Kenneth Hendricks

Ken Hendricks is Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His primary field of research is industrial organization. He has conducted theoretical and empirical studies on bidding behavior in auctions. His research also includes studies on the demand for music, games of timing, sender-receiver games, and airline networks. He currently holds the Christensen Chair of Economics at University of Wisconsin-Madison. He currently holds the Christensen Distinguished Chair of Economics at University of Wisconsin-Madison and is on the editorial board of the Journal of Industrial Economics. He is a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research and a Fellow of the Econometric Society.

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Curriculum Vitae

[PDF version]


Professional Experience

Editorial and Referee Service

Other Professional Activities




Canadian citizen, U.S. citizen

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  1. “How to Sell in a Sequential Auction Market”, (with Tom Wiseman), Theoretical Economics, November 2022, pp. 1451-1471. [PDF]
  2. “A Theory of Indicative Bidding”, (with Daniel Quint), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2018, 10(2), pp. 118-151. [PDF]
  3. “Auctioning Resource Rights”, (with Robert Porter), Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2014, 6, 175–190. [PDF]
  4. “Auctions and Bid Rigging”, (with R. Preston McAfee, Michael Williams), Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, 2014, 2, 498–522. [PDF]
  5. “Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry, ” (with Ilke Onur, Tom Wiseman), Review of Industrial Organization, 2012, 40, 1-19. [PDF]
  6. “Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods”, (with Alan Sorensen, Tom Wiseman), American Economic Journals: Microeconomics , 2012, 4, 1-31. (Winner of the AEJ Micro Best Paper Award, 2015) [PDF]
  7. "Recent U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Bidding: A Progress Report" (with Philip Haile and Robert H. Porter), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28, July 2010, 390-396. [PDF]
  8. “Theory of Bilateral Oligopoly” (with R. Preston McAfee), Economic Inquiry, 48, 2, April 2010, 391-414. [PDF]
  9. “Information and Skewness of Music Sales”, (with Alan Sorensen), Journal of Political Economy, 117 (2), April, 2009, pp. 324-369. [PDF]
  10. “Bidding Rings and the Winner’s Curse: The Case of Offshore Federal Oil and Gas Lease Auctions,” (with R. Porter and G. Tan), The RAND Journal , 39, 4, Winter 2008, 1018-1041. [PDF]
  11. “Evaluating the Likely Effects of Horizontal and Vertical Mergers”, (with R. Preston McAfee and M. Williams), Antitrust Report, Issue 2, pp. 33-40, 2007. [PDF]
  12. “A Survey of Empirical Work in Auctions,” (with R. Porter), in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. III, edited by R. Porter and M. Armstrong, Vickers, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2007. [PDF]
  13. “Price Discrimination and Irrational Consumers: A Discussion”, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress of the Econometrics Society, Volume II, eds. R. Blundell, W. Newey, and T. Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006. [PDF]
  14.  “Feints,” (with R. Preston McAfee), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2007.  [PDF]
  15. “Evolution of the Market for Air-Travel Information”, (with Michael Doane and Preston McAfee), in Advances in Applied Microeconomics: Organizing the New Industrial Economy, [PDF]
    edited by Michael R. Baye, Elsevier, 2004.
  16. “Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions,” (with J. Pinkse and R. Porter), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70(1), January, 2003. [PDF]
  17. “Measuring Anti-competitive Effects of Mergers when Buyer Power is Concentrated, (with R. Preston McAfee, Michael A. Williams, Joshua M. Fried, and Melanie Stallings Williams), Texas Law Review 2001, Vol. 79, 6, pp 1621-1639. [PDF]
  18. “Equilibria in Networks,” (with M. Piccione and G. Tan), Econometrica, November 1999. [PDF]
  19. “Entry and Exit in Hub-Spoke Networks,” (with M. Piccione and G. Tan), The RAND Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, summer 1997, pp. 291– 303. [PDF]
  20. “Determinants of the Timing and Incidence of Exploratory Drilling on Offshore Wildcat Tracts,” (with R. Porter), American Economic Review, vol. 86 (3), June 1996, pp. 388–407. [PDF]
  21. “The Economics of Hubs: The Case of Monopoly,” (with M. Piccione and G. Tan), Review of Economic Studies, 62, January 1995, pp. 83–99. [PDF]
  22. “A Survey of Recent Empirical Work Concerning Auctions,” (with H. Paarsch), Canadian Journal of Economics, ed. by W. B. MacLeod and M. Poitevin, May 1995, pp. 403–426. [PDF]
  23. “Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price,” (with R. Porter and C. A. Wilson), Econometrica, 62, November 1994, pp. 1415–1444. [PDF]
  24. “Bidding Behavior in OCS Drainage Auctions: Theory and Evidence,” (with R. Porter), European Economic Review, 37, March 1993, pp. 320–328. [PDF]
  25. “Optimal Selling Strategies for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Buyer, ” (with R. Porter and G. Tan), American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 83, No. 2, May 1993, pp. 234–239. [PDF]
  26. “Joint Bidding in Federal OCS Auctions,” (with R. Porter), American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 82, No. 2, May 1992, pp. 506–511. [PDF]
  27. “Reputations in the Adoption of New Technology,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, December 1992, pp. 663–677. [PDF]
  28. “Equilibrium in Preemption Games with Complete Information,” (with C. Wilson) in Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honor of David Gale. Ed. M. Majumdar, MacMillan Press, 1992, pp. 123–147. [PDF]
  29. “Random Reservation Prices and Bidding Behavior in OCS Drainage Auctions ”, (with R. Porter, R. Spady), Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXXII (2) (Pt. 2), October 1989, pp. S83–S106. [PDF]
  30. “Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, and Efficiency: The Case of Oil Exploration,” (with D. Kovenock), The Rand Journal of Economics , Vol. 20, No. 2, summer 1989, pp. 164–182. [PDF]
  31. “Collusion in Auctions,” Annales d’Economie ET de Statistique, No. 15/16, Juillet–Décembre, 1989, pp. 218–230. [PDF]
  32. “An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information” (with R. Porter), American Economic Review, Vol. 78 (5), December 1988, pp. 865–883. [PDF]
  33. “The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information” (with A. Weiss and C. A. Wilson), International Economic Review, Vol. 29 (4), November 1988, pp. 663–680. [PDF]
  34. “Information and Returns in OCS Auctions, 1954–1969” (with R. Porter and B. Bourdreau), Journal of Industrial Economics, XXXV (1987), pp. 517–542. [PDF]
  35. “A Note on the Core of the Overlapping Generation Model” (with K. Judd and D. Kovenock), Economics Letters, 6 (1980), pp. 95–97. [PDF]
  36. “Canadian Perspectives on the Alaska Highway Pipeline: Modeling the Alternatives” (with J. Helliwell and D. Williams) in Energy Modeling: Canadian and U.S. Experiences. Edited by W. Ziemba et al., Hingham, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, Vol. II, pp. 279–317.
  37. “An Integrated Simulation Approach to the Analysis of Canadian Energy Policies” (with J. Helliwell, B. Duncan et al.), Journal of Business Administration, 10 (1979), pp. 283–94.
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Working Papers

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Lecture Notes

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