Here are some possible topics and readings for the second half of Econ 805 – we can discuss which ones look most interesting.  At the bottom of this page are suggestions for possible papers for student presentations – they’re focused on auction theory, but I’m happy to have presentations on any other micro theory-related topic as well (for example, the papers listed here that we don’t get to).

 

 

Matching Markets – Theory

 

Roth, Alvin, and Marilda Sotomayor (1992), Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge University Press.

 

Gale, David, and Lloyd Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly 69

 

Kelso, Alexander, Jr., and Vincent Crawford (1982), “Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes,” Econometrica 50

 

Coles, Peter, and Muriel Niederle (2007), “Signaling in Matching Markets,” working paper

 

Hatfield, John, and Paul Milgrom (2005), “Matching with Contracts,” American Economic Review 95.4

 

Ostrovsky, Michael (2008), “Stability in Supply Chain Networks,” American Economic Review 98.3

 

 

 

Matching Markets – Applications

 

Frechette, Guillaume, Alvin Roth, and Utku Unver (2007), “Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls,” RAND Journal of Economics 38.4

 

Roth, Alvin, Tayfun Somnez, and Utku Unver (2005), “Pairwise Kidney Exchange,” Journal of Economic Theory 125.2

 

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, and Tayfun Somnez (2003), “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach,” American Economic Review 93.3

 

 

 

Bargaining

 

Rubinstein, Ariel (1982), “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica 50.1

 

Crawford, Vincent (1982), “A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining,” Econometrica 50.3

 

Myerson, Roger, and Mark Satterthwaite (1983), “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,” Journal of Economic Theory 29.2

 

Admati, Anat, and Motty Perry (1987), “Strategic Delay in Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies 54.3

 

Fernandez, Raquel, and Jacob Glazer (1991), “Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents,” American Economic Review 81.1

 

Yildiz, Muhamet (2003), “Bargaining Without a Common Prior – An Immediate Agreement Theorem,” Econometrica 71.3

 

Feinberg, Yossi, and Andy Skrzypacz (2005), “Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining,” Econometrica 73.1

 

Fuchs, William, and Andy Skrzypacz (2008), “Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders,” working paper

 

Yildiz, Muhamet (2004), “Waiting to Persuade,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119.1

 

Smith, Lones, and Ennio Stacchetti (2002), “Aspirational Bargaining,” working paper

 

Caruana, Guillermo, Liran Einav, and Daniel Quint (2007), “Multilateral Bargaining with Concession Costs,” Journal of Economic Theory 132.1

 

Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson (1982), “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory 27

 

 

 

Signaling and Screening

 

In-Koo Cho and David Kreps (1987), “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102.2

 

Riley, John (2001), “Silver Signals: 25 Years of Screening and Signaling,” Journal of Economic Literature 39.2

 

Kremer, Ilan, and Andy Skrzypacz (2007), “Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown,” Journal of Economic Theory 133.1

 

 

 

Some papers that might be interesting for student presentations

 

 

 

First, a few on this year’s syllabus that we probably won’t get into much in class:

 

Eric Maskin and John Riley (1984), “Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,” Econometrica 52 (link)

 

Eric Maskin and John Riley (2000), “Asymmetric Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies 67 (link)

 

Ronald Harstad, Aleksandar Pekec, and Ilia Tsetlin (2008), “Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders,” Games and Economic Behavior 62 (link)

 

Nathan Larson (2005), “Private Value Perturbations and Informational Advantage in Common Value Auctions,” working paper (link)

 

Angel Hernando-Veciana (2007), “Information Acquisition in Auctions: Sealed Bids vs. Open Bids,” working paper (link)

 

 

 

Some nice miscellaneous theory:

 

David McAdams and Michael Schwartz, “Who Pays When Auction Rules Are Bent” (working paper)

 

Hafalir, Isa, and Vijay Krishna (2008), “Asymmetric Auctions with Resale” (AER)

 

Faruk Gul and Ennio Stacchetti (2000), “The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities” (JET)

 

Ilan Kremer and Kjell Nyborg (2004), “Divisible Good Auctions – The Role of Allocation Rules” (RAND)

 

Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal (2006), “The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices” (JET)

 

Matt Jackson and Ilan Kremer (2004), “The relationship between the allocation of goods and a sellers revenue” (Journal of Mathematical Economics)

 

Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu (2007), “Mixed Bundling Auctions” (JET)

 

Peter Crampton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer (1987), “Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently” (Econometrica)

 

Peter Eso and Balasz Szentes (2007), “Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions” (Review of Economic Studies 74)

 

Balasz Szentes (2005), “Equilibrium Transformation and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem” (JET)

 

 

 

Some auction-related experiments:

 

Gary Charness and Dan Levin, “The Origin of the Winners Curse: A Laboratory Study” (working paper)

 

John List and David Lucking-Reiley (2000), “Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment.” (AER) – see also a related  comment and reply by the authors

 

 

 

Some empirical auction papers:

 

Patrick Bajari and Lixin Ye, “Competition Versus Collusion in Procurement Auctions: Identification and Testing” (working paper)

 

Phil Haile and Elie Tamer (2003), “Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions” (JPE)

 

Al Roth and Axel Ockenfels (2002) “Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet” (AER)

 

Pai Xu, Artyom Shneyerov, and Vadim Marmer (2007), “What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions?  A Nonparametric Approach” (working paper)

 

 

 

And finally, a few papers dropped from last year’s syllabus:

 

Kenneth Hendricks and Robert Porter (1989), “Collusion in Auctions” (Annales d’Economie et de Statistique)

 

R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan (1992), “Bidding Rings” (AER)

 

Lawrence Ausubel (2004), “An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects” (AER)

 

B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986), “Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence” (QJE)

 

Lawrence Ausubel and Paul Milgrom (2002), “Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding” (Frontiers of Theoretical Economics)