|
All the official materials will be posted on Canvas.
OUTLINE:
3/15: Axiomatization (what, why, how, relation to
identification), Mixture set,
Proof of Von
Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem;
Readings: MWG, pp. 175-8
3/20: Static Bayesian games (continuous strategy
spaces), Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,
Harsanyi's
trick, Standard auction formats, First-price auction, Winner's curse;
Readings: Gibbons 3.1.C,
3.2B+Appendix 3.2B, MWG, pp. 865-6
3/22: First-price auction (Linear equilibrium and
general solution for the monotone BNE),
Second-price auction;
Readings: Jehle and Reny 9.1, 9.2.1-9.2.4
3/24: Revenue Equivalence Theorem, Stochastic
orders, Double auction, Myerson-Satterthwaite
Theorem;
Readings: MWG 6.D, Gibbons
3.2.C, (Salanie 3.2.3, optional)
4/3: Adverse selection, Akerlof's
Market for Lemons
Readings: MWG 13.A-B (or
Jehle and Reny 8.1.1))
4/5: Spence's Job Signaling model,
Single-Crossing Property
Readings: MWG 13.C
(Gibbons 4.2.B offers a nice treatment, though it's not a substitute)
4/12: Costly signaling games, Equilibrium
Dominance, Intuitive Criterion
Readings: MWG
Appendix A in Ch 13, The relevant part of Gibbons 4.4
4/17: Principal-agent problems, Screening,
Price discrimination, Information rent
Readings: Salanie 2.2, MWG 14.C
4/19: Moral hazard, Incentives versus risk
sharing, Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
Readings: MWG 14.B
4/24: Costless signaling games, Partitional
equilibrium
Readings: Salanie 4.3.2 (Gibbons 4.3.A, optional)
4/26: Adverse selection with a continuum of types,
Incentive compatibility in general mechanisms
Readings: MWG, pp.
887-9
5/1: Mechanism design, Direct mechanism, Revelation
Principle
Readings: MWG, pp.
884-5, 889-891
HOME
|
|