can no longer expect to get amnesty for their houses. Yet, these practices still constitute the basis of claim-making over the land for the community.

⁵⁶ The chapter adopts the definition by McAdam et al (2001, p. 12), defining subjects as “persons or groups not currently organised into constituted political actors.”

⁵⁷ Challengers are defined as “constituted political actors lacking routine access to government agents and resources” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 12).

“On the one hand, we have seen the victimhood. On the other hand, we started speaking to people and NGOs that were against the clearance projects. Who are these? The Chamber of Architects, the Chamber of Urban Planners, Contemporary Lawyers’ Association etc. We’ve seen that these projects are all over Turkey” (Kaya)

Figure 16: A protest in Basibuyuk



Source: (sendika.org, 16 April 2008)

The association has 1,350 members, the majority of whom are squatters living in the 400 decares area, and whom would be evicted within the first stage of the project. According to the figures Kaya provides, 95 percent of the population that is included in the first stage of the project support and take part in the acts of the association. This implies that the ‘actors’ of contentious politics are mainly home owners without title deeds to land. Since land owners are not initially included in the project, Kaya underlines the support from this group to be meagre. Members of the association contend that the level of support they receive from the tenants is strong. An activist woman⁵⁸ (anonymous L) states the following:

“In general, there is a high level of support from tenants. They [authorities] have said that they won’t provide tenants with the chance to own a flat in these 6 buildings. Fikri Kose [the ex-mayor] said it. What did the tenants

⁵⁸ Women have been very influential in Basibuyuk in the mobilization of resistance as well in its sustainment.

do after that? They said ‘aren’t we humans as being tenants? We also support the movement.’ They came with us to demonstrations, marches. They didn’t leave us alone.”

Figure 17: Activist women of Basibuyuk



Source: (Ogunc, 17 May 2008)

Notwithstanding the mobilizing agents, the prominent influencing factor, in the Basibuyuk activism, appears to be derived from their knowledge of other neighbourhood clearance projects. The experiences of these other communities have been discovered. As Kaya elaborated:

“We started our investigation. Just close-by, there was another project in Cambazbayırı, Pendik. We went there, we talked to people there, and we saw that they were deeply grieved. Then we heard about Ayazma, we went there, did some investigation. They couldn’t establish a neighbourhood association, because there was no collective resistance. Citizens say that they have debts worth of 42,000 TL [17,008 GBP]. Then we decided to found our association.”

Figure 18: Protest in Basibuyuk with symbolic graves for Karpuz and the Maltepe ex-mayor from the JDP



Source: (Atilim, 22 March 2008)

Some of the current residents of Bezirganbahce also describe how they have recounted their experiences of eviction and resettlement to the Basibuyuk community and assisted them with their mobilization efforts. An activist Kurdish tenant (anonymous M) explains:

“We went to Basibuyuk. There were around 100 people. I have told them my experiences. We had many meetings. Other neighbourhoods had a better chance [to resist] unlike Ayazma. Ayazma was the first, Ayazma turned out to be an example to them.”

Another middle-aged Kurdish man (anonymous Z), who was the head of the ‘Committee against the Demolition of Ayazma’, buttresses this account:

“My only aim is to enable other neighbourhoods not to be cheated. We had meetings in Basibuyuk, we had meetings in Bayramtepe [another squatter neighbourhood in Istanbul]. For example, people of Bayramtepe made barricades; they didn’t let them demolish their neighbourhood. We were always with them.”

It should be noted that the resistance in Basibuyuk was not one led by intellectuals or “outside political actors”. Even though various political party representatives visited the neighbourhood to reiterate their support, they were not a mobilizing force. The RPP, the main

opposition party, as an example, managed to canalize the resistance into votes in the local municipal elections after mobilization had already taken place. As such, the leadership of the movement as well as its actualization through its unique “repertoires of contention” was born of the enagement that the community itself felt. This is evident in the community’s narratives of violence it endured and the numerous confrontations it had with the police.⁵⁹ These narratives in turn feed the contentious politics and are fed by it.

Ayazma

The success of the Basibuyuk resistance suggests some of the reasons behind the failure of mobilization in Ayazma. Firstly, the Ayazma community has never been able to establish a neighbourhood association of its own; hence it lacked a major mobilizing agent, which was cardinal for Basibuyuk, and which increased the awareness of the community.⁶⁰ Secondly, the Ayazma project was amongst the pioneers of clearance projects undertaken in Turkey and was the first in Istanbul during the 2000s. Therefore, its dwellers were unable to draw upon the experiences and the knowledge of other neighbourhood clearance projects, especially to gain an understanding of the outcomes for those dwellers. This knowledge gained by the community of Ayazma was subsequently shared, with the people of Basibuyuk to the benefit of their own resistance.

⁵⁹ All the dwellers in Basibuyuk resort to a symbolic common language, mythologizing their confrontation with the police and local municipality officials. They draw a similarity between their own confrontation and the conflict between Israel and Palestine, which was on the agenda when fieldwork was conducted. By comparing the authorities with Israel, they reinforce their solidarity and most importantly assert the injustice they have been subjected to. Stories about dwellers’ being beaten, gassed and insulted by the police are told very frequently. As an example, an older man (anonymous E), who was serving tea in the election bureau of the RPP, documented their resistance and its adverse outcomes: “67 people have been arrested. One person became permanently disabled. One got paralysed, one got shot in his head, got into a coma and had an operation worth of 16,000 TL [6,479 GBP]. I got shot in my leg. The policemen threw a gas bomb into the mosque. This place is Palestine, they are Israel. 5,000 policemen came here.” Because of their resistance, the Basibuyuk community has also been accused of being ‘terrorists’, ‘provocateurs’, ‘drug dealers’ and engaging with ‘women trafficking’. The most striking example of it is the commentary by Bayraktar: “Those who are engaged in ‘dirty business’ like hashish smuggling and women trafficking, and also the terrorist groups try to prevent *gecekondu* transformation by using innocent people” (Sezen, 28 November 2007).

⁶⁰ A comprehensive investigation into the reasons behind the failure in establishing an association requires a more in-depth ethnographic study.

The Kucukcekmece municipality and the Housing Administration promote the Ayazma project as the paragon of community participation in its implementation. However, as squatters are not provided with the option of non-participation, and have no influence over where, and to what types of homes, they will be resettled, it is hard to conclude that the clearance projects provide any meaningful participation for communities. The process could rather be termed as one of persuasion that operates through clientelistic relations and exploits community ties, rather than one that seeks to build an informed community consensus.

Immigration in Turkey has generally been in the form of chain migration. Traditionally this resulted in the formation of migrant communities, based on the location of a home town or village (Karpat, 1976, pp. 118-119). These communities were generally 'guided' by the community leaders and are sustained through strong ties amongst the migrants. These ties are flexible and informal, nevertheless bearing loyalty and solidarity amongst the migrant community, and providing squatters a sense of belonging and identity (Erder, 1999, pp. 162-163). It is this structure of migrant communities that the local municipality exploited in order to persuade the squatters to sign contracts and acquiesce to the project.

The project has been implemented through clientelistic ties established between community leaders and the local municipality. These leaders, however, were not community leaders *per se*, who utilised their status and power as an instrument of persuasion, but those leaders who had close ties with the Kucukcekmece municipality and therefore, with the JDP. The reciprocal relationship was based on the community leaders' high status within their communities and the influence they exerted upon their groups. Such influence would be brought to bear in return for material gain granted by the municipality, which was in any event, to decide the amount of compensation to be offered to squatters in the form of flats in

Bezirganbahce.⁶¹ Many dwellers, who have been interviewed, underlined how certain ‘leaders’ became rich after the project was completed. A resident in Bezirganbahce (anonymous R) explains the process:

“They gave them flats. There is someone from Erzurum or Diyarbakir [cities in Turkey]. He knows a lot of people, maybe 50-100 households. They told him ‘we’ll give you 5-10 flats, you bring the people you know, make them sign the contracts.’ They [community leaders] hit the goldmine. When we came to Bezirganbahce, there were no flats for rent, these men had 10-20 spare flats. He came here with a *Sahin* [brand of an inexpensive car], now he has a *Megane*.”

Although there are many accounts of the same process from different dwellers, a Kurdish man (anonymous U) enunciates the bribery explicitly:

“They have tricked people like this. The *municipality itself bribed a few people, who in return signed the contracts*. Then others found no way out, they were forced to sign them.”

Along with targeting the community leaders, the Kucukcekmece municipality also tried to form proximate relationships with squatters. Many dwellers underlined how *mawlids* and *iftars* [dinners during the religious month of fasting] were organised by the municipality, to which the entire community was invited and which served to establish trust and familiarity between the authorities and the people. Babaoglu highlighted the extensive effort and time they devoted to establish personal relationships with each and every dweller:

“We gave so much of our time. There was no single wedding, circumcision feast or funeral we did not attend in the region.”

Nevertheless, efforts to persuade dwellers were not confined to such acts. An urban planner from the Administration’s Istanbul division, Tantan, pointed to another tool of persuasion, one that again works through clientelism and is justified by the word ‘aid’:

⁶¹ Though there is no data to make generalizations, it is anecdotal to mention that this patronage relationship got reversed for some dwellers that resisted the project or explicitly challenged the actions of the municipality. A squatter, who tried to mobilize the community and resisted the project all throughout, alleged that he had to pay 18,000 TL [7,289 GBP] more for the same flats. And, he was entitled to just one flat for his two squatter dwellings -they look more like rooms-, while he had to be entitled to two flats. Likewise, an activist Kurdish man, who is a supporter of the Kurdish party and who has overtly challenged the JDP municipality, claimed to be ‘given’ one flat in return for his two squatters.

“The local municipality’s relationship with people is very important. The Kucukcekmece municipality has been in constant dialogue with them. *For example, certain benefits in kind, from coal aids to...* They went to *iftars* to *persuade* people.”

Through ‘aid of coal and food supplies’, the municipality managed to exploit the nature of this relationship, which was “rooted in expectations of reciprocal rights and duties” (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972, p. 5). The expectation made of the squatters, in fulfilment of their reciprocal obligations, was to support the project.

Consequently, it was through the exploitation of these clientelistic relations, established with the squatter community and the community leaders that the local municipality succeeded in the implementation of the project, especially in the face of the lack of a collective resistance.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearance projects can be described as continuing the implementation of the entrepreneurial task to make Istanbul a world city. This task is closely aligned with the global and liberal reorientation of the Turkish economy, with regard to the post-1980 neoliberal world economy, where cities become prominent engines of economic growth and avenues of competition.

This dissertation repudiates the proposition of the world city hypothesis which anticipates the retrenchment of the state. Rather, the state, in Turkey, is seen to play a prominent role in the transition of Istanbul to a world city. Projects represent a form of capitalist urban redevelopment of squatter neighbourhoods. The two case studies chosen demonstrate that they comply with the rent gap theory regarding the selection of a squatter neighbourhood for clearance, and the theory of gentrification regarding the outcomes.

The projects aggravate the differences, and deepen the inequalities, between squatters as a result of the formalization of land use and ownership rights and the rules and relations of the new property regime. Despite the authorities' stated intentions to enable each squatter to live a decent life, in modern homes, those who cannot meet their monthly payments are deprived of their homes, in which they are expected to have an ownership right. This deprivation is compounded since squatters are already deprived of their self-built homes, their claims over which are delegitimized by the property rights system enforced by the state.

This new era of 'immoral economy of housing' embodies a shift in the state-squatter relations. The latter is no longer secured access to the use of state land and the use of clientelistic ties to secure title deeds becomes obsolete. The market progressively becomes the arbitrator in the allocation of land. Squatters are left to operate within the contours of the market economy.

Within this framework, the question of who has the right to the city becomes more crucial. As squatters are compulsorily enslaved to 'urban captivities' through clearance projects over which they have no say, they are subject to a symbolic deportation, are made invisible in the city space as well as in its new image and are progressively denied this right. Clearance projects, far from saving squatters from 'blight', aggravate their marginality. The defence of this right for the squatters at present is to be taken under this new property regime, and more importantly against its 'a-morality'. In this respect, the fight for the right to Istanbul constitutes the domain of conflicting claims over land, whereby the squatters and the state each claim the land to be their own. It is the politics of property in urban land that defines the avenue through which the squatters fight for their right as Istanbul continues to open its arms to the world. It remains to be seen, however, whether they will ever find a home in it.

NOTES

1. All TL-GBP conversions are made based on the exchange rate of June 6, 2009.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS

Date	Location	Name of Interviewee	Interviewee
19.03.09	Housing Administration of Turkey, Ankara	Mehmet Ali Kahraman	Consultant of Chair of Housing Administration, City and district planner
19.03.09	Housing Administration of Turkey, Ankara	B. Gul Deliktas	Head of Strategy Development Department
19.03.09	Housing Administration of Turkey, Ankara	Gurol Konyalioglu	Head of Urban Regeneration and Public Works Department
19.03.09	Housing Administration of Turkey, Ankara	Yalcin Demirtas	Urban Planner
19.03.09	Middle East Technical University	Dr. Cagatay Keskinok	Urban and District Planner
19.03.09	Housing Administration of Turkey, Istanbul Division, Istanbul	Ali Seydi Karaoglu	Real Estate Director
20.03.09	Housing Administration of Turkey, Istanbul Division, Istanbul	Banu Tantan	Urban Planning Expert
20.03.09	Maltepe Municipality, Istanbul	Ali Ergun	Vice-Mayor
20.03.09	Kucukcekmece Municipality, Istanbul	Bulent Babaoglu	Urban Planner, Head of Urban Transformation Division
23.03.09	Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Istanbul	Mahmut Kocamese	Head of Department of Real Estate Management
23.03.09	Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Ayhan Kapruz	Local Headman
23.03.09	Republican People's Party Election Bureau, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous A	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
24.03.09	Coffeehouse, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous B	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
24.03.09	Coffeehouse, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous C	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
24.03.09	Coffeehouse, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous D	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
24.03.09	Republican People's Party Election Bureau, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous E	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
24.03.09	Coffeehouse, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous F	Squatter, Construction worker, (Basibuyuk)
25.03.09	Chamber of Architects, Istanbul	Mucella Yapici	Professional
25.03.09	Chamber of Urban Planners, Istanbul	Pinar Ozden	Professional, writer

25.03.09	Chamber of Urban Planners, Istanbul	Tayfun Kahraman	Official
25.03.09	Basibuyuk Neighborhood Association, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Adem Kaya	Squatter (Basibuyuk), Head of Neighborhood Association
26.03.09	Office, Kadikoy, Istanbul	Ziya Celik	Lawyer (Basibuyuk)
26.03.09	Sales office of a gated community, Istanbul	Anonymous G	Marketing Manager
27.03.09	Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Istanbul	Tevfik Uysal	Official at Department of Real Estate Management
27.03.09	Kucukcekmece Municipality	Eda Cactas	Urban Planner, Head of Planning and Design Department
27.03.09	Basibuyuk Neighborhood Association, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous H	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
27.03.09	Squatter, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous I	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
27.03.09	Squatter, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous J	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
27.03.09	Squatter, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous K	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
27.03.09	Squatter, Basibuyuk, Istanbul	Anonymous L	Squatter (Basibuyuk)
28.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous M	Tenant in Ayazma, lived in tent, current resident in Bezirganbahce
28.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous N	Tenant in Ayazma, lived in tent, current resident in Bezirganbahce
28.03.09	Flat, Neighborhood of Ataturk, Istanbul	Anonymous O	Tenant in Ayazma, lived in tent, current resident in Ataturk
28.03.09	Ayazma, Istanbul	Anonymous P	Owner of land and dwelling
28.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous R	Dwelling owner in Ayazma, current resident in Bezirganbahce
30.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous S	Dwelling owner in Ayazma, current resident in Bezirganbahce
30.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous T	Dwelling owner in Ayazma, current resident in Bezirganbahce
30.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous U	Dwelling owner in Ayazma, current resident in Bezirganbahce
30.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous V	Dwelling owner in Ayazma, current resident in Bezirganbahce
31.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous Y	Resident in Bezirganbahce (not a squatter)
31.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous Z	Head of Committee against Demolition in Ayazma, dwelling owner, current resident in Bezirganbahce
31.03.09	Flat, Bezirganbahce, Istanbul	Anonymous AA	Dwelling owner in Ayazma, current resident in Bezirganbahce

APPENDIX B: Documents by the Maltepe Municipality regarding Compensation

T.C.
TOPLU KONUT İDARESİ BAŞKANLIĞI
MALTEPE BELEDİYE BAŞKANLIĞI
BAŞBÜYÜK MAHALLESİ
HAK SAHİPLİĞİ DEĞERLENDİRME FORMU

Analiz No:
1

Malik Adı: Ferid Koçak
Baba Adı:
Doğum Yeri / Tarihi:
Açıklamalar:
Adres:

Tapu Tahr. Emlak Vahi. Emlak Mük. Eml. Mük. Su Mük. T.Y. Mük. T.C. Kimlik No:

Maliyet / Koy: Başbüyük **Mevki:** Maltepe **Ada No:** 1391 **Parcel No:** 13 **Parcel Alanı (m²):** 772.800.00 **Pay / Payda:**

Taşınmaz Cinsi: **Taşınmaz Alanı (m²):** **2008 Yılı Harca Esas Taşınmaz Değeri (YTL/m²):** **2009 Yılı Risyto Taşınmaz Değeri (YTL/m²):**

Tapu Tahsis: 400.00 **2008 Yılı Harca Esas Taşınmaz Değeri (YTL/m²):** 100.00 **2009 Yılı Risyto Taşınmaz Değeri (YTL/m²):** 40.000.00

Takdir Edilen Toplam Bedel (YTL):

Sınıf / Yapı Türü (Cins)	Kat	Başlangıç Adedi	Kullanım Amacı	İnşaat Alanı (m ²)	2008 Yılı Birim		TAHİSİLİ		Tutar (YTL)	
					Fiyat (YTL)	Maliyet (YTL)	Yas (Y0)	Acama (Y1)		
Yıkma Tek Katlı Konut	1	1	konut	80.56	389.00	32.143.44	15	25	8.025.88	24.167.56
Mişinimlet				29.54	65.00	1.920.10	15	25	480.00	1.440.08
Diğer				43.00	65.00	2.785.00	15	15	418.26	2.376.76
									Genel Yapı Bedeli Toplamı (YTL)	27.923.41

fotoğraf ön cephe

60/100 yapı kroketi

fotoğraf yan cephe

Alan Cinsi	Adet	Yas (Y0)	Fiyat (YTL)	Tutar (YTL)
Kiraz	5	10	122.00	610.00
Elk	7	10	61.00	427.00
Elma	9	10	111.00	999.00
Ceviz	4	10	122.00	488.00

Ağaç Genel Toplam (YTL): 2524.00

Komisyonca takdir edilen arsa bedeli (YTL): 40.000.00

Muhtesat Bedeli (YTL): 27.923.41

Ağaç Bedeli (YTL): 2524.00

Toplam Bedel (YTL): 70.447.41 → total sum

Enkaz + Ağaç Bedeli: 5,316.34 YTL olup **Fark Bedeli:** 65,131.06 YTL'dir

Fark Bedeli 24/02/2006 tarihli protokol kapsamında arsa bedeli karşılığında Maltepe Belediyesi'nce mahsuplaşma yolu ile karşılanacaktır.

24/02/2006 tarihli Maltepe Başbüyük Kentel Yenileme Protokolüne ilişkin hazırlanan değerlendirme raporudur. 22/06/2008

Kamlayıcı Başlatıcı **Öye** **Öye**

Ahmet DEMİRCİOĞLU Çetin ÇANKUR Ali Sevil KARAOĞLU

Maltepe Belediyesi (Harita Müh.) Maltepe Belediyesi (Harita Müh.) TOKİ (Emlak Şube Müdürü)

↙ difference amount (total sum wreckage payment)





T.C.
TOPLU KONUT İDARESİ BAŞKANLIĞI
MALTEPE BELEDİYE BAŞKANLIĞI
BAŞİBÜYÜK MAHALLESİ
HAK SAHİPLİĞİ DEĞERLENDİRME FORMU

Analiz No:
6

Malik Adı	Baba Adı	Doğum Yeri / Tarihi	Açıklamalar	Adres:						
Cafer Kemur										
<input type="checkbox"/> Tapu Teh.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Eml.Verg.Bey.	<input type="checkbox"/> Eml.Mak.	<input type="checkbox"/> Etk.Mak.	<input type="checkbox"/> Su Mak.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yr. Mak.	T.C. Kimlik No:				
İli	İstanbul	İlçesi	Maltepe	Ara No	Parsel No	Parsel Alanı (m ²)	Pay /Payda			
Mah.Köy	Başibüyük	Mevki:								
Taşınmaz Cinsi	Taşınmaz Alanı (m ²)	2008 Yılı Haros E. İle Taşınmaz Değeri (YTL/m ²)	2008 Yılı Rayiçe Taşınmaz Değeri (YTL/m ²)	????						
Takdir Edilen Toplam Bedel (YTL)										
Sınıf / Yapı Tarzı (Cinsi)	Kat Adedi	Bağimsiz BSL.Say.	Kullanım Amaçı	İnsaat Alanı (m ²)	2008 Yılı Birim Fiyat (YTL)	Maliyet (YTL)	Yas (Yıl)	Aşınma (%)	Aşınma Tutarı	Tutarı (YTL)
Yığılma 1 Katlı Konut	1		konut	13.20	399.00	5,266.80	8	18	948.02	4,318.78
Yığılma 1 Katlı Konut		1	konut	52.58	399.00	20,971.44	8	18	3,774.86	17,196.58
Temel				100.00	60.00	6,000.00	8	12	720.00	5,280.00
Duvar				10.00	65.00	650.00	8	18	117.00	533.00
Genel Yapı Bedelli Toplamı (YTL)										27,323.36


fotoğraf ön cephe	ölçülere yapı kroki																									
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	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Ağaç Cinsi</th> <th>Adet</th> <th>Yas (Yıl)</th> <th>Fiyat (YTL)</th> <th>Tutarı (YTL)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Viyane</td> <td>15</td> <td>10</td> <td>82.00</td> <td>1,380.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Kayısı</td> <td>7</td> <td>10</td> <td>81.00</td> <td>427.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Kavek</td> <td>21</td> <td>10</td> <td>42.00</td> <td>882.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4">Ağaç Genel Toplam (YTL) :</td> <td>2889.00</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Ağaç Cinsi	Adet	Yas (Yıl)	Fiyat (YTL)	Tutarı (YTL)	Viyane	15	10	82.00	1,380.00	Kayısı	7	10	81.00	427.00	Kavek	21	10	42.00	882.00	Ağaç Genel Toplam (YTL) :				2889.00
Ağaç Cinsi	Adet	Yas (Yıl)	Fiyat (YTL)	Tutarı (YTL)																						
Viyane	15	10	82.00	1,380.00																						
Kayısı	7	10	81.00	427.00																						
Kavek	21	10	42.00	882.00																						
Ağaç Genel Toplam (YTL) :				2889.00																						

wreckage payment

Komisyonca takdir edilen arsa bedeli(YTL)	0.00
Muhtesat Bedeli (YTL):	27,323.36
Ağaç Bedeli(YTL) :	2889.00
Toplam Bedel (YTL):	30,017.36
Enkaz + Ağaç Bedeli :	5,421.84 YTL olup
Fark Bedeli :	24,595.52 YTL'dir
Fark Bedeli 24/02/2006 tarihli protokol kapsamında arsa bedeli kapsamında Maltepe Belediyesiince mahsuplaşma yolu ile karşılanacaktır.	
24/02/2006 tarihli Maltepe Başibüyük Kentsel Yenileme Protokolüne ilişkin hazırlanan değerlendirme raporudur. 22/05/2008	
Komisyon Başkanı	Üye
Ahmet DEMİRCİOĞLU	Selim BASHASANOĞLU
Maltepe Belediyesi (Şehirci Müh.)	Maltepe Belediyesi (İnsaat Müh.)
	TOKİ (Emlak Müdüğü)

total sum

difference amount (total sum - wreckage payment)



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